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Introduction
Looking Proper Answers in African, Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries
Samwel Ong’wen Okuro*
Alicia Puyana Mutis**
It was fortunate that three organIzatIons joined efforts 
to organize the seminar “Strategies against Poverty: Designs from the 
North and Alternatives from the South” in which academics from af-
rica and Latin america examined the policies and the programmes to 
eradicate poverty in both continents. the purpose of the seminar was 
to open a space to debate alternative theoretical approaches on  the 
causes of poverty and to explore the, some times diverging, strategies 
to its eradication as proposed by the North, donors and multilateral 
organizations, and by the south, governments and non-governmental 
organizations. the particular interest in studying poverty in the con-
text of developing countries, often called the south, is to show the 
profound socio-economic inequalities existing in these countries and 
the problems that result when the programs are structured to mitigate 
poverty are, in too many cases, a mere the incorporation to local sce-
narios of the universal policies, from international agencies and fund-
ing. these programs made with the idea that one size fits all, ignore 
the needs, priorities and realities of individual countries and regions 
and only meet the north’s neoliberal paradigms.
 * PhD in economic history. Lecturer at Maseno university.
** D. Phil in economics by oxford university. Lecturer at fLaCso-México.
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the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLaCso), the 
Comparative Research Programme on Poverty (CroP) and the South-
South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of development 
(sePhIs) share similar preoccupations and pursuit the matching 
objectives: how developing countries can construct societies that are 
inclusive, less discriminatory and more just and democratic. the task 
is how to eradicate extreme poverty and to achieve rates of economic 
growth that are high enough to guarantee better employment and in-
comes for the fast growing population while protecting the environ-
ment and preserving the habitat for future generations. It means that 
developing countries have to structure a model for economic growth 
quite different to the one followed by developed countries that did 
not put attention to saving  limited, renewable and non renewable 
resources. 
CLaCso main objective is to create and consolidate a forum to 
discuss the political, economic and social problems affecting Latin 
american countries, from a regional comparative perspective and 
with a clear compromise to support democracy and the respect of 
human rights for all citizens. CroP, forms part of the International 
social science Council Programmes on poverty and is cosponsored 
by the university of Bergen which hosts the secretariat. CroP mobi-
lizes critical poverty research and education on poverty. CroP’s main 
objective is to develop a critical global poverty research agenda and 
to foster and coordinate an interdisciplinary south-south and south-
north comparative research.  sePhIs, a programme funded by the 
netherlands Ministry of Development Cooperation, aims at encourag-
ing the formation of a south-south network directed towards com-
parative historical research on long-term processes of change. se-
PhIs is focusing on two sub-themes that run through the histories 
of national and local development and underdevelopment in recent 
times: identity and equity. 
there is no need to stress the relevance of comparative analysis 
of the effects of colonial and neo-colonial powers to understand the 
factors constraining economic growth in developing countries. the 
works discussed in the seminar, and presented in this book constitute 
one step in the direction of finding both, similar problems and akin 
solutions and to envision policies that respond to local and national 
history, conditions and priorities.
A Dash of History
africa and Latin share some elements of history and characteristics. 
Both continents were colonized by european powers: france, spain, 
holland and great Britain, amongst others. In order to consolidate 
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their political and economic power, the colonial metropolis inserted 
these rich and immense territories into the world market and, in do-
ing so they radically distorted the colonies economic, social and cul-
tural structures and traditions. In that process, everything was altered: 
religion, languages, social structures and institutions. strong cultures 
and civilizations adapted to the ones introduced by colonial powers. 
a dynamic and vibrant syncretism preserved deeply rooted principles 
and values and created new ones. 
africa and america, all the western hemisphere, were joined 
by the terrible human trade. today, the two continents have many 
common elements that constitute strong linkages and can be source 
of solid solidarity relations. the common roots can be found in all 
artistic manifestations, from music and dance to literature, cinema 
and painting. Common roots are evident as well in the search for new 
institutions and policies to confront and overcome the problems that 
put a break to development and progress. Despite all the effort, in both 
continents severe social and political exclusion, poverty and income 
concentration prevent large segments of their population to enjoy and 
to take advantage of the development so far achieved. 
But there are some differences as well. spain was the colonial 
power of south and Central Latin american countries while Brazil 
was a Portuguese colony. france, england, holland, Portugal colo-
nized african and asia and some countries Caribbean countries. that 
led to the establishment of diverse colonial institutional frame that 
prevailed even after the colonialism. Independence and decoloniza-
tion took place in quite different circumstances, separated from each 
other for more than a century. that difference is crucial to understand-
ing some characteristics of the course of constructing the states, the 
institutions, in short the “nation building path” in the new republics. 
almost all Latin american countries achieved independence be-
fore the end of the second decade of the nineteenth Century, after 
long wars with spain. Independence leaders were spaniards borne in 
Latin america fiercely committed to free trade. During the last quarter 
of the nineteenth Century, policy makers were familiar with ricardo, 
smith and John stuart Mill’s economic works [something missing]. 
they were interested in trading with england without the mediation 
of spain. free trade was needed to pay the debt acquired mainly with 
england to finance the war. Independence did not have any national 
economic project different to engage in free trade. the idea of nation 
building did not contemplate to integrate indigenous population or 
population of african origin. 
Brazil has a unique history: the Portuguese the emperor, and the 
metropolitan government, were moved to the colony and the empire 
Strategies against Poverty
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was planted there. It lasted until 1864 when the republic was estab-
lished, under the pressure of militaries and the powerful coffee ex-
porters. no war of destruction took place. 
By 1860 liberal economic model was totally embedded and fully 
implanted in the newly born Latin american republics. It lasted up to 
mid twentieth Century (fitzgerald, 2005). It was only in the twentieth 
Century, particularly in the interwar period, economics was raised as 
an independent branch of knowledge, aiming at creating an “elite” 
with technical expertise and to rationalized public administration. In 
the interwar period there was the strong believe that policy makers 
and experts had better to be preoccupied with practical questions and 
not to dedicate to the theoretical aspects of the economy or the sociol-
ogy. this was left to the scholars from the metropolis. 
By the end of the second world war, when independence of many 
african and Caribbean nations took place, the ideas of state interven-
tion and planning were in fashion all over the world, Latin america 
included. thanks to Keynes, Leontief, rosestein-rodan, nurse and 
the successes of the soviet union, state intervention was justified in 
order to foster growth and to lead the structural change that will de-
liver modernization and social change, while reducing the depend-
ence of international commodities markets which generates economic 
instability and periodical crisis. raúl Prebisch and the united nations 
economic Commission for Latin america and the Caribbean (eCLaC) 
formulated the conceptual frame for import substitution policies, 
putting into practice the ideas of the Litz and other economist pre-
occupied with industrialization. eCaLC ideas were adopted in all 
third world countries instrumented by unCtaD and other multilat-
eral organizations, included the world Bank. By the early fifties, the 
state lead industrialization model was implemented not only in Latin 
america but also elsewhere in the developing world. all embraced the 
economic planning that was supported by the need to order the as-
sistance programmes of the world Bank to build infrastructure and 
heavy industry and to guarantee the supply of raw materials for the 
reconstruction of the world economy. 
In late fifties and early sixties, new african, Caribbean and asian 
republics initiated the process of constructing the republican institu-
tions and instrumenting their own policies while south and Central 
american republics engaged in the task of reforming the almost a cen-
tury old liberal institutions by adopting some elements of the devel-
opmental state. this time, africa and Latin america share the same 
pattern of ideas and policies for economic development. 
the development policies, and the theory that supported them, 
that were instrumented in the decolonization of asia and africa and 
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adopted by Latin american countries in the fifties, conceived mod-
ernization as the ultimate goal of development. “the process of devel-
opment consisted, on this theory, of moving from traditional society, 
which was taken as the polar opposite of the modern type, through a 
series of stages of development –derived essentially from the history 
of europe, north american and Japan– to modernity, that is, approxi-
mately the united states” (toye, 1993). the states had to be important 
actors in achieving the passage from agricultural to industrial socie-
ties. the state as principal agent for change was justified by the suc-
cess of Keynesianism in europe and the united states and of the so-
viet union. to prevent the spread of socialism was another objective 
of the developmental state, as the famous Rostow Manifesto explicitly 
pointed out (rostow, 1960). rostow’s work gave the theoretical back-
ground to the new world order as envisioned by truman in his 1949 
Inaugural speech. the “modernization” of new and old ex-colonies 
was a central element of the Cold war. In his speech truman proposed 
a “peaceful crusade” to integrate developing countries into the world 
economy, giving them the opportunity to share the progress and pros-
perity available in developed countries. 
“More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery. their food is inadequate. they are victims of dis-
ease. their economic life is primitive and stagnant. their poverty is a 
handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. for 
the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the 
skill to relieve the suffering of these people” (truman, 1949). 
the speech was the programme to consolidate usa world he-
gemony and restrain communism. all the Bretton woods Institutions 
were the agencies designed to give conceptual and financial support 
to it. that was the aim of the Mac namara economic development 
and anti poverty strategy, carefully formulated and instrumented by 
the word Bank in all the third world.  Modernization conceptualized 
a classless society not divided by antagonistic conflicts. the distribu-
tive elements of the welfare state would make it possible to eliminate 
social and political exclusion and to lay down the foundation of fully 
integrated society. 
Subside of the Developmental State
or One Size Fits All
several elements, internal and external, marked the end of the De-
velopmental estate and the return of economic liberalism to Latin 
america and its introduction in post colonial african, Caribbean and 
asian estates. first, we have the decline of thee Import substitution 
Industrialization (IsI) as a viable growth strategy. By mid sixties, it 
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was evident in several developing countries especially in Brazil, Mex-
ico, argentina and Chile, that the model was not working and need-
ed reforms. second, the debt crisis that erupted in Mexico in 1982 
and that spread to the entire third world. third, the collapse of the 
socialist camp and the consolidation of usa as the only hegemonic 
power and, last but not least, was the downfall of the welfare state as 
a leading paradigm of economic policy and the enthronization of the 
reagan-thatcher economic revolution (Jomo et al., 2005). It is a fact 
that, despite the intensive restructuring did take place in all of them, 
the welfare state is still in place in the development world and, with 
various intensity degrees, in some developing countries, as noted by 
esping-andersen (2000)1, the author suggests, that the welfare state 
was reformed under the argument it was impossible to finance. fur-
ther reforms may be introduced as developed countries approach the 
post industrial era. the final shape the welfare state will take would 
depend on each country’s strength of the family economy and each 
country’s cultural, social and economic traditions.  In developing 
countries, africa and Latin america in particular, were labour mar-
ket is unstable and informal sector tends to concentrate the largest 
share of occupied labour, the liberal reforms gave way to a minimalist 
welfare state, which is coherent with low taxation and low fiscal ex-
penditure. In these circumstances we can hardly conclude find what 
esping-anderson concluded for some developed countries: “[…] de-
commodification of workers is a priority and is achieved through uni-
versal and comprehensive welfare policies with the underlying belief 
that all benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged 
to pay” (esping-anderson, 1990: 28). social policies instrumented in 
Latin america and africa, as all authors in the present volume sug-
gest, resemble the conservative welfare state which give a minimal 
assistance to reduce economic hardship affecting the poor the unem-
ployed or the informal employee, but “[…] make little attempt to pro-
mote ‘equality’ or eradicate divisions centred around class” (hagberg 
2000), “[…] but make little attempt to promote ‘equality’ or eradicate 
divisions centred around class”.
these interlinked crises open the door to the coming back of eco-
nomic Liberalism in the form of neoliberalism, and the redefinition 
of the economic borders of the state with the structural reforms and 
adjustment programmes prescribed in the washington Consensus. 
Besides the recession and debt crisis of the early eighties, some eco-
1 the authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for his comments and 
suggestions about the crisis of the welfare state which helped to refine the argu-
ment.
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nomic conditions facilitated the penetration of anglo-saxon neolib-
eral doctrines: the concomitant rise of globalization, and the subse-
quent renewal of growth, however slow and selective. In the nineties, 
the neoliberal model was easy to sell for its ability to respond to the 
problems affecting Latin american and other developing countries: 
foreign debt, inflation, fiscal deficit, slow growth. In that context, the 
“major attraction –of the neoliberal model– was the ability to lure for-
eign capital and supposedly to reduce uncertainties for us investors 
and traders” (fairbrother, 2004: 20-22).
the liberalization of the economy encompassed all areas of eco-
nomics trade, finances, exchange, monetary and fiscal policies and 
labour reform. the shrinking of the borders of the state changed the 
relations between the state and the society, among capital and labour 
and amid different sectors of capital. as the  model of “war of at-
trition” indicates2, the intensity of debt crisis of early eighties facili-
tated the introduction of these deep changes. the way was paved by 
the economist’s appearance in the political scenario as the legitimate 
bearers of scientific economic knowledge entrusted with professional 
responsibility for formulating and instrumenting politically neutral 
economic policies. Members of the profession’s elite become indis-
pensable to politicians, to economically powerful groups and to con-
gressional lawmakers. they become public actors when they enter the 
institutional and political structure and, by doing that, knowledge and 
power were linked (Palacios, 2005; Babb, 1998, 2001). when econo-
mist enter of the political establishment and took part of the policy 
making process, they are not scientific any more and become support-
ers of the statu quo.
who supported the coming back of liberalism and the washington 
Consensus?  In Latin america it was, first, the “modernizing elite” of 
economists and political scientists with “academic training in neoclas-
sical economics and graduate degrees from the most prestigious north 
american universities” (Babb, 1998). they instrumented the reforms, 
and were the architects behind trade liberalization and of the negotia-
tions of north american free trade agreement nafta3 like free trade 
2 “the key assumption of the war of attrition model is that the political conflict 
over what type of stabilization to implement, in particular on the distribution of costs 
of the adjustment, leads to delays. stabilization occurs when one of the competing 
groups can impose its desired policies on the other(s) which have exhausted their 
ability to resist the undesired stabilization (alesina et al., 2006). structural reforms 
were instrumented in Chile in 1973, after the military coup and in other countries 
because of the debt crisis.
3 the free trade agreement signed by the Canada, Mexico and the united states in 
1993 and enforced the first of January 1994.
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agreements with the usa (Babb, 1998, 2001). second, importers, land 
owners, political modernizing elites, and the large business groups, ex-
port- oriented, linked to external capital, interested in a special treat-
ment for capital intensive manufactures or linked to international 
sub-contracting. Multinational institutions, the world Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary fund, engaged in the task of promoting the new 
economic policies as the only theoretically sound economic policies and 
introduced the so called “double conditionality” by which no lending 
was approved by any of the two agencies unless the reforms were ac-
cepted and dully introduced. In that way, with the “one size fits all poli-
cies”; african, Latin american and some asian countries adopted this 
same economic model, as a way to overcome underdevelopment. to 
day, there share similar experiences: repeated economic crises, external 
shocks, severe poverty, increasing inequality and mounting informality. 
the failure of the model to deliver the promised fruits induced the pre-
scription by the Multilateral organizations of a new wave of structural 
reforms nicknamed the reforms of second and third type aiming to rad-
ically change political institutions following the anglo-saxon model. In 
order to lessen the social costs of the reforms and to alleviate poverty, 
these new reforms were to be complemented by the social safety nets 
and the focalized conditioned cash transferences. 
what is more important in the context of the topics analyzed in 
the present book is that the new economic doctrine encompasses a 
deep transformation on how development was assumed. economic de-
velopment is not seen any more as the passage to modernization and 
radical transformation of economic and social structures but only, or 
mainly, as sustained growth of gDP and productivity, and full reliance 
on the market and on a minimal state. Development economics is not 
accepted as an independent branch of economics, since the same prin-
ciples apply for all countries and all times. economics have to maxi-
mize the wellbeing of rational, perfectly informed individual actors. 
the principles of neoclassical economics have universal validity and 
their economic reasoning is extended to non economic activities; pov-
erty is seen as a problem to be resolve through the price mechanisms 
and is taken in isolation as exogenous variable not affected by the eco-
nomic model (Jomo et al., 2005: 4-7). to overcome poverty became a 
responsibility of each person and his capacity to function in a liberal 
society and in a perfectly competitive market. that vision is clear in the 
ideological basement of the poverty programmes based on focalized 
and conditioned cash transferences. Poverty is a personal problem and 
it is the responsibility of each person’s particular effort to overcome 
it. the Iron Lady put that principle very clearly in a famous interview 
which transcribe in large because we consider of uppermost relevance: 
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I think we have gone through a period when too many children and 
people have been given to understand ‘I have a problem, it is the 
government’s job to cope with it!’ or ‘I have a problem, I will go 
and get a grant to cope with it!’ ‘I am homeless, the government 
must house me!’ and so they are casting their problems on society 
and who is society? there is no such thing! there are individual 
men and women and there are families and no government can do 
anything except through people and people look to themselves first 
(thatcher, 1987). 
Perhaps, as the studies presented in the present book suggest, the pen-
dulum has tilted again indicating that the actual economic model is 
not solid and changes are needed in order to guarantee not only the 
fastest growth but more equality and more and better employments, 
quicker growing incomes and better distribution of income and assets 
(rodrik et al., 2002). It is time to put together efficiency and equality in 
economic policies, because assets concentration (increased by privati-
zation) hampers growth and reduces the interests in private indivisible 
investments. It could restrain the growth effects of investments in hu-
man capital. 
Latin america is known as the region with the most intensive in-
come concentration of the world. Inequality is acute in income and 
consumption as well as in access to public services: education, health, 
water sanitation, electricity and so on. It is deeply rooted in the past 
and is related to the extreme concentration of land property estab-
lished by the Colonial powers. this colonial inheritance is shared with 
africa. It is estimated that the richest 10% of population concentrates 
over 50% of total income, while the poorest ten percent perceives only 
one and a half percent (world Bank, 2003). Mexico is a strong exam-
ple of the income concentrating effects of the neoliberal model. one 
citizen owns property amounting to 53 billion dollars, equivalent to 
5.3% of total national income. at the same time, 22 million Mexican 
survive with us$ 1 a day and perceive only 3% of national income. 
such income concentration hinders economic growth, deters poverty 
reduction and deeply divides the nation. 
since concentration of wealth goes parallel with concentration 
of political power, Latin american centurial socioeconomic inequality 
has gave birth to profound vertical and horizontal inequality and has 
excluded large ethnic groups, poor women and men from the fruits 
of progress. Better-off minorities, have the power to influence institu-
tions and to induce the adoption of public policies that promote their 
own interests and that reproduce poverty and income concentration. 
that is so despite the modest, but not less important, achievements in 
moving towards “democratic” regimes.
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the debt crisis and the structural reforms adopted as the cure for 
all economic problems that developing countries are facing marked 
the end of universal social policies and open the door to the introduc-
tion and global adoption of the focalized, targeted and conditioned 
monetary subsidies to deserving families living in conditions of ex-
treme poverty as Álvarez, garcía and Brown analyzed in this text. In 
some developed countries universal policies exist but not in the major-
ity of developing countries
the basic ideology of the focalized poverty programmes is to trans-
fer resources needed just to bridge the poverty gap or the difference in 
the income of the beneficiaries to the extreme poverty line: one dollar a 
day. It is the idea behind the motto: to weave safety nets (Moreno, 2007; 
and the majority of chapters of this book). the fine tuned focalization 
would achieve several objectives. first, it would prevent the less poor 
and the rich from taking advantage of the programme; second, it may 
guarantee that “resources will be on the poorest hands” (Le grannd, 
1982); third, it will facilitate to withdraw from the pardon of benefi-
ciaries the families that do not comply with the conditions or when 
their income surpasses the extreme poverty line and last but not least, 
the fiscal costs of the programme will be small and will not require to 
increase taxation affecting perhaps the rate of return of capital. 
In country after country the south policies of focalized cash trans-
ferences were adopted as the way to alleviate poverty. the list in Latin 
america is large and growing: Programa Bolsa de Familia (Brazil), Pro-
gresa/Oportunidades (Mexico), Chile Solidario (Chile), Familias en Ac-
ción (Colombia), Jefas y Jefes de Hogar (argentina), Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (ecuador) (rivera, Currais and rungo, 2009). the same is 
being experimented and/or piloted in a number of countries in africa. 
some of these countries include Kenya, Mozambique, south africa, 
namibia, Lesotho, zambia, Malawi, uganda, and ethiopia. 
for various reasons, Latin america has been at the centre of the 
concern of international agencies. some countries, argentina and 
Chile, introduced in the mid-seventies the structural reforms and lib-
eralized their economies. they privatized government assets, reduced 
both direct taxes and public spending, introduced market mecha-
nisms in the provision of health, education, water and electricity and 
liberalized monetary and labour markets. Many others embarked on 
this route in the early eighties and, like Mexico, were “early and radi-
cal reformers”. however, neither of them (but one or two exceptions) 
has achieved higher and sustained growth and did reduce poverty or 
inequality, beyond the levels they had in the seventies, before the re-
forms (Puyana, 2010). Latin america has in her record not one but 
two lost decades, in terms of income and poverty reduction. 
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hence the concern of the world Bank and other multilateral agen-
cies and their urgency in analyzing the causes of poor performance in 
Latin america which challenges the presumed strength of the assump-
tions of the washington consensus and economic policies designed to 
its principles. as in The long March: A Reform Agenda for Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the Next Century, the world Bank suggested in 
this publication and time and again in a long series of similar reports, 
that Latin america needs at least a 6% economic growth rate to re-
duce poverty, and the that the causes for having failed to reach it is 
the lack of institutional reforms as the only way to guarantee macro 
economic stability, growth and poverty alleviation. In this respect, 
the policy documents of the wB, the IMf and the Inter-american De-
velopment Bank (IDB) mirror the recommendations formulated for 
african countries, as presented further down and scrutinized in the 
present book. 
In more recent years, the world Bank has emphasized for both 
regions four work areas around which governments and civil society 
should develop specific actions to speed up growth: 1) build trans-
parent public institutions open to public scrutiny and to design so-
cial policies opening the door to greater participation of subordinate 
groups in order to empower them politically and economically; 2) 
ensure macroeconomic management and effective institutions that 
pursue greater equity and resolve social conflicts; 3) increase access 
of poorest people to the public services (education, health, water and 
electricity), to farmland and rural services for poor people as a way to 
improve their productivity; 4) sustain and reform the income trans-
ference programs for the poorest families, so the use condition con-
ditioned assistance would improve their capacity to generate revenue 
over their life cycle (wB, 2003).
the Inter-american Development Bank has stressed that the lack 
of proper and universal education, in the majority of Latin american 
countries, has been the perhaps the most important factor explain-
ing the persistent inequalities between rich and poor people. there-
fore the Bank considers that improving the quality of basic education 
quality is the efficient engine of development and empowerment of 
the most vulnerable groups. In this sense there are some guidance 
from the economic Commission for Latin america and the Carib-
bean (eCLaC) that emphasizes investment in human resources and 
seeking the convergence of economic and social policies. unemploy-
ment, but especially underemployment is another preoccupation of 
these agencies.  they both undermine the possibilities of improving 
the welfare of the majority of the population. this situation is difficult 
to reverse because of the magnitude underemployment has reached 
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today. all three agencies, the wB, eCLaC and the IaDB ignore the 
role of property and wealth concentration in reproducing poverty and 
income concentration. they take the symptoms of poverty (malnutri-
tion, poor education, ill health and so on) as causes of poverty and rec-
ommend to act upon the symptoms leaving untouched the causes of 
poverty. extreme poverty and intense income concentration as these 
existing in africa and Latin america can annulate the growth effects 
of investments in human capital (Deiniger and olinto). the effects 
of social policies are unable to solve the problems generated by the 
prevailing economic policies that foster the accumulation of capital at 
the expense of labour earnings, individual, social and environmental 
relationships. In this regard, Valencia (2003) considers that the failure 
of policies is due to the reductionism approach to it, based on market 
relations and assuming market is perfectly competitive. 
The African Case
for at least four or five decades, african governments and donors have 
experimented with a series of alternative approaches for redressing 
poverty (Jayne, 2002). however, despite all these interventions, the 
absolute numbers of african living in poverty has increased substan-
tially. the increase in the numbers of those living in poverty in africa 
has attracted substantial research from various disciplines and has 
generated substantial literature and competing explanations in the 
fight against poverty. generally, growth and distributional linkage has 
been favoured as the most persuasive explanation for poverty reduc-
tion4. In the context of africa, the argument has been that africa has 
not registered any significant growth and its income levels are too low 
for redistribution to resolve poverty. 
the growth and distribution linkages seem to have informed pov-
erty debates in africa to the extent that the eighties were described as 
africa’s “lost decade” characterized by economic decline and social 
decay (ogot, 2005: 45). the african leaders responded to this decline 
by the publication of the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Devel-
opment of Africa 1980-2000. however, this grand idea remained sim-
ply a plan which neither the african governments nor the donors ever 
intended to implement. the donors and the international community 
seem to have favoured the idea that africa was not registering growth 
because of inappropriate economic policies (Berg, 1981). In the afri-
can context, this view was made explicit by r. Bates in 1981, when he 
published Markets and States in Tropical Africa. In this book, Bates ex-
4 this is not to down play the other competing explanations such as those focusing 
on institutions, leadership, and geography. 
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plained the african dysfunctional policy choices in terms of the inter-
est of the powerful groups, notably the taxation of export agriculture. 
these views had significant impact within the International Mon-
etary fund and world Bank to the extent that in 1981 the bank and 
the fund promised Accelerated Development with an Agenda for Action 
in which it demanded structural adjustment policies which would 
raise the rate of private investment and productivity growth. In the 
words of ogot (2005) “african countries had to adjust themselves to 
the structures of the real capitalistic world market-stabilizing balance 
of payment by cutting public spending, retrenchment of staff, curren-
cy devaluation and privatizing public enterprises”. these financial in-
struments were not confined to africa, the fund and the bank engaged 
low income countries in asia, Latin america, and soviet block as well. 
In 1989 the african governments protested the structural adjustment 
policies through the organization african union (oau) paper enti-
tled African Alternative Adjustment Programmes for the Socio-economic 
Recovery and Transformation adopted on the april 10th, 1989. here, 
the african governments complained that structural adjustment pro-
grammes failed to take into account the social and human dimen-
sions, the long tem development objectives, and the structural trans-
formation of african economies. But this protest represented nothing 
more than an angry voice crying in the wilderness of international 
capitalism and globalization. 
therefore, by eighties the north had emerged as the ‘big brother” 
in terms of designing alternative poverty reduction strategy papers for 
use by the south. a decade after the introduction of structural adjust-
ment programme conditionality, there was a growing body of knowl-
edge particularly from the proponents of the “social dimension” of 
development that saP had put too much emphasis on accelerating 
gDP growth and neglected considerations of income distribution. the 
proponents of the “social dimension” particularly clarified that even 
where saP were achieving their growth objectives, some component 
measures were exerting a negative impact on the incomes and wel-
fare of significant population groups, including the poorest segments 
of society. Moreover, saP induced pressures on governments to trim 
fiscal deficits was to blame for curbing expansion of social services, 
notably in education and health, which represented the primary path 
to better, and more productive lives of low income citizen. thus there 
was a visible link between adjustment programs and growing poverty 
and inequality. 
In 1999, these findings, forced the bank and the fund to recast 
saP as “poverty reduction” to embrace a new anti-poverty focus in 
low income countries a majority of which are found in africa. the 
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bank and the fund also wanted to arrive at policies that are more 
clearly focused on economic growth and poverty reduction and with 
more national ownership and consistency for implementation. these 
are the arguments which informed the formation of Poverty Reduction 
Strategies (Prs) and the need to develop of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PrsP) for consideration by the world Bank and the IMf in 
1999 and putting poverty reduction as a prime objective of programs 
and operations of international financial institutions (IfI) in low in-
come countries.
under this new strategy, governments were expected to prepare 
poverty reduction strategy papers in close consultation with domestic 
stakeholders particularly members of the civil society. the PrsP has 
added two new elements to the conventional saP. first, the PrsP held 
scepticism towards the trickle-down assumption, leading to the recog-
nition that the poor’s access to human, physical and financial assets 
need to be facilitated. secondly, the short term adverse impacts of saP 
on the poor are recognized leading to the advocacy of social safety 
nets to accompany structural adjustment. however, what is worrying 
about this new poverty reduction strategy is the lack of real change: 
a close examination of the macroeconomic and structural adjustment 
policy content of PrsP shows that there no fundamental departure 
from the kind of policy advice handed out under what has come to be 
known as the “washington Consensus” (gray, 2002; holtz 2003). 
the debate about the soundness of the antipoverty programmes 
formulated by the north is intense and it takes place all around the 
developing world and with particular intensity in africa and Latin 
america, as the authors of the book being introduced here testify. sev-
eral are interesting, although not totally successful, initiatives from 
the south. these discussions and new experiences are worth the ut-
most consideration for the formulation of ad hoc measures for african 
and Latin american countries. this work is an important contribution 
in that direction. 
this compilation is an interdisciplinary effort of the authors to 
make visible the contemporary preoccupations about social change 
and the political, institutional, economic and cultural problems the 
world is confronting today. the papers in this volume attempt a nu-
ance interpretation of the poverty reduction strategies emanating 
from the north (whose key architects are the world Bank and the 
International Monetary fund) and the alternatives from the south, 
particularly africa and Latin america.  the issues critical in all the 
papers concern experience, participation, ownership, autonomy, mac-
roeconomic content, the question of historicity and how all these are 
engaged with poverty reduction strategies. 
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although the exercise presented in this volume is not without lim-
itations derived from the tools and concepts employed, it is certainly 
an initial approach to raise awareness of the actors and processes that 
are in line and give meaning to poverty scenes and are the responsi-
ble for instrumenting the antipoverty programmes or the recipients of 
them, some time reduced to be passive actors. 
another distinguishing feature that accompanies this publication 
is the extensive literature reviewed and the use of novel methodologies 
that provide new avenues to discover emerging dimensions of poverty. 
the comparative analysis of africa and Latin america enriches the anal-
ysis and allows proposing conclusions of wider, global significance. 
to have a coherent overview, the volume is structured in three 
parts. the Part I is integrated by three chapters and suggests new the-
oretical alternatives to the analysis of anti-poverty strategies, while 
two papers integrate Part II, which deals with some of the most seri-
ous problems affecting rural population and agricultural production 
in almost all countries analyzed in this volume. the remaining six 
chapters make up Part III which brings together some proposals for 
the design of alternative policies for poverty eradication. 
The Theoretical alternatives for a comprehensive
analysis of poverty strategies
the chapters in the first section of this volume stress the importance of 
the theoretical perspectives originated in the south, so the dimensions 
and characteristics of mass poverty of the south are properly identi-
fied and the conditions that perpetuates poverty are well understood. 
these conditions are amongst others, the dramatic liberalization of 
the economy; the neoliberal governance; low public investment; la-
bour flexibility, and the imposition of development models that ignore 
the social and cultural context of the nation state. It discusses some 
of the main analytical proposals from the south showing the variety 
of edges and determinants of poverty. this approach enables rigor-
ous knowledge of a very complex reality. finally, this section focuses 
on alternative proposals and policies for combating poverty, based on 
previous experiences in the south.
sonia Álvarez centres her analysis on Latin american and Carib-
bean countries to scrutinize the approach taken by multilateral or-
ganizations and donor organizations that design and finance the anti 
poverty programmes, under the umbrella of the so called “strategies 
against poverty”. these are the actors that have fine tuned the policies 
of the focalized cash transferences that have reduced the social poli-
cies to a minimum. from this perspective, Álvarez suggests that all 
the discourse on neoliberal governability and human Development 
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(hD) is framed in a neo-colonial ideology. she identifies a network of 
concepts that define the current policy focus, highlighting contradic-
tions, dilemmas and paradoxes of the policies that have been imple-
mented in the region and which become hegemonic neoliberal vision 
of the north. there is no wonder that, as Álvarez observes, there is 
constant tension between the needs of the poor, the people that have 
been marginalized or excluded people from social welfare and the 
political power and the bureaucratized discourse embedded in the 
focalized anti poverty policies. the bureaucratized and depoliticized 
social policy discourses have deepened social polarization within and 
between countries.
a sound study about the relationship between public investment 
and economic development, based on a structuralist and Keynesian ap-
proach is presented in chapter two. Cristina Borja stresses the differ-
ences in the economic policies that have been instrumented in Latin 
america and illustrates the diverging effects achieved, in terms of eco-
nomic growth and social welfare. In the entire region, the liberalization 
of the economy did imply the redefinition of the borders of the state 
in economic and social matters, but the intensity and the speed of the 
reforms of it varied from country. sI did the effects. to asses the impact 
of the reforms Borja studied the Brazilian experiences with the intro-
duction of the structural reforms. Borja identifies some effects linked 
with the change in the growth model Brazil had since the early forties. 
In the first place, she found a severe decline in gross capital formation 
–due especially to the contraction of public owned capital that was not 
totally replace by private investments. the fall in capital formation lead 
to lower rates of total and industrial gross domestic product which in-
duced negative effects on labour income and its distribution.
the first part is closed by a comparative study of economic growth, 
unemployment and poverty reduction in Chile and Mexico with refer-
ences to argentina Brazil and Colombia, outlined by alicia Puyana. 
the study covers 1980 to 2006, the period of the introduction of the 
structural reforms and adjustment programmes after the debt crisis of 
1992 and the maturity of them. It is a period long enough that allows 
a deep evaluation. as a remarkable point, the researcher founds that 
despite the new economic model had been fully established in these 
countries and some of the effects of the of liberalization were evident 
(in terms of reduced inflation or the contraction o the fiscal deficit) 
the impact is not so clear in terms or productivity or expansion of the 
production and neither poverty nor the concentration of income has 
been reduced. this is explained by the evolution of the elasticity of 
labour in gDP, the path of labour productivity and capital intensity in 
gDP. Labour has not moved from low productivity activities into high 
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productivity tradable sectors but rather has moved to non tradable 
sectors mainly to informal services and construction.
How the South diagnosis poverty
In almost all countries of the south the rural population suffers inten-
sive poverty and exclusion, the topic analyzed in the second part of 
the volume, agricultural production was oriented towards the world 
market and not to the satisfaction of the needs of the local population. 
During the import substitution model, the agricultural sector and ru-
ral population suffered severe discrimination that put a break to it 
expansion. the reforms, which aimed to dismantle the substitutive 
industrialization, did not erase this discrimination. the new model 
has intensify the exclusion of small rural producers turned them into 
the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population and the 
main sufferers of consequences of globalization which has aggravated 
the impact of the low value the international markets credited to ag-
ricultural commodities. finally, the second section presents a critical 
analysis of the discourse used by the media to present the develop-
ment of policies and indicators around poverty.
andrés garcía opens the second part of the volume. his article 
examines the emergence and consolidation of the programs of con-
ditional cash transfers (CCtP) for Latin america. the main objective 
of the anti poverty programmes is not so much to eradicate poverty 
but to consolidate and legitimize the neo liberal model and the po-
litical regime that introduced it in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin 
america, since mid nineties. to illustrate his hypothesis garcía takes 
as example the CCtP of families in action (fa) instrumented in Co-
lombia in 2001. garcía is critic of the interpretations given by multi-
lateral agencies on the operation and impact of that specific program. 
he proposes that at least in Colombia, Familias en Acción has served 
for several different purposes: 1) to facilitate the continuation of neo-
liberal structural reforms and the military solution to the armed con-
flict; 2) to concentrate public social spending in the executive, and 
to allow the president to recover the political power lost due to the 
decentralization of public expenditure; and 3) adjusting the relation-
ship between state citizenship, replacing the framework of rights and 
obligations towards one of personal favours and gratitude. ultimately, 
the CCtP function as mechanisms of de-politicization of social policy. 
while all these political effects have been achieved, poverty and in-
come concentration remains almost unchanged, he concludes.
after extensively studying national Poverty eradication Program 
(naPeP), particularly the PrsP document, eugene nweke’s paper 
argues that it is the lack of both government and county ownership 
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which explains the failure of pro-poor poverty reduction strategies in 
nigeria. that naPeP in reality is not government owned. It is driven 
by the interest world Bank and IMf and accepted by special interest 
groups who have captured the state rather than allowing the national 
interest to propel the fight against poverty. ndubuisi concludes that 
pro-poor programme  ought to be owned by three main actors the 
state, civil society (including traditional civil society groups and so-
cial movements beyond the ngo phenomenon like labour, students’ 
organizations, rural and community based groups), and market (the 
private sector). the nigerian government will have to change the per-
ception of regarding PrsP as a document prepared solely as a means 
of securing financial assistance or fund raising tool from the world 
Bank, IMf and other development partners, but rather a national 
blueprint to guide the Country’s towards poverty reduction. 
Proposals to alternative policy designs
for poverty eradication
the third part brings together six chapters with proposals for the de-
sign of alternative policies for poverty eradication. It addresses the 
importance of understanding the historical context of the reproduc-
tion of poverty in order to made the structural adjustments needed 
to reverse the intergenerational reproduction of poverty, combining 
redistribution policies (both income and land tenure) and social in-
vestment. furthermore, it assesses the important role played by other 
actors such as ngo, provided they develop all their potential effective-
ness to “win the war against poverty”. this section discusses as well as 
well as the commitment of nation-states to revisit their public policies 
and to rethink their macroeconomic and sectorial policies.
Dennis Brown opens this section with a review of policies for re-
ducing poverty and improving quality of life of people in the southern 
hemisphere. he notes that such policies were implemented without 
regard to the historical traditions that shaped the character of poverty 
in these places. so indeed, the weight of the history of exploitation, 
deprivation and neglect, which are historic features of the political 
economy of the Caribbean, continues to exert a negative influence on 
the picture of poverty in the region. In particular, these traditions have 
not been considered in the analysis of local context by the institutions 
responsible for supervision of structural adjustment programs in the 
south; hence, this has undermined efforts to eradicate poverty by who 
engage in the south. then, the interviews made in poor households in 
the eastern Caribbean territories, are presented to justify this argu-
ment. In the end, the article closes with some alternatives to help solve 
the intergenerational reproduction of poverty.
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the paper by John gasu entitled “Poverty reduction in ghana: 
alternative solutions by the state” continues with the same question 
of autonomy and ownership particularly in the context of the applica-
tion of structural adjustment policies and the need to increase access 
to education, health and employment in ghana. the paper provides a 
theoretical conceptualization of poverty and how these have been ad-
dressed overtime. gasu also provides the historicity of poverty eradi-
cation strategies particularly within the nationalist framework which 
emerged after political independence in africa. the paper however 
argues that the decades after eighties marked the ascendancy of neo-
liberalism as an ideological alternative marked by widespread social 
dislocation and poverty in africa. the main conduits for bringing 
these ideas to the african continent were the Bretton woods financial 
institutions: the International Monetary fund and the world Bank. 
In this vein, financial assistance and all sorts of donor support were 
now predicated on conditionalities meant to delegitimize the state, 
and thereby roll it back from intrusive economic activities. the ef-
fort was particularly targeted at suffusing adjusting economies with 
the market logic and rationality so as to move them away from their 
prior command systems. the neoliberal orthodoxy, therefore, de-
manded the removal of subsidies and the cost-free universalistic so-
cial interventions as they were considered as market distortions. the 
rejection of the state as a vital economic actor, and for social interven-
tion, began to produce dilemma and crippling effects for the under-
developed continent that had depended very much on state-led or col-
lectivist approaches for development management. the sectors that 
were impacted on most by the neoliberal policies included education, 
health, and access to employment. the rest of the paper is dedicated 
to the struggle by the state to remain relevant in the face of neoliberal 
policies in educational, health and employment sectors. It is in this 
context that the Provisional national Defence Council (PnDC) gov-
ernment sponsored Program of action to Mitigate the social Costs 
of adjustment (PaMsCaD) in 1987 as a response to mitigating the 
emerging costs associated with saP with the dual objective of political 
survival and to keep the adjustment program rolling. this is also what 
informed the formation of the national Development Planning Com-
mission (nDPC) in the subsequent years to coordinate poverty related 
issues. the nDPC has been instrumental in the development of ghana 
Vision 2020, ghana Poverty reduction strategy I and growth and 
Poverty reduction strategy II, all of which are anchored on growth 
and poverty reduction. gasu concludes by arguing that ghana has 
over relied on neoliberal poverty reduction programs which have not 
been successful in large scale reduction of poverty as evidenced by 
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ghana statistical service surveys. there is therefore the need to bring 
back the state into the whole question of poverty reduction and to 
champion the collective good that would enhance the legitimacy of 
the state. It is within this context that the over ambitious state-led en-
deavours –ghana educational trust fund (getfund), national health 
Insurance scheme (nhIs) and national Youth employment Program 
(nYeP)– were conceived and operated. this paper thus shows the ex-
tent to which growth is necessary but not sufficient; it must be but-
tressed by equity and above all people’s participation. 
a similar question also emerges in olayinka akanle and akin-
pelu olutayo’s paper entitled “fighting the Poverty war: non-gov-
ernmental organization and the Challenge of Poverty eradication in 
nigeria”. the main argument being that nigeria has a long history 
of failure in poverty eradication strategies. to drive these strategies, 
the nigerian governments have established specialized agencies and 
frameworks with huge financial, manpower and technical commit-
ments. the agencies, some of which are defunct, include agricultural 
Development Projects (aDP); nigerian agricultural Cooperative Bank 
(defunct); national agricultural Insurance scheme (defunct), na-
tional Directorate of employment (nDe); federal agricultural Co-
ordinating unit (now projects coordinating unit); national Primary 
health Care agency; Population activities fund agency: People Bank 
of nigeria (defunct): federal urban Mass transit; national agricul-
tural Land Development agency; Directorate for foods, roads and 
rural Infrastructure (defunct); national Boards of Commodity Banks 
(defunct); Better Life Programmes (defunct); family economic ad-
vancement Programmes (defunct);  Mass Mobilization for social and 
economic recovery (defunct), national economic reconstruction 
fund, national Commission for Mass Literacy and Poverty alleviation 
Programme (defunct). More recently, the immediate past President 
of nigeria, Chief olusegun obasanjo demonstrated its own commit-
ment to poverty eradication in the country by establishing the na-
tional Poverty eradication Programme (naPeP) in 2001. however, 
the failure by successive governments to reduce poverty has invited 
a significant number of non-governmental organization as a “third 
party” in poverty reduction strategy. In performing their roles, ngo 
basically adopt two different but overlapping approaches. these are 
advocacy and programmes’ implementation (intervention and opera-
tions). advocacy is geared towards influencing government policy to 
achieve some course. It may be in changing laws, establishing agencies 
and other institutional manipulations. this is often achieved through 
campaigns, awareness creation, lobbying and activism to defend or 
promote specific course. the operational ngo on the other hand de-
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sign and implement projects as a form of direct intervention in gov-
ernment incapacities. this could be cases of building public toilets, 
construction of schools or micro credit financing. nearly all ngo in 
nigeria undertake both advocacy and operations and the two classifi-
cations are mostly not distinct in practice. good as they may appear, 
the conceptions of ngo poverty eradication framework are foreign. 
operations and interventions are designed and financed from abroad 
through international donor agencies. although poverty is accepted to 
be endemic in nigeria, philanthropic orientation is still very underde-
veloped among wealthy citizens who keep their wealth to themselves 
and families. ford, rockefeller and Bill and Melinda gates public sup-
port spirits are obviously absent from nigerian rich class. ngo are 
therefore forced by operational funding and survival to rely on for-
eign granting agencies who decide which areas they are determined to 
fund even though with little understanding of the local problems. 
this is what the paper by samwel okuro investigates. okuro par-
ticularly examines the nexus between land tenure reforms and sub-
sistence agricultural productivity in Kenya. this is done in the con-
text that history has shown that different rates of poverty reduction 
over the past forty years have been closely related to differences in 
agricultural performance, particularly the rate of growth of agricul-
tural productivity. this view seems to have informed the generality of 
world Bank. Driven land tenure reforms in africa as illustrated in: 1) 
Land reform Policy Paper (1975); 2) sub-saharan africa: from Cri-
sis to sustainable growth (1989); 3) sub-saharan africa: from Crisis 
to sustainable growth. In all these papers, the world Bank under-
scored the importance of land issues in fostering economic growth 
and reducing poverty and recommended that “formal land titling as 
a precondition of modern development; the abandonment of commu-
nal tenure systems in favour of freehold title and sub-division of the 
commons; widespread promotion of land markets to bring about effi-
ciency-enhancing land transfer; and that support for land redistribu-
tion on both efficiency and equity grounds” (Quan, 2000: 38). tenure 
reform was seen as central to promoting agricultural growth, with pri-
vate freehold tenure as an essential step to a modernized agriculture, 
promoting investment and providing incentives to adopt new technol-
ogies (whitehead & tsikata, 2003: 11). while increasing agricultural 
productivity perhaps remains the single most important determinant 
of economic growth and poverty reduction, serious doubts are begin-
ning to emerge to the extent that land titling has not delivered on 
the key envisaged areas namely: that titling has failed to achieve the 
expected increase in agricultural investment and productivity even 
among small holders, did not facilitate the use of land as collateral 
Strategies against Poverty
34
for small holder farmers, and encouraged land speculation by outsid-
ers. the titling programs were also responsible for the increased land 
conflicts as it ignored the overlapping and multiple rights and uses of 
land at the local levels hence reinforcing unequal access to land based 
on gender, age, ethnicity, and class. Moreover, attempts to improve ac-
cess to land and tenure security are often delayed or manipulated by 
the power of vested interests and the landed classes as shown in the 
current debates around Draft Land Policy in Kenya. 
Mariano féliz meanwhile enters the analysis of incomes policies 
in argentina during recent years. this article discusses the policy of 
income in argentina in recent years. In particular, it examines the role 
of social policies and wages from 2001 to 2008. this article shows 
that the effectiveness of such policies on poverty reduction is strongly 
affected by the objectives of macroeconomic policy and the participa-
tion of argentina in the global capitalist economy. additionally, from 
a Marxist theoretical framework, féliz shows how the peripheral posi-
tion of the economy of argentina has limited the country’s ability to 
instrument policies to increase the income of the poor. some macro 
economic policies to foster capital accumulation in the context of a 
globalized dependent economy are behind for instance: maintain-
ing a high real exchange rate and fiscal surplus as tool to control in-
flation. the need for competitiveness and payment of external debt 
imposes immediate pressures on wages and labour incomes. within 
this framework, féliz shows that argentina is facing two main alter-
natives in her development path. first, accept the long-term relative 
poverty, while trying to structurally improve its competitive position 
with lower wages, lower labour rights and low productivity; second, 
to transform the social security system with a programme to guaran-
tee a basic income, which becomes a program of income redistribu-
tion. this strategy could not only end the long-term income poverty 
but may also reduce social conflict. In turn, by maintaining domestic 
demand, it would allow for adequate levels of investment and socio-
technical innovation.
the final point on this dissertation are paid by erik reinert and 
rainer Kattel in a study that part of the proposition that a strong re-
lationship between a particular type of structure around the national 
economic output to the propensity of a nation-state to failure. these 
failed states are economic factors which distinguish, for example, fin-
land, Canada and singapore. the premise is that any policy aimed at 
preventing that nations fail or alleviate poverty should avoid treating 
the symptoms and attack the causes rather, and also should include 
an analysis of how to adapt the productive structures of the states 
decomposition similar to the state structures that operate in a demo-
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cratic and successful. typically, states are failing and failed, have a 
very low percentage of gDP in the manufacturing sector (increasing 
returns). the paper provides statistical evidence from 1950 to 2003 to 
document the change in the national economic structure, as necessary 
starting point for economic growth.
In short, this book represents a diverse and practical contribu-
tion of distinguish researchers from africa and Latin america that 
drive us to reflect, on the basis of  based rigorous analysis of several 
case studies, on the dimensions and determinants of poverty in the 
countries from the south. It is possible from the research included 
in this compilation to arrive to a general idea of the complexity and 
magnitude of the problem poverty embraces that can not be solve 
only with technocrat actions or from a particular approach. It de-
mands first of all to be considered as a political issue that has to be 
integrated in the economic model and analyzed and solve by multi-
disciplinary programmes. antipoverty programmes to be effective 
have to emerge from the south, and bottom-up. In this context it 
becomes imperative, as already has emphasized, the knowledge of 
the historical, cultural, economic models suitable to each country. 
there is essential a profound understanding of the processes of gov-
ernance and their protagonists, as well as of the essence of the focal-
ized antipoverty programmes. and, finally, but not less important, the 
policy makers have to have a good understanding of the particular 
needs of individuals.
It is expected then, that this volume will be a useful tool for a 
wide audience related to public and private sector and to academics 
and in general to wide sectors of civil society. as seen, the reduction of 
poverty, but more important the reduction of income concentration, 
is now one of the most important challenges of policy design in the 
south and is a joint duty that are geared to leaders and national and 
international organizations as guarantors to ensure equity, justice and 
universal rights for a dignified life for all.
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1.1. Neoliberal and Neo-Colonial 
Governmentality, Social Policies 
and Strategies against Poverty 
from the North, Alternatives 
from the South
The case of South America and the Caribbean
Abstract
the paper analyzes the neo-colonial global and neoliberal governmen-
tality and the human Development dispositif; second, the conceptual 
system of the strategies against Poverty from the north, namely poli-
cies promoted by the Multilateral Development and financial agencies 
as a part of a dispositif that I name focuspolicy. also, it discusses on 
the new neoliberal governmentality by focusing on neo-colonial glo-
bal discursivity. It includes a net of concepts that define focuspolicies, 
the first are the minimal biological basic needs or essential basic needs, 
a second set of concepts are the informal safety nets, social capital, 
empowerment, participative policies, participatory poverty assessments 
and asset vulnerability framework. a third net of concepts include hu-
man capital, poverty productivity, formal security nets, and poverty trap. 
the work traces recent trends and policy proposed or implemented in 
some south america and Caribbean countries that could be consid-
ered alternatives to hegemonic neoliberal social policy. finally, I draw 
a few provisional conclusions by examining the paradox and dilem-
mas represented by these policies. the paper is based on analytical 
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and comparative methods and discusses relevant academic literature 
and research. 
Introduction
the paper addresses two contested processes that shape contemporary 
society: first, the strategies against poverty (saP) from the “north” 
and, second, the alternative approaches from the south, namely, some 
south america and the Caribbean countries (sa&C)1. 
sa&C is a region where, after africa, the majority of the popu-
lation is poor. Moreover, the region inequality and concentration of 
wealth is the most extreme of the world (De ferranty et al., 2003). 
the higher concentration of poverty in sa&C are found in Central 
america, the andean region and the Brazilian northeast (echever-
ría; 2000). the picture became dramatic in the last decades. By the 
eighties around half the growth of poverty (50 million more poor 
people) resulted from the deterioration of income distribution. Dur-
ing the neoliberal fever of the nineties, concentration of wealth in-
tensified so did social inequality (CePaL, 1997) and the saP created 
the illusion they would reduce poverty. the country likely to suffer 
most dramatically was Mexico, but argentina, guatemala, Panama, 
Peru y Venezuela experienced similar processes (Korzeniewics & 
smith, 2000: 9). 
the paper is organized into three parts. first, it analyzes the neo-
colonial global neoliberal governmentality and the human Develop-
ment (hD) dispositif; second, the conceptual system of the so-called 
“strategies against poverty” from the north, namely policies promoted 
by the Multilateral Development and financial agencies (MDfa such 
as the IMf, the wB, the IaDB, and the unDP among others)2 as a part 
of a dispositif which I call focus-policy (Álvarez Leguizamón, 2009). 
also, this part discusses the new neoliberal governmentality (fergu-
son, 2005) focusing on neo-colonial global discursivity throughout the 
so-called hD. at last, I discuss recent trends and policy proposed or 
1 the term south america and the Caribbean (sa&C) differ from Latin america 
since the latter excludes non-Latin identities as well as pre-colonial and post colonial 
cultural characteristics. even if the concept south america and the Caribbean does 
not take fully into account the multiple cultural differences of the region, is more 
adequate than Latin america.  
2 although there are many differences among those agencies, they do not operate 
under similar basis, and are not monolithic institutions; the analysis here is devoted 
to similar categories and devices promoted by most of them beyond the differences 
in approaches that might exist among them. nevertheless, each case in this article 
is developed in a specific citation. for a discussion on differences in the devices and 
concepts, see Álvarez Leguizamón (2005, 2009).
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implementing in some sa&C countries that are able to be considered, 
in a way, as alternative to the hegemonic neoliberal social policy. fi-
nally, I draw a few provisional conclusions by examining the paradox 
and dilemmas represented by this sa&C policy. the paper is based on 
analytical and comparative methods and discusses relevant academic 
literature and research.
Neo-colonial global neoliberal governmentality 
and the HD dispositif
My view on the neoliberal/neo-colonial and biopolicy or biofocouspol-
icy is based on foucault’s notion of neoliberal governmentality (1981; 
2007) along with esposito’s (2006) discussion on immunity. In light 
of this, I am able to frame those policies as a particular form of gov-
ernmentality (gupta and sharma, 2006) and discuss hD as a singular 
power technology and dispositif that is deployed on defined territory 
and population. as a consequence, national citizenship or population 
are not the only subjects of the new forms of biopower ruling sover-
eignty but new collective terms, defined as “target group”, groups of 
people known with different concepts: the informal sector, marginal, 
structural poor, excluded or non integrated, the poorest among the 
poor, vulnerable groups according to age such as children, aging, or 
ethnic background, that are excluded from the basic mean of subsist-
ence and most of “human rights”. those groups are targeted by the 
hD3 policies that are said to be “multicultural”, “participative”  and 
empowered to the poor but in fact are based on utilitarian, mercantil-
ist, managerial, and renewed visions on social relationship of the poor 
and the poor communities (Álvarez Leguizamón, 2009). I use the term 
imperial governmentality meaning power-knowledge, practice and so-
3 Dh is analyzed as a speech and a fundamental utopia of our contemporary 
world. as such, there is a tension because, on one hand, it seeks to humanize the 
“development” and make it more sustainable. however, their devices and practices, 
rather than reduce poverty, in fact increase poverty and the gap between the poor 
and the non-poor. the Dh is a discourse in foucault’s sense, i.e. a set of sentences, 
themes or theories that define objects, concepts, institutions, systems, technologies, 
intervention and the problematized subject. In this regard, it is able to state that 
discourse constructs, by evocation, a subject (foucault 1997) that in our analysis 
is the poor and poverty. as speech, it plays a function, which is to regulate global 
governance to enable neoliberal govern-mentality, and the exercise of neo-colonial 
relations among countries. Instead of being a policy of life (or biopolitics), it is a 
focuspolicy or focus-politics. I, therefore, consider it a new art of government or a 
policy of targeted populations at risk in the sense that promotes the life of the poor 
and the excluded to the minimum, basic or essential living standards. But under a 
humanizing rhetoric that does not raise or seek to modify the conditions that pro-
duce poverty.
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cial relationship that arise from the geopolitical capitalist world order 
as well as the meso level of the national polity and the political micro 
level. that is governmentality which operates through the regulation 
of life and death and aims to expropriate subjectivity even if it resists 
to this form of government. 
I also understand the post washington Consensus neoliberal gu-
bernamentality as a set of policies aimed at privatizing, liberalizing, 
deregulating and promoting precariousness of labour relationship, 
weakening the welfare regime and the universal rights, undermining 
nation sovereignty on natural resource and basic services. those poli-
cies are linked with the strategies against poverty backed by the north 
that, I think, are a new policy of life at the essential minimum, named 
policy of the target (focus policy) as a part of hD discourse or disposi-
tif. Previous hegemonic discourse, i.e. development, has been framed 
by authors like escobar (1995), sachs (1999), ferguson (1997) and 
esteva (1996) as a concrete way of knowledge and action in which 
“progress” is understood as unique, non-reversal and unavoidable 
process rooted in american and eurocentric cultural models from 
which the “third world” and underdevelopment are constructed. neo-
liberal gubernamentality in sa&C has promoted minimum state form 
and minimal policy: privatization of public basic service such as edu-
cation, the health system and the pensions in connection with changes 
at the macro level as it was referred. according to Chilean philosopher 
Castro (2007: 8), in sa&C countries “the relationship between liberal-
ism and governmentality highlights the critical role of management 
biopower of the population organized by market interests. this means 
that there are circulating lives worth financially and others which are 
not, within the framework of a new type of biopower that determines 
the commoditization of the existence [...] [and] emerge with absolute 
clarity on two key dimensions of contemporary capitalism: the insur-
ance and the health industry”.
Biopower is a useful concept since its heuristic and critical fea-
tures. however, foucault’s discourse analysis (1997, 1997) is itself a 
historical explanation enrolled in the colonialist experience where the 
policy over life is thought to be endogenous and exterior to the “mod-
ern” colonial ruptures. Moreover, foucault’s reference to the colonial 
practice is linked with his methodological reflections on how operate 
race and war power (Castro, 2006), but it is secondary in terms of 
the european colonialism (Bhabha, 1994: 196 cited by Castro gómez, 
2006) and the liberal forms of governmentality that he discusses on 
the cases of german ordoliberalism and the Chicago school neoliber-
alism (foucault, 2007). In this regard, esposito (2006) immunization 
becomes as a useful complementary view with biopower in the con-
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text of colonial relations and the current neoliberal governmentality. 
espósito reading of foucault stresses on the fact that foucault’s bi-
opower is a blind spot, a crack of meaning, an enigma, a failure which 
does not exceed, that synthesize the lack of response to the next ques-
tion, why the continuing threat biopower to become thanatopolitics. 
In order to answer that question, this author develops the paradigm 
of immunization biopower considered complementary to, but which 
binds in a different way to power and life. Immunization would be a 
negative protection of life since it preserves some life at the expense 
of another death (espósito, 2006: 75-76). I would like to make clear 
that esposito does not discuss neo-colonial relationships or immune 
forms of it, instead he focuses on european fascism, particularly na-
zism, the atomic bomb, genetic manipulation, and different type of 
death by war.
from that perspective, it is possible to address the processes and 
technologies of inoculation which operate between life and death. 
those processes “include not only the appropriation of bodies in the 
global market but their exclusion or discarding […] this is about sys-
tems that operate on life as source of consumption and goods as well 
as they manage a let die politics” (as would said Castro, 2007: 8). It is 
necessary to state that there is a field of forces that shapes the field 
of politics since certain subjects fight in order not to be controlled, 
named, expropriated, colonized and subjected (fanon, 1997; Quijano, 
2000; rivera Cusicanqui, 2003)
In my view, biopower can be complemented with a biothanatic 
power since it allows framing politics, processes and technologies of 
inoculation which placed between life and death. Biopower replaces 
the old sovereignty rights by the eighteenth century in the colonial na-
tions as foucault said. however, disciplinary power along with labour 
over-exploitation is still valid in the colonial or neo-colonial geopoli-
tics. In fact, several studies on internal colonialism in Latin america 
(gonzález Casanova, 2006; rivera and Barragán, 1997) point out that 
domination includes not only classical form of subjection  (like oc-
cupation and formation of a government that rules a certain terri-
tory) but extraction and suction of plus-value by mean of different 
technologies and tutelage relationships, in a new scenario that some 
authors call modern semi-servitude (Coronil, 2000) or coloniality of 
power  (Quijano, 2000; restrepo, 2004)
In some sa&C countries, social security, universal and free 
health care and education systems, and social assistance protection 
were implemented around the thirties and the sixties under different 
types of political regimes. they were implemented under different 
scope and scale, giving rise to different welfare regimes (esping-an-
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dersen, 1993; Barba solano, 2004; Martínez franzoni, 2008) or sys-
tem of protection run by the state, the market, the working class, la-
bour unions, families, communities or civil associations inter-related. 
But, in most of the countries when the republic democratic regimes 
were established, they were “limited democracy”, generating “dis-
welfare regimes” –a term coined by Bustelo (1995) in his reflection 
on argentina transformation in the neoliberal era–, limiting rights in 
a situation of non-citizenships (fleury, 1997), or establishing residual 
welfare state in the case of those society where universal coverage is 
limited and the market or the social assistance were the main means 
of social policy targeted to the “deserving poor”. some countries, like 
argentina, Chile and uruguay, had established several universal poli-
cies close to a welfare state, but the experience was interrupted by 
neo-conservative coup d’Etat. Backed and promoted by the empire, 
the legitimacy of southern Cone military regimes, as well as in other 
cases in the region, was based on thanatic policy aimed at life and 
disciplinary control policy aimed at body. In the seventies and the 
eighties, military dictatorship planned and carried out the extermi-
nation of progressive groups, labour organizations, peasant, and stu-
dent groups (often all at once as in the case of guatemala, Chile or 
argentina). after this dictatorship in the region last three decades 
came democracy, even if there are several differences among coun-
tries and processes (sader, 2004). I point out common trends and 
features since neoliberal reforms implemented in the democratic era 
promoted social assistance target to the “deserving poor” rather than 
citizenship or rights (Brito Leal Ivo, 2008). those trends have been 
contested by social movement; at the same time, the social struggles 
have succeeded in challenged the established notion of liberal de-
mocracy pushing toward an advance and comprehensive notion of 
democracy which is able to take into account the social and cultural 
difference of societies like Bolivia, nicaragua, ecuador, or Venezuela 
which are struggling for getting it.
Conceptual system of the so-called 
“Strategies against Poverty” from the North 
as part of the HD dispositif
“strategies against poverty” are policies promoted by multilateral glo-
bal development agencies (IMf; wB; IaDB among others; Chossudos-
vsky, 2002), that I call focuspolicies of life and dead. In this section, I 
discusses on the conceptual system of this strategies as a part of the 
focus power in connection with the hD dispositif.
the so-called “strategies against the poverty” encompass various 
policies promoted by those agencies, since Mc namara arrival at the 
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wB in 1973, target to different regions, territory, poor groups and pop-
ulations from poor countries. however, this label is incorporated into 
wB and IMf discourse (wB, 2008; IMf, 2008) by 1999 as part of condi-
tionality “suggested” by borrower government in order to establish the 
country PrsP (Poverty reduction strategy Paper). there is an irony 
that this strategy includes, “for its design”, civil society participation. 
PrsP mark a change in the sense that IMf loans include, since then, 
“pro-growth” poverty reduction policy rather than structural adjust-
ment. the so called esaf (enhanced structural adjustment facility) 
was replaced by the Prgf (Poverty reduction and growth facility). 
this is known as second generation of structural adjustment policy 
since they promote to “integrate poverty reduction approach” into a 
policy designed by efficacy and targeting criteria that should be imple-
mented by “good” and accountable government (reD, 2003).
at the same time, poverty reduction strategies can be seen as 
social policy from abroad sense since it is a type of making policy 
into the social realm in the north as well as the south, the hegem-
onic sector and the subaltern taking into account that there are not 
pre-established hegemony or domination and this can be achieved 
by rights or tutelage interventions also target to ethnic majority or 
minorities. for sa&C countries, social policy is rooted in the colo-
nial practices of the tutelary and patronage assistance marked by the 
catholic notion of occidental and religious charity which in fact re-
calls a certain political economy what Castel (1997) notes for the case 
of europe as “the economy of salvation”, referring to the production 
and reproduction or a certain hierarchical social order. Certainly, the 
region social policy is coloured by its racist difference that could be 
analyzed as the direct and indirect forms of neo-colonial domination 
over the indigenous population and the racialized minorities (Pérez 
Bustillo, 2001).
I understand social policy as a set of reciprocity relations of 
goods or services between government and no government strategies 
(explicit or by omission) with the workers, the poor, the family, the 
market and the community, and a cultural and political field where 
certain social, economic and ethnic hierarchies are constructed, re-
signified, and naturalized by mean of a classificatory process that 
sometimes assumes forms or rights, others as assistance practice 
where discrimination  forms, works through stigmatization –because 
the different means– testing. social policy has many goals because of 
the social dynamic and context. however, it aims to social cohesion 
or control of those population defined as threat by constructing them 
rights subject or second-class citizenship or political society. those 
are processes located in a force field shaped by contested interests 
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whose object of knowledge and practice is the life, welfare or dis-
welfare of certain population. In this regard, social policy promotes 
life to certain threshold and quality, same time those are institution-
alize as a rights, others as assistance practice as it is noted in the 
focus policies: recent minimalist social policy on life which implies 
hunger, destitution or death to large populations. this constitutes a 
field of forces formed by –in different grade– of ways of reciprocity, 
between actors and institutions of different kind: Churches, com-
munity associations, ngo, states, MDfa, people, families and com-
munities. at the same time, the field is shaped by struggles for the 
well being of working class, peasants, ethnic communities as well 
as people from different social strata condemned to live under mar-
ginality, exclusion, deterioration of their life condition and identi-
ties. following nancy fraser (1997), these processes can be analyzed 
as demand for redistribution and recognition of people identity and 
subjectivity. It also can be framed as race war in the sense of fou-
cault’s work (1992) since the state exerts the power to make live 
and let die. at the same time, forms of assistance in hand of the 
state, non-state or supra-state actors can be discussed in terms of 
Partha Chatterjee notion of political society (2006, 2004), namely a 
new mode of state and society relationship, not based on universal 
categories of rights, citizenship or law, but on day to day bargain 
between “interest group”, and “targeted group” (the poor women, 
ethnic groups, unemployed, peasant, favelas residents, among oth-
ers). In my opinion, Chatterjee’s analysis, referring first to the spe-
cific neoliberal gubernamentality for the Indian case, illuminate the 
focus power gubernamentality that I have already discussed above. a 
policy that, in one hand, objectify the discipline of the particular to 
the community level (in both rural and urban) and, at the same time, 
is the result of struggles for life reproduction and the demand for 
self-government. hD discourse system comes into being when the 
neoliberal gubernamentality which, I consider, challenges and modi-
fies previous developmental modes. In this regard, I analyze Dh in a 
context of change and disruption in the archaeology of intervention 
on poverty (sachs, 1999; escobar, 1995) in both the local-national 
and the supranational arena (Álvarez Leguizamón, 2009). this is a 
new shift which includes a new utopia with a positive side to human-
ize “development” and making it sustainable. however, it also in-
cludes a negative side, which is disciplinary interventions on poverty 
only to satisfy basic needs at a minimum level near dead that do not 
reduce what they claim to fight against to, since this intervention are 
only in the local or family level (Álvarez Leguizamón, 2009). as such, 
hD can be analyzed as part of the neoliberal gubernamentality that 
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produce poverty, wealth concentration, and increasing of inequal-
ity according to social and ethnic belonging. the birth of hD dated 
around the middle eighties, and it is rooted in the wB Mc namara 
“war against poverty” but we can said that hD come into light in 
1990 when, for the first time was mentioned in a unDP report hD is 
the result of a previous production and circulation of several basic 
concepts in international agencies, deeply linked with the academi-
cals institutions. hD appeared first in Brundtland report, titled as 
Our Future in Common in the late eighties, which expresses a delu-
sion from the dominant paradigm (guimarães, 2000). since I frame 
discourse not only as a system of interrelated notions from which 
arise, according to coherence, rigor and stability, approaches and 
theories, then it is necessary to take into account the divergences and 
dispersions (foucault, 1997). In this regard, I note first the meaning-
ful contradiction in its rhetoric: to humanize the world, or its mot-
toes “poverty eradication”, “poverty alleviation” (PnuD, 1993) or a 
world “without poverty” or the “fight against poverty” (wB), but in 
fact policies implemented in our countries have increased poverty 
and inequality. 
In the early eighties, both wB and IMf did not consider nec-
essary to address poverty in the adjustment implementation since 
structural adjustment programmes magically would solve poverty by 
its own and would create better options for the poor. retrospectively, 
it is noted that “there has not been any progress in identifying the 
adverse consequences on the poor” by the structural adjustment pro-
grammes (ribe and Carvalho, 1992: 6-7). since then, international in-
stitutions approved the so called compensatory programmes directed 
to those that could not get victories in the unruled market. however, 
international aid to the Latin america region shows  only the 33% 
of the total approval programmed are directed to attend the “new” 
or “chronicle” poor and the 78% to reallocation of social spending 
(stewart, 1992: 5-7) or in other words “state reform” in the social se-
curity system, and the few health care and education universal policy. 
this is a common feature in various types of social policies of the 
focuspolicy that Mesa Lago (2000) called social protection minimum 
nets. stewart (1992: 8) notes that 1990 wB report is devoted to pov-
erty in the same moment when wB began talking in terms of “fight 
against poverty”. In this context, there are several concerns regarding 
the management of that programmes since the so-called diagnosis on 
state inefficiency. Social Investment Funds (sIf) has been promoted 
as inter-sectorial mode to concentrate and manage resources. at this 
time, nation state agencies specialized to deal with social issues, were 
restructured on the bias argument that “in Latin american countries, 
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traditional estate agency of the social sector has always been inefficient 
in the provision of social services to the poor”. sIf would “take quick 
and effective decisions to assist the vulnerable or marginal groups 
from a participative approach in the program formulation, design and 
implementation” […] becoming “a mean to re-establish or, in some 
cases, establish credibility to government and guarantee political sup-
port to the implemented economic reform” (glaessner et al., 1995: 2-3, 
emphasis added).
hD critiques the established notion of development, based only 
on the per capita gP (gross Production) growth instead on the people 
well being. In fact, this is a limited political economy idea since it 
assumes development as “affluence and economic growth” (sen and 
anand, 1994: 8-9). amartya sen, a main figure in the making of this 
discourse stresses on people’s human capacity rather than their in-
come or capital. as it is noted, “developmental approaches have dealt 
with capacity and freedom as final goals” (BID-oVe, 2002: 2). even 
if poverty is more than lack of resources but lack of capacity, sen in-
sists “freedom expansion is (i) principal goal y (ii) principal mean to 
development” since “diverse rights and opportunities expand human 
freedom to develop” (sen, 2000: 36-37; emphasis added). the problem 
here is to expand capacity and freedom in an unequal world defined 
by fewer opportunities, restriction to the social rights of the disadvan-
tage and, therefore, limited freedom.
Net of concepts that define focuspolicy in 
connection with the practical dispositif of 
HD social intervention
In this section, I examine a net of concepts that define focuspolicies in 
connection with the discourse of hD and its practical social interven-
tion. In my view, “minimal biological basic needs” (Boltvinik, 1990) 
or “essential basic needs” (filgueira et al., 2006) are the meaningful 
categories that shape hD intervention (Álvarez Leguizamón, 2005) 
and the discourse of development. they have been assessed from sev-
eral and complex knowledge, and are linked to the capabilities of the 
poor concept (sen, 1993). In addition, the informal safety nets, social 
capital, empowerment, participative policies, participatory poverty as-
sessments and asset vulnerability framework constitute a second set 
of concepts. this web demonstrates the introduction of the economic 
rationale into non economic relationships of social reciprocity along 
with promotion of territorially and targeted “social programmes”. 
such concepts, embedded into intervention dispositive, include the 
maintenance of the poor at a biological minimal level, but strengthen 
the non mercantile and local social nets. as a result, poor people ca-
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pacity is “discovered”. they, challenging dominant social representa-
tions, are now seen as “smart” and  “informed” in line with the motto 
“improve yourself” promoted by that paradigm. for uphoff (1993) 
“beneficiaries” (of social programmes) have more than work and mon-
ey to offer for the project success. they can offer intelligence, experi-
ence and managerial skill to be considered and included in meeting 
the development goals”; they offer “good ideas” that should be taken 
into account, and there is “expectation on human potential that has 
to be mobilized in order to the development self management and 
sustainability”. 
non mercantile solidarity social relations ties or non-market 
institutions are subsumed on economic activities and in manage-
rial view of social policies, formalized into economical concepts as 
social capital, informal nets or intangible assets, that are seen favour-
able and functional to the economical rationality of the discourse 
and practice of hD. they are not seen anymore a burden from socie-
ties conceived traditional by classical political economy (edwards, 
1999) or by the “modernity theory” of social development. now is 
time for the “smart” poor to manage their own problem: this is why 
participation and empowerment (PnuD, 1988: 46-50, emphasis add-
ed) are instrumental and oriented (uphoff, 1993: 135-136, emphasis 
added) to benefices of promoting participative development. for ex-
ample for uphoff, popular participation could be framed “as a pro-
cess in which people, especially those with disadvantage, participate 
in decisions that could affect them”. the label “popular” refers not 
only to the absolute poor but includes the “disadvantage in terms of 
health, education, ethnic group and gender” ascription. this point of 
view is not only a mercantilist perspective but also a neo-colonial, 
racist and sexist vision since people are not able to present them-
selves as belonging to neither a national or local community nor as 
main actors of civil, political, social or cultural rights but “disadvan-
tage holders”. By mean of participation, and managerial capacity 
development, “beneficiaries are able to share responsibilities in the 
operative management taking responsibility by themselves” and make 
a sustainable project. as a consequence, “cost sharing” becomes 
possible since “it is expected that beneficiaries make a contribution 
with work and capital or offer their “self improvement” in order 
to keep the project alive” (Bhatnagar and williams, 1992: 177-178; 
emphasis added). as well, according to the wB, informal safety nets 
“by contrast to the social security or unemployment security sys-
tems are generally linked with conditional transfer to the poor (wB 
group, 2001b, emphasis added) opposed to rights-based-policy. In 
Latin america, anthropology and sociology have developed catego-
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ries and empirical work to explain how the poor could survive in a 
context of material deprivation. 
notions like reciprocal relationships were coined to take into 
account the way that the poor produce resources based on their 
relationships of trust and solidarity. other concept, such as sur-
vival or life strategies, stresses on the agency of the poor by con-
trast to developmental and cultural theories that depict the poor 
as lazy and passive agent. these concepts are similar to the social 
capital concept and practice that has several meanings but in this 
net of concepts is extrapolated from the social to the economic and 
development discourse. economists equal it to capital or to asset. 
they “recognize” their importance in determining the “feasibility 
and productivity in economic activity” (Moser, 1998: 4) and their 
value and functionality in the “fight against poverty”. the utilitar-
ian vision described by stiglitz (2000: 60-61), is hegemonic. In his 
words, “social capital (has one important function) is to comple-
ment or substitute for market-based exchange and allocation. [...] 
the evolution I have described reflects a marked change in the inter-
relationship between market and non-market institutions. this has 
been characterized as a change from a situation in which economic 
activities are embedded in social relations, to one in which social 
relations are embedded in the economic system” (stiglitz, 2000: 64-
65). Social capital as capital or the poor’s asset, as part of the Asset 
Vulnerability Framework (Moser, 1988) is promoted also by the wB. 
It is understood as a portfolio of complex assets that “reinforces the 
inventive solutions of the people themselves rather than replace, 
block or not to consider”. In this regard, “poor urban people assets 
are defined by five dimensions of vulnerability (asset vulnerability 
framework) by Moser. those include  tangible assets such as hu-
man and labour capital, or less productive assets like household, 
and non-tangible and invisible assets for example, intra domestic 
services and social capital” (Moser, 1998: 1).
those core concepts are related to a new wB conceptual frame-
work known as Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPa). Combining 
statistical measurement of poverty with a refined quantitative analysis 
of it, calls for the assessment of poverty by the poor themselves. PPa 
requires a “participatory process” of research focusing on the “voices 
of the poor”, which aims to understand poverty in the local social, 
institutional and political context (narayan et al., 1999: 7-15; 2000).
a third net of concepts, that I consider meaningful and strongly 
related with the later, include human capital, poverty productivity, for-
mal security nets, and poverty trap. By contrast with current repre-
sentation on the poor based on capacity and management, they are 
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now seen as worker or petite entrepreneur.  this new view suggests 
that the poor are able to do more than they have already done with 
their strategies for survival being still poor or indigent. In this view 
the poor’s productivity has to be stimulated, in order to overcome their 
extreme poverty and indigence. I consider this strategy as new form 
of self exploitation (it is also super-exploitation if the wage is estab-
lished by the law and the productivity of the poor increases) of poverty 
labour and non market reciprocity work relationships as other sa&C 
theoretical have explain in other situations (Quijano, 2000; Kowarik, 
1982; Marini, 1997).
Productive capacity, as proposed by hernán De soto (2002), is 
linked with “human capital” of the poor. even if liberal thinking and 
welfare economy had dealt with it, the notion is actually promoted 
by un social Development Commission (naciones unidas, 2006) as 
an essential part of strategies for poverty reduction, which “should 
be based on strengthening the productive capacity of people living 
in poverty”.
these last net concepts, ideas and representations allow other 
focus policies known as the Conditional Cash transfer (CCt), which 
can be seen as a new package of assistance devices focus-policy. 
according to its words, it aims to “reduce poverty” by transfer-
ring income conditionally. Based on the idea of human capital and 
productivity of the poor, the recipient or his family must carry out 
tasks or activities as condition for receiving compensation and re-
sources. they require compliance of several conditions (De la Brière 
and rawlings, 2006; núñez, 2008). among others: the obligation of 
child school attendance, regular medical checks, vaccinations con-
trols, work euphemistically called “community work” (see different 
kind of this programs in same sa&C countries in Valencia, 2008 and 
Mesa Lago, 2000). according fonseca (2006: 7) and Lindert (2005), 
diverse conditional programmes share three common features: tar-
get to poor or extremely poor families with children and teenagers; 
conditionality as a principle; and “human capital accumulation” in 
the long term. CCt, requires a “social contract” (Lindert, 2005). this 
point is disputed by fonseca since he points out that such contract 
is not included into the rights framework. De la Brière and rawl-
ings (2006) argue that those programmes innovate the classical so-
cial assistance (I might say they are a new generation of assistance 
focuspolicies) and are a new “family” or type of welfare intervention 
that make up national policies of safety nets different from insur-
ance systems. 
for the wB, safety net programs have two main functions within 
the economic policies. first, it is the so-called “political function” (re-
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distribution of income and resources to the needy) by helping them 
to address problems of poverty in the short term. secondly, it is about 
assisting households to manage risk. It is managing the political risks 
associated with, or by those in need. this is targeted to certain groups 
not only to the poor but those “needy” (chronically poor and those in 
special circumstances such as disability, discrimination due to race 
issues, problems due to conflicts, “social pathologies” of abuse drugs 
and alcohol, domestic violence and crimes) (wB group, 2001b). the 
latter shows a eugenic, racist, and social Darwinism understanding 
of the social. actually, this discourse talks again in term of “social 
pathologies” (referring to discrimination, victimization and criminali-
zation) as one of the causes of poverty (spicker et al., 2007), theory 
that is believed to be gone nowadays. this is an old idea of the west-
ern social neo colonial hygienic practices which subsumed the same 
habits considered pathologies and “racial poison” into the body of the 
poor (as foucault would said) that the hygienic dispositif have to be 
sanitized and regenerated. that idea, had been developed during the 
middle of the twentieth century in Mexico, argentina and Brazil (Leys 
stepan, 1991) but got not fashioned after the defeat of nazism, now is 
re-emerged in a renovate form.
the idea of “safety” promotion, as part of “safety nets”, is based 
on the notion that safety net programmes have to be only tempo-
rary to “mitigate the poverty consequences” and “other risks of the 
vulnerable families” (wB group, 2001a, emphasis added). In face of 
a minimal state and free market, the temporary usually means the 
chance to get a basic meal just in the case of a critical nutritional 
condition as it is stated in same transitory food program. In this 
connection, there are two kinds of programs: non-state informal 
networks based on community (reciprocity of resources and services 
among families) and public safety networks, based on formal public 
programs (wB group, 2001b). the latter includes: money transfer, 
food, public work, micro-finance, and school voucher (wB group, 
2001b). It combines utilitarian logic and economic efficiency:  “must 
have an effective cost-benefit ratio, with appropriate benefits along 
with focused and efficient administrative systems” (wB, 2005). 
those programs may break “poverty trap”, an idea formulated by 
certain social anthropology (Lewis, 1961) and backed by a tradition 
from the liberal and neoliberal political economy and the welfare 
economy (Piachaud, 1973; un Millennium Project, 2005; spicker et 
al., 2007). Both sides assumed that poverty is reproduced according 
to a vicious circle namely an intergenerational, territorial or national 
transmission of certain inadequacies (a generic way to say it) such 
as disability, lack of skills or saving, training or education, between 
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others lacks. In oscar Lewis’ vicious circle, poverty represents one 
particular culture, a subculture (minor and different one) in which 
circulates cultural family values that are the contrary of the desires 
to improve the quality of life. I consider that improving productive 
capacity means to favour overworking –increasing the self-exploi-
tation– under extreme poverty conditions, precariousness, and low 
income this means a process of more weakness of the already vulner-
able people. In the neoliberal political economy language, it is “work 
the main productive factor of the poor” and a critical aspect “in the 
fight against the poverty and inequity, this is about strengthen to hu-
man capital investment since the people childhood” (rapoport, 2006, 
emphasis added).
Strategies against Poverty from the South 
Coming from the sa&C countries, there are various alternative poli-
cies and strategies against poverty that have their own history and 
depend on contextual factors. some of them echoed old vindication 
of the working class, the ethnic groups, the peasant or the urban poor. 
on the other hand, there are several original initiatives like the social 
economy, the solidarity economy, or participatory budget that have 
been promoted and implemented in the region. alternatively, anoth-
er group of policies inspired by the reinforcement of classical social 
rights, some of them coming from a southern reading of the north 
social welfare experiences and their different form of regulating the 
assistance to minimum guaranteed income at different kind of situ-
ation, as others promoted by the IaDB. those are the cases of initia-
tives like “citizen income”, “social protection for the workers in infor-
mal economy”, “Basic Income”, “minimum assistance income”, “basic 
universalism”, among others.
In this section, I analyze different sort of social policy on both 
the national and the local level. first, some countries develop what 
I call a new anti-imperial national statism or a new democratic and 
multicultural way of imagining the society. their policy is an expres-
sion of a new national anti-imperialism rhetoric and anti neo-colonial 
nationalism turn, as said (1996) would note, emerging in countries 
like Venezuela, ecuador, Bolivia, nicaragua, among others, in which 
poverty is understood from the socio structural conditions. to some 
extent, their policies are taken as an answer to the neoliberal reforms 
and programmes, promoted by the north and accepted in the majority 
of the countries that held neoliberal reforms in the eighties and nine-
ties. even if in same sa&C countries policy shows similar features to 
the previous, in fact in same countries, they are resignified and same 
incorporated emancipatory processes.
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alternative policies are based on contested visions and perspec-
tive about structural poverty (Barba et al., 2005; Du toit, 2005) in 
both Latin america and africa. even if there are several differences, 
I can resume them as follows. Poverty is seen as a multidimensional, 
structural and historical phenomenon that results from different lev-
els of exclusion; geopolitical, national and local inequalities produced 
by a long-term process, persistent exclusion, concentration of eco-
nomic power, lack of access, product of politics power that maintains 
grip on resources (political, natural or otherwise), at the expenses 
of citizen rights –through ruthless exploitation–, seemingly harmless 
cronyism or patron client relationships, deprivation to the rights to 
resources, and systematic violation of basic social, political and hu-
man rights. Most of this perspective reflect an oppressive political 
structure, and promote the liberation of oppression, while equal dis-
tribution of resources to all people sectors; it is expected to rule out 
this condition. as general feature, it poses poverty as part of socio-
structural processes, and encompasses the cause, process and context 
of its reproduction from a renewed political and cultural understand-
ing of society. opposed to the core neoliberalism vision of the state, 
it promotes a different understanding of the social order and of the 
state role, a new idea of justice and as a result, new ways to prevent 
and attack poverty. 
regarding first kind of policies echoed old working class, ethnic 
groups, peasant, and land tenure vindication. this is a problem first 
identified by the dependency theory (see Dos santos, 2002 for a sum-
marize vision), an innovative social theory from the sa&C region, as 
one of the most important causes of the extended rural poverty. the 
problem and production of the urban poverty is also aboard for this 
theory, but is not a subject of this point.
the lack of land has been addressed by movements like Bra-
zilian Movemento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Mst), the 
cocaleros peasants movement in Bolivia –originally a union linked 
with the evo Morales’ Mas party– and the ezLn in Mexico. In all 
cases, land use or tenure demand was connected with political eth-
nic claiming, and the new way of capitalist expansion and exploi-
tation condemn. Moreover, they question the failure of the result, 
promise, and myths offered by democracy, western modernity and 
“development”. In this context, they propose new and diverse alter-
natives depending on the historical context. Mexican Pérez Bustillo 
(2001: 75-76) observes similar features in sa&C movements and 
the african cases discussed by Mamdani (1996) in particular the 
idea of “colonial bifurcation” of the state and economy, between 
the spheres directly and indirectly dominated and penetrated by 
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colonial power distorts, the development of the classic kind of “civil 
society” and “public sphere” between the indigenous and non-in-
digenous population. In the sa&C region, “bifurcation” has been 
referred to consider the persistence and reproduction of the “colo-
nial legacy –and render hegemonic its contemporary neo-colonial 
(neoliberal) equivalences– rather than provide the necessary and 
desirable basis for its radical democratic transformation” (Pérez 
Bustillo, 2001). that perspective is referred by many Latin ameri-
can authors to explain the current neo colonial forms in their neo-
liberal turn (rivera Cusicanqui, 2003; Bonfil Batalla, cited by Pérez 
Bustillo, 2001: 77). the significance of the colonial legacy brings 
light to meaning and extend of the upraising of the indigenous and 
landless people social movements in Peru, México, ecuador, Bo-
livia, Colombia, argentina and Brazil, among other, in spite of the 
hegemony grade they have in their national societies, most of these 
movements propose a new policy to deal with poverty, ethnic ex-
clusion, land demand, identity, self determination, and the right 
to their culture. Bolivian cocalero peasant movement asks also for 
theirs rights to trade coca, vindicate ethnic identity and access to 
land (Vargas and Córdoba, 2003: 91), incarnates a neo-colonial vin-
dication against republican neo-colonialism and the national Pop-
ulism of the fifties. that social movement arises for the resistance 
to the impossibility to exert the right to the cultural difference. In 
this connection, social struggles claim against the usurpation of 
livelihood (means of employment, land and water) and the means 
of cultural and symbolic reproduction. their struggles also put on 
evidence the state, liberal democracy and development weaknesses 
to assure and to expand basic social rights (health, education, wor-
thy wage, access to sanitary services) and to construct a citizenship 
based on multicultural and ethnic rights. this is about construct-
ing multicultural and re-distributive state which could displace es-
tablished meanings and practices of politics. these kind of social 
movements develop a national character in opposition to the inter-
ference into local policy by neoliberalism and imperial capitalism, 
which has damaged human dignity. I consider that those struggles 
make a main contribution to the construction of new nationalisms 
and statism. as a consequence, they challenge the meaning, validity 
and scope of representative democracy.
when they get hegemonic power they draw new social and 
cultural horizons by constructing new mediation systems with and 
into the state throughout symmetrical, participative and delibera-
tive arenas in connection with the idea of community, as in Chat-
terjee. Current reforms like those promoted by evo Morales and 
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popular movements draw a new statism. as an example, consti-
tution reform states statization of energetic resource, establish-
es legal criteria for land tenure and uses, includes a new agrar-
ian reform –still in process of institutionalization because of the 
dominant and racist resistance coming from the lower land and 
the richest landlord linked with transgenic soy (urioste, 2007). In 
addition, Bolivia has implemented a minimal universal income, 
budgeted by oil rent after its partial statization, for people older 
than 66 year that cover basic need. according to the analysis of 
economic and social Policies of Bolivia, moderate poverty line fell 
from 66.4 to 59.3% and extreme poverty fell from 45.2 to 32.7% 
covering the 2000-2008 years period.  non-conditionality cash 
transfer programs, implemented since 2006 and aimed at the el-
derly, schoolchildren and pregnant women, have had an impact on 
poverty reduction. figures for 2007 and 2008 years also show that 
rural poverty declined by 10.6 %4. 
another case is the zapatist movement that has emerged into 
the international political arena the same day that México signed 
aLCa-usa initiative, which reminds, recalls and resounds the mu-
sic of colonial and republican domination (Pérez Bustillo, 2001). 
In addition to land and identity demand, the zapatist claimed for 
common agreement and national demands in 2003 year (ezLn, 
2003). they include: effective autonomy and independency of the 
social worker, peasant and indigenous organizations, promotion of 
self-government and self management of all national territory ac-
cording to each one opinion; to promote rebelliousness, civil and 
peaceful resistance in front bad government and political parties 
decisions, total solidarity with the victim but not with the aggressor, 
inter community trade promotion, trade giving preference to small 
and medium business and the so-called informal trade; joint and 
coordinated defense of national sovereignty and radical opposition 
to the impending privatization of the electricity and oil, and other 
natural resources; training a network of information, culture and 
media, creating, local and regional media networks, and defense 
and promotion of local, regional and national cultures, and sciences 
and the arts world. the seven demands were: the land belongs to the 
person who works it; defense of cooperative and communal land, 
and the protection and defense of natural resources. they think that 
anything have to be without the knowledge and consent of the in-
4 see <http://www.solvision.co.cu/index.php/201003223761/Internacionales/bolivia-
registra-modesta-reduccion-en-indices-de-pobreza.html> March 22, 2010; and CeDLa 
<http://www.cedla.org/content/908> June 21, 2010.
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habitants and workers in each location. they ask for decent work, 
fair wages, decent housing, free public health, food and clothing 
at low cost for all. also they think that the education have to be 
free and secular for all children and youth and to respect the dig-
nity of women, children and the elderly. one of the most signifi-
cant achievements of the ezLn in Chiapas, is the establishment of 
so-called Caracoles also known as Juntas de Buen Gobierno (good 
government Councils), consisting of forms of self-organization and 
self-sufficiency, including educational and health services, related to 
territorial spaces (gonzález Casanova, 2004) .
argentinean unemployment worker movement, known as 
the piqueteros, claims for the right to work and have been recog-
nized by some official programmes (svampa and Pereyra, 2003) 
that could be called minimal targeted income (some with CCt for-
mat). the movement emerged in the early nineties as resistance 
against neoliberal reforms that had promoted privatization, dein-
dustrialization, and state reform. the same as other experience, 
the movement has developed a strong criticism to neoliberalism 
since it was “a failed experiment” as well as extends criticism to 
the governors and politicians. Politicians are considered “employ-
ees of great transnational companies and monopolies”. Between 
and important range of organizations, there is an autonomous one 
called the MtD solano (Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados, 
related to their name in spanish). they are the main reference of 
the so called Colectivo Situaciones (situations Collective) located 
in Buenos aires province around the Buenos aires capital. they 
confront both revolutionary vanguards and reformist positions to 
access to the power. the first is represented by the Bloque Piquetero 
(Piqueteros Block) and the second by the MtD aníbal Verón and 
to the movement of D’elia integrated by peronist leftist sectors in-
volved in the civil and armed struggle of the seventies. Situaciones 
argues for a new radicalism where the question of the power is 
displaced from the state, and locate in daily resistance “without 
models”, “the social revolt as policy”, promoting “contra cultural 
practices”. they view Mexican zapatist movement as the symbol of 
the “social rebel”. In their words, “dignity arises under phenomena 
of the autonomy, the multiplicity, the disposition of the creation, 
self defense, capacity, and the dispute to produce life”. In addition, 
they consider that “the attempts to form self defense way of social 
organization also register in a produced civil war to wards inte-
rior of Latin american countries under the speech of drug traffick-
ing, terrorism and insecurity”. the Piquetero movement forced the 
government to implement social programmes to cope with the ex-
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treme situation of the un-employed workers. the government im-
plemented, first a small number of unemployed programmes, and 
after the 2001 crisis, thorough a kind of conditional cash transfer 
programme named “unemployed household heads Programme” 
(Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados) which reached 2,000,000 ben-
eficiaries in 2002 at the moment of the so-called “the height of the 
crisis” and then covering 620,000 beneficiaries in 2009 (social De-
velopment secretariat, 2009). It was the first program of massive 
subsidies to unemployment than not takes the form of right to un-
employment (Pautassi, 2004).
the Sem Terra movement, the largest social movement, was es-
tablished in 1985 when its first congress Ocupação é a única solução 
(Occupation is the unique solution). non productive rural land is 
occupied by symmetrical and horizontal communal organization 
that also organized autonomous activities in education and cul-
ture, among others. sin tierra Movement has achieved the tenure 
of community land based on the legal interpretation of state-land-
legal framework. since 1990 until 2006, around 6,177 campamentos 
and 1,086,474 families (Mst, 2009) have been recognized5. as it is 
published in the movement web page: “In the same year, José sar-
ney’s government approved the national Plan for agrarian reform 
(Pnra for its abbreviation in  Portuguese), which had the objective 
of rapidly implementing the statute of the Land and make the land 
reform by the end of the President mandate, including 1.4 million 
of families. once again the proposed land reform was only on pa-
per. at the end of a term of his five years, less than 90 thousand 
families without land were registered, only 6% of the targets set 
in the Pnra. with the articulation for the Constituent assembly, 
the Ruralista sectors organized Ruralista Democratic Union (uDr 
for its abbreviation in Portuguese) and work on three fronts: the 
armed wing –encouraging violence in the field– the branch Rural-
ista in parliament and the mass Media Communications as allies. 
the political arm of the movement succeeded introducing emends 
to the Constitution of 1988 even more conservative as the previous 
statute of the Land. until 1997, the Movement organized the his-
toric “national March for the use, the Justice and Land reform”, a 
year after the massacre of Eldorado dos Carajás, when 21 landless 
5 among his achievements, as well as settlements and occupations, are recorded 81 
cooperatives as Sem Terra worker, 45 agro-industrial units, reduction of child morta-
lity rates in their settlements through the elimination of extreme hunger. It also re-
cords with pride in its history, 100,000 children and adolescents studying in schools 
in their settlements, as well as a mass movement of youth and adult literacy without 
land, approximately 20,000 (sales Caldart, 2000).
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were killed by police. In 2000, the Mst held its IV Congress, whose 
slogan was “for a Brazil without latifundia” that guides the actions 
of the movement today. 
“the Brazilian suffered eight years with the neoliberal economic 
model implemented by the government of fernando henrique Car-
doso causing serious damage to those living in rural areas, causing 
growing poverty, inequality, the exodus, the lack of labour and land. 
the election of Lula in 2001 represented the victory of the Brazil-
ian people and the defeat of the elites and their project. But even 
the electoral victory was not enough to generate significant changes 
in the structure of the land tenancy and the agricultural model. [...] 
thus, the movement believes that it is necessary to promote, increas-
ingly, the social struggle to ensure the construction of a model that 
prioritizes agriculture to food production and distribution of income 
[...] after 24 years of existence, the Mst considers that its role as a 
social movement is to organize the poor in the field, them aware of 
their rights and mobilize them to fight for the land reform, but by 
building a popular project for Brazil, based on the social justice and 
human dignity”.
the movement political position and demands are: intensifying 
the organization of the poor to a massive struggle for land reform; 
to build unity in the field and develop new forms of struggle, help 
to build and strengthen the other social movements in the field. It is 
considered that the established way of global production, consump-
tion and market caused a massive destruction of the environment, 
including global warming, which is jeopardizing the ecosystems of 
our planet and bringing human communities towards disaster. the 
movement, along with its communication task, register the number 
of jailed, death, imprison and violence conflict in the field, land con-
centration, generation of jobs in the field and rates of production, and 
production data with names of the sixty largest companies operating 
in the Brazilian agriculture.
second, regarding the focuspolicies resignification and new par-
ticipative social policies, I note that most current social policy for the 
poor are still targeted policies distinguishing them from a orientation 
toward rights to emancipatory ones. examples of the second are pro-
grams implemented in Bolivia as Bono Juancito Pintos, the so called 
Misiones Venezolanas or the Hambre Cero (zero hunger) in Brazil 
or the first Plan Trabajar in argentina. other policy like participative 
budget or social economy (Coragio, 2004; among others) are policies 
that have a socialist and anarchist background and they are promoted 
for socialist parties as the local level as he Presupuesto Participativo in 
cities ruled by the Trabalhista Party ruled for Lula in Brazil, and other 
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in argentina cities as rosario o de Mexico Df6. they are frequent-
ly pointed out as an emancipatory since they promote participatory 
practices and innovative perspective for creating jobs and generating 
income to address poverty in rural and urban poor areas. Solidarity 
economy developed in Brazil has incorporated a new right, the right 
to the market. I will take some examples. even if Hambre Cero pro-
gramme, implemented by Lula da silva in Brazil, is a program aiming 
to modify structural conditions that produce poverty from a rights 
perspective in its rhetoric formulation, the programme discourse is 
very close to the hD discourse. the programme does not refer to so-
cial welfare but social development in terms of food and nutritional 
security as well as participatory scheme that has a long emancipatory 
tradition in Brazil (freire, 1967; Castro, 1951). this social policy ap-
proach does not follow any assistance nor contra-prestation principle 
neither of tutelage (tutor or patronage relationships). “fight against 
hunger is not a cost but an investment”, and, from a neokeynesian 
perspective, it assumes that the increasing food demand would mean 
the increasing of employment (near 350 thousand) and an increasing 
of tax collection (around 2,500 millions of Brazilian reais). accord-
ing to tavares (2004), the Cardoso’s president office implanted a neo-
liberal economical policy.  however, there were important progresses 
in terms of access to universal social protection in health care and 
education. nevertheless, poverty has persisted and wealth concentra-
tion increased. for this author, Hambre Cero faces a problem since it 
reduces food security and there are very few progresses to access to 
basic rights, to wage and appropriate household, which are the main 
causes of poverty. 
the social policy of the government of President Chávez in Ven-
ezuela has been a profound social transformation and shifting re-
sources to the poor. on the other hand, it still is a focused policy, 
even if there are missions to the state bureaucracy and the social 
protection system. this experience is tangled by a strong national-
ism discourse who reminds us of certain changes in the region by 
mid-twentieth century, such as peronism in argentina, with strong 
military influence in the social sphere. Plan Bolivar (the name of the 
national political strategy) is set out as a civic-military (executed by 
the military, government and community organizations) and covers 
intervention on health care, education, unemployment, alienation, 
and security infrastructure. Programs and their rhetoric acquire a 
strong nationalist tone: country project (provides assistance to the 
6 for an analysis of participatory budgeting programs in europe and Latin ameri-
ca see united nations Program for Development (2004). 
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needy); home project (public employees joined in social activities 
and community organizations); nation project (investment in infra-
structure and mass education). at the same time, there is a persis-
tence of old colonial-style rhetoric of care reflected by names like 
“missions” as it was labelled the first plan, even if mission goals are 
emancipatory. Chávez took government when the poverty rate had 
reached above 55% and lowered that percentage to 27% in 2007. the 
public social spending rose from 8.2% of gDP by 13.6% in 2007, and 
from 5% to 10% spending on health, education and housing (Mon-
talban, 2010).
according to the Development vice-minister Pacheco (2004) the 
Venezuelan social policies involves a transition from a “model of a 
compensatory social policies” to another aimed at the strengthening 
of popular power and the claim of politics and society as alternative 
to the hegemony of the market –with a strong criticism of decen-
tralization and weakening of state in the social policies of the previ-
ous neoliberal stage. the value of the policy is seen as “a recovery 
of policy, and not as pure technology governmentality but back to 
politics as utopian strain that politics as a consensus-building”. In 
the nomination, rhetoric and intentions of the programs, there is 
a strong commitment to communitarian utopia, this time and not 
territorial or popular focal length, the promotion of social economy 
that is about to a more popular, less based on the self of poverty 
and more on the processes of social awareness. empowerment is 
also present as an emancipator not instrumental, through the di-
rect democratic participation through the de-bureaucratization and 
technical efficiency.
this experience is similar to that of participatory budgeting, that 
we cannot explain to the full extent, but it can be seen us an alternative 
from the south and a participatory strategy of management resource at 
the city governmental level. In Brazilian cities under the management 
of the Trabalhista Party; in rosario, argentina ruled by a socialist party, 
or the Mexican federal District also ruled by a left wing party. In those 
cases, re-empowerment is meant to be emancipatory and put in the 
policies the political tension as a utopic transformation of society.
the third group of alternative policies would be influenced by the 
tradition of a minimal welfare rights promoted by some european 
agencies coming from european tradition. But in the last, assistance 
policies guaranteed minimum income for the poor or excluded (Pau-
gam, 2001) are supplemented by broader insurance schemes as well 
as universal social policies in health, education and, especially, unem-
ployment insurance. so, this minimum income or additional set of 
life focuspolicy, I would say, has a broad social supplemented in these 
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countries that does not exist or is waked in sa&C.
unDP has also promoted the esCr (economic, social and cultur-
al rights). Linked with the right rhetoric, esCr has provided a broad 
legal framework for the development of universal social rights (espe-
cially in health and education); but, in my view, when in practice these 
are embodied in “programmes” (format devices intervention focus-
policy), they become regular assistance programs that meet the CCt 
requirement. on the other hand, there eCLaC has presented some 
initiatives on “social cohesion” which promotes gradually minimum 
threshold of social protection for all without changing the format 
of focuspolicy and neoliberal policy, already in place in most sa&C 
countries. the IaDB has recently launched a campaign called “basic 
universalism” (filgueras et al., 2006; sojo, 2006), which does not to 
consider the non-basics needs (narbordo, 2006). this initiative is pro-
moted for the party called the Frente Amplio Progresitsa (in english, 
opposite Progressive Broad) in Bogotá.
other groups, as the teachers and the doctor more middle classes’ 
vindication, like to improve and also change the universal policies in 
health and education, without take out which is not basic of the free 
state services. there are another line of thought related with the un-
esCo/ohChr, poverty rights but with other tradition and propose, 
based on promoting pro poor rights and policies. 
Final reflections
the new utopias and imaginary face several dilemmas. the practic-
es and intervention dispositif promote the citizen, the poor, and the 
marginalized or excluded welfare or the welfare dual. they encounter 
resistance and opposition from the local and international political 
power, and the bureaucracies within the discourse of the focuspolicies 
in different levels: the macro, the meso and the micro. at the same 
time, a current orientations and alternative arrangements for social 
policy raises the question about the extent and a real change from the 
neoliberal governmentality and established social policies. another 
question is if they really favour a universal and comprehensive social 
policy, aimed at the distribution of wealth and power.
there have been in some cases significant progress in terms of 
access to universal social protection in core sectors like the health 
system, the basic education or food security systems, and, in few 
cases, access to land in same countries as Bolivia. at the same time, 
there are not so many improvements in terms of revenue situation 
(such as the Brazilian case). Brito Leal Ivo (2008) questioned poverty 
reduction while maintaining a dual system of society with little or 
poor articulation of the universal social protection systems. at the 
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same time, social policy related to national policies of the new stat-
ism could mean a deeply social transformation and redistribution of 
resources to workers and the poor, as the case of Bolivia and Ven-
ezuela. By contrast, it is observed the heavy concentration of wealth 
in cases like Brazil, Chile, Mexico and argentina where, paradoxi-
cally, cash transfer programmes have achieved to reduce poverty. at 
the same time, social policy develops a new approach, now aimed at 
the social inclusion rather than a territorial-based compensatory ap-
proach. this has been linked to the strengthening of popular power as 
a way of retrieve the policy not as pure technology governmentality, 
but as chance to build counter hegemony that incorporate processes 
of empowerment and emancipatory and popular representation. this 
happens in different ways. In this regard, Bolivia and Venezuela have 
established policies from the government itself, while cases like Mst 
and ezLn, policies are produced by social movements. In argentine, 
polices arise from government in response to social struggles of the 
Piquetero Movement. 
In the context of a global trend towards concentration of wealth, 
the de-politicization of social policies by economical and technology 
rationality of focuspolicy and the centralization of political power 
(through decentralization that has been, in its neoliberal version, a 
continuing policy of disinvestment in social, while generating tension 
in the autonomous area of the local polity), the struggles and move-
ments are continuing and persistently resisting to be expropriated and 
subjected. however, a strong national and local inequality in wealth 
distribution still remains unflappable. In other cases, the policies are 
re-appropriated notion of targeting by the social movements giving it 
an emancipatory character. the scenario is not a single but a complex 
one, since those trends reflect different struggles and tensions that draw 
our contemporary world.
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the objective of this research is, first, to present the relationship be-
tween public investment and economic development in a broad sense, 
based on a structuralist and Keynesian approach. Complementarities 
between private and public investment are shown, as well as impacts of 
public investment over manufacturing and gross national products. It 
is specially remarked the impact of public investment in infrastructure. 
the second objective is to analyze public investment in Brazil from 
1950 to 2006. It is shown that the great drop of public gross capital 
formation, mainly from state-owned enterprises, is one cause of the low 
Brazilian growth rate from the eighties until 2006. 
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Introduction
the aim of the international workshop “strategies against Pover-
ty: designs from the north and alternatives from the south” is “to 
bring about a comparative, critical and multidisciplinary under-
standing of the theoretical frameworks and practices which were/
are put forward as solutions to poverty in the south”. the program 
of the workshop says that “the neoliberal agenda provided coun-
tries in the south with several sets of standardized policy recom-
mendations which ended up becoming the customary wisdom for 
politicians and bureaucrats alike. however, regardless of this ideo-
logical reorientation, poverty is still an endless feature of african, 
Latin american and the Caribbean countries, that has been even 
aggravated in many cases”1.
Many developing countries passed through neoconservative re-
forms since the eighties and nineties aiming to diminish public inter-
vention in economy. one of the most notable reforms was the priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises. nowadays due to the melting of 
financial markets public intervention and rise on public investment 
is returning to the agenda of economic policy. however this agenda 
treats differently north and south countries. Multilateral institutions 
still recommend to developing countries conservative macroeconomic 
policies. Meanwhile, poverty remains and can get worse depending 
on the negative impacts of the financial crisis. this paper argues that 
public investment has to be a priority for the countries of the south 
because, as it is demonstrated, it is one of the key pillars to promote 
development and to eradicate poverty.
therefore the objective of this research is, first, to present the 
relationship between public investment and economic development 
in a broad sense, based on a structuralist and Keynesian approach. 
section 1 shows the complementarities between private and public 
investment, as well as the impacts of public investment over the indus-
trial product and the gross national product. It is specially remarked 
the impact of public investment in infrastructure. the conclusion 
is that, on the demand side, public investment generates economic 
development because it induces private investment through its tradi-
tional multiplier effect and through physical integration and expan-
sion of internal market, mainly promoted by infrastructure. on the 
supply side, public investment and purchasing policies of state-owned 
enterprises motivate the usage or expansion of productive capacity in 
capital and technological intensive sectors. thus, public investment 
1 CLaCso/CroP, ossrea and sePhIs call for papers for this international wor-
kshop.
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policies have a strategic role for economic development and they also 
may have an important distributive effect. Public investment is a vari-
able politically determined, so its behaviour depends on the groups of 
interests in power and, consequently, on the macroeconomic regime 
adopted by them. 
the second objective, held in section 2, is to analyze public in-
vestment in Brazil as a case study for the theory undertaken. It is 
shown that the great drop of public gross capital formation, mainly 
from state-owned enterprises, is one of the causes of the low Bra-
zilian growth rate from the eighties until 2006. Between 1950 and 
1979 the conjugation of high public investment with other economic 
policies to benefit the industrialization process enabled the expan-
sion of private investment and the growth of gross national product, 
industrial product and gross fixed-capital formation. Political and 
judicial decisions made easier the huge expansion of state-owned 
enterprises and the construction of various mechanisms for their 
funding. these achievements were enhanced by the interests sus-
taining national government, especially domestic big corporations, 
domestic big builders and multinational companies. after the eight-
ies, the great burst in the growth pattern was parallel to the transfor-
mation of the role of the state2. the macroeconomic model adopted 
in Brazil was synchronized with neoliberal policies imposed over 
developing countries, which benefited financial elites. Public invest-
ment diminished a lot due to fiscal restrictions and the privatization 
process. In opposition to what was expected by neoliberal authors, 
private investment also diminished and did not recuperate public 
investment. the low growth of gross fixed capital formation entailed 
a decreasing trajectory in the industrial product and gross national 
product growth rates. once the investment in infrastructure gives 
competitiveness for the industry and it conducts structural change, 
its deterioration resulted in worse productive conditions, mainly in 
capital and technological intensive sectors.  thus there was a douse 
in the dynamics of the industrial structure, with negative effects on 
income distribution. 
the conclusions pinpoint and summarize the main contribu-
tions of the paper. the general idea is to demonstrate the impor-
tance of public investment to generate growth and to reduce income 
2 the state, in this article, is viewed following a gramscian concept, like trujillo 
(2009: 12) has described: “as the organ of one particular group, destined to create 
favorable conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion. But the development and 
expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor 
force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the ‘national’ energies”. 
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inequalities. although its effect is indirect, it must be a fundamental 
pillar of economic development policies.
Section 1: Theoretical perspective
In accordance to a perspective based on the demand and on the his-
torical-structuralist tradition, investment is the key variable of growth 
dynamics and capitalist structural change. the demand induces and 
creates –through the Principle of effective Demand3– the supply, which 
adjusts itself both in the short and long run to variations of demand’s 
autonomous components (funding standards, consumption, competi-
tion and the social relations between capital and labour) and induced 
ones (accelerator mechanism that adjusts the capital stock)4. 
economic development is a process of structural change led by 
capital accumulation which increases the productivity of the whole 
economy, sustaining high growth rates in medium and long run. this 
structural change means the transformation of production functions’ 
technical coefficients, and therefore of the input-output matrix5. 
according to Kaldor’s first law6 manufacturing industry is the 
growth engine of the economy, not only due to the share of indus-
trial output in the whole production, but also because  the higher the 
growth rate of manufacturing output is, bigger is the economy growth 
rate. this relationship derives from the impact that manufacturing 
activity exerts on the economy’s demand and productivity, displacing 
labour from sectors of low productivity to industry7.
thus, manufacturing industry has dynamic effects on other eco-
nomic activities, diffusing innovation and technological progress. the 
rhythm of the industrial output expansion drives the growth of total 
product8. the development of capital goods industry expands and 
deepens dynamic effects, enhancing general investment and promot-
ing domestic demand lead growth. 
3 the principle of effective demand was formulated by Keynes and Kalecki. for a 
deep understanding see Possas (1986) and the originals Keynes (1992) and Kalecki 
(1985).
4 serrano (1988).
5 this definition is strictly economic in the sense it sees the accumulation of pro-
ductive forces as the motor of economic development because it enables the raise of 
the wages level, which would enable social and political development of people.
6 Kaldor (1966), Libanio (2007).
7 the positive relationship between product and productivity in the manufacturing 
sector is known as Kaldor’s second law.
8 and more, “in periods of high growth and new products introduction, the existence 
of a pool of qualified workforce and research & Development generates externalities 
and amplifies the positive effects of the former investments” (Medeiros, 2007: 04).
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It is important to note that this approach takes labour market, 
especially labour demand, as intrinsically related to income distri-
bution and poverty in a developing country. In the view adopted 
here, the scarcity of resources and the substitution between capital 
and labour do not hold in the real world. this is the opposite of 
the neoclassical approach, especially human Capital’s. therefore, 
income redistribution is considered here as the result of three main 
factors, as López (2005) demonstrates. the factors are, first, the 
growth in formal employment; second, the reduction in unemploy-
ment (that is, labours not working in either the formal or the in-
formal sector); and third the raise in relative income of capitalists 
vis-à-vis workers9.
there are two basic possibilities of interpreting the relationship 
between public and private investment: the existence of “crowding in” 
or “crowding out”10. although both phenomena may occur simultane-
ously, it is claimed in this paper that, in general, there is “crowding 
in” between public and private investment, not necessarily linear or 
proportional. 
from the empirical perspective, there are several work papers 
–based on different approaches– that confirm the “crowding in” be-
tween public investment (especially in infrastructure) and private 
investment, output and productivity11. here it is defended that there 
9 “generally speaking, income will tend to become more evenly distributed if the 
relative share of formal employment in total employment rises, or when the share of 
the urban population effectively unemployed falls. Income concentration will also 
decline if the relative income of workers vis-à-vis capitalists gets higher, although in 
this case we need to differentiate between the agricultural and the non agricultural 
sector, and we also need to discriminate between alternative causes behind the chan-
ge in relative factor shares”. (López, 2005: 85) 
10 the role of public investment is more specific than the one of public spending. 
while public spending is an important component of aggregate demand and deter-
mines the intensity of the Keynesian multiplier, public investment specifically means, 
also, the creation of productive capacity (serrano, 1995). unlike private investment, 
it is an autonomous variable because it depends on government’s decisions. therefo-
re, it is a political variable.
11 some papers; authors that defend “crowding in” are aschauer (1990) for the usa 
in the eighties, Calderón & servén (2004) and Candido Jr. (2006) for Latin ameri-
can countries in past two decades, Belloc & Vertova (2004) for highly indebted poor 
countries, and ferreira & Malliagros (1999) for Brazil since 1970. Particularly, Mon-
teiro neto (2006) stated that public investment has been one main element for gross 
fixed capital formation (gfCf) in Brazil since the II world war, both from quantitati-
ve and qualitative perspectives. according to the author public investment motivated 
productive restructuring of existing sectors and formation of new ones through its 
direct action towards sectors that private investment was not interested in or had no 
conditions to reach. on the other hand, after a cross section exercise including 98 
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is “crowding in” between public and private investment because, on 
the demand side, the former sustains the economic cycle and expands 
and integrates the market, and on the supply side, public investment, 
especially in infrastructure12, affects the general productivity of the 
economy and anticipates the investment cycles (if there is economic 
planning). this investment is able to displace the productive struc-
ture to capital and technology intensive sectors13, with impacts on the 
amount and allocation of the investments in general.
for theorists of the Development like rosenstein-rodan, nurkse, 
hirschman, the technological discontinuity of peripheral countries 
would be overcome through public policies aiming to promote the 
“big push”; the expansion of various industries. this expansion 
would generate income and enlarge the demand, extending markets 
and profit perspectives for the private sector, both due to horizontal 
linkages and to the improvement of labour skills in manufacturing, 
which raises employment and productivity. this would be, then, the 
mechanism that would generate more employment and that would 
enhance income in formal and informal sector of the economy 
(López, 2005).
traditional macroeconomic theories, used in the official speech 
and documents of multilateral institutions since the eighties, only re-
gard public investment as acceptable in case of “market failures” and 
whether it obeys to funding conditions which do not jeopardize “fiscal 
fundamentals”. In the orthodox view, decisions on public investment 
should follow the same criteria of the private investment: profitability 
and efficiency. they believe that, except when the net return is posi-
tive, public investment exerts a negative impact on the public debt 
and, consequently, on the interest rate. this effect would generate a 
process of “crowding out” with the private investment (IMf, 2004). 
Besides, in neoclassical economic models that considers full employ-
countries for the period between 1960 and 1985 Barro (1991) concludes that the po-
sitive effect of public investment on growth is not significant. Dejavaran et al (1996) 
find crowding out in empirical analysis with 43 countries between 1970 and 1990, 
Melo & rodrigues (1998) and rocha & teixeira (1996) show that there was crowding 
out in Brazil between 1970-1995 and 1965-1990, respectively. for more reports about 
empirical literature in the mainstream tradition, see andersen et al (2006).
12 Infrastructure investment is important, first of all, because its social and politica-
lly genuine objective is to improve the population’s welfare. that is because infras-
tructure means the essential services for peoples’ lives. and in the geopolitical point 
of view, infrastructure is essential to integrate and delimit the territory.
13 hirschman (1958) was one of the first economists who analyzed the effects of 
public investment on the supply side. he affirmed that public investment is essential 
mainly because it stimulates investment in productive activities. 
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ment, expansionary fiscal policies only induce inflation and do not 
change product level,
this interpretation does not consider that public investment has 
a superior impact on the economy than the one appropriated by the 
executor. Mainstream theories reject the public nature of government’ 
investments that might contemplate long run strategic elements for 
the development of the nation14. In the Keynesian and structuralist 
point of view, in developing countries, once “there is no mechanism 
that induces full application of productive factors, the macroeconom-
ic policy may influence the economy’s performance if it displaces the 
potential output, not only in the short but also in the long run”15. the 
level of output depends on the amount and on the growth rate of au-
tonomous spending. finally, there is no connection between interest 
rate and public debt, because the former is exogenous, determined by 
the Central Bank. 
In developing countries the most important investment in innova-
tion for the expansion of manufacturing productivity and employment 
are imports of machines and equipments. this is due to the greater 
necessity of adaptation, replacement and maintenance of these goods. 
But Medeiros (2007: 03) ponders that, considering problems in the 
balance of payments, “the local production of machines and equip-
ment reveals itself as the strategic core of industrialization process, 
in the sense that it makes the industrial subsystem less dependent on 
technology and on foreign exchange”. as Prebisch (1949) said, over-
coming problems concerning the balance of payment in underdevel-
oped countries would also depend on international trade public poli-
cies. exports should be promoted and their surplus should be invested 
in more capital intensive activities. on the other hand, imports poli-
cies in favour of the goods that would make industrialization viable 
should be set in order to progressively reduce the imports coefficient. 
the technical progress and the raise of the productivity in agriculture 
cause increase of real wages and employment, placing the engine of 
economic growth in the domestic market. If these effects come true, 
the distance between centre and periphery nations reduces.
the point about productivity and employment is crucial to 
understand how public investment positively affects growth and 
14 see Chang (2003) to get a complete criticism of neoclassical arguments about 
public investment, state-owned enterprises and industrial policies of the state. for 
instance, the author argues that the premises of neoclassical models –decreasing re-
turns, perfect competition, no differentiation and no capital specificity– do not hold 
in real world. 
15 Medeiros (2007: 05).
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income distribution. here it is argued that public investment has 
the ability of triggering the kind of economic growth that allows 
economic development and better income distribution. as Medei-
ros (2008) affirms, only when there is increase in the productivity 
of food and wage good industries and reduction of surplus labour, 
it is possible a higher wage rate. a high employment growth in low 
wage manufacturing may not change this reality, as the Mexico’s 
maquilas case shows. It has to be a kind of expansion of formal 
employment that changes the structure of labour market, “enlarg-
ing the share of better paid labour and reducing the number of 
informal and lowest paid labour” (p. 19). then, the drop in open 
unemployment reduces the number of individuals and households 
without income. similarly, Islam (2004) demonstrates that growth 
may reduce poverty, depending on the patterns it follows. In this 
sense, “employment and labour market variables emerge as sig-
nificant in making growth pro-poor” (p. 23). But “it needs to be 
borne in mind that if treated separately from the overall develop-
ment strategy, employment cannot serve as an effective route out of 
poverty” (p. 23)16.
since growth may drive poverty reduction, depending on country’s 
structural characteristics, state intervention and industrial policies 
are crucial in this process. Chang (2003) presents static and dynamic 
reasons to explain that. In the static case, state intervention is im-
portant because market mechanism has coordination failures which 
represent costs to the society17. then the industrial policies should 
happen ex ante firstly because they give credibility to the economic 
system; secondly, because the state represents the national interests; 
and finally because public policies may guarantee the supply of goods 
that do not attract private investment. In the dynamic case, indus-
trial policy is needed to lead the structural change that induces im-
provement of the productivity. If transaction costs hindered contracts 
16 “employment outcomes of alternative strategies and policies must be considered 
as one of the major criteria in formulating them (i.e., the strategies and policies). 
this is particularly important when it comes to the formulation of macroeconomic 
policies and policies relating to specific sectors. It should be possible to integrate em-
ployment concerns into the process of formulating such policies. a pro-employment 
macro policy regime would take into account the possible effects of tariffs, exchange 
rate, and taxation policies on the growth of sectors and sub-sectors that are by na-
ture more labour intensive than others. Integration of employment concerns should 
be associated with the adoption of measures to track the employment intensity of 
growth to see whether growth is taking a pro-poor character. Islam (2004: 23).
17 fails of coordination may emerge from imperfect competition, natural monopo-
lies, increasing returns of productive factors, entrance barriers etc. Chang (2003).
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that would diversify the productive structure towards the capital and 
technological intensive sectors, the intervention of the government 
would be necessary. the role of industrial policy is, thus, to coordinate 
changes and to encourage experiences that generate innovation and 
new investments (Chang, 200: 135). 
Chang has also ranked five main reasons for the existence of state 
owned enterprises (soe). the first one is the verification, in capi-
tal markets, of absolute and comparative advantages in activities in 
which the minimum efficiency degree is too high to attract private 
investment. the second reason is the natural monopolies, which are 
very common in infrastructure sector. the third one is the fact that 
they have an important strategic character, in order to enable activi-
ties that generate interesting externalities or spillovers for economy’s 
development. the fourth one is the domestic technology production 
and accumulation, which reduce the dependency on external capital. 
finally, soe’s investments and price policies may be a mechanism of 
income redistribution.
soe can evaluate their activities through profitability and effi-
ciency levels, but their purposes are much wider, such as: distributive 
matters, employment and inflation objectives, promotion of private 
productivity and investment, sustainability of economic cycle etc. It is 
important to remark that the state becomes more active towards di-
rect enterprises when it not only invests in traditional public sectors, 
for instance infrastructure, but also in other capital intensive ones, 
such as mining and intermediary manufacturing. 
therefore the theoretical starting point of the analysis about the 
relationship between public investment and economic development is 
that the former is essential to induce the industrialization of capital 
and technological intensive sectors. this role in general is carried out 
by soe. thus, the privatization reforms should be carefully analyzed, 
considering particularly their impacts on economic development and 
on distribution. 
Section 2: Public investment in Brazil
between 1950 and 2006 
the aim of this section is to analyze public investment in Brazil and 
its relationship with economic development and poverty reduction 
between 1950 and 2006. the initial first hypothesis is that the great 
drop in public gross fixed capital formation is one of the fundamen-
tal reasons for the low Brazilian economic growth rate since the 
eighties. the second hypothesis is that growth may drive poverty 
reduction when there is enhancement of general productivity and 
employment.
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for the best comprehension of the referred data, the period was 
separated in two phases –1950 to 1979 and 1980 to 2006– which are 
discussed respectively in subsections 2.1 and 2.2. the time division is 
in accordance to the different models of public investment conduction, 
and therefore, to the model of state actuation. the most meaningful 
difference is that, in the first period, the state was very interventionist 
and applied aggressive policies to enhance domestic demand, mainly 
through its productive enterprises; while in the second period public 
investment recrudesced and economic policies privileged prices sta-
bilization. 
In each phase, some relevant topics are investigated, such as: 
macroeconomic scenario and model of state actuation; the decom-
position of gross fixed capital formation (gfCf) between public and 
private sectors, distinguishing the shares of soe and public adminis-
tration; composition of soe’s gfCf in different economic activities. 
these subjects are presented in the tables below and in the charts at 
appendix, which are used as reference on the whole section18.
18 Consolidated data about poverty started to be provided just after 1977 by the 
annual national household Panel (PnaD). once the information is not complete, no 
tables are provided, bur the proceeds are presented along the text. 
Table 1
Variation of GDP, Manufacturing output, GFCF and the share of GFCF over the GDP in Brazil
by historical period (1950-2006). In percentage, R$ 1980
Variation of GDP 
(%)
Variation of GDP 
per capita (%)
Variation of 
manufacturing 
output (%)
Variation of GFCF 
(%)
GFCF/GDP
(%)
1950-1967
Average 6.23 2.24 7.65 7.05 18.34
Stand. dev. 2.97 6.49 5.21 10.12 1.96
1968-1979
Average 8.93 4.82 9.89 10.81 22.85
Stand. dev. 2.91 5.86 4.45 7.35 1.61
1980-1989
Average 3.01 -3.16 1.89 0.52 18.55
Stand. dev. 4.61 10.73 7.04 11.97 2.45
1990-2006
Average 2.27 0.52 1.59 1.41 14.58
Stand. dev. 2.50 8.79 4.96 7.39 1.04
Source: Elaborated by the author based on IBGE and IPEA. Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF).
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2. 1 From the “constrained industrialization” until
the crisis of the eighties: 1950 to 1979
In Brazil, just after the II world war, the investments flow in economy 
was more driven mostly by domestic production. these were the final 
years of the so called “constrained industrialization”19. the govern-
ment of getulio Vargas (1950-1954) implemented an economic plan 
in 1951, whose objective was to solve the problems related to health, 
food, transports and energy. It increased public administration spend-
ing and expanded the credit concession. Big infrastructure projects 
were developed with the support, since 1952, of the national eco-
19 this concept refers to the period between 1933 and 1955. “the industrialization 
was constrained because the technical and financial basis of accumulation process 
was not enough to implement, in a punch, the fundamental core of the goods pro-
duction industry, which would allow productive capacity to grow ahead of the de-
mand, self determining the process of industrial development”(Cardoso de Mello, 
1982: 110).
Table 2
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by investor –Public Sector (Public Administration and Federal State Owned 
Enterprises) and Private Sector–, Share of Public Sector GFCF over Total and GFCF by type (Construction and 
Machines and Equipments) in Brazil (1950-2006). In percentage of GDP, R$ 1980 (except share of GFCF over GDP)
GFCF by investor (% of GDP)
Public 
Sector 
(% of 
GFCF)
GFCF by type (% of GDP)
Public Sector 
Private 
Sector
GFCF/
GDP 
(%)
Public 
Administration
SOE
Total 
Public 
Sector
Construction
Machines 
and 
equipments
1950-1967
Average 18.34 4.35 1.22 5.58 12.70 31.07 11.40 6.57
Standard dev. 1.96 0.71 0.74 1.02 2.56 7.69 1.32 0.82
1968-1979
Average 22.85 4.21 4.30 8.31 14.68 36.02 13.65 8.83
Standard dev. 1.61 0.91 1.74 1.74 1.42 6.15 0.95 0.97
1980-1989
Average 18.55 2.25 2.94 5.19 13.36 27.85 12.51 5.52
Standard dev. 2.45 0.39 0.96 0.97 1.64 2.64 1.25 1.18
1990-2006
Average 14.58 2.08 1.14 3.22 11.75 21.64 8.66 5.07
Standard dev. 1.04 0.47 0.58 0.93 1.39 6.79 2.00 1.14
Source: Elaborated by the author based on IBGE and IPEA. Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF); State 
Owned Enterprises (SOE).
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nomic Development Bank (BnDe). these years started the period of 
state-led development20. 
Investments were financed by foreign exchange revenue, money 
issuing and by external loans –particularly those from eximbank for 
infrastructure projects. Infrastructure investments were led by the 
state claiming that the high risks and the control of public utilities’ 
tariffs were withdrawing private investment21. Moreover, the techno-
logical capitalist cycle of that period –led by oil, automobile industry 
and others durable goods (Pérez, 2002)– needed an appropriate infra-
structure to arrive in Brazil. so interests of foreign capital were a very 
relevant reason for the state to implement an aggressive infrastruc-
ture project. 
In the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, from 1956 to 1960, 
the Plano de Metas (Plan for goals) was launched to expand the par-
ticipation of the public sector in the gfCf (with focus on energy, 
transports, basic industries and education) and to stimulate private 
investment, generating employment. In this period, the gDP grew 
9.43% per year22 and the state started to exert a substantial demand 
for investment. according to orenstein & sochaczenski (1990), the 
funding of Plano de Metas’ investments was mainly domestic, nota-
bly by monetary issuing and credit. soe were financed mainly by 
the BnDe (at that time it could only lend to public institutions). 
at that time, the demographic profile of Brazilian population was 
changing a lot, the country became urban and poverty has acquired 
different dimensions.
the interregnum between 1961 and 1964 had low growth and less 
dynamism in the industrialization process, with high inflation (the 
Consumption Price Index was about 80.5%). one reason for the fall in 
growth process was the cooling of public gfCf compared to previous 
years, as it is possible to be seen in Chart 2. from 1964 until 1967, 
under the military dictatorship, the Paeg –economic action Plan of 
the government– led to a growth rate of 4.2% per year and inflation 
20 Cardenas et al. (2006) reject the term “import substitution industrialization” to 
describe the development of some countries in the last century, because it does not 
correctly reflect the importance of the state in that process. the authors say that the 
correct term is “state-led industrialization”, which is adopted in this paper.
21 ferreira & Malliagros (1999: 3) argues that the tariff control of sectors like elec-
tric energy, transports, communication, oil and others “was considered desirable to 
encourage the industrial growth and to subsidize the consumption”. But it did not 
follow the inflation rates. then, “the private capital did not expand its capacity” and 
“the only possible alternative was the state gradually enter in” infrastructure seg-
ments. 
22 source: IPea. see Chart 1.
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stabilization. It also implemented a big tributary reform that substan-
tially raised state revenues through higher taxes and diversification of 
sources. In addition, the issuing of public debt has started and it to-
tally replaced money issuing already in 196623. But in the case of soe 
funding, more than the half was originated from their own incomes 
from 1964 to 1975 (trebat, 1983).
therefore some important inflections in public accounts hap-
pened between 1950 and 1980. Primary expenditures/gDP accelerated 
and became progressively higher than revenues/gDP after 1968. the 
former rate has stabilized in the seventies and it diminished by the 
eighties. gross tributary revenues only rose after the Paeg and it was 
flat on a level of 25% of gDP from 1968 to 1979.
the annual growth of gDP between 1968 and 1979 registered 
high rates and it varied from 4.84% to 13.71%. the average growth 
of gDP per capita was 4.82% (see table 1). such a growth meant low 
unemployment rates during the seventies24. table a, in the appendix, 
shows that the employment in manufacturing represented almost 
15% of total employment in 1970. Despite improvements in income 
per capita and employment, some indicators do not reveal that there 
was better income distribution in the period. the rate between the 
income of the richest decil of population in relation to the income 
of the poorest decil has got worse from 1960 to 1980 (see table a). 
In 1960, the 10% richest people of the country had an income 34 
times greater than the 10% poorest people. In 1970, this rate was 
40 and in 1980 it was 47. the gini coefficient also indicates that in-
come distribution did not improve from 1960 (gini = 0,497) to 1980 
(gini=0,592). 
the growth scenario in the seventies was originated from profit 
reinvestment, higher capacity utilization, extension of fiscal and cred-
it incentives, wage distortions in favour of entrepreneurs etc. (Lago, 
1990). Despite the oil crises of 1973 and worst terms of trade, the 
investment rate –in average 24.4% of gDP between 1974 and 1979– 
grew 6.75% per year, mainly in basic, capital goods, heavy electronics 
and inputs industries. In this period, the government launched the 
II national Plan of Development (nPD). In parallel, there was abun-
dance of foreign capital25 and the exchange rate remained valued. the 
weight of public sector in gfCf these years was the highest of Brazil-
23 resende, (1990: 218).
24 Lago (1990: 291) affirms that the unemployment rate in 1973 was in between 
3-4.9% in urban area and 0.4-2.3% in rural area.
25 average foreign direct investment increased almost 4 times from 1968-1973 (usD 
473) to 1974-1979 (usD 1.773), (source: Central Bank of Brazil).
Strategies against Poverty
88
ian history since the independence. the maintenance of high growth 
rates configured a development process. But it depended, as Medeiros 
(2007) says, on a monetary, exchange rate and fiscal regime in favour 
of high growth.
Chart 2 shows that private and public gfCf were correlated dur-
ing the fifties and sixties, probably there was “crowding in”. In the sev-
enties their trends took different paths, but here the “crowding out” 
argument cannot be used to explain the drop in private investments, 
since the real interest rate was negative at this period.  
soe have acquired a higher share in the composition of gfCf, 
which turned bigger than the share of public administration in 1974. 
their share has reached a peak in 1976: 7.26% of gDP (see Chart 3). 
this was due to soe’s scale expansion and proliferation and to the 
surge of big sectorial holdings26. according to trebat (1983), soe 
have played a key role during the “miraculous” period of the Brazil-
ian economy (1968-1973)27. In 1975-1976 their main resources were 
50.5% from profits and depreciation (internal incomes), 12.3% from 
tied revenues to treasury funds (established by regulation), and 10.2% 
from treasury’s subsides; 8.3% from long term internal borrowings 
(mainly from BnDe), 16.9% from long term external borrowings and 
1.8% from bonds (trebat, 1983: 88).
It is important to observe that the external debt contracted in the 
seventies was, as Medeiros (2009) affirms, a process of over-indebted-
ness. recorded data shows that external debt grew 25.7% per year be-
tween 1968 and 1979. In 1967, 73.1% of that was public. then in 1973 
the situation inverted, and the external debt became 64.1% private. 
But in 1979 it became public again (67.6%). therefore, public external 
indebtedness was not the growth engine during the earlier seventies, 
only after 1974. Medeiros (2009) argues that this was due to an impo-
sition of foreign capital market over peripheral countries. ferreira & 
Malliagros (1999) explain that this was also caused by the tariff poli-
cies practiced by soe. after 1975 they were not realistic because the 
government used them to reach inflation targets.
It is evident in chart 4 that on one hand, between 1950 and 
1965, the gfCf of federal soe was especially high in the manufac-
26 Decree 200 of 1967 facilitated the creation of soe to stimulate the administrative 
efficiency and profit, relaxing some wage constraints. Many sectorial holdings emer-
ged like telebrás (telecommunication), eletrobrás (electric energy) and embratel 
(telecommunication). In the sixties, 39 federal soe were created, most of them in 
mining, while in the seventies 115 ones were launched. trebat (1983: 37).
27 It is possible to understand the greatness of the soe role in Brazil at that time 
when it’s noticed that 28 of the 30 largest non financial companies 1979 were public 
(in 1971, 17 were public). 
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turing sector. It can be noted that a particularity of the developmen-
talist state was to invest not only in traditional activities, such as 
infrastructure. this trend began during the Plano de Metas, whose 
manufacturing investments were concentrated mainly on chemical 
and mining activities. energy and transports sectors also grew a lot 
in this period (transports were the main activity in 1958 and 1959). 
on the other hand, from 1976 manufacturing was replaced by in-
frastructure, in terms of shares, in soe investments. Investment in 
manufacturing was the highest in 1972 and 1975; energy in 1971 
and 1977, transports in 1970, 1978 and 1979; and telecommunica-
tion in 1976.
thus, from 1950 to 1979 the tripod of the developmentalist 
state was established. one leg was public sector, the leader on ba-
sic industry and infrastructure production. the second leg was big 
national corporations, acting in labour intensive activities such as 
food and beverages, textile and metal-mechanic. finally, the third 
leg was foreign multinational companies, dominating high capital 
and technologic intensive sectors such as chemical, electronics and 
automobile. Clearly, beneficiaries of this model were big national 
and international capital, mainly the ones related to consumer 
goods and civil construction. Despite the labour class was not di-
rectly involved in the power in Brazil during the military dictator-
ship, it was benefited by the low rate of unemployment. thus it can 
be said that in Brazil from 1950 to 1980 the public investment may 
have driven poverty reduction through its positive effects on em-
ployment. nonetheless, the income distribution remained very un-
even and did not improve. 
But the economic model was too dependent on external funding. 
when international interest rates rose in 1979, the over-indebtedness 
scheme caused a deep financial crisis in the country. then a reversion 
in the model of the state took place, driven by neoliberal reforms.
2.2 A quArter of century of low economic growth: 1980 to 2006
the boom of external funding by the late seventies triggered transfer-
ence of resources28 to foreign countries and a new behaviour of the 
public sector. on one hand, the government wanted to obtain com-
mercial surplus through fiscal exceptions and subsidies to the exports 
sector. on the other hand, it took the onus of the debts’ interests and 
squeezed public spending. 
28 for Carneiro (2002) real transferences mean surplus in goods & services transac-
tions while financial transferences mean that the sum of capital entrance plus net 
income sent abroad is positive.
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as an attempt to overcome the crisis in the balance of payments, 
the government borrowed us$6 billion from the International Mon-
etary fund (IMf) and other international institutions. the agreement 
made by them was based on Brazilian’s government commitment 
of promoting exports and adopting contraction measures, mainly in 
the public spending. after 1981, public finance started to be assessed 
through the operational result of the government. this deducted the 
monetary and foreign exchange debt adjustment from the Public sec-
tor funding necessity29. Before that, the accounts of soe were not 
included in public sector general accounts. so those changes meant a 
higher control over soe spending. furthermore, their nominal invest-
ment growth rate was limited by 66%, what helped the government to 
adjust its net indebtedness (which was growing because of the increas-
ing weight of public debt’s interests). 
In addition, the federal Constitution of 1988 stiffed federal 
spending because it increased tied revenues (92% was tied) although 
it excluded infrastructure sector. so, the new Constitution cut several 
funds that were designated to soe. this decision was absolutely po-
litical and it meant a less interventionist orientation of the state in 
direct enterprises. the new law had a tremendous impact on gfCf.
as it can be seen in Chart 1, the gDP growth rates between 1980 
and 1989 had a negative trend, as well as the manufacturing product 
and gfCf ones. Chart 2 shows that public and private investment 
evolved together, with a negative trend too. Public investment dropped 
mainly because of the reduction in gfCf of federal soe. If earlier 
they were responsible for two thirds of the public investment, at the 
end of the decade their share became less important than public ad-
ministration’s. this situation was similar to the one when there were 
just a few soe, at the beginning of the fifties. In parallel, poverty has 
grown during the low growth decade. In 1979, 45.1% of total Brazil-
ian population was poor and, in 1990, this rate rose to 48.0%, such as 
it can be seen in table a. the proportion between the income of the 
10% richest and 10% poorest of the population increased dramati-
cally from 47 to 78 times higher. the growth of average yearly gDP 
per capita was negative: -3.16%. nevertheless, the appropriation of the 
gDP by wage earners grew from 38.4% to 53. 5% and the rate of open 
unemployment improved from 6.5% to 4.6%. 
29 “the calculation of public sector funding necessity follows a methodology created 
by IMf for the fiscal accounting of its member-countries. this methodology focuses 
the accounting of the public deficit by the variation of government indebtedness –in-
cluding all expenses of all spheres of public sector, e.g. central government (national 
treasury, Central Bank and social security), government of national states and coun-
ties, and the state-owned enterprises” (silva, 2006: 36).
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Primary spending of public administration was below revenues 
until 1987, the opposite of what had happened between 1968 and 
1979. from 1990 on, the tributary load exhibited a soft ascendant 
trend, caused by stabilization gains and a little better growth rate gen-
erated by Plano Real (1994). Besides that, primary spending raised to 
a peak in 1998, when it started to fall. this drop was possible due to a 
reduction in public gfCf and consumption. after the exchange rate 
crisis in 1999, the IMf forced the Brazilian macroeconomic regime to 
follow inflation targets and primary fiscal surplus. this was obtained 
mainly by the rise of revenues and30, secondly, by a squeeze in spend-
ing, facilitated by the Law of fiscal responsibility. 
In the nineties the process of commercial31 and financial32 open-
ing was started, in obedience to the washington Consensus33. at that 
time, the national Plan of Denationalization (nPD) was launched 
along with a liberal external trade policy, with several tariff reforms 
(lower imports tariffs). this new external policy was one of the main 
reasons for the transformations in Brazilian’s productive structure 
and external insertion34.
Before talking about the privatizations, is important to highlight 
that changes in the productive structure in Brazil and its international 
insertion –which are both related to the macroeconomic policy adopt-
ed– were directly connected to two important changes at the political-
30 “the rise on revenues between 1999 and 2003 was like 1% of the gDP, while the 
tax burden rose 5% in the same period”. (silva, 2006: 49).
31 the openness did not improve Brazilian position in international trade. the in-
dustrial dynamics depended on the domestic market, but production became less di-
versified and more dependent of capital goods and raw material imports. exports of 
durable and capital goods increased a little bit due to intra-industrial specialization 
and to the larger market in south america. It is worth to phrase that capital goods 
exports were mainly of goods on series, which are less intensive on technology than the 
customized ones. 
32 Main dimensions of financial openness in Brazil were the larger convertibility 
of capital accounts and the denationalization of banks. the regulatory mark has 
been adapted to international trends like securities and capital flow flexibility. 
this has significantly impacted domestic capital attraction. Profit remittances in 
the nineties were at the same high levels of the eighties, in spite of the lower eco-
nomic growth.
33 In 1989 the washington Consensus shared a list of measures to peripheral coun-
tries reach sustainable economic development, in which the general recommenda-
tion was fiscal discipline, financial liberalization and less state intervention.
34 Carneiro (2002) calls the specialization promoted by the openness as “regressive 
specialization” because it occasioned a decrease in the intra-sectorial relations of 
the industry and less national density in technologic-intensive sectors. on the other 
hand, the labour intensive industry had to compete with asian products both in in-
ternal and external markets.
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economy framework. first, internationally, the neoliberal state ideology 
has gained strength in the north, which was leading the globalization of 
capitals and goods. the rising flow of capitals has magnified the power 
of financial institutions both internationally and locally. Consequently, 
in Brazil there was a political movement that strengthened the power of 
financial and rentier classes in the state. 
the nPD promoted more than 160 privatizations during the nineties35. 
Chart 4 shows the great drop of federal soe investments in all economic 
activities, to levels above 1% of the gDP. the manufacturing industry was 
the activity that received more investments and this is because Petrobras 
(the Brazilian oil Company), the only big soe that remained public, is in-
cluded there. the energy sector had an investment peak in 1998, and then 
it stagnated in 0.2% of gDP. Part of the transports sector went through 
concessions processes and the level of federal investment was low. nev-
ertheless the telecommunication was the activity with the highest invest-
ments between 1990 and 1997, especially before its privatization in 1997. 
Mining was totally sold until 199736. from 2003 to 2006, during the years 
of first mandate of President Luis Inácio Lula da silva, the privatization 
was interrupted. In the nineties the investment of soe decreased, but after 
2003 it started to increase again. Yet, the general guidelines of the macr-
oeconomic regime of the previous government were maintained, including 
the low public investment, mainly in infrastructure. 
the capital for privatization proceeded mainly from the expan-
sion of foreign direct investment (fDI), which increased after 199437. 
It was designated especially for mergers and acquisitions, and not for 
new productive investments. however, this fDI flow was not very sig-
nificant compared to the period between 1976 and 198538. 
as regards to the decrease in gfCf, the economic performance of 
the Brazilian economy was very inexpressive between 1990 and 2006 
35 the complete list of privatization deals in the nineties is available in world Bank 
– Privatization transaction Data for Brazil, 1988-2000, <www.fdi.net>.
36 In mining sector, the privatization of Companhia Vale do rio Doce was the biggest 
operation. In oil and gas sector, Petrobras was not privatized and its investments did 
not increase significantly between 1998 and 2002. until then, Petrobras was only har-
vesting the results of former investments, without enlarging productive capacity, what 
may be related to a intention of privatization in that time (Bielschowsky, 2002).
37 Bielschowsky (2002) says that 70% of fDI in the nineties were related to patrimo-
nial changes, mainly due to privatization.
38 according to Bielschowsky (2002:31), between 1995 and 2000 Brazil had the best 
participation in fDI in 1998, when the country received 4.1% of the total. In current 
prices, this capital entrance was equal to 5.9% of gDP and 18.4% of gfCf. however, 
between 1976 and 1985, the average share of Brazil in the world’s fDI was 5.3%, what 
was equal to 0.7% of the gDP and 3.3% of gfCf.
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(average gDP growth and gDP per capita growth rates were 2.27% 
and 0.52% per year, respectively). fortunately, this recent period meant 
rapid reduction of poverty (48.0% in 1990, 37.5% in 1999, 33.3% in 
2006)39, what is related to the stabilization gains, the growth of mini-
mum wage (especially after 2003) and to conditional cash transfers 
programmes such as Bolsa Família40. this compensated the adverse 
effects of the raise in both unemployment and informality41.
Chart 1 shows that gfCf obtained negative variation in some 
years of this period, and so did the manufacturing product and the 
gDP. the lower public investment was a result not only of the privati-
zation, but also of the restrictive fiscal policies. the most important 
policies were the previously mentioned change in public operational 
accounts in 1981, the end of tied revenues for soe after the federal 
Constitution of 1988 and the pursuit of fiscal surplus after the second 
half of the nineties42. 
fiscal adjustment reports from IMf (IMf, 2004, 2005) accept 
that the reforms and the privatization in infrastructure sector in Latin 
america did not obtain the expected results. In other words, private 
investment could not overcome the public one43. But the IMf believes 
that the solution to raise the investment would be a flexible public 
budget and higher efficiency of public spending, whereas the fiscal 
39 source: eCLaC. Poverty is considered here as the share of people living below 
indulgency line in total population.
40 Bolsa Família is a conditional cash transfers program instituted by law in 2004 for 
families that receive up to r$ 140 (us$80) per person and per month. the benefit de-
pend on the condition of the family –extreme or not extreme poverty– on the number 
of 0-15 years old children and on the number of 15-17 years old children attending 
school. In 2009 the program was reaching more than 11 million families in the coun-
try and the expected budget for it is around 12 billion reais. 
41 table a in the appendix shows that in 1980 and in 1990, there were 56% of the 
formal employed persons (in Brazil formality is measured by the activation or not of 
the labour ID). In 2000, the number of workers with active labour ID decreased to 
43.7%. In 2006 it was almost 45%. 
42 afonso & Biasoto Jr. (2007: 102) affirm that the manner of measuring deficits in 
more than 80% of Latin american countries, and not only in Brazil, has assumed a 
wider profile than in other regions of the world. only 15% of oeCD (organization 
for economic Cooperation and Development) countries use a wide concept of non 
financial public sector in their fiscal statistics. Most of the nations measures public 
accounting considering only public administration.
43 “the share of public investment in gDP, and especially the share of infrastructure 
investment, has declined during the last three decades in a number of countries, 
particularly in Latin america. since the private sector has not increased infrastruc-
ture investment as hoped for, significant infrastructure gaps have emerged in several 
countries. these gaps may adversely affect the growth potential of the affected coun-
tries and limit targeted improvements in social indicators”. (IMf, 2004:  3).
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balance should be kept anyhow. the position defended here is that 
it would be very difficult to increase investment effectively and re-
vamp the development process without changing the macroeconomic 
regime based on inflation targets, fiscal surplus and flexible exchange 
rate. and if this is so it is likely that poverty reduction will not be 
deeply and sustainable solved, remaining dependant of Bolsa Família 
and minimum wage readjustments.
on the other hand, President Lula’s government has tried to coun-
terbalance the restrictive issues for increasing the investment through 
the BnDes and Public-Private Partnerships. results of these efforts 
were more considerable only after 2005.
three more comments on the privatization are important. the first 
one refers to its theoretical objectives during the first half of the nine-
ties. as giambiagi (2004) claims, these objectives were the strategic reo-
rientation of the state, to decrease public expenses, to revamp and to 
modernize the investment of ex soe and to improve capital markets. 
But put into practice, the privatization was used to promote the fiscal 
adjustment and to finance the current account. Carneiro (2007) states 
that the privatization raised more than us$ 100 billion during the nine-
ties, almost 18% of Brazilian gDP at that time. nonetheless this money 
was used to keep the monetary and exchange rate regime. Despite this 
fact, the relation debt/gDP kept increasing, mainly because of the high 
interest rates44. the second comment is that the solution of privatiz-
ing was aimless, not only because its premises were mistaken (and the 
results were unsatisfactory, without generating the rise of gfCf), but 
also because the devaluation in 1999 withdrew the urgency of the pri-
vatization. this means that the first comment is likely to be correct, 
and the privatization was used to keep exchange rate overvalued. the 
third comment is that this experience shows that short-term measures, 
without strategic planning, in general fail and exacerbate difficulties for 
a peripheral country to develop. the regulation of privatized markets in 
Brazil had a bad planning and resulted, for example, in the energy cri-
sis in 2001, higher tariffs of infrastructure services and less investment 
than expected. Meanwhile, infrastructure bottlenecks are still there and 
block the private productive sector.
this section showed the contrast of economic growth between 
two periods, 1950-1979 and 1980-2006 in Brazil. It seems that the first 
hypothesis presented in the beginning of section 2 is in accordance to 
44 a fourth comment would be pertinent, which is about the distributive effects of 
privatizations. however, the research in this field is still incipient. thus the distributive 
impact of reforms is broadly accounted in this text, i.e., taking in consideration overall 
effects of macroeconomic policies in income distribution during each period. 
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what happened in Brazil. one main explanation for the low growth 
in the second period was the reduction in public investment, which 
caused low growth of the private investment and low dynamism of 
the economy. therefore, the rate of unemployment did not improve 
significantly. the second hypothesis –that growth may drive poverty 
reduction when there is enhancement of productivity and employ-
ment– may be true but did not happen in Brazil. as a matter of fact, 
such as Islam (2004) affirmed, between 1950 and 1979 employment 
cannot serve as an effective route out of poverty reduction. this is 
because it was treated apart from an overall development strategy, 
which should be focused in enhancing productivity and conducting 
structural change to towards a dynamic productive structure. and the 
low growth in second period led to the maintenance of income in-
equality. Poverty was wrestled only after 2004 through Bolsa Família 
and minimum wages’ raises.  
Conclusions
In a theoretical point of view, the intention was to make clear that 
public investment has an essential role in the development consider-
ing that it has “crowding in” effects with private investment, given 
the macroeconomic policies and the external constraint. It is assumed 
that high rate of investment is important to generate employment 
and improve income distribution, together with poverty reduction. 
Complementarities between public and private investment happen 
through four main mechanisms. on the demand side, public invest-
ment induces private investment, by the Keynesian multiplier effect 
and by the physical expansion and integration of the domestic mar-
ket, mainly through infrastructure means. on the supply side, public 
administration and purchasing policies of soe are an autonomous 
demand that stimulates the usage of productive capacity or the exten-
sion of it in sectors that would not grow without this external demand. 
Besides that, the public investment services, mainly provided by infra-
structure, reduce private costs of production, what may expand firms’ 
productivity and supply.
empirical analysis of the Brazilian public investments between 
1950 and 1979 seems to confirm some of these theoretical effects. 
when there was expansion of public gross fixed capital formation, the 
product of manufacturing was directly and indirectly impacted, and 
so was the gross domestic product growth rate. It was shown that total 
gfCf, gDP and manufacturing gDP kept a narrow link; except in the 
late seventies, when the state had to practice an aggressive investment 
policy to sustain the demand (II PnD). the formation of the capital in-
tensive industry –though incomplete– has accelerated the dynamics of 
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the economy by means of productivity increase and its linkage effects. 
nevertheless productivity gains were not always followed by both real 
wage and wage’s participation in gDP increase. thus, despite the raise 
in gDP per capita the economic development in the seventies did not 
reduce income inequality. 
as it was shown, in Brazil between 1950 and 1979, political and 
juridical decisions facilitated public investment because they legal-
ly authorized mechanisms that linked soe’ income to taxes of the 
state. that’s why there was a big expansion of soe. In parallel, most 
of the time the macroeconomic regime operated policies in favour 
of the growth of domestic gfCf, such as selective exchange rate, ex-
pansionist fiscal policy, and a monetary policy with low interest rates 
and high rates of credit allowance. In addition, there was a peculiar-
ity of the developmentalist state: direct intervention in the manufac-
turing sector, not only in traditional sectors as infrastructure. thus, 
public policies were crucial to start overcoming the typical difficul-
ties of underdeveloped economies: the technological delay. But it’s 
important to remark that this kind of state actuation was shaped in 
a convenient way for the national and international interest groups 
in the power45. 
the new power configuration after 1980 (domestic and interna-
tional), as discussed before, adopted economic policies that caused 
the drop of public investments, which is one of the reasons for the 
decrease in growth rates between 1980 and 2006. During the eighties 
in Brazil, the great change of the growth standard was parallel to the 
deep transformation of the role of the state. the macroeconomic re-
gime was based on liberal prescriptions and it progressively eliminat-
ed some state intervention mechanisms in the economy. from 1990 
to 2006 the commercial and financial opening process, together with 
reforms and privatization, triggered a huge drop in soe investments 
in terms of gDP share. But the private investment did not replace 
the public investments, so the gfCf had low growth rates, and the 
competitiveness and the dynamism of national productive sector were 
jeopardized.
therefore, fewer investments and the lower growth rates verified 
until 2006 could be reverted by political interventions applied to ex-
pand public investments. this would complement and intensify the 
positive effects of poverty reduction direct policies. however these 
policies have to be in “harmony” with an appropriate macroeconomic 
regime pro growth, such as it was explained in section one. thus, like 
Islam (2004) and Medeiros (2008) affirmed, gDP growth and income 
45 for a good discussion, please see Chibber (2004). 
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distribution occur simultaneously only when a set of elements hap-
pens, which are linked to the structure of the labour market and the 
dynamism of employment. Public investment may trigger the dynam-
ics effects that enable these elements to happen, but it was not verified 
in the Brazilian case both in 1950-1979 and 1980-2006. It is worth 
remembering that, at different times, the model of state actuation de-
pended on the influential interest groups. Public policies, besides their 
strategic role for the development, also have a key distributive role 
that can be more or less fair in terms of income distribution according 
to the degree of struggle between social classes. 
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Chart 2
Share of Gross Fixed Capital Formation –Total: Public Sector and Private Sector– in the GDP
of Brazil (1950-2002). In percentage of GDP, R$ 1980
Source: Elaborated by the author based on IBGE and IPEA. Public sector does not include SOE of states and cities, Data for 1966-1969 
and 2003-2006 were not available.
Chart 1
Annual Real Variation of Gross Domestic Product, Manufacturing Output (value added) and Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation in Brazil (1950-2006). In percentage, R$ 1980
Source: Elaborated by the author based on IBGE and IPEA.
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Chart 3
Composition of Gross Fixed Capital Formation of Public Sector between Public Administration and Federal State 
Owned Enterprises in Brazil (1950-2006). In percentage of GDP, R$ 1980
Source: Elaborated by the author based on IBGE and IPEA. Data for 1966-1969 and 2003-2006 were not available.
Chart 4
Shares of Economic Activities in Gross Fixed Capital Formation of Federal State Owned Enterprises
in Brazil (1950-2002). In percentage of GDP, R$ 1980
Source: Elaborated by the author based on IBGE. Data for 1966-1969 and 2003-2006 were not available.
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Table A 
Income distribution and employment indicators for Brazil (1950-2006)
        Industrial Employment (% EAP)e
Year
Poverty 
(%)a
Gini 
Coef.b
Labours 
income / 
GDP (%)c
Income 
10% 
richest/
 10% 
poorest d
Total Extractive Manufacturing
Open Un-
employment 
(%)f
Formal 
employment 
(%)g
1950 N/A N/A N/A N/A 22.9 5.01 17.96 N/A N/A
1960 N/A 0.497 N/A 34 17.9 0.45 17.46 N/A N/A
1970 N/A 0.565 40.7 40 15.2 0.4 14.9 N/A N/A
1980 45.1 0.592 38.4 47 15.6 0.3 15.3 6.5 56.7
1990 48.0 0.616 53.5 78 8.8 0.2 8.6 4.7 56.9
2000 37.5 0.592 45.2 66 8.4 0.1 8.2 7.8 43.6
2006 33.3 0.560 48.3 50 9.6 0.2 9.4 9.8 44.9
Source: a) ECLAC, data for 1980 is actually of 1979 and data for 2000 is of 1999, ECLAC percentage of poverty is the share of people 
living below indulgency line in total population; b) IPEA, data for 2000 is of 1999; c) Elaborated by the author based on IBGE (GDP 
factor price); d) IPEA for data 1960/1990 and IETS 2000/2006; e) Elaborated by the author based on IBGE and IPEA, data for 1950 is of 
1953 and for 1960 is of 1959, and do not include rural sector; f) IPEA; g) Elaborated by the author based on IPEA. Not available (N/A). 
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1.3. Economic Growth, Employment 
and Poverty Reduction 
A Comparative Analysis of Chile 
and Mexico with references 
to Argentina, Brazil and Colombia 
Abstract
the paper studies the relation between economic growth and poverty 
reduction argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and México. a major 
emphasis is put on the experiences of Chile and Mexico. the period 
studied is 1980-2006, starting from the structural reforms and adjust-
ment programmes put in motion after the debt crisis of 1982. It is 
to be expected that after 15 years the new model has consolidated 
and the effects of liberalizing the economies, in terms of productivity, 
employment, incomes and poverty reduction, will be apparent. nev-
ertheless, even during the rather short lived periods of economic ex-
pansion, neither poverty no income concentration were reduced. the 
main cause of it is to be found on the evolution of labour elasticity of 
gDP, the path of labour productivity and the capital intensity of gDP. 
Labour has not moved from low productivity tradable sectors to high 
productivity tradable activities but rather it has moved to informal 
services and construction. In the new model, the pattern of growth 
has reduced the labour elasticity of gDP. today higher rates of growth 
are needed to generate the same amount of labour as before 1980. In-
 * D. Phil in economics, oxford university. Professor at facultad Latinoamerica-
na de Ciencias sociales, fLaCso-México.
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come distribution policies are required to reduced concentration both 
of capital and income in order to speed up growth.   
Introduction 
after almost three decades since the eruption of the debt crisis in 1982 
and the beginning of adjustment and structural reforms, it is widely 
accepted that economic growth performance of the majority, if not all, 
Latin american countries has been disappointing. furthermore, even 
when growth of the gross domestic product did take place, formal em-
ployment was not created, salaries and income lagged behind, poverty 
and the concentration of income intensified. 
today, when the first decade of the XXI Century is ending, it is gen-
erally acknowledged that Latin american economic growth was lower 
than during 1950-1980. what is more troubling is the evidence that re-
gion is once again under the duress of a deep economic turmoil and suf-
fering colossal job losses and dramatic poverty increases. the evidence 
is now stronger than ever that, since the reforms, Latin america has not 
been able bridge the gap separating its economic and social develop-
ment to that of developed economies and the announced convergence 
that the export model would deliver may not emerge. even during the 
sporadic growth surges, the distance, both in per capita gross domestic 
product, gDP/C and labour productivity did widen. 
the debt crisis that battered all Latin america in 1982 was the 
water-shed of the economic model the region had pursued since early 
forties.  the crisis marked the end of the state lead industrialization 
strategy and the beginning of the growth model based on exports and 
external savings. the crisis was the opportunity that different groups 
waited for years to introduce the reforms to benefit their interest al-
lowing changes in distribution pattern of the economic surplus. the 
reforms aimed at liberalizing the economies and liberalization meant 
the elimination of the market interventions of the state but leaving in-
tact the private sector suppression of the market derived from the ex-
treme concentration of capital, physical and human, production, land 
and commerce. the centrepiece of the new model is trade and capital 
account liberalization. all other reforms were designed to comple-
ment it: exchange and monetary policies; tax and fiscal expenditure 
policies and labour markets reforms (Bulmer-thomas, 1999). 
the macro-economic crisis of the eighties allowed the introduction 
of controversial trade reforms. the high costs of distribution were over-
shadowed by the crisis. the introduction of deep changes was feasible 
only when the crisis prevented all possible political and social resistance 
and made it possible to alter the distribution of income between labour 
and capital and within the capitalist sector (alesina et al., 2006). since 
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the crisis, economic policies have been dictated by new criteria which 
changed the path of economic development. efficiency, profitability and 
competitiveness overshadowed equity; capital accumulation replaced 
social welfare. economic policy depart from the principle “[…] that is-
sues of efficiency and equity cannot be neatly separated” (stiglitz, 1991: 
40). with informality, unemployment, income concentration increas-
ing, perpetuating poverty, along side with environmental depletion, 
governments and scholars can not ignore this fundamental element of 
political economy. since efficiency and equity are the two faces of the 
same coin, how to achieve them both simultaneously should be at the 
core of the economic debate in democratic societies and, not as it has 
been up today, that the discussion is:  “if the market economy attains 
the ideal of Pareto efficiency” (stiglitz, 1991: 40). equity was demoted 
to marginal residual measures, out of the realm of economic policies, 
and designed only to lessen the ravage that the preference on efficiency 
and capital accumulation inflicted to equity. 
the reforms were introduced, with different intensity and speed, in 
almost all Latin american countries. Chile and argentina reformed in 
the seventies, under military dictatorships; Mexico in early eighties as 
response to the debt crisis; Colombia and Brazil, and others, at the end of 
the eighties. all reduced tariffs, eliminated non-tariff trade barriers and 
abridged the economic role of the state by selling public enterprises ex-
cept the state companies producing copper, in Chile, and oil and electrici-
ty in Mexico, Colombia, ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela. they deregulated 
transport, telecommunications, banks and financial institutions, and re-
duced government investment. all governments privatized social security 
and reformed health care and education. so far, the Mexican government 
has not succeeded in passing legislation reforming the labour market, 
which all other countries did. nonetheless, a de facto reform has trans-
formed Mexican labour relations. Liberalization also included opening 
up the country to foreign capital. the movement of goods, services and 
capital is, therefore, practically free. welfare improvement appeared as 
an implicit objective of the adjustment and trade liberalization policies, 
although poverty and inequality reduction were not the concern of the 
reforms. the motto of the new economic policy was “stabilize, privatize, 
liberalize” (Commission on growth and Development 2008: 10). the ob-
jective was to increase growth. the trickle-down effect was to deliver pov-
erty and inequality reduction. 
this paper1 analyzes the evolution of the economies of argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, and explores how the new 
1 the paper expands the findings of the study the author carried out for fLaCso 
and the International Labour organization. see: Puyana (2008a). 
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model has changed the linkages between economic growth and pov-
erty reduction. the nexus linking both terms is employment genera-
tion, which Islam labelled the missing link, because “[…] a rigorous 
analysis of the role of employment in the linkage between economic 
growth and poverty reduction appears to be missing” (Islam, 2004: 
12). rather mild economic expansion took place, accompanied by 
the reduction of job elasticity of gDP and increasing capital inten-
sity, with the result of permanent job losses in the formal sector and 
the expansion of informality and/or unemployment. we will examine 
that process. In doing so, we define poverty in terms of income that 
is not sufficient to satisfy basic food requirements (extreme poverty) 
or basic needs: food, housing, health, education etc (relative poverty). 
By inequality we consider the concentration of income defined by the 
gini coefficient of income and eventually. we fully recognize other 
definitions coming from sociology, anthropology or economy. never-
theless, for the purposes of this work, we consider appropriate theses 
definitions.
the remaining of the paper is organized as follows. section II 
presents some conceptual elements on the growth and poverty nexus 
while section III illustrates some of the long term economic path sup-
porting the analysis of the link between growth and poverty. In section 
IV there is a summary of the pattern of the relations of the relevant 
economic variables through which the impact of economic expansion 
affects employment and poverty. section V the main conclusions. 
The Growth-Poverty Nexus. Conceptual Framework 
the ultimate goal of economic policies is improving living conditions 
for the entire population so as to reduce income concentration and 
granting basic needs and decent levels of living for all. these objec-
tives are to be obtained through more and better employment, and 
higher wages. In the dominant policy prescriptions, permanent gDP 
growth and increases in productivity are a necessity, support by lower 
inflation rates, fiscal discipline, balanced external accounts, and faster 
exports. In our recollection, all these mentioned elements, important 
as they are, are just means, tools to economic and social develop-
ment and should not become the only indicators of the success of the 
economies policies even less can they be considered as the ultimate 
objectives of economic policies. when any given country introduces 
reforms in its development model, or when it engages in negotiating 
trade agreements –multilateral or bilateral– or regional economic in-
tegration treaties, the aim is to overcome the obstacles to its social 
and economic development and advance towards the levels of welfare 
enjoyed by more developed economies. 
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It is a generally accepted fact that in order to reduce poverty, 
growth is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient.  this depends 
on the characteristics of the model of growth and its capacity to inte-
grate into the productive system the labour reserves that, over the cen-
turies, have accumulated in the majority of the developing countries. 
for growth to benefit the poor population, it is necessary to generate 
enough employment to absorb increases in the labour force and si-
multaneously raise total labour productivity. the income of the poor 
should growth at faster rate of total gDP and of the higher income 
groups. this requires an increase in capital endowment, both physical 
and human, per worker, and the transfer of labour from the least pro-
ductive to the most productive activities, especially out of informality. 
If these conditions emerge, the virtuous circle outlined by Islam might 
reap up: growth widens productive capacity, which generates new 
jobs, additional productivity grows and salaries rise (Islam, 2004).  
nevertheless, as real life shows, the relation between growth and 
poverty reduction is neither automatic not a necessary outcome. In-
deed, “Poverty has reduced where there has been growth” (Kanbur, 
2009: 5). the evidence from the last twenty years suggests that coun-
tries that registered high rates of growth during relative large periods 
have reduced poverty at the cost of increased inequality. the hard fact 
is that there are not examples of countries that achieved high econom-
ic expansion without increases in inequality2. Kanpur (2009), sug-
gests that the intensification of inequality has been so intensive that 
has dissipated the poverty reduction effects, and has generated grand 
apprehension about the social, economic and political consequences 
of the negative distributional effects of growth. as we will mention 
below, the increases of income concentration eliminate the effects of 
growth on poverty and might hold back growth it self. the higher the 
inequality, the lower is the reduction of poverty emanating from eco-
nomic growth (gutierrez et al., 2007; López, 2008; Perry et al., 2006)
2 It has been suggested that Korea is an example of growth with improvements in 
income distribution. we have not found conclusive evidence of it. on the contrary, 
in a long time perspective, Korea is a good example of the famous Kuznets inverted 
u income distribution trend. In fact, in 1950-53, with a gini coefficient of income 
concentration of 34 percent “[…] Korea had near perfect income distribution equa-
lity”. from that period up to 1985 gini grew to 39%. the period from 1985 to 1993 
shows a three percent reduction of the gini, a trajectory put to an end by the 1997 
crisis Kyungsoo Ch. (2003), “Measuring and explaining income inequality in Ko-
rea”, consulted in: <http://www.eadn.org/reports/iwebfiles/i05.pdf>. after the 1997 
crisis gini worsened escalating well above the 1993 level. It is probable that the re-
cession of 2009 would have similar effect, see: Kwang soo Cheong 1999 “economic 
Crisis and Income Inequality in Korea” (Manoa:  university of hawaii) working 
Paper n° 99-6r. 
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on the other hand, if not definite answers have been found on the 
question if high income concentration reduces growth, if seems clear 
that inequality induces inefficient resource allocation, on the other 
hand it has been showed that gender, regional or ethnic discrimina-
tion, does indeed hinder growth. 
work is considered the essential link between growth and the 
reduction of poverty, among other things because labour is the 
main, if not the only, capital of the poor and their wages are their 
main income, besides remittances and gifts.  Islam (2004) presents 
an updated and critical revision of the treatment given to the rela-
tion between growth and the reduction of poverty over the years. 
Polasky (2006) analyzes the effects of international commerce on 
growth and poverty in developing countries, and concludes that in 
all the feasible scenarios under the wto strategy, the benefits for 
developing countries are slender, and the liberalization of trade in 
agriculture inflicts losses on developing countries, especially on the 
poorest ones.  the liberalization of trade in manufactures gener-
ates some benefits for medium income countries, but perhaps not 
enough to compensate for the losses. Perry et al. (2006) reverse 
the causal direction and suggest that mass poverty slows down 
growth and reproduces poverty and income concentration. goñi 
et al. (2008) suggest that, in the short term, both the employment 
intensity of growth and the productivity intensity of growth are 
equally important for poverty alleviation, and agriculture should 
grow intensively and faster than gDP to reduce overall poverty. 
In our calculations, according to economic development of Latin 
american countries, agriculture should represent at least twice as 
much of gDP as in 2007. therefore, when designing policies, policy 
makers should consider the sector structure of growth and employ-
ment and stimulate faster growth of agriculture and manufactures. 
for Loayza et al. (2006), sectorial composition of growth matters 
for poverty alleviation and the greatest effects arise when the fast-
est growing sectors are those with the highest labour intensity, es-
pecially agriculture.  
a different approach emphasizes the need to distribute income 
and wealth. for growth to benefit the poor population, that is, to 
reduce poverty and inequality, it should not only create job oppor-
tunities for the poor, but also distribute the effects of productivity 
growth fairly.  the intense concentration of property and income 
in Latin america may have negative effects on growth and distribu-
tion, since they are accompanied by concentration of political power 
and the capacity to influence the design of policies partial to the re-
production of capital, such as exchange rates, monetary, credit and, 
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of course, fiscal policies (Brisdale, 1999; stewart, 1992). Because 
inequality retards growth, it explains the lack of progress of Latin 
american countries in reducing income concentration and poverty 
(López et al., 2008).  
It is debatable that the growth of each country gDP and the 
growth of the global economy is the necessary condition to meet the 
Millennium Development goals (woodward, 2006). to overcome the 
one dollar threshold of those living with less than 1 dollar a day, will 
require adding to global gDP 166 dollars. Latin american countries 
would have to growth between 8 and 20% a year for a very long pe-
riod (pp.15-17). environmental constraints will impose limits to the 
growth centred poverty reduction strategy and the global crisis which 
erupted in 2008, proved another face of its fragility.  redistribution 
may be a more efficient way. Indeed, to distribute “[…] just 1% of the 
income of the richest 20% of the world’s population to the poorest 
20% would benefit the latter as much as distributional equal growth 
of around 20%” (woodward, 2006: 17). the nef studies signals a con-
tradiction of the “pro-poor growth” policy:  If it is not clear that con-
centration of income affects growth, why is it that distributive policies 
will hamper growth? 
as we will illustrate, the trajectory of employment in the coun-
tries under analysis has been disappointing: open urban unem-
ployment and informal employment have risen, and the real medi-
um and minimum wages have decline. these results can be linked 
to the liberalization of trade and the reforms of the labour legisla-
tion. Imported value added has replaced domestic value added. 
A Long Term View of Latin American 
Economic Growth
as we presented elsewhere (Puyana, 2008a), all our sample coun-
tries, but Chile, registered, during 1945-1982, their fastest growth 
rates in a century long period, 1900-2007. In effect, the import sub-
stitution period (1945-1982), is the most dynamic and convergence 
towards the usa gDP level took place. Chile achieved the lowest 
highest economic expansion in its history, while Mexico and Brazil 
argentina showed a rate almost 50% above of the expansion one 
reached during 1900-45, and 1982-2006. form 1982 onwards, Latin 
america lost positions in the global economy. table 1 presents the 
weight of our sample countries in the global gDP measured in con-
stant 2000 dollars at purchasing power parity. Chile and Colombia 
are the most successful countries since their share of world gPD 
increased between 1980 and 2005. the contrast with the evolution of 
China and India is staggering.
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to explain these differences in economic growth and the impact on 
job generation and poverty we will analyze some of the most rele-
vant economic variables, according to the mainstream theories and 
policies. first, we consider the liberalization of the economy, the pro-
ductivity increases and the changes in the structure of employment 
and gDP. Later, we will present the results of two models of gDP and 
employment growth and finally evolution of the main labour market 
features.  
Opening the economies to external competition
Chile and Mexico present the deepest trade liberalization with an 
external coefficient that in 2006 reached 76 and 65% of gDP respec-
tively. all other countries have opened their economies relatively 
less, but quite remarkable nevertheless, especially argentina, who’s 
coefficient jumped from 11.5% of gDP in 1980 to 44% in 2006. 
Brazil has the lowest coefficient that is similar to the usa. trade 
balance as percentage of gDP is illustrated in the right side panel 
of table 2. Mexico is the only country with systematic deficit (ex-
cept in 1995 due to the crisis and devaluation). Colombia and Chile 
registered surplus trade balanced. Both are the countries with the 
highest share of commodities and resource based manufactures in 
their external supply. 
there is no theoretical support to define clearly the optimal degree 
of openness, but we can reasonably conclude that the countries under 
study have substantially advanced in openness, continuously submit-
ting the production of tradable goods to greater external competition. 
therefore, there should be evidence of the supposed dynamic effects 
of commerce on the growth of gDP, of productivity and productive 
capacity, through increase in the endowment of physical as well as 
Table 1
Share of global GDP, in percentages (1980-2008)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Argentina 1.10 0.86 0.72 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.79
Brazil 3.58 3.31 3.07 3.21 2.97 2.86 2.81
Chile 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35
China 2.01 2.92 3.58 5.72 7.25 9.62 10.86
Colombia 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.48
India 2.20 2.50 2.83 3.26 3.68 4.22 4.60
Mexico 2.46 2.37 2.17 2.10 2.30 2.12 2.08
Source: Our elaboration based on IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008.
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human capital, and the advancement of employment, added value and 
salaries in the tradable sectors and those of all the labour force. 
all countries show changes in the structure of exports, from exporting 
raw materials, to having today a diverse structure, with manufactures 
of varied degree of technological sophistication. In 2006, manufac-
tures represented 85.6% and 67% of Mexican and Brazilian export 
sales, while in argentina and Chile around 56% and 50% Colombia 
(Puyana, 2008a). Mexican exports of manufactures are mainly maq-
uila products with very little national value added and low labour con-
tent and quite intensive in imports with minor return value and lim-
ited multiplying effects. south american Countries specialize more 
than Mexico in exporting primary products and resource based, low 
technology manufactures.  the advance of manufactures in total ex-
ports is not reflected in the structure of gDP and/or employment.
some interesting facts emerge when comparing the structure of 
gDP and employment of the sample countries since 1970. first, it is 
the declining contribution of transable sectors, that is, agriculture, 
mining and manufacturing, table 3. the reduction of manufactures 
and agriculture as source of gDP is premature and does not corre-
spond to the level of development of our countries. It is one effect of 
the long periods of overvaluation of the national currencies, frequent 
external shocks and volatile flows of foreign resources. this phenom-
enon, known as “Dutch Disease symptom” is evident from table 3, 
which allows comparing the structure of gDP and the per capita gDP 
of the usa and the Latin american countries. at the level of develop-
ment or Latin american countries, the share of gDP of agriculture 
and manufactures should be around 13 and 26% respectively. 
Table 2
External coefficient and trade balance as percentage of GDP (1970-2006)
External coefficient of GDP% Trade Balance as % of GDP
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2006 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2006
Argentina 10,3 11,5 15,0 19,7 2,24 43,9 0,87 -1,42 5,73 -0,43 -0,63 5,57
Brazil 14,5 20,4 15,2 16,0 2,17 26,4 -0,42 -2,25 1,24 -1,76 -1,51 4,38
Chile 28,6 49,8 64,5 56,4 6,13 76,3 -1,51 0,63 5,74 -6,43 2,10 0,11
Colom. 30,1 31,8 35,4 35,5 4,09 47,3 0,59 -4,16 3,44 2,20 1,86 8,27
Mexico 17,4 23,7 38,3 58,1 6,39 65,1 -1,90 -2,27 -1,10 2,66 -1,99 -1,60
U.S.A. 11,3 20,8 20,5 23,4 2,63 26,0 -0,55 -1,57 2,28 -0,41 -0,83 2,85
L.A.C. 20,0 27,7 31,5 37,2 4,18 49,0 0,38 -04,7 -1,35 -1,24 -3,89 -3,87
Source: Own elaboration based on WB, WDI, CDR 2008.
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It is highly surprising that the sectors in which Latin american 
countries do have comparative advantage and are export oriented ac-
tivities (mining and agriculture in Chile, agriculture in Brazil and 
argentina, and labour intensive manufactures in Mexico) have a 
very low participation in gDP. all countries have lost participation 
in world production in these sectors in which they have comparative 
advantage. similar path is evident in the structure of employment 
(Puyana, 2008a). 
the pattern of change of the structure of total employment by sectors 
confirms the decline of tradable sectors. During 1980-2006, employ-
ment in agriculture and livestock in Mexico fell from almost 30% in 
1980 to 17% in 2006, in mining the reduction was from 1.3 to 0.4% 
and employment in manufacturing shrank from 13% at the end of the 
seventies, to 11% by the end of the period. In 2006, the services sector 
concentrated 57% of all employment while construction accounted 
Table 3
Structure of GDP by sectors, in percentages (1960-2006) 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2006
Argentina Agricul. 9,6 6,4 8,1 5,0 8,4
Manufac. 31,5 29,5 26,8 17,5 22,3
GDP/Cap.* 6617,0 7550,8 5592,5 7702,9 8692,6
Brazil Agricul. 12,3 11,0 8,1 5,6 5,1
Manufac. 25,9 21,5 19,6 19,5 13,5
GDP/Cap.* 2001,3 3557,5 3373,5 3700,5 4043,9
Chile Agricul. 6,9 7,3 8,7 6,1 4,1
Manufac. 25,9 21,5 19,6 19,5 13,5
GDP/Cap.* 2219,7 2520,1 3092,8 4916,7 5896,3
Colombia Agricul. 25,7 19,9 16,7 12,9 12,0
Manufac. 21,2 23,9 20,6 15,8 16,7
GDP/Cap.* 1194,9 1621,2 1874,5 2009,9 2316,6
Mexico Agricul. 12,7 9,0 7,8 4,2 3,9
Manufac. 23,2 22,3 20,8 20,3 18,0
GDP/Cap.* 3576,4 5114,2 4966,3 5935,0 6386,7
USA Agricul. 3,5 2,9 2,1 1,2 1,2
Manufac. ND 22,0 19,4 17,0 14,4
GDP/Cap.* 18150,0 22567,9 28262,6 34600,3 37791,4
GDP/Cap* In constant 2000 dollars.
Source: Own elaboration based on WB, WDI, CDR 2008.
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for 11.8%. In Chile, we see a similar trend and structure, with a lower 
participation of agriculture and a larger one in the remaining sectors. 
argentina has the lowest employment in agriculture and the highest 
in services. Brazil and Colombia still have over 22% of total employ-
ment concentrated in agriculture. all have expanded the occupation 
in services well over 55%, as evident from table 4. 
to summarize, the trajectory of the structure of gDP and employment 
did not follow the path expected from the theory. expansion of the high 
productivity tradable activities did not materialize and tradable sectors 
declined, while construction and services expanded. the services sector 
has segments of high productivity, such as the banking system, by now 
fully privatized and controlled by foreign banks. Important foreign invest-
ments went to internal retail business, but there is a very large segment 
of low productivity and low income services, which absorbs the bulk of 
precarious employment. no one of our countries is important exporters 
of services as India, China and some Caribbean countries are.
the evolution of productivity per worker countries confirms the 
diverging path of the economies: In all countries, productivity expand-
ed quite intensively during 1960-1980. the pace slowed after 1982 and 
did not recover. nevertheless, Chilean productivity out passed Bra-
zilian and Mexican ones. Mexico registered the lowest productivity 
growth for the entire period and during 1980-2006.   
Table 4
Structure of Employment by Productive Sectors, in percentages (1960-2006) 
CHILE MEXICO
Período Agric. Mining Manuf. Const. Serv. Agric. Mining Manuf. Const. Serv.
1960-1970 24,8 3,2 17,3 7,9 46,8 47,4 1,3 15,0 3,9 32,3
1970-1980 17,8 3,1 15,8 6,1 57,2 33,1 1,2 13,8 6,5 45,3
1980-1990 17,6 2,1 14,5 5,4 60,3 27,2 1,1 11,8 8,9 50,9
1990-2000 16,0 1,8 16,0 7,6 58,6 22,9 0,5 12,1 10,2 54,2
2000-2006 131 1,3 14,0 7,8 63,8 20,0 0,4 11,9 12,1 55,5
2004 19,2 0,5 11,1 12,4 56,9 13,0 1,3 14,1 7,8 63,,8
2005 12,6 1,3 13,3 8,0 64,8 17,5 0,45 10,2 15,2 56,6
2006 12,5 1,4 13,3 8,4 64,4 16,8 0,4 10,1 15,6 57,1
Argent* 1,1 ND 14 9,8 75,1
Brazil* 20,4 0,3 13 7,3 59
Col* 23,2 0,6 13,1 5,1 58
* Data for 2006
Source: Own calculations based on the data bases of CEPAL, ILO.
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In all countries and main sectors (agriculture, manufactures, mining 
and construction) productivity gains emerged because of the dras-
tic cutback in employment as a share of total employment. this is 
evident when comparing the shares of each sector in tables 3 and 4. 
employment in agriculture and in manufactures, as percentage of to-
tal employment, decreased at highest speed than the share in gDP. 
In these conditions, labour has moved from agriculture, to services 
and construction, sectors with low productivity, in relative terms. the 
reduction of the share of employment in agriculture has been even 
more acute than in manufactures, and that is true for argentina, and 
Mexico. Brazil and Colombia and Mexico have retained more employ-
ment in agriculture, but productivity remains relatively low.  
the gains in total economic productivity coming from the trans-
ference of labour out of rural activities have been rather low. Countries 
could have increased production of the transable sectors with high 
comparative advantage to supply foreign markets and, so doing, could 
simultaneously increase productivity and product volume and create 
more jobs. that was the aim of the liberalization of foreign trade re-
Graph 1
Value Added per Worker (1960-2006)
Constant 2000 dollars per worker
Growth% Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico
1960-1980 2,35 4,03 2,40 1,70 2,48
1980-2006 0,53 0,34 2,21 1,07 -0,10
1960-2006 1,27 1,72 2,02 1,38 0,96
Source: Own elaboration based on WB, WDI, CDR 2008.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
0
 U
S
$
117
Alicia Puyana Mutis
forms and of the changes in the labour market. one of the reasons 
for the feeble growth of productivity of all countries, except Chile, is 
the evolution of the gross capital formation per worker, during 1970 
and 2006. In argentina, Brazil and Mexico we registered a reduction 
in this variable from the record level of 1979, 1980 and 1981, respec-
tively (graph 2). only in Chile and Colombia gKf per worker in 2006 
was the highest of the entire period. Low investments explain, at least 
partially, the frail expansion of productivity and the accumulation of 
working force in the informal sector.  the new flows of fDI concen-
trate in services and natural resources, with a rather low participation 
of agriculture and manufactures. 
Graph 2
Gross Capital Formation Evolution per Worker (1970-2007)
In constant 2000 dollars
Source: Own elaboration based on WB, WDI, CDR 2008.
gross fixed capital formation (gfKf) in percentages of gDP, is well be-
low the standard norm for developing countries suggested, by Isham et 
al. (1999).  for countries at the level of development in our sample, gfKf 
should represent at least 24% of gDP, with public investments covering 
no less than 50% of that, in order to maintain robust growth, increase 
productivity and competitiveness and exports so that production and em-
ployment can be expanded. the fact that investments, as percentage of 
gDP, have remained almost constant suggests that returns to capital have 
increased as percentage of gDP and increases in profits have not been 
saved nor converted in investments. thus, in productivity growth, Latin 
american countries are lagging behind China, India or the usa. from 
1980 to 2008, China’s gDP per worker expanded at the impressive annual 
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average rate of growth of 6.4%, while Brazilian and Mexican productivi-
ties stagnated (Conference, total economy Database, 2009).
Labour Markets and Poverty
In this section, we will show the evolution of labour markets as indi-
cated by the gross activity rate (gar), the urban open unemployment 
rate and the expansion of the informal sector, which allows us to esti-
mate the relation between gDP growth and employment generation, 
calculating the gDP elasticity of employment. In the following section 
we present the trajectory of real minimum and average wages.   
In all countries, gar has expanded quite substantially. the incre-
ments coincided with crisis, as real wages decrease and unemploy-
ment rises, more persons look for work, further depressing wages. It 
is evident in Mexico (1995) and Chile, the gar increased from the 
eighties to the mid nineties when the economies fell into crisis, as 
well as during that period in the nineties when the economies started 
to grow. Mexico presents a unique case in which gar is substantially 
larger and unemployment lower, due to low income and lack of unem-
ployment insurance, table 5.
the Mexican economic crises deteriorated the labour market to 
such a degree, that it is nowadays questioned whether the employment 
indicators are diagnosing the health of the economy. this is inferred 
from the low rate of urban unemployment during the crises of 1983, 
1995 and 2004, when unemployment only reached 7, 6 and 5%. this 
can only be explained by the high rate of informal and precarious em-
ployment. the Mexican labour market adjusts itself to the shocks and 
crises through deep salary reduction and in the remaining countries 
through unemployment and a less stern reduction of salaries. these 
diverging adjustment routes may signal the disposition of the Mexican 
labour sector, organized into powerful unions, to reach agreements 
with the government and the employees, to reduce minimum and me-
dium wages, as has been done in periods of crisis (Lustig, 1992; thorp, 
1998; López, 2000). In all other countries, unemployment explodes 
above 15% during recessions. In argentina, Chile, Brazil and Colom-
bia the labour reform and the liberalization of the labour market were 
intensive, aiming at lowering the protection given to labour (edwards 
et al., 2000). salary indexation to inflation was eliminated, laws for 
lying off workers were liberalized and contributions to social security 
were reduced.  In addition, the rules for enterprise bankruptcy and 
for opening new economic units were relaxed and the banking system 
was deregulated. all these measures did reduce the labour costs but 
failed in reducing the impact of crisis on employment as indicated by 
the severe increases in unemployment during the ongoing crisis.
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no labour reforms have been legislated in Mexico due to political re-
sistance in congress and the strength of public sector unions. never-
theless, there is a de facto reform, since the main increase in employ-
ment is in work without an indefinite contract, on call, and with no 
social security benefits. 
one of the most stressing changes in labour market is the sus-
tained increase in informal work.  In all five countries informal-
ity, which covers all sectors and especially new entrants, even with 
college degrees, shows permanent increases. By 2005, informal-
ity among workers with higher education increased in Mexico by 
12%, in argentina by 20%,  while in Chile it was 64%, according to 
seDLaC (2009) estimates, despite the liberal reforms to the labour 
market and in social security policies (edwards et al., 2002). the 
reforms did not succeed in reducing the tendency to avoid paying 
social security contributions, which was its main objective; they 
only contributed to increase the returns to capital. Informal work 
in Mexico is almost three times higher than in Chile, therefore, the 
role played by the informal sector in labour markets of each coun-
try should be different. In the Mexican case it is more appropriate 
to consider some of the effects of the surplus labour economy upon 
salaries, productivity and, domestic demand and fiscal accounts, 
among others.  
Table 5
Gross Activity Rate (GAR) and Urban Open Unemployment (1980-2007)
Gross Activity Rate GAR* Urban Unmeployment Rate**
Año Arg. Brazil Chile Col. Mex. Arg. Brazil Chile Col. Mex.
1980 51,2 61,6 50,3 52,3 55,9 2,6 6,3 11,7 10 4,5
1985 54,3 63,2 52,2 57,3 57,3 6,1 5,3 17,2 13,9 4,4
1990 57,6 64,6 54,2 63 58,4 7,4 4,3 9,2 10,5 2,7
1995 59 69,1 55,6 65,5 60 17,5 4,6 7,4 8,8 6,2
2000 61,1 68,2 54,6 68,6 60,7 15,1 7,1 9,7 17,3 3,4
2001 62,1 67,9 54,5 69,2 60 17,4 6,2 9,9 18,2 3,6
2002 63,3 68,4 54,1 69,8 60,1 19,7 11,7 9,8 17,6 3,9
2003 63,7 69 54,4 70,1 59,6 17,3 12,3 9,5 16,6 4,6
2004 63,8 68 53,6 70,6 59,7 13,6 11,5 10 15,3 5,3
2005 64,4 67,9 53,2 71 59,4 11,6 9,8 9,2 13,9 4,7
2006 64,9 67,9 52,9 71,3 59,2 10,2 10 7,7 12,9 4,6
2007 64,9 67,6 53,1 72 59,3 8,5 9,3 7,1 11,4 4,8
Source: Own elaboration based on ECLAC: Bases Estadísticas. Consulted in: <http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAp
licacion=1&idTema=5&idioma=e>.
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the above mentioned changes in the structure of the labour market 
are reflected in the trajectory followed by employment earning, both real 
minimum and average. the standard argument is that with advances in 
education and changes in the economic model, there should be a sub-
stantial increase in labour productivity and a sustained rise in wages. 
these effects are supposed to be brought about by other changes:  as 
the economy opens up to international competition it moves towards 
the production of goods with comparative advantage and therefore to 
more labour intensive ways of production demanding more labour, the 
relatively plentiful factor. as the process advances, the share of wages 
in national income increases, along with a corresponding reduction in 
the share of profits. that is, liberalization will increase the elasticity fac-
tor in developing countries, “[…] this will ensure that globalization will 
improve the elasticity factor as well as growth”, osmani (2003: 22). 
for several reasons, however, in Latin america the effects of trade 
liberalization do not necessarily follow this pattern (stallings, 2000: 
261; fitzgerald, 1994). all countries, with differences in time and in-
tensity, show the effects of the ‘lost decade’ on real minimum wages 
and real average salaries and a relative recovery of the minimum wag-
es starting in the early two thousands.
Table 6
Index of Real Minimum Wages and Medium Real Salaries (1980-2005)
2000=100
MINIMUN REAL WAGES AVERAGE MEDIUM REAL SALARIES
Arg. Brazil Chile Col. Mexico Arg. Brazil Chile Col. Mexico
1980 132 135 66 93 312 121,3 90,9 67,9 64,9 114,1
1985 153 126 50 102 224 16,6 95,7 63,5 75,0 86,6
1990 78 74 58 100 145 93,3 99,6 71,2 76,3 88,9
1995 99 87 75 96 113 94,2 95,4 88,0 86,4 100,9
2000 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
2006 193 145 116 108 99 84,2 84,9 1046 102,4 110,0
GROWTH RATES
1980-85 6,3 -1,1 -4,5 1,8 -6,2 1,9 1,3 -1,1 3,0 -4,8
1985-90 -15,1 -7,5 1,6 -0,8 -7,1 -5,7 1,6 1,3 -0,1 0,7
1190-95 3,7 -1,5 6,1 -1,2 -5,6 0,9 -2,2 3,9 1,9 3,0
1995-2000 -07 3,4 5,4 0,7 -5,0 0,8 1,5 2,8 3,0 -2,1
2000-06 10,8 5,3 3,9 1,5 -0,5 -4,6 -5,5 2,0 2,1 5,3
1980-06 3,6 0,7 2,5 0,6 -4,2 -1,2 0,0 2,1 2,1 0,1
Source: Own elabouration based on ECLAC: Bases Estadísticas. Consulted in:
<http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=1&idTema=5&idioma=e>.
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Mexico suffered a dramatic fall in the minimum wage, since the index 
fell from 312 in 1980 to 99 in 2006, and it is the only country in Latin 
america where minimum wages in 2006 were lower than in 1980 and 
in 2000. real average and minimum wages decreased in argentina 
and Brazil during 1980-2006. In Mexico, average wages registered 
the largest increase of all countries, with a 10% growth from 2000 to 
2006. the second segment of table 6 shows the rates of growth of both 
wages. Mexico shows a clear tendency to a dramatic deterioration of 
minimum wages and the fastest expansion of average salaries. Just the 
opposite trajectory registered in all other countries, which preserved 
the value of minimum wages and a relative decline in average wages. 
we could suggest that in Mexico wage policy was less attentive to the 
needs of the poor population than specially argentina, Chile, Colom-
bia and Brazil. 
Poverty increased after the reforms up to the mid nineties. the 
speed and intensity of poverty, and the changes in poverty varies from 
country to country. table 7 presents the evolution of poverty in Chile 
and Mexico, during 1970-2006. 
Both countries reduced poverty and indigence, Chile up to 1970 and 
Mexico from 1970 to 1984. this path reversed because of the crises suf-
fered by Chile (in 1973 and 1982) and Mexico (1982, 1986 and 1995). 
In the eighties and part of the nineties, slower growth implied lower 
Table 7
Chile and Mexico:  Persons living in conditions of poverty and extreme poverty, percent of total population
(1970-2006)
CHILE MEXICO
Poverty Extreme poverty Poverty Extreme poverty
Año Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Año Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
1970 17 12 25 6 3 11 1970 34 20 49 12 6 18
1987 38 37 45 14 13 16 1977 32 ND ND 10 ND ND
1990 38,6 38,5 38,8 13 12,5 15,6 1984 24 28 45 11 7 20
1994 27,6 27 31,1 7,6 7,1 9,9 1989 47,7 42,1 56,7 18,7 13,1 27,9
1996 23,2 22 30,4 5,7 5,1 9,4 1996 52,9 46,1 62,8 22 14,3 33
1998 21,7 20,7 27,5 5,6 5,1 8,6 2000 41,1 32,3 54,7 15,2 6,6 28,5
2000 20,2 19,7 23,7 5,6 5,1 8,4 2002 39,4 32,2 51,2 12,6 6,9 21,9
2003 18,7 18,5 20 4,7 4,4 6,2 2005 35,5 28,5 47,5 11,7 5,8 21,7
2006 13,7 13,9 12,3 3,2 3,2 3,5 2006 31,7 26,8 40,1 8,7 4,4 16,1
Source: Puyana (2008 a).
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employment rates, decreased real salaries and lower public social ex-
penditure. In Chile, the reduction of poverty started when the demo-
cratic government initiated income distributive fiscal reforms.  Chile 
returned to the low level of poverty existing in 1970 only between 2003 
and 2006 and Mexico did so in 2006. In argentina, poverty incidence 
in 2006 was considerable (23% of total population) higher than in 
1970 (9% of population), reflecting the severe impact of the crisis the 
country suffered in the late seventies, early eighties and late nineties, 
which was perhaps the most severe. Colombia is the only country with 
a very high poverty incidence in 1970 (54% of total population) and 
has not reduced it even during growth spells. In all countries, the ma-
jor effort has been in reducing rural poverty and rural indigence.  an 
important reduction in poverty and indigence did take place during 
the period 1990-2006, but just to recover the ground lost after the re-
forms. the most remarkable is Brazil that during 1990-2007 reduced 
the incidence of rural poverty from over 70 to 45% and rural indigence 
from 46 to 18%. a similar path, although less intensive was registered 
by Colombia, Chile and México (Puyana, 2008b). the 2008 crisis has 
erased almost all gains and poverty is rising again.
Linking economic growth and employment 
the employment elasticity of gDP is one way to visualize the strength 
and direction the link between gDP growth and poverty. with greater 
elasticity, the capacity of the economy to generate employment increas-
es and the possibilities of reducing poverty improve. Labour elasticity 
of gDP measures the changes in employment level, not changes in the 
rate of occupation, an important problem in developing countries. for 
growth to reduce poverty, labour demand must reduce hidden unem-
ployment, underemployment and informality.  If these conditions are 
met, there would not be any changes in the employment rate but the 
labour force would move towards better-paid activities.  such a strat-
egy requires employment growth to surpass that of the economy and 
to sustain long-term growth and income improvements, productivity 
has also to increase. since gDP growth depends on the expansion of 
productivity and employment, both elements have to register simulta-
neous increases. 
the gDP elasticity of employment detects the periods where gDP 
growth integrates higher or lower increases in labour. however, em-
ployment elasticity of gDP is the reverse of productivity. elasticity 
which is larger than unity indicates decreasing productivity and, in-
versely, elasticity which is lower than the unit implies that produc-
tivity is growing, (Islam, 2004).  the promotion of intensive labour 
growth should not be the only purpose of a poverty reduction policy, 
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since that would imply the fall of productivity and diminishing in-
come (Islam, 2004).  a growth strategy should attempt, in the first 
place, to diversify production to include a wider range of production 
with differing elasticities, and secondly, to increase labour intensity 
and productivity.  total labour elasticity depends on the elasticities 
of the different economic activities and their total weight in gDP and 
employment. a strategy that combines productivity increases and pro-
duction expansion in activities of greater elasticity and higher labour 
intensity is feasible. (Islam, 2004: 5; Khan, 2005) this strategy may 
lead to a type of growth with increased total elasticity, even if in some 
sectors it may decline (Ibid.). any policy for raising productivity of the 
total economy should start by increasing it in the activities weighing 
more on employment and product, and shifting labour from less pro-
ductive activities to those of higher productivity. (ul haque et al., 1995; 
osmani, 2003; Khan, 2005; gutiérrez, 2008; Loayza et al., 2006)
the shifts of labour to higher productivity activities leads us to 
consider the real capacity of poor workers and of those involved in 
low productivity and low income activities, to become part of the ex-
panding higher productivity sectors.  this refers to the widening of 
the volume and quality of labour, or the integration factor.  “[…] the 
measure by which the poor are able to join the economic process in 
such a way as to take advantage of greater possibilities of improving 
the quality and quantity of employment, when there is growth and the 
employment potential expands” (osmani, 2003: 11).  this movement 
implies important structural changes in the economy.  these chang-
es could induce the expansion of production and employment in the 
activities with higher productivity and improvements in real average 
wages and income for the self-employed.  another way to perceive the 
effects of structural changes is whether the population involved in low 
productivity activities diminishes and their income increases, or both. 
this would lead to an improvement in the distribution of income and 
consumption and to a greater participation of labour in income. 
as mentioned before, the rates of growth of gDP per capita have 
been lower than before the structural reforms and insufficient to re-
duced poverty in a considerable degree, mainly because of the pattern 
of job creation. In the following sections we will present some rela-
tions to illustrate the above arguments, based on elasticities. we do 
not pretend to demonstrate any exclusive cause-effect relation, but 
to demonstrate that the pattern of growth followed has reduced the 
gDP elasticity of labour and induced ever growing capital intensity, 
without important total productivity increases. 
we show the different trajectories of gDP and employment growth 
in table 8, lines 1 and 3. During the entire period (1980-2006), argen-
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tina and Brazil, registered the lowest economic growth, total and per 
capita and, in all countries, but Mexico, the economy expanded faster 
than employment. that was the trend prevailing during 1980-1990. 
In argentina, employment registered the fastest rates of growth dur-
ing 1980-1990 while the economy contracted. table 8, line 4 shows 
the trend in unemployment and the contrasting pattern of Mexico. 
while, argentina, Chile and Colombia registered double digit unem-
ployment, in Mexico the record level was 4.9%. It is clear that the 
economies need very high rates of growth to expand employment and 
reduced unemployment. 
In general terms, labour elasticity of gDP (line 13), for the 
whole period, was in Chile and Colombia well below the unity, and 
lower than in other countries. only Mexico registered elasticity 
above the 1. that means that in all countries, except Mexico, pro-
ductivity increases were instrumented at the cost of labour inten-
sity. the sharpest decreases in labour intensity of gDP took place 
in Chile and Colombia, the countries with the lowest labour elas-
ticity. that is evident when comparing lines 13 and 12, in table 
8. one explanation of reduction of labour elasticity accompanied 
by rather low productivity growth is that labour has not moved 
from low productivity to high productivity activities, despite clear 
improvements in education, (Puyana, 2008b). the inverse relation 
between increments in productivity and labour intensity is clear 
in all countries. we calculated simple correlation between the two 
variables. In the Chilean case a one percent increase in productiv-
ity generated a 0.50% fall in labour intensity3. this result is simi-
lar, although weaker, in all other countries. when regressing capi-
tal and labour intensity, the results suggest that, for instance for 
argentina, a 1% increase in the capital intensity of gDP, generates 
a reduction of the labour intensity of 45%. some facts are is sur-
prising and troublesome: first is that capital per worker registered 
a declining tendency from the record level of 1980, nevertheless, 
capital accumulation is the most important variable explaining 
gDP growth, and it induces the reduction in labour elasticity of 
gDP (Puyana, 2008b). 
we estimate the partial elasticity of work with respect to wag-
es and investments, to explore the role of the cost of labour and 
capital intensification in the decline of labour elasticity (lines 13 
and 15, table 8). In theory, wage elasticity may be negative, that is, 
when salaries fall, employment should rise and decline when re-
munerations rise (Khan, 2005). we found that for the entire period 
3 the obtained value of the r2 was systematically above 80%. 
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that expectation was not fulfilled, since wage elasticity is positive 
in all countries but argentina. In Chile, Mexico and Brazil, even in 
periods of high average growth in wages employment grew. from 
the results we may suggest that average real wages were not the 
main cause for the expansion of unemployment and the reduction 
of job elasticity of the product, since during 1980-2006 real average 
wages increased at a lower rate than total gDP total and per capita 
gDP. the Chilean case is illustrative. the period of the fastest total 
and per capita Chilean gDP growth was 1990-95, during which, the 
gDP elasticity of work fell to 0.3, the lowest registered and mini-
mum wages increased more than medium salaries, but less than per 
capita gDP. In that period, Chilean the increases in unemployment 
were the second lower registered since 1980. however, in Mexico, 
the strongest increase in average wages, well above the rise in gDP, 
took place in 2000-06 coinciding with very intensive growth of un-
employment and almost stagnant employment. Partial labour elas-
ticity of capital per worker (line 16, table 8) can be expected to be 
either positive or negative, since capital would replace labour, but 
gDP increases resulting from capital accumulation would generate 
employment. In our case study, the obtained elasticities are posi-
tive. In argentina gfCf was negative when the gDP descended. 
In Mexico, the expansion of investment was rather feeble, below 
gDP growth and the resulting elasticity is positive and high. gfCf 
in Mexico speed out after 1990. the negative sign of the elasticity 
results from declining investments rather than from drops in em-
ployment when investments grew. In Chile, only during 1980-85 did 
elasticity turn negative due to the fall in investments, coinciding 
with very low total and per capita gDP expansion. so, as before, we 
cannot conclude that capital accumulation is the main reason for 
the decline in the labour elasticity of the economies under scrutiny. 
In our growth model, the main variables explaining employment 
generation were gDP expansion. one percent change in gDP in-
duces a 0.58% change in employment. the second most important 
variable is gfKf with a positive but less strong relation than gDP. 
In the case of Chile, other variables in direct direction but not high-
ly significant are urban population, secondary education and the 
growth of the agricultural sector. It is interesting that the variables 
related with the external sector, such as the external coefficient of 
gDP, as well as the import or the export orientation coefficient are 
not significant in some cases, the relation is indirect. 
In lines 16 and 17 we calculated the ratio of the rate of change 
in poverty to gDP, and employment. with stalled gDP growth (and 
at the same time with increasing employment), we expect that the 
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ratio of poverty rates of change to gDP growth should have a nega-
tive sign. that happened in Chile over the entire period but not in 
Mexico, where both output and poverty increased over 1980-85. we 
do not comment the argentinean results since information is miss-
ing and irregular. In all countries, poverty declined after 1990 when 
the economy increased rapidly. a similar relation can be observed 
between poverty and employment. the value of the ratio is positive, 
in all countries (except Chile), suggesting that both variables change 
in the same direction. only during 2000-06 we obtained, for Bra-
zil, Colombia and Mexico, the expected negative value of the ratio, 
which means that employment expanded and poverty fall. In Chile 
we obtained as well a negative value, for the whole period and for all 
sub-periods. 
the value of the relation is very high, implying high impact from 
employment to poverty. In our understanding, unemployment is the 
main reason for poverty increase in this period. Poverty and indigence 
are very sensitive to the reduction of growth, as indicated by the ratios 
calculated for the frequent crisis that affected Latin american econo-
mies. 
as mentioned, there is not definite consensus about the relation 
between income concentration and growth. nevertheless, in general 
terms, countries with high concentration of income and wealth need 
higher rates of gDP growth to reduced poverty and income concen-
tration may induced less than optimal resource allocation and lower 
economic expansion. Latin america is the most unequal region and 
situation aggravated after the reforms. In lines 18 and 19, table 8, we 
present the ratios of gini to gDP growth and gini employment. we 
expect a negative value of the first ratio, since fast economic growth 
will reduce income concentration throw employment generation and 
salary increases.
the same sign would be expected for the gini employment ra-
tio. In all countries (except argentina), the gini of income fall dur-
ing 1980-2006 but  at much lower pace than gDP expanded, for that 
reason the value of the ratio, although with the right negative sign, 
is very low. this result may confirm that the region needs very high 
rates of growth to reduced income concentration and eliminate the 
negative economic and social effects of inequality. the so small re-
duction of the gini also suggests that the impact of social policies is 
not particularly strong. the ratio gini employment (line 19, table 8), 
follows the same trajectory of the gDP-gini, therefore, no additional 
observations are needed. 
we can conclude that the economic variables presented in table 8 
are not the main factors behind the decreases in poverty and income 
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Table 8
The relation between GDP and productivity growth, employment, poverty and income concentration.
Labour elasticity and capital intensity (1980-2006)
Argentina Brasil
Variable 80-06 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-06 80-06 80-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06
1 A% GDP 2,12 -1,33 -1,54 5,18 1,74 2,77 2,52 2,52 3,07 1,78 2,41 3,12
2
A% GDP per 
capita
0,83 -2,81 -2,97 3,77 0,56 1,76 0,77 0,22 1,10 0,18 0,88 1,68
3 A% Employt 1,62 2,18 1,57 0,91 0,64 2,71 2,22 3,58 3,33 1,11 1,30 3,22
4 A% Unemployt 10,20 4,63 6,50 9,92 15,32 14,99 6,73 6,60 4,02 5,00 6,33 9,80
5 A% GFKF 3,33 -7,41 -5,35 9,99 0,10 7,87 1,11 -2,67 3,15 1,51 2,34 2,44
6
A% Real Averg 
Wages
-1,23 1,93 -5,71 0,93 0,83 -4,57 0,02 1,30 1,56 -2,19 1,49 -5,55
7
A% Real Minim 
Wages
7,90 6,31 -24,22 22,14 -0,46 12,14 0,72 -1,13 -7,51 -1,51 3,25 5,94
8 A% GINI 2,10 - - 1,89 4,86 0,77 -0,03 1,69 1,27 -0,69 -0,08 -0,89
9 A% Poverty 39,94 - - 145,75 57,82 9,02 2,67 - 34,01 16,53 -3,82 -0,29
10 A% Indigence 50,42 - - - 111,26 35,21 -7,92 - - -9,39 -15,42 -4,62
11
A% Capital per 
worker
1,50 -9,27 -6,80 9,11 -0,43 4,00 -1,03 -6,00 -0,08 0,40 1,07 -0,75
12
A% Labour Intens 
GDP
-0,17 3,85 3,49 -3,70 -0,87 0,007 -0,20 1,28 0,40 -0,54 -1,07 0,10
13
Labour Elastic 
GDP
0,76 -1,63 -1,02 0,18 0,37 0,98 0,88 1,42 1,08 0,62 0,54 1,03
14
Labour Elastic of 
RAW
-1,32 1,13 -0,27 0,98 0,77 -0,59 97,02 2,76 2,13 -0,50 0,87 -0,58
15
Labour Elastic 
Capital
0,49 -0,29 -0,29 0,09 6,50 0,34 2,00 -1,34 1,06 0,76 0,55 1,32
16
Ratio A% 
Poverty/A%GDP
18,80 - - 28,11 33,15 3,25 1,06 - 11,08 9,29 -1,59 -0,09
17
Ratio A% 
Poverty/A% 
Employ
24,63 - - 159,68 90,30 3,33 1,20 - 10,22 14,96 -2,95 -0,09
18
Ratio A% 
GINI/A%GDP
0,99 - - 0,36 2,79 0,28 -0,01 0,67 0,41 -0,39 -0,03 -0,28
19
Ratio A%GINI/A% 
Employ
1,29 - - 2,07 7,59 0,28 -0,01 0,47 0,38 -0,62 -0,06 -0,28
concentration. other forces are behind it. In the first place, we have to 
mention the impact of social policies, such as the programmes of con-
ditioned and targeted cash transferences that all countries have put 
in motion since late eighties.  In second place is the impact of remit-
tances on income of poor households, which are especially important 
for Mexico and Colombia. 
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Table 8
The relation between GDP and productivity growth, employment, poverty and income concentration. Labour 
elasticity and capital intensity (1980-2006)
Chile Colombia
Variable 80-06 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-06 80-06 80-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06
1 A% GDP 5,1 2,3 6,8 7,9 5,3 4,2 3,3 2,6 4,6 4,5 1,7 3,8
2
A% GDP per 
capita
3,5 0,7 5,0 6,0 3,8 3,1 1,4 0,4 2,6 2,5 -0,1 2,2
3 A% Employt 2,9 2,4 4,9 2,4 1,7 3,6 2,3 0,9 3,2 4,4 0,7 2,3
4 A% Unemployt 10,6 15,9 12,9 7,9 7,7 9,4 12,6 11,1 11,8 9,5 14,1 16,0
5 A% GFKF 8,0 2,5 15,1 12,3 5,9 8,0 5,7 4,4 3,8 10,7 -7,5 12,7
6
A% Real Averg 
Wages
2,1 -1,1 1,3 3,9 2,8 2,0 2,1 3,0 -0,1 1,9 3,0 2,1
7
A% Real Minim 
Wages
2,5 -4,5 1,6 6,1 5,7 3,2 0,6 1,8 -0,8 -1,2 0,6 1,2
8 A% GINI -0,4 - -1,6 -0,7 0,1 -0,7 -0,4 - -4,6 3,6 2,4 -0,9
9 A% Poverty -11,91 - -9,87 -16,52 -7,23 -11,06 10,36 - - 32,59 6,90 -2,17
10 A% Indigence -16,54 - - -37,17 -6,37 -13,46 0,43 - - 15,44 2,46 -5,92
11
A% Capital per 
worker
5,07 0,29 9,79 9,71 4,12 4,36 3,39 3,35 0,67 6,14 -7,92 10,36
12
A% Labour Intens 
GDP
-1,92 0,58 -1,78 -4,97 -3,24 -0,59 -0,90 -1,58 -1,42 0,001 -0,78 -1,42
13
Labour Elastic 
GDP
0,57 1,05 0,72 0,31 0,33 0,85 0,70 0,37 0,68 1,00 0,44 0,60
14
Labour Elastic of 
RAW
1,40 -2,18 3,83 0,62 0,61 1,81 1,09 0,31 -28,94 2,31 0,24 1,08
15
Labour Elastic 
Capital
0,36 0,97 0,32 0,20 0,29 0,45 0,41 0,21 0,83 0,42 -0,10 0,18
16
Ratio A% 
Poverty/A%GDP
-2,34 - -1,45 -2,10 -1,37 -2,61 3,14 - - 7,31 4,15 -0,57
17
Ratio A% 
Poverty/A% 
Employ
-4,14 - -2,03 -6,77 -4,17 -3,07 4,45 - - 7,35 9,53 -0,95
18
Ratio A% 
GINI/A%GDP
-0,08 - -0,24 -0,09 0,02 -0,17 -0,11 - -1,00 0,81 1,44 -0,25
19
Ratio A%GINI/A% 
Employ
-0,13 - -0,33 -0,30 0,06 -0,21 -0,15 - -1,47 0,82 3,32 -0,42
Chile
Variable 80-06 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-06
1 A% GDP 2,86 3,23 1,87 2,19 3,51 2,91
2 A% GDP per capita 1,13 0,93 -0,13 0,33 1,98 1,80
3 A% Employt 2,95 3,78 3,73 1,95 3,06 1,87
4 A% Unemployt 4,28 4,93 3,62 3,58 4,82 4,30
5 A% GFKF 3,71 0,48 3,43 1,97 6,30 4,36
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Chile
Variable 80-06 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-06
6 A% Real Averg Wages 0,13 -4,84 0,74 3,02 -2,12 5,26
7 A% Real Minim Wages -4,19 -6,18 -7,12 -5,62 -4,07 -0,04
8 A% GINI 0,31 - 19,20 -7,40 0,62 -1,88
9 A% Poverty 1,11 - 22,91 3,39 1,18 -5,91
10 A% Indigence -4,95 - - -1,76 2,44 -12,10
11 A% Capital per worker 0,63 -3,39 -0,31 -0,21 2,84 2,42
12 A% Labour Intens GDP 0,17 0,69 1,91 -0,15 -0,33 -0,98
13 Labour Elastic GDP 1,03 1,17 2,00 0,89 0,87 0,64
14 Labour Elastic of RAW 22,63 -0,78 5,07 0,65 -1,44 0,36
15 Labour Elastic Capital 0,79 7,90 1,09 0,99 0,49 0,43
16 Ratio A% Poverty/A%GDP 0,39 - 12,26 1,55 0,34 -2,03
17 Ratio A% Poverty/A% Employ 0,38 - 6,13 1,74 0,39 -3,16
18 Ratio A% GINI/A%GDP 0,11 - 10,28 -3,39 0,18 -0,65
19 Ratio A%GINI/A% Employ 0,10 - 5,14 -3,79 0,20 -1,01
Source: Own elaboration based on CEPAL and WB data bases.
social policies, the provision of social services for all the population, 
are the result of the social contract and social priorities. since 1990, 
public social expenditure per head has increased in all countries under 
scrutiny.  In Chile, it has grown at an annual average rate of 39.2% and 
by 11.5% in Mexico, and at similar rates in Brazil, argentina and Co-
lombia. the main emphasis has been on education, which expanded 
several times more than on health. Despite the fact that the expendi-
ture per capita differs quite substantially from country to country, see 
table 9, (columns 1-3-7) the expenditure as percentage of gDP is rath-
er similar. In Chile, the biggest effort in public social expenditure took 
place during 1990-2001 and decelerated thereafter. the increases in 
social expenditure as a percentage of gDP decelerated in all countries 
in different periods, suggesting that the economy grew faster than the 
resources dedicated to the accumulation in human capital. It is par-
ticularly so in Mexico during 1999-2001 and in Chile, in the period 
2001-2005. Lower rates of economic growth and the resulting reduc-
tion in fiscal income may be the causes. social expenditure follows the 
economic cycle and can be volatile and, in the gDP downturns, social 
expenditure may fall more intensely than the economy. 
generally, in all Latin america, fiscal policies are much less dis-
tributive than in europe and other regions of the world. Market in-
come is “[…] largely determined by market rewards to the private 
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assets and efforts of individuals, and by the underlying distribution 
of those private assets” (goñi et al.: 7). Disposable income, after tax-
es and after transfers in kind and in cash, is almost the same as the 
market income. In Chile and  Mexico, two countries with the most 
distributive fiscal policies (goñi et al.: 7) the difference between the 
gini coefficient of market and disposable income is about 1.5%, in 
sharp contrast with europe where the difference is 12 % on average 
(goñi et al.: 7-8). the reduction of the gini during the period 2000-06 
was 0.32% points for Chile and 1.22% in the case of Mexico. Despite 
that, given the low gDP elasticity of the gini, we could assume that 
the main factor for the reductions in inequality were fiscal policies, 
mainly cash transfers. these transfers support consumption and have 
little effect on the concentration of assets. some of the transfers were 
made to poor families on condition that their children regularly at-
tend school and undergo periodic health check-ups. Programmes of 
this kind act as investments in human capital and their effects on in-
come concentration and poverty will be measurable once the benefici-
aries join the labour force.  
remittances from Mexican workers in the united states grew from to 
2.5 billion dollars in 1993 to over 27 billions in 2008, reaching close to 
2.83% of the gDP. In 2005, Chile only received remittances for three 
million dollars, which represented 0.003% of the gDP (wB, 2008: 
wDI, 2008). remittances helped to reduce Mexican poverty and in-
come concentration (Brambila, 2008). average monthly remittances 
received by 1.4 million of households were us$ 215, which represent-
ed 36% of their total monetary income CePaL (2005: 99). It reduced 
extreme and moderate poverty by 1.6% and 1.3% respectively, and the 
gini coefficient by 1.3% (p. 105).  CePaL, registered a similar effect, 
although less intensive was registered in Colombia.
Table 9
Expenditure in Education Public expenditure in Health Total Social Expenditure
Per cap. As % GDP Per cap. As % GDP Per cap. As % GDP
2001-06 90-01 2005-06 2001-06 1990-01 2005-06 2001-06 1990-01 2005-06
Argentina 406 3,5 4,8 362 4,3 4,5 768 7,8 9,3
Brazil 187 3,7 4,7 190 3,6 4,8 377 7,3 9,5
Chile 190 2,3 3,3 192 1,8 2,8 352 4,1 6,1
Colombia 84 2,6 3,7 50 1 2,2 134 3,6 5,9
Mexico 241 2,9 3,9 167 2,9 2,7 408 5,8 6,6
Source: Based on CEPAL, 2008 “Panorama Social de América Latina 2008”. In: <http://www.eclac.org/cgiin/getProd.asp?xml=/
publicaciones/xml/2/34732/P34732.xml&xsl=/dds/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/dds/tpl/top-bottom.xsl>.  Accessed April 15, 2009.
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Conclusions 
this paper analyses the economic trajectory the relations between 
economic growth and poverty reduction through the generation of 
employment. growth in all the countries analyzed reduced tempo af-
ter reforming the economy and implementing the new economic mod-
el. Labour productivity developed at very low rate, so did salaries and 
employment. tradable sectors retreated as source of gDP en employ-
ment; therefore, labour did not moved from low to higher productivity 
activities. In general, the rates of growth of the economy have been 
disappointing, well below the level required to create formal employ-
ment and reduce poverty. Minimum and medium real salaries/wages 
have considerably declined. unemployment is low in Mexico and Bra-
zil, thanks to the intensive expansion of informal labour. 
Productivity is at the core of the differences in the patterns of 
economic growth between countries. Chile has managed to increase 
productivity and has outperformed all other countries, especially 
Mexico and argentina. Paradoxically, Chilean, argentinean and Bra-
zilian geographical location is one of the country’s comparative ad-
vantages while Mexican vicinity may be one disadvantage. In effect, 
the agriculture of these countries is complementary to the usa and 
other developed countries agriculture while Mexican agriculture com-
petes with usa agricultural produce in the sense that it produces the 
same (corn, fruits, vegetables) at the same time and at different prices. 
with nafta, Mexican agriculture has declined. 
the movements of labour among sectors, and between the princi-
pal divisions of the manufacturing sector, do not indicate that labour 
is migrating from low productivity activities to the higher productiv-
ity sectors. the movement has been from agriculture to construction, 
the sector with the second lowest productivity. the new entrants to the 
urban labour market are inflating the informal sector. all this indicates 
that poor workers do not have the qualifications/skills required to inte-
grate into the growth process. therefore, productivity gains from move-
ments of factors of production are rather small and the impact on pov-
erty limited. at a two-digit level of the manufacturing sector, labour has 
not moved to the high productivity branches, neither has it moved to 
activities linked to exports. Manufacturing has not attracted labour. 
there is the urgent need to reverse the fall of agriculture and the 
stagnation of manufactures as sources of gDP and employment, since 
it is a structural imbalance affecting total economic productivity, rural 
and urban incomes and the volume and growth of domestic demand, 
and the degree of food security. 
the employment elasticity of gDP has been falling since the eight-
ies and with it the labour intensity of the economy. one factor behind 
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the reduction of unemployment has been the contraction in labour 
participation rates. the wage elasticity of employment has been nega-
tive and falling, since we registered positive employment growth and 
declining wages. therefore, salaries are not the cause of the reduction 
in labour intensity of the two economies scrutinized.
the reduction in poverty and in inequality that took place in re-
cent years is the result of different factors in each country. In Chile 
and Brazil, economic growth has furthered the reduction of poverty in 
two ways: first by improving salaries thanks to increased productivity 
and second, by providing the fiscal resources to finance targeted and 
conditioned poverty programmes. In Mexico, since growth has been 
rather feeble, the reduction of poverty has more to do with factors not 
directly related to the pattern of growth. these factors are, firstly, the 
remittances from Mexican workers in the usa. second, there are the 
effects of the public programmes for poverty reduction; and last, but 
not least, the significant reduction in the rates of population growth. 
these elements are common to all five countries. the reduction in in-
come concentration is directly related to poverty reduction. whether 
the current model of social policies and fiscal expenditure aimed at 
reducing poverty and inequality are sustainable, has yet to be seen. In 
any case, the recommendation is to create the conditions for the crea-
tion of better jobs on a sustainable basis.
from the above summary we can suggest the lines of action to 
reduced the negative effects emerging from growth to poverty through 
employment: first of all to induce higher rates of growth of the value 
added of the more labour intensive sectors in which a faster produc-
tivity should be stimulated; secondly, to eliminate the constant ten-
dency to the revaluation of the national currencies and the emerging 
discrimination against labour intensive sectors; secondly, to change 
the mandate given to the central banks to care only for stability sacri-
ficing growth and employment, which has resulted in the revaluation 
of the currency mentioned above. 
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2.1. Social Policy in the 
Neoliberal Order
Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes 
as Mechanisms of Political 
Legitimacy in Latin America
Abstract
this paper aims to contribute to the construction of an alternative un-
derstanding of Conditional Cash transfers Programs (CCtP) in Latin 
america through the analysis of Families in Action (fa), implemented 
in Colombia since 2001. It is relevant to examine such programs not 
only in terms of their direct impacts but also in relation to the model 
of economic growth they are part of. the larger picture of the neoli-
beral economic and political project within which Families in Action 
takes place allows elucidating the limited scope of this intervention 
in terms of poverty reduction. In this light, Families in Action is only 
a palliative strategy that mitigates the effects the economic growth 
model generates (land concentration, unemployment, informality). 
CCtP, besides their mitigating effects, also produce important political 
effects that should be incorporated into the analyses of such interven-
tions. Families in Action in particular has contributed to the ideologi-
cal, institutional and social sustain of the current regime in Colombia 
and its neoliberal project, strengthening the presidential figure and 
modifying the state-citizenship relation, substituting the framework 
of rights and duties for one of personal favours and gratefulness.
 * Master in social Policy, Pontificia universidad Javeriana. social researcher mem-
ber of fundación Centro de estudios escuela para el Desarrollo (CesDe).
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Families in Action is a social programme in Colombia that provides 
grants to poor families conditional on the fulfilment of certain goals rela-
ted with education, health and nutrition. Beneficiary households receive 
a ‘nutrition component’ worth $50,000 (around us$25) per month for 
every children aged 0 to 6, only if the mother participates in growth and 
development check-ups for children, a vaccination programme and some 
“classes” on hygiene, diet and contraception. for the “education com-
ponent”, beneficiary households receive payments of $15,000 (around 
us$7.5) for each child enrolled at and regularly attending primary school 
and of $30,000 (around us$15) for each child in secondary school.
the rationality behind this Conditional Cash transfers Progra-
mme is that the conditioning of monetary grants to educational or 
health requirements allows combining poverty alleviation in the short 
term with long term objectives related with the accumulation of hu-
man capital (Villatoro, 2005). the premise behind such intervention 
is that the intergenerational reproduction of poverty is related to the 
lack of investment in human capital and that the conditioning of cash 
transfers might generate incentives for this investment in poor house-
holds (CePaL, 2000).
Currently, CCtP represent the avant-garde of multilateral orga-
nizations: these programmes condense and put into practice world 
Bank’s and Inter-american Development Bank’s most recent theoreti-
cal and policy precepts. according to these institutions, the expansion 
of CCtP in the region is the logical consequence of the conceptual 
and policy advances these programmes have incorporated and the po-
sitive impacts they have demonstrated. after the first two CCtP, Beca 
Familia (Brazil) and Oportunidades (Mexico), between 1995 and 2007, 
fourteen countries in the region have developed their own version. 
today, there is a regional consensus around the fact that CCtP are the 
most efficient and effective poverty reduction strategies.
usually, governments and multilateral organizations have promo-
ted studies on CCtP that privilege either the analysis of institutional 
processes (programmes’ design, implementation and follow-up) or 
impact evaluations (Cohen and franco, 2006; rawlings and rubio, 
2003; Villatoro, 2005, 2007). while these studies have allowed streng-
thening the technical aspect of social expenditure, they take for gran-
ted the social policy conception behind CCtP and do not link it with 
a larger context, for example, in terms of the macroeconomic models 
that countries in the region have adopted in the last decade and the 
relation these interventions have with the political regime.
the aim of this paper is to contribute to an alternative understan-
ding of CCtP in Latin america, attempting to expand the lens through 
which they have generally been assessed. the analysis of Familias en 
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Acción (Families in Action), the Colombian CCtP implemented since 
2001, sheds a light on the way these interventions have contributed 
to legitimize the consolidation of the neoliberal order1 in the region. It 
is relevant to conceive Families in Action not only as a social progra-
mme with explicit objectives related to human capital formation and 
poverty eradication, but  also as a political instrument of the current 
Colombian regime. the positive impact results of Families in Action 
in nutrition, health and education are important for the country’s so-
cial development; however, when the programme is framed within the 
larger economic growth model in which it is inscribed, these impacts 
seem more like ways of mitigating the consequences of the economic 
policies than ways of overcoming the causes of poverty. Families in 
Action only procures to counterbalance the anti-poor economic model 
prevalent in Colombia, characterized by high levels of assets (income, 
land) concentration, unemployment and informality. 
Besides the impacts strictly related with its objectives, Families in 
Action may have as well political effects that strengthen the political 
regime, which can be analyzed in their ideological, institutional and 
social dimension. the high popularity the presidential figure was able 
to maintain 8 years in power, was greatly due to Families in Action, 
which generated significant political capital to the executive power.
this paper is organized in three sections. In the first one, the growing 
importance of Families in Action in the Colombian government’s social 
policy is described to then move on into a discussion on how this social 
programme articulates itself to the economic growth model. then, in 
the second section, the political effects of Families in Action are exa-
mined, evidencing how this intervention has operationalised in practi-
ce the legitimation of the current Colombian political regime. finally, 
in the third section, some brief conclusions are put forward, outlining 
some of the central questions formulated by the seminar.
Families in Action and the Colombian 
anti-poor growth model
the explicit objectives of Families in Action (fa) are to “protect and 
promote human capital formation of children between 0 and 17 years 
old members of poor households, through the support of households’ 
investments” (Department of national Planning, DnP, 2000). In the 
1  In this new phase of capitalism, capital has become into a juridical-economic 
order. some have called it the “political constitution of the market” or the “neoliberal 
order”, in the strict sense of law (estrada, 2006). In this order, the normative contents 
of “global law”, related with economic deregulation and fiscal discipline, have been 
incorporated into the national legal orders. 
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process of fulfilling these objectives, the programme has, undoubte-
dly, become one of the main referents of alvaro uribe government’s 
social policy. while it initiated in 2000 with andrés Pastrana’s gover-
nment (1998-2002), in the frame of the Social Support Network (ras, 
for its initials in spanish)2, it has been under uribe’s administrations 
(2002-2006, 2006-2010) that the programmes’ development and mas-
sive expansion has taken place, as it is shown in figure 1.
originally targeted only towards poor households of rural areas 
(DnP, 2000)3, since 2007 the programme jumped onto urban areas and 
larger towns, reaching a widespread coverage. thus, between 2002 
and 2009, the programme increased its beneficiaries from 320,434 
to 2,441,870 families, including urban and rural families from poor 
sectors and, more recently, internally displaced families. Considering 
population estimates of 2005 Census, the current coverage of the pro-
gramme represents 23% of total Colombian households (10,570,899) 
and 50% of total poor households (4,866,187), evidently significant 
numbers.
2  an emergency strategy put in place to confront the severe social and economic 
crisis that Colombia experienced during the late nineties.
3  Colombia has a system of identification of households eligible for social progra-
mmes (called sIsBen) that classifies households in categories according to their 
living conditions (roof and walls’ materials, access to public services, sanitation, 
overcrowding, education of the household head, etc.). In the first phase of fa, the 
targeted population were households belonging to sIsBen 1 (the lowest level) living 
in municipalities with a high rural population percentage (DnP, 2000). 
Figure 1
Families in Action Beneficiary Households (2001-2009)
Source: Sistema de Gestión y Seguimiento a las Metas de Gobierno (SIGOB), 2009.  
-
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this coverage expansion has meant as well an increase in the 
programme’s resources needed to provide the monetary transfers to 
each household every two months. with data available until 2005, 
it is possible to see how the programme’s budget has been increa-
sing over time, from representing 0,02% of gDP in 2002 to 0,1,% 
in 2005 (see table 1), percentage that has increasingly grown in the 
last four years.
the expansion was, in great part, sustained by the results of 
the early impact evaluation carried out in 2003, which demons-
trated that the programme had positive effects on the health 
and nutritional levels of children under 5 years old and on the 
school attendance of children between 12 and 17 years old in rural 
households (DaPr/fIP/DnP, 2006). this evaluation also led the 
government to elevate fa into a fundamental component of the 
social agenda of the National Development Plan 2006-2010, (DnP, 
2006), as it constituted the core of the Poverty reduction strategy, 
representing 57% (us$58,000 million) of the total 4 year national 
budget, equal to $228,185 billion Colombian pesos (us$102,000 
million)  (DnP, 2006: 617). since then, uribe’s government has es-
tablished a solid normative, financial and institutional framework 
in order to implement fa, spearhead of the new social policy con-
ception that the Colombian state adopted in 2005, based on the 
world Bank’s Social Risk Management framework (holzmann and 
Jorgensen, 2000).
Table 1
Budget of Families in Action as a Percentage of Colombian GDP (2001-2005)
(In current millions of Colombian Pesos)
Year GDP FA Budget of FA as % of GDP
2001 188,558,786 32,905 0,02
2002 203,451,414 106,799 0,05
2003 228,516,603 281,295 0,12
2004 254,405,241 200,212 0,08
2005 283,847,595 245,272 0,09
Source: Núñez and Cuesta (2006) based on Department of National Statistics (DANE) and DNP.
an important step in this process was the creation in 2005 of Acción 
Social, a centralized presidential agency that was given the task of 
administering resources coming from various national (i.e. social so-
lidarity network) and international sources and implementing social 
programmes at the national level, including fa. In four years, Acción 
Strategies against Poverty
142
Social has grown to become a highly-budgeted4, widely known institu-
tion that is associated by the population with the president. Moreover, 
financially, in 2007 uribe’s government guaranteed further funding 
for fa from the multilateral institutions (us$1.812 million), for its 
2007-2010 expansion phase (arias, 2007: 3) and, in early March 2008, 
president uribe demanded to his staff to double the 2010 target of be-
neficiaries, from 1.5 million families to 3 million families.
Considering the increasing importance fa has acquired in uribe’s so-
cial policy, especially since its second administration in 2006, it is indeed 
useful to ask how it relates to the rest of uribe’s policies and its overall 
economic model. according to the Colombian government (DnP, 2007), 
fa is a central element of the social Protection system that has been de-
signed. on one hand it protects poor households’ consumption levels du-
ring times of crises, keeping poor households from falling way under the 
poverty line. on the other hand, through its nutritional and educational 
conditionalities, fa assures that human capital is created amongst poor 
children so as they can overcome poverty in the long-term.
following Bhagwati (in sarmiento et al., 2005: 4), assessing the effects 
a programme like fa has in poverty reduction is only one side of the coin. 
Poverty reduction must complement direct social policies (health, educa-
tion, dwellings, nutritional supplements, subsidies to consumption) that 
allow improving the quality of life of the poorest sectors of society, with 
indirect channels, which refer to policies geared towards promoting eco-
nomic growth that improves poor households’ living conditions. If the be-
nefits of economic growth concentrate in “not poor population”, then the 
rate of return of growth is negative for the poor. Moreover, if the rate of re-
turn of the poor is not positive enough in a particular growth model, then 
the potential population to be beneficiary of the direct channels would in-
crease. there must be coherence between both direct and indirect policies 
or, to put it in another way, between social and macroeconomic policies, 
in order to have an impact on poverty reduction. a direct policy without 
adequate indirect policies turns out to be an assistentialist mechanism 
without real impact on the structural conditions that determine poverty. 
hence, the need to frame fa within the larger context, in order to deter-
mine to what degree is it really affecting poverty determinants. 
sarmiento et al. (2005), through the Poverty Equivalent Growth 
Rate (Pegr)5, analyzed the extent to which economic growth in 
4 In 2009 acción social budget represented 8.04% of the total national budget avai-
lable that is distributed amongst all state sectors. Defense sector represents 8.16% of 
the total budget (sIgoB, 2009). 
5  Measure proposed by Kakwani, Khandker and son (2004) to establish the 
relationship between the magnitude of growth and the way its benefits are distri-
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Colombia in the 1996-2004 period benefited the poor (pro-poor 
growth). their conclusion was that, in average, economic growth 
in this period did not favour the poor (anti-poor growth) and, con-
trary to what is commonly thought, added that while growth does 
not always benefit  poverty reduction (through the mythical trickle-
down mechanism) it can actually deepen it sometimes (immiseri-
zing growth). “growth can either reduce or generate poverty, depen-
ding on what happens with inequality during the growth process” 
(sarmiento et al., 2005: 6-7; emphasis added). In this way, in order 
for economic growth to have a real effect on poverty reduction, it 
must be accompanied by redistributive policies; hence, an increase 
in per capita gDP is not sufficient in poverty reduction, the same 
way subsidies such as fa are not enough. what is needed, above all, 
are “strategies oriented towards improving access to assets such as 
land, capital, credit and education and policies directed, for exam-
ple, towards making more equal the tributary system” (sarmiento 
et al., 2005: 19)
having this in mind, we should answer whether uribe’s govern-
ment has designed and executed indirect policies geared towards the 
poor or not; depending on this outcome, we may be able to frame 
better fa and to state whether uribe’s social policy affects poverty era-
dication. from the government’s perspective, between 2003 and 2007, 
there was a virtuous cycle –that consisted in generating security that 
turned into confidence and, in turn, into higher foreign investment 
and economic growth, that led to an increase in household’s income 
and, thus, to a reduction of poverty and incidence (DnP, 2007)– which 
had a positive impact on poverty reduction. from this point of view, 
fa served as an important direct policy that complemented and su-
pported other government’s actions, thus being an effective poverty 
reduction strategy.  
from another perspective, however, and having recent eviden-
ce that signals the slowing down of such growth, it is possible to ar-
gue the contrary. Between 2003 and 2007, the Colombian economy 
had its greatest economic growth in the last forty years, growing 
in average at a rate of 5,88% and reaching outstanding rates in 
2006 (6,9%) and 2007 (7,5%), as it is shown in figure 2 (CePaL, 
2009). however, poverty reduction during this same period was not 
as outstanding.
buted amongst poor and not poor. see Kakwani, nanak; Khandker, shahid and 
son, hyun 2004 “Pro-Poor growth: Concepts and Measurement with Country 
Case studies”, in International Poverty Center Working Papers (Brasilia: unDP), 
n° 1.
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Between 2002 and 2009, as it is shown in figure 3, poverty6 decrea-
sed 8.2%, passing from 53.7% to 45.0%; rural poverty decreased 
5.0%, from 69.3% to 64.3%. nonetheless, for that same period, in-
digence, or extreme poverty, only decreased 3.3%, from 19.7% to 
16.4%. 
hence, the poverty reduction gains that may have taken place 
during the expansive cycle (2003-2007) were not enough. accor-
ding to government’s estimates (DnP, 2009), social programmes 
that, like fa, provide monetary subsidies, have a positive impact 
in the conditions of poor and extreme poor population, achieving 
a 1.5% decrease in extreme poverty. nonetheless, this impact does 
not compensate the losses in poverty reduction caused by indirect 
policies that were anti-poor. as Vilas (1997) puts it, social policy 
plays as a last-resort mechanism after the economic policies have 
already done the damage.
6 the national poverty line in 2009 was estimated in $281,384 Colombian pesos, 
equal to us$140.5. the national extreme poverty line in 2009 was estimated on 
$120,588 Colombian pesos per month, approximately us$60. 
Figure 2
GDP % Variation in Colombia (2000-2010)
Source: Own estimates based on DANE 2010.  Estimate of 2010 is based on the data of the first trimester.
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the gini coefficient, which measures inequality levels in Colombian 
society, illustrates that the recent growth it did not translate into a 
significant improvement in income distribution; in fact, in 2009, the 
gini only decreased 1 unit in relation to 2002, passing from 0.59 to 
0.58 and, compared with 1991, it augmented the historical levels of 
income concentration, as it is shown in figure 4. Moreover, land con-
centration augmented in the last 10 years, since the country expe-
rienced the most significant counter land reform in its history, being 
around 5.5 million hectares of land (out of the 14.3 million available 
for agriculture) violently appropriated by armed illegal actors from 
rural settlers and peasants, which caused an internal forced displa-
cement of between 3 and 4.5 million (Comisión de seguimiento a la 
Política Pública sobre Desplazamiento forzado in Área de Memoria 
histórica, Comisión nacional de reparación y reconciliación, 2009: 
23). agricultural policies such as the Program Agro Ingreso Seguro, 
initially designed to decrease rural inequalities, ended up funding lar-
ge agro-industrial projects (i.e. palm oil) and traditional landowners 
(revista Cambio, 2009), further deepening the gap between rich and 
poor in rural areas and leaving small producers with even less oppor-
tunities to generate income and lessen the gap. 
Figure 3
Poverty and Indigence in Colombia (1991-2009)
Source: Own estimates based on DANE, Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for the periods 1991-2000, 2002-2005 (I semester.). 
There is no data available for the years 2006 and 2007, as these were the transition years between the ECH and the Gran Encuesta 
Integrada de Hogares (GEIH), an improved version of the national household survey. In September 2010, DANE published the poverty 
indicators for 2008 and 2009, based on the new methodology of the GEIH 2006.
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Both phenomena, the lack of significant impact of growth on poverty 
reduction and income distribution inequality are strongly related with 
the structure of the labour market in the country. as it is shown in 
figure 5, despite the economic growth, unemployment stayed above 
11% and increased between 2008 and 2009, reaching 12.6%. In addi-
tion, informality levels stayed over 55%, evidencing the lack of formal 
job creations. as the growth model was not able to create the con-
ditions (indirect policies) for the population to adequately enter the 
labour market, the government turned to subsidies, to compensate for 
the households’ lack of sufficient income.  
the current growth model, lacking redistributive and adequate 
employment policies, as it is based on the concentration of capital 
assets, overtly contradicts fa objective of poverty eradication. the 
Colombian government has not been neutral and has actually been 
a strong supporter of capital accumulation, for example, subsidizing 
big businesses and promoting privatization processes (Libreros and 
sarmiento, 2007). Contrary to the government’s arguments, its social 
policy does not really seek to modify structural social inequalities in 
Figure 4
Gini Coefficient in Colombia (1991-2009)
Source: For 1991, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENH), December. For 1992-2000, ENH, September. For 2001-2005, Encuesta 
Continua de Hogares (ECH), third trimester. For 2008 and 2009, the recent data provided by DANE in 2010, based on the GEIH.
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Colombia, but to mitigate the effects of the neoliberal accumulation 
strategy and thus to politically justify it.
Political Effects of Families in Action
some authors (Laurell, 1994; Dresser, 1994; soederberg, 2001) have 
argued that Pronasol, a social programme implemented in Mexico in 
1988 that preceded CCtP, played important political effect providing 
legitimacy to salinas de gortari administration (1988-1994). regar-
ding Familias in Action I argue that such intervention has produced 
significant effects within the Colombian political sphere that are wor-
th examining. the hypothesis I propose is that, as a mechanism of 
the State’s apparatus, fa produces “unexpected”7 or implicit political 
7  In his study on Lesotho’s development apparatus, James ferguson (1990: 251-277) 
uses foucault’s argument regarding the “instrumental-effects” of political technologies 
such as the prison. ferguson’s main argument is that, even though rural development 
projects in Lesotho promoted by the state and multilateral organizations failed, the 
collateral or instrumental effects of these projects had long term consequences for 
the communities involved in them. the same way that foucault’s prison, which fails 
respect its explicit objective of reforming the criminal but is successful in producing 
a normalized and disciplined society, development apparatus shows a significant pro-
ductivity: not only does it contributes to the state’s control of the population but it also 
depoliticizes the problems of poverty it sought to resolve in the first place. 
Figure 5
Unemployment and Informality in Colombia (2001-2009)
Source: Own construction based on DANE. Annual unemployment data obtained for July, and annual informality for April-June. As the 
informality data for 2009 is not available yet, it was assumed that the same as in 2008. 
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effects that contribute to strengthen uribe’s regime, which in turn is 
inextricably linked and instrumental to the neoliberal accumulation 
strategy. these political effects explain, more than any other reasons, 
the continuity and expansion of such programme. 
the political effects of fa may be disaggregated into three types 
of effects, having each one of them a specific purpose and operational 
mechanism: (i) ideological effects, (ii) institutional effects and (iii) so-
ciological effects. the ideological effects of fa not only refer to ideas 
and symbolic representations but also to material practices that the 
programme carries out in order to inculcate and reproduce the poli-
tical domination of uribe’s regime. the institutional effects, in turn, 
have to do with the institutional arrangements and the state’s orga-
nizing that this programme has generated in order to strengthen and 
sustain uribe’s regime within the state’s apparatus itself. finally, the 
sociological effects have to do with fa’s discourses and concrete stra-
tegies specifically geared towards the population, in order to modify 
the state-society relation in favour of uribe’s political regime. table 2 
summarizes these effects which will be examined in what follows.
Ideological Effects
fa has improved school assistance and children’s health and nutrition 
in poor households, a result that is far from being undesirable or un-
Table 2
Political Effects of Families in Action for Álvaro Uribe’s Government 
Type of effect Purpose Operational Mechanism
Ideological  • To sustain the continuity of structural reforms 
(i.e. labour, health and pension systems) and the 
dismantlement of social rights 
 • To demonstrate that the government has a “social 
face” beyond its economic commitment with 
national and transnational capitalistic interests.
 • Provision of the subsidy to extreme 
poor.
 • Extension of the programme for 
an undefined period and to large 
urban areas. 
Institutional  • To guarantee the Executive’s hegemony within the 
State’s apparatus.
 • Execution of Presidency’s resources 
obtained from social public 
expenditure’s centralization. 
Sociological  • To strengthen the support towards Uribe’s 
political project in the regions and in popular 
neighbourhoods of main urban areas.
 • To bring the population closer to the president’s 
figure. 
 • Creation of clientelistic networks, 
first, in rural areas and then in large 
urban areas.
 • Handing out of the subsidies during 
Community Councils led by the 
president.
Source: Author’s construction.
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necessary in a country like Colombia, still with relatively low social 
development indicators. what is problematic is that this programme 
has taken place at the same time that uribe’s regime has deepened the 
neoliberal structural reforms that bring down the conception of social 
rights expressed in the 1991 Constitution. thus, even though it has 
no real interest in protecting such rights, uribe’s regime, through the 
provision of subsidies to poor households via Families in Action, has 
been able to acquire a “social face”. this is what I call the ideological 
effect of fa.
In the last two decades Colombia has adopted a neoliberal order, 
characterized by a state that is geared towards national and transna-
tional capital interests (estrada, 2006). uribe’s administration, with 
the purpose of consolidating this order, has rigorously applied the 
points outlined in the International Monetary fund (IMf) standby 
agreement (2002). therefore, labour flexibilisation, for example, a re-
quirement posed in the agreement’s document8, translated into the 
labour reform (Law 789 of 2002)9 (estrada, 2006: 268-269). while it is 
true that with this reform there was a relative increase in employment 
levels between 2002 and 2005, this increase took place in detriment 
of labour’s quality: in 2005 there was a smaller utilization of labour 
force, an increase of sub-employment and an increase of part-time 
labour (farné, granados and Vergara, 2006). Moreover, with recent 
data, the evidences of the effects of the labour reform are quite pre-
carious, as unemployment levels have increased again. Between 2002 
and 2008, 2.4 million of jobs were created, when the economy needed 
to create 4.7 million of jobs: 2.4 million for the population entering 
the labour market (300,000 per year) and 2.5 for the unemployed po-
pulation (Bonilla, 2009).
along the same lines, two other issues that have been furthered 
reformed according to neoliberal precepts, are the health and pen-
sion systems. In 2002, the pension reform was approved (Law 797 of 
2002)10 and in 2007 the final phase of the public social security was ini-
tiated. the dismantlement of universal social protection, in detriment 
8 the agreement document established that “this reform should reduce labour 
costs through the extension of working hours and the reduction of extra hours’ pay-
ments and lay-off compensations” (fMI/Ministerio de hacienda, 2002: 14).  
9 this reform was based on the need to generate jobs and dynamism in the eco-
nomy in a context of post-crisis. In order to reach its goal, it promoted, amongst 
other actions, extending the daily shift and reducing the additional payment for wee-
kends and holidays.
10 Conceived as part of the “fiscal adjustment”, this law introduced an increase in 
the number of weeks that a person needs to contribute and an increase in the mon-
thly payment.
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of the conception of social rights, has occurred parallel to the so-ca-
lled “fight against poverty” characterized by its targeted interventions, 
such as fa, in the poorest sectors of society. Between 2002 and 2008, 
fa exponentially increased its beneficiary households from 350,781 to 
2,441,870, as it was shown in figure 1. the lack of job creation and 
the worsening of social benefits (health, pension) was compensated 
with transfers to lower income families who, it may well be the case, 
were furthered impoverished after the labour, health and pension re-
forms. to what extent then, fa’s subsidies have influenced the percep-
tion lower income households have of uribe’s government? obtaining 
a concrete answer to this question would require having data from the 
households with statistical significance. nonetheless, it is not at all 
implausible stating that, while it was planned with specific objectives 
and intentions11, fa’s poverty discourse and concrete practice –miti-
gation of poor household’s misery– have produced a “non-planned” 
effect: absolving uribe’s political regime from any responsibility of the 
economic reforms’ negative impacts in lower income households. the 
results of 2010 legislative and presidential elections, in which uribe’s 
candidates won with a substantial margin and reiterated that uribe’s 
project is the first political force in the country, may shed a light into 
such ideological effects. In this way, fa, adopting ferguson’s term 
(1994), acts as an “anti-politics machine”; it “incidentally” depoliticizes 
the poverty question, converting it into an urgent social problem that 
must be resolved through governmental action (conditioned grants), 
even though it is caused and reproduced by the political regime that 
claims to eradicate it (Lo Vuolo et al., 1999). 
In its expansive phase, fa –going against its original design which 
established a maximum duration of three years– does not have an-
ymore a temporal limit12. Changing its objective, from being a short-
term programme aimed at counterbalancing the effects of the econo-
mic crisis in lower income families to being a programme aimed at 
protecting and promoting human capital in lower income families, 
fa has been able to extend in time. this extension however has not 
been completely based on technical criteria and it is possible to argue 
that is has also obeyed to political reasoning. In 2007 the expansion 
11  for ferguson (1994), the most important effects of a social intervention may be 
the ones that were not planned beforehand, those that were not even in the minds of 
the planners. this applies perfectly for the case of families in action.
12  according to núñez and Cuesta (2006: 269), “initially a household could benefit 
from fa for a maximum of three years [ ] however, the continuity given to the pro-
gramme has made that today there are families that have been involved in it for even 
five years. Currently, there is no limit to the grants received”.
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of fa into large urban areas took place; the exponential increase in 
total beneficiaries was in partly due to this jump into the cities. what 
calls the attention is that this ‘urban phase’ of the programme did 
not consider the impact evaluation’s recommendations, which stated 
that the programme should target only rural households (DaPr/fIP/
DnP, 2006: 159-160). from a political perspective then, an alternative 
understanding of this expansion could be that, as the hegemony cons-
truction role fa was playing in the rural areas had reached its limit it 
moved into larger urban areas.
the anti-politics machine of fa also works at another level. Based 
on the technical discourses of multilateral organizations, this progra-
mme has promoted a “culture” of social interventions in which the 
targeting on the poor principle has replaced the formalization of labour 
principle in the social policy’s formulation process (giraldo, 2007a: 
242). this has led to a concrete ideological effect: the judgment of 
the government’s results in terms of social indicators is centred now 
in poverty issues (coverage, attendance capacity) and not anymore in 
labour’s quality or social security’s universality, both obstacles of the 
neoliberal accumulation strategy (Lo Vuolo, 1999). In this strategy, 
workers’ salaries and social benefits are not anymore an investment 
but rather expensive administrative costs and unproductive expendi-
tures that affect companies’ competitiveness. the new labour discour-
se promotes “entrepreneurship” and flexibilisation, on one hand, and 
public assistance (cash transfers), on the other, for those that have 
still not been able to insert themselves in the labour market (giral-
do, 2007b). now, besides this ideological support, the uribe’s regime 
requires as well strengthening the executive power. fa has also been 
very effective in this task, especially due to the institutional and social 
effects it has produced.
Institutional and Social Effects
one of the main requirements for the maintenance and consolida-
tion of uribe’s political project is the obtainment of hegemony within 
the state’s apparatus. far from being homogenous, these apparatus is 
conformed by multiple sectors, branches, institutions, functionaries, 
each one of them with particular interests and needs. the hegemony 
of one of these apparatus’ fractions depends then on its capacity to 
mobilize and obtain political support.
since the start of his administration, uribe has sought to obtain 
state’s hegemony through the strengthening of the executive power. 
for Moncayo (2004: 352), uribe’s political regime has given an exacer-
bated supremacy to the presidential institution, almost to the point of 
reaching a personal exercise of power, “without any dissent or alter-
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natives from other branches or institutions of the public sphere”. this 
has been possible due to the massive citizen’s support uribe received 
since he was elected in 2002 (with 53.2% of the votes) and to its ca-
pacity to align Congress’ majority around his political project. none-
theless, it is worth mentioning that this political support has been re-
cently questioned on the grounds that it was influenced or even forced 
by paramilitaries’ violent actions (i.e. romero and López, 2008).
In order to be politically legitimate, the executive’s construction 
of hegemony over other branches of the state’s apparatus has been 
sustained in arguments referring to the “common interest” or “collec-
tive will”. amongst the diverse mechanisms the executive has used to 
provide itself with further power13, the reform to the territorial trans-
fers has definitely been one of the most subtle and effective ones. the 
Central government achieved taking away resources constitutionally 
assigned to regional and local governments translating them to the 
executive power14. one of the arguments exposed to justify this re-
centralization of social public expenditure was that fa’s expansion re-
quired further resources in order to reach more people. In this way, 
uribe’s regime was able in 2006 to further reduce regional and local 
government’s resources, a tendency that had began in 2001, and that 
according to rodríguez (2007: 145) represents a loss of more than 
52,2 billion pesos (of 2006) (around us$23,000 million), for the pe-
riod 2008-2019, in their income. figure 6 shows how the resources 
(as a percentage of gDP) of decentralized entities significant decrea-
se with the approval of the Legislative act of 2001, further deepened 
with uribe’s government, going against what had been established in 
Law 60, 1993 in terms of the percentages that these entities should 
receive for their own social investment (health, education and sanita-
tion). an explanation to such modification is that the executive was 
in need of a mechanism that allowed it to exercise political power in 
the regions. after the process of decentralization that took place in the 
nineties, Colombia’s central government, alike other Latin american 
countries, entered into political deficit: besides its taxing and repres-
13  since uribe was reelected in 2006, the executive power has been able to co-opt 
the different branches of the state’s apparatus. In one way or another, uribe has been 
able to politically influence the Constitutional Court, the superior Council of Judi-
cature, the Central Bank, the office of the attorney general, the national television 
Commission, the treasury Inspector’s office, the supreme Court of Justice and the 
Procurement’s office.
14  the 1991 Constitution sought to strengthen political, fiscal and administrative 
decentralization through assigning to the regions a fixed percentage of the nation’s 
Income which should be spent in health, education and sanitary services, according 
to the local priorities and citizen’s participation.
153
Andrés García Trujillo
sive functions, the executive remained without legitimating functions 
that would allow it obtaining support. recuperating political power 
has meant then recentralizing social public expenditure via a cut of 
territorial transfers and spending these resources in cash transfers in 
the name of the President.
this concentration of resources in the executive power has had, in 
turn, the purpose of “providing cohesion to the political fractions 
agglutinated under uribe’s regime” (rodríguez, 2007: 146-147). no-
netheless, it is not legitimate presenting it this way. that is why since 
the national Development Plan 2006, the government stated the need 
of reforming the territorial transfers in order to achieve its poverty 
reduction goals (DnP, 2006). Despite the problems territorial entities 
have had managing these transfers; these are also used for social ser-
vices. thus, it is not that without the recentralization there will not 
be resources for poverty reduction strategies; what is really affected 
without it is the central government’s capacity to directly spend re-
sources in the regions and obtaining political credits from it. fa is 
the perfect receptor of these resources: opposing such a reform would 
Figure 6
Transferences from the Central Government to Decentralized Entities as percent of GDP in Colombia (2001-2006)
Source: Rodríguez (2007).
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mean going against a programme that seeks to eradicate poverty. fa, 
hence, displays a concrete institutional effect: justifying the concen-
tration of public resources in the executive power.
according to Yepes (2007: 5), the reduction of the transfers has 
meant that, at least, $5 billion (us$2,200 million) are taken away from 
the local and regional governments and transferred to Acción Social’s 
budget, specifically to fa. these numbers are bigger now as with the 
doubling of fa’s target –from 1,5 million families to 3 million fami-
lies– the programme’s 2006-2010 budget increased from $1,84 billion 
(us$813 million) to $3,55 billion pesos (us$1,559 million) (el tiem-
po, 2008). this means that the executive will need to subtract the-
se resources from somewhere else. only in 2008, fa’s expenses were 
around 1 billion pesos, which indicates that that the concentration of 
resources in the central government has no return.
with the social investment resources in its hands, uribe’s regime 
counts with the material means to consolidate its political hegemony 
within the population. fa’s grants modify the state-citizen relation, 
defining social public expenditure not anymore in terms of state’s 
duty (and citizens’ right) but in terms of a president’s favour. these 
grants thus generate certain political effects of a social character rela-
ted with the increased support towards the government in rural areas 
and popular urban neighbourhoods, bringing the population closer to 
the president’s figure and demobilizing popular and grassroots critical 
social processes.
In the first place, fa reproduces the typical deformations of an 
assistentialist scheme, such as clientelism and a return to charity. as-
sistentialist mechanisms such as fa may be interpreted “as favours 
through which a system of recommendations is produced and a body 
of intermediates is generated” (giraldo, 2007a: 210). some studies 
(rodríguez, 2007: 371-372) have already evidenced how sIsBen –the 
system that is in charge of reporting fa’s beneficiaries– has taken pla-
ce accompanied of political favours that have nothing to do with the 
technical character this programme argues it has. 
fa’s assistentialism has become one of the new ways of creating 
clientelistic networks. for many authors, these clientelistic relations 
were useful for the 2010 legislative and presidential elections (gavi-
ria, 2008; López, 2008; revista Cambio, 2008). the growing expan-
sion of fa, hence, does not stems out from technical parameters but 
from mere electoral ones: “three million families represent at least 
six million votes in the presidential elections” (gaviria, 2008). three 
million families that, summed up, equal to around 20% of Colombia’s 
population. fa has become then a populist mechanism of the gover-
nment that has inevitable effects in the political scenario. the televi-
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sion commercial that the Presidency used in the political campaign of 
2006 perfectly illustrates the political benefits of this programme: “go 
ahead, Mr. President”, in such a way one of the beneficiaries of fa’s 
subsidies expressed his support to uribe’s ideas and actions (giraldo, 
2007b: 9). 
Moreover, global exchange (2010) recently examined the results 
of legislative elections evidencing how the exponential increase of fa’s 
beneficiaries in certain regions between 2006 and 2010 is closely rela-
ted to the exponential increase uribe’s candidates had in the votes ob-
tained. one of the cases this study provides to illustrate the coinciden-
ce between fa’s beneficiaries growth and electoral growth is the one 
of senator Piedad zuccardi, elected senator of Bolívar department, for 
the u Party, one of the political parties that supports uribe’s political 
project. according to the study, in 2010 zuccardi obtained 13,692 vo-
tes in five municipalities of this department, while in 2006 she had 
only obtained 4,716 votes. During this same period, the number of 
households registered in fa in these municipalities increased from 
6,153 to 21,702. In these municipalities, judicial authorities have re-
ceived claims regarding how this senator has influenced the inclusion 
or exclusion of families from the programme. 
It may also be argued that fa has contributed to strengthen one 
of the characteristics of uribe’s political regime, that is, the deins-
titutionalization of the state for his own benefit. through fa and 
other mechanisms like the Community Councils, has achieved that 
the relation of the people with the state is equal to the personal rela-
tion between the president and the population. the subsidies, despite 
being sustained by an institutional framework, are, ultimately, deter-
mined by the president’s willingness, by his “care” for the poor, as it 
was evidenced in a Community Council where the president sponta-
neously demanded duplicating the number of families involved with 
the programme15.
Being subject to uribe’s discretionarily, and not to a state’s policy 
that responds to the conception of state’s obligatoriness, fa’s subsidies 
leave aside the fact that social protection is a right and turns it into a 
favour. fa replaces the figure of the citizen subject of rights with the 
one of beneficiary target of focalized grants. thus, the element of de-
mand that is constitutive to rights is replaced by one of thankfulness, 
generated by the provision of the subsidy. for Yepes (2007: 7), “while 
15  In that occasion, uribe declared, “we have to make all the effort to have 3 million 
families in Families in Action. to the bandits: stick and to the poor, care. this is the 
only way we can progress in this country”. (secretaría de Prensa. Presidencia de la 
república, 2008; author’s translation).
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the poor remain poor, they will keep returning with gratitude what 
the ruler provides as favours”. the predictions regarding the electoral 
platform that the current political regime is currently constructing 
through fa are then not at all unsound.
fa not only allows strengthening the figure of president uribe 
within the population, but may also operate as a social control me-
chanism, preventing that critical poverty transforms into threaten to 
governance. subsidies, then, generate “grateful poor”, weakening cri-
tical popular social processes (giraldo 2007a). according to Lo Vuolo 
et al. (1999: 12), poverty reduction policies, “do not seek overcoming 
the problem, but only to circumscribe it to a limited social space and 
codify it in such a way that the margins of social tolerance are ex-
tended in order to impede the alteration of the “healthy” fraction of 
society”. In periods of social tension, subsidies usually increase so as 
to weaken opposition.
Conclusions
this article has explored one of the seminar’s questions regarding the 
intentional and unintentional consequences of standardized policies 
and interventions from the north, as it has analyzed the way in which 
the Colombian Conditional Cash transfers Program Families in Action, 
beyond its explicit objectives of poverty reduction, provides political 
effects that legitimize the current government. It has put forward the 
idea of transcending the ways in which CCtP have been traditionally 
analyzed, arguing the importance of examining these programmes in 
the light of the wider macroeconomic context and the political effects 
they produce. 
even though the social conditions of Colombian vulnerable sec-
tors have deteriorated since uribe’s regime came into power and the 
growth model has actually not favoured the poor, fa has contributed 
with uribe’s sustained popularity within the lower-middle classes in ur-
ban and rural areas. the subsidies have acted as palliatives in a context 
of furthering impoverishment and social insecurity, growing informali-
ty and labour flexibilisation. Moreover, they have justified social public 
expenditure’s recentralization, so as to the executive power gain back 
the political power it had lost during the decentralization process. and, 
finally, it has effectively modified the state-citizenship relations.
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2.2. Ownership Question and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy 
in Nigeria
What Has Gone Wrong?
Abstract
ownership of policies is premised on the capacity of interest groups 
and individuals to be more effective by forming a critical mass that 
aggregates and articulates public policies. the essence is that owner-
ship of policy provides an enabling environment for both government 
and citizens to accept or reject or modify pro-poor policy. this pa-
per hinges on this and argues that national Poverty eradiation Pro-
gramme (naPeP) of nigerian state failed to reduce poverty because 
it lacks ownership of the citizens. It adds that this has exacerbated 
the pouncing of abject poverty on nigerian citizens. to this end, this 
paper adopts the ‘common agency theory’ as framework of analysis 
through which the origin of vision, participating stakeholders and un-
derstanding of the pro-poor strategy is examined  to determine the 
“ownership” standing of naPeP. the finding reveals that the scope 
and content of nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy is comprehensive. 
however, what has gone wrong is lack of adequate consultation, ho-
me-grown ideas and low level understanding from the citizens. It also 
notes that, resulting from this, it was hastily accepted and launched 
by nigeria government in a bid to attract fund from world Bank. this 
 * Department of Political science, ebonyi state university.
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affected the implementation and eradication of abject poverty given 
that its origin is externally based and driven by International finan-
cing Institutions (IfI) without input from target beneficiaries, civil 
society organisations, organized private sector. above all the entire 
process lacks the commitment political/public officials. this therefore 
accounts for unending increase in the number of people living in po-
verty. the study concludes that naPeP by virtue of the exclusion of 
non-state actors in the various policy making structure alienates the 
citizens from making inputs towards the governance of the pro-poor 
programme. as such recommends strategies that can enhance owner-
ship in naPeP.
Introduction
Poverty is a perennial issue, which has always been important in 
social policy and in international development debates. It is condi-
tions in which people lack the opportunities to develop capabilities 
required to live a basic human life and are excluded from society and 
development process. In addition, poverty is lack of certain capacity 
such as being able to participate with dignity in societal endeavour 
(aluko, 1975; sen, 1987).given this, poverty creates a circumstance 
of inability in attaining a minimum standard of living that give rise to 
insufficient food, clothing and shelter. also associated with poverty, is 
low levels of; life expectancy, education and access to health care and 
high infant mortality. to this end, poverty is a state of hopelessness 
whereby an individual lives a life worth below us$ 1 a day, cannot ac-
cess basic human needs required for survival, voiceless and powerless 
resulting from lack of ability to participate in public decisions that 
could improve his standard of living.
In nigeria, the prevalence of poverty is disturbing  and  wides-
pread despite efforts and resources committed in the fight against 
poverty  for the past two decades amid plenty of resources; oil, so-
lid mineral resources, agricultural resources and human resources. 
nevertheless, nigerian state has remained challenged by protracted 
military regimes, ineffective governance, weak public institutions 
and widespread corruption thereby contributing to widening the ho-
rizon of abject poverty. to this effect, the post –military government 
streamlined and rationalized function of core poverty alleviation ins-
titutions and agencies. for example, the nigerian agricultural and 
Cooperative Bank (naCB) the People’s Bank of nigeria (PBn) and the 
family economic advancement Programme (feaP) were merged to 
form the nigerian agricultural Cooperative and rural Development 
Bank (naCrDB).the government later in 1999 launched poverty 
alleviation programme(PaP) which was later reorganised and named 
163
Eugene Ndubuisi Nweke
national Poverty eradication Programme (naPeP) in 2001 following 
the adoption of world Bank designed Poverty reduction strategy Pa-
pers (PrsP).
although these programs exist, statistics on human development 
and social provision reveal that abject poverty has continued to poun-
ce on nigerian citizens. this is argued to be the result of disconnect 
of the people from the pro-poor policy. therefore there is need to in-
tegrate the citizens into pro-poor policy process if poverty reduction 
strategies are to be implemented successfully with desired impact of 
leveraging hardcore poor from poverty.  to this end, this paper is the-
refore compelled to critically appraise the policy process of naPeP 
to determine its “ownership” standing. the essence is that owners-
hip of policy provides an enabling environment for both government 
and citizens to accept reject or modify pro-poor policy. further more, 
it is  “premised on the belief based on three decades of experien-
ce that unless countries assume responsibility for their own destiny 
and commit themselves to transform the lives of their most depri-
ved citizen, no policy reform or economic transformation is feasible 
and no donor can impose this on a country however weak they may 
be”(sobhan, 2003: 6).
against this background, the section two of this paper discusses 
the concept of ownership and its framework of analysis. the third 
section uses national Poverty eradication Programme (naPeP) as a 
case study to explore policy ownership in relation to formulation and 
implementation of pro-poor strategy at the three levels of government 
in nigeria. whereas the fourth section examines how the involvement 
of international financial Institutions (IfI) in the design of poverty 
reduction strategy has affected the dwindling   poverty profile of ni-
gerian state, the paper concludes by suggesting  alternative strategies 
that could address the challenges of increasing  poverty amid interna-
tional assistance in nigeria.
The concept of Ownership and framework of analysis 
ownership is an indefinite concept in development policy. It is percei-
ved and interpreted differently by people and institutions. however, 
ownership in whichever perspective is a relation among stake hol-
ders in development, particularly their respective capacity, power or 
influence to set and take responsibility for a development agenda, and 
to muster and sustain support for policy or otherwise. nkombo (2008: 
1) identifies such stakeholders to include; governments of developing 
counties, communities and organization in those countries, outside 
the government: donors or multilateral development agencies and 
financial institutions”. this confirms the variety of perceptions and 
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explanations associated with ownership that dissolve into different 
aspects such as control and stakeholders’ interest. 
accordingly, Johnson and wasty (1993: 2) further describe ownership 
using a four dimensional variables; “locus of initiative; namely, who 
had the initiative in formulating and implementing the programme, 
the degree of collaboration in working out the programme, and whe-
ther or not the funding for the programme was extended despite cer-
tain reservations of the authorities (disagreements and reluctance to 
implement some aspects of the programme). the second dimension 
is the level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers namely, 
the degree to which there was consensus among policymakers on the 
nature and causes of the problem, the choices open for its resolution, 
and the approach to be taken. the third dimension is the expression 
of political will by top leadership: as reflected, for example, in up-
front actions and public statements. the fourth dimension comprises 
efforts toward consensus-building among constituencies, for instance, 
by eliciting broad participation in the programme design and in laun-
ching a broad-based public campaign to elicit support for the progra-
mme outside the central government”. all these combine to achieve 
national ownership which Klick et al. (1998: 87) describe as “when the 
political leadership and its advisers, with broad support among agen-
cies of state and civil society, decide of their own volition that policy 
changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when 
they should be introduced, and where these changes become built into 
parameters of policy and administration which are generally accepted 
as desirable”.
In a similar view, omotunde, (2005: 3) notes that this form of 
ownership include the “(i) the right of the country representatives to 
be heard in the process of diagnosis and programme design, (ii) the 
freedom and ability of the country to choose the programme to be 
implemented, without coercion, than about (iii) who designs the pro-
gramme”. from the  perspective of the Paris Declaration on aid effec-
tiveness, signed in March 2005, ownership is described  as “develo-
ping countries’ exercising effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies and coordinating development actions, that 
strengthen the impact of their common efforts on poverty reduction” 
(renzio, et al., 2008: 3).
In the view of International Monetary fund (IMf) ownership is 
a “willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of po-
licies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility 
to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding 
that the programme is achievable and is in the country’s own interest 
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(world Bank/IMf, 2001c: 3).this is the point on which the concept of 
ownership is debated as well as the bane for poverty reduction in ni-
geria. the perspective of IMf advocates in this regard means that, to 
“own” a policy, it is not necessary that government official think up the 
policies themselves or that the policies are independent of conditiona-
lity. this is far from the desired ownership for poverty reduction.
Theoretical background 
Consequent upon the arrays of definitions, policy ownership is exa-
mined from the perspective of conceptualizing or understanding a vi-
sion both by policy planners, implementers and beneficiaries. In this 
respect the common agency which is also known as multi-principal 
games is adopted as an explanatory framework of analysis. this theo-
retical framework is derived from two models, the theory of veto pla-
yers within government and theory of special interest group (sIg). 
the theory of veto player was developed by george tsebelis (2001a). 
It likens decision in policy making process of various political organi-
zations as veto players within a domestic government and notes that 
there are different principals who must agree on a given policy or 
policies based on their interests. on the other hand, special interest 
group theory (sIg) is developed by wolfgang Mayer and alex Mour-
moras (2002).the special Interest group (sIg) refers to those whose 
interests are separated from those of the people at large and use their 
power to influence government policy choices.
these circumstances occur very often in political processes in 
which all shades of individuals conceive government as an agent that 
must be lobbied in order to contribute to policy making.  In the light of 
this, grossman and helpman (1994: 834) notes that “Common agency 
is the name given to a multilateral relationship where several princi-
pals simultaneously try to influence the actions of an agent”. 
essentially “common agency theory” as applied to explain policy 
ownership in relation to challenge of poverty reduction strategies in 
nigeria suggests that state policymakers and external organization as 
IMf should build national ownership in policy process to avoid weak-
ness that goes with failed policies. It is then expected that multiple ob-
jectives and interests pursued by governments and strong individuals 
should be harmonized as their policy choices reflect the concern of 
diverse constituencies inside and outside of government. this drives 
the argument  that  government  needs to achieve a common agenda 
in the  policy process including  the parliament, regional and local au-
thorities and other constitutionally recognized actors both state and 
non state actors in policy process. other actors and interest groups 
considered relevant should be taken into account in public policy 
Strategies against Poverty
166
process. these actors are international players, active domestic sIg, 
labour, industry, professional bodies and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Considering this, Boughton and Mournouras (2002: 7) note that 
the outcome of common agency model where applied, is “the need to 
achieve equilibrium of a non-cooperative game”. however where the 
state is captured by sIg be it IfI or domestic, the policies of such state 
mostly do not achieve the policy desire that make positive impact on 
the generality of the citizens.
It against this premise, that policy ownership is associated with 
different perspectives and explanations but united primarily in the 
context of common belief that the state through the government, acts 
on behalf of the country as a whole. In the same vein the non-state-ac-
tors with their multiple parties and heterogeneous interests influence 
the outcome of the policy thereby exercising their ownership rights in 
public policy process. hence external or international bodies such as 
IMf are expected to buy into the harmonized interest of government 
to realize national ownership of pro-poor policy. the import of this 
reflects concern on explaining how external agencies sway the state 
authorities to embrace their version of policy reform.
furthermore, while this framework takes for granted that gover-
nment must lead the process of building ownership, it must however 
consult a broad group of stakeholders from among political parties, 
ngo, community organizations, media, academia, etc in order to 
foster true ownership. In addition true (national) ownership entails 
having sufficient political support within a country to implement its 
developmental strategy, including the projects, programs, and policies 
for which external partners provide assistance. It equally requires that 
government achieves sufficient support for the strategy among stake-
holders within and outside of the government. this likely includes line 
ministries, parliament, sub-national governments, civil society orga-
nizations, and private sector groups.
national ownership therefore extends beyond the government: 
it requires the active participation of non-state stakeholders. Parti-
cipation by actors outside national governments functions as an end 
in itself by promoting accountability and also greatly improves the 
design and effectiveness of development interventions. reflecting on 
this assertion, justifies the relevance of common agency theory as a 
framework for pro-poor policy process that can shrink the ownership 
gap in the poverty reduction strategy of nigerian state. this theoreti-
cal approach becomes more essential for designing nationally owned 
poverty reduction strategy given that International financial Institu-
tes (IfI) are influencing and dominating nigeria’s policy space with 
strategies from the north. these strategies as argued lack national 
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ownership required to eradicate abject poverty from the citizens who 
ought to steer pro-poor policy process. this argument derives from 
the belief that “policies that originate from society and whose content 
reflects popular assessment, aspirations and needs, are more likely to 
be successfully implemented” (Mukandala, 2006: 3). 
Ownership Analysis of National Poverty
Eradication Programme (NAPEP)
the framework, “common agency theory” appropriately analyzes the 
ownership of naPeP.  essentially, it is necessary to use this framework 
so far explained to establish the origin of naPeP, its vision, consulta-
tive process, conception and understanding both to government and 
beneficiaries at the three levels of nigerian governments.
Origin of NAPEP 
the origin of naPeP is traced to failed pro-poor strategies of various 
governments in nigeria. the ownership analysis of naPeP stems 
from an observable fact that the war against poverty has been a com-
mon denominator of all governments in the history of nigeria, though 
fought in a number of ways. at the first instance, the strategies were 
through ministries/agencies. the efforts in this regard focused on 
agriculture and rural development policies, trade, fiscal and monetary 
policies. as such various policies and programmes were designed to 
bring about economic growth that could reduce poverty, which would 
invariably lead to higher standards of living. the programmes and 
initiatives include operation feed the nation (ofn) of 1979, later 
changed to green revolution and lasted till 1983, Peoples Bank, (PB) 
national agriculture, Cooperative and rural Bank (naCrB), Direc-
torate of food, roads and rural Infrastructure (DfrrI), and Better 
Life/family support Programme (BLP/fsP). also introduced are, the 
family economic advancement Programme (feaP) and national 
Directorate of employment (nDe). More importantly these efforts, 
attention and strategies at addressing poverty challenges in nigeria 
remained superficial and uncoordinated until 1999 when a civilian 
regime was inaugurated.
In a response, to establishing a more comprehensive agency, Po-
verty alleviation Programme (PaP) was established to unify the di-
verse pro–poor strategies. this was an interim measure to address 
the problems of rising unemployment and crime wave, particularly 
among youths. essentially, the primary objectives of PaP are three-
fold: reduce the problem of unemployment and hence raise effective 
demand in the economy; increase the productiveness of the economy; 
and drastically reduce the embarrassing crime wave in the society. 
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specifically the government targets among others: provide jobs for 
200,000 unemployed; create a credit delivery system from which far-
mers would have access to credit facilities; increase the adult literacy 
rate from 51 to 70% by year 2003;shoot up health-care delivery system 
from its present 40 to 70% by year 2003; increase the immunization 
of children from 40 to 100%; raise rural water supply from the pre-
sent 30 to 60% and same for rural electrification; embark on training 
and settlement of at least 60% of tertiary  institutions’ graduates; and 
development of simple processes and small-scale industries” (Central 
Bank of nigeria, 1999: 68).
Being an interim, it was later reorganized and named national 
Poverty eradication Programme (naPeP) in 2001 following the adop-
tion of Poverty reduction strategy Papers (PrsP).Be that as it may, its 
origin like the previous strategies is the vision of the world Bank and 
IMf. It is conceived as a new development paradigm to reduce pover-
ty and improve the effectiveness of development assistance through 
adoption of Poverty reduction strategy Papers (PrsP).the introduc-
tion of the PrsP by the IMf and the world Bank in December 1999 
provided an operational vehicle for its formulation and implementa-
tion at all levels of government.
the naPeP blue print was formulated through a consultative 
process. government official, particularly from 13 ministers whose 
ministries are involved in poverty alleviation participated in the con-
sultative workshop with world Bank and IMf officials for adoption 
of the strategy. the participating ministries in the scheme are those 
of agriculture and rural development, education, works and housing, 
women affairs and youth development, industry, science and techno-
logy, solid minerals development, water resources, health, power and 
steel, employment labour and productivity, environment and finance. 
other participants included the Chief economic adviser to the Pre-
sident, who later became the national Coordinator of naPeP, civil 
society organisations such as non-governmental organisation, com-
munity based organisations, private sector and trade unions. In all, 
obadan (2002: 14) notes that, “only a few of them were selectively 
invited to consultative workshops where they sometimes received only 
limited background information regarding the Poverty reduction 
strategy. also, participatory structures were formed on an ad hoc ba-
sis without clearly established mechanisms for collaboration among 
various stakeholders, governments and donors”.  
the implementation of naPeP is sequel to the approval by the 
federal executive council in 2001. It envisages at first stage, to con-
tain the spread of poverty and mitigate its most acute manifestations. 
It therefore combined employment-intensive growth with human re-
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source development, accompanied by a safety net for the hard-core 
poor. also, it is aimed at strengthening social protection systems for 
vulnerable groups, improving access to education and health services, 
and promoting entrepreneurship for the poor.
the national Poverty eradication Programme is classified into 
four, namely: Youth empowerment scheme (Yes), rural Infrastruc-
ture Development scheme (rIDs), social welfare service scheme 
(sowess) and natural resources Development and Conservation 
scheme (nrDCs).
the Youth empowerment scheme aims at achieving poverty 
reduction among youths through the following strategies; capacity 
acquisition, mandatory attachment, productivity improvement, credit 
delivery, technology development and enterprise promotion. the com-
ponent activities expected to realise the Capacity acquisition Progra-
mme (CaP) include training, apprenticeship, investment inducement 
seminars, exposing participants to various applications of science and 
technology and adaptation of simple technologies in the exploration 
and exploitation of available resources. the Mandatory attachment 
Programme (MaP) is designed for graduates who have completed 
their mandatory national Youth service but yet to secure full-time em-
ployment even when such graduate has undergone naPeP’s capacity 
building courses in any corporate organization. the attaché receives 
the sum of n10,000 every month. the last in the Youth empowerment 
scheme is the Credit Delivery Programme which aims at providing 
credit facilities to graduates of Yes programme to start their own 
businesses that lead to enterprise promotion.
the second part of the programme is the rural Infrastructure 
Development scheme (rIDs). It aims at provision of potable and irri-
gation water, transport (rural and urban), rural energy and power su-
pport to the rural poor. the main expectation is that these activities 
will guarantee poverty reduction among the extreme and sustainable 
development through; rural electrification, rural water development 
and supply, rural transportation Development and rural Communi-
cation development in nigerian villages.
thirdly is the social welfare service scheme (sowess).this 
component of naPeP deals with special education, primary health-
care services, establishment and maintenance of recreational centres, 
public awareness facilities, youth and student hostel development, en-
vironmental protection facilities, food security provisions, micro and 
macro credits delivery, rural telecommunications facilities, provision 
of mass transit, and maintenance culture. 
the fourth is natural resource Development and Conservation 
scheme (nrDCs).the aim of this strategy is to harness agricultural, 
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water and solid mineral resources, conservation of land and space 
(beaches, reclaimed land, etc.) particularly for the convenient and 
effective utilisation by small-scale operators and the immediate com-
munity. (frn, 2001: 3; aliyu, 2001: 4-5). By this expanded discussion 
on the origin and nature of poverty reduction strategy in nigeria; it is 
significantly shown that the content and scope of naPeP is no doubt 
comprehensive and reflects the multi-dimensional nature of poverty.
In the next section, the usefulness of ownership analysis of pover-
ty reduction strategy is shown to determine how the implementation 
of naPeP has faired in eliminating abject poverty in nigeria. It is 
extended to explain the ownership of vision, its conception and appli-
cation across the three tiers of government. 
Ownership of NAPEP and its Implementation 
achieving implementation reflects concern on ownership of vision. 
this is because as akash (1998: 96) argues “ownership of vision is 
important .If the vision is conceived and imposed by an external for-
ce, then the degree of commitment or the quality of support at home 
is likely to be weak .on the other hand, a domestically owned vision 
generally reflects a higher degree of commitment through a more rea-
listic concentration of the vision”. to this end, we therefore ask, what 
is the relationship between ownership and implementation structure 
of naPeP within the three levels of governments in nigeria? 
taking it from the national level, the naPeP Blueprint (2001) has 
the national Poverty eradication Council (naPeC) as the apex or-
gan for policy formulation, coordination, monitoring and review of 
all poverty eradication activities in the country. the council is chaired 
by the President while the Vice-President is the Vice Chairman. the 
secretary to the government of the federation is the secretary of the 
organ, while 13 ministers whose ministries are involved in poverty 
alleviation activities are members. the participating ministries in the 
scheme are those of agriculture and rural development, education, 
works and housing, women affairs and youth development, industry, 
science and technology, solid minerals development, water resources, 
health, power and steel, employment labour and productivity, environ-
ment and finance. the Chief economic adviser to the President and 
the national Coordinator of naPeP are also members of the council. 
this apex body possesses the entire authority that determines 
the nature and manner in which resources are allocated as well as 
the beneficiaries. Be that as it may, the compositions of this body are 
mostly the members of federal executive council. this composition 
shows that the ownership of the poverty reduction strategy is to great 
extent in hands of government elites and therefore certifies naPeP as 
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a policy product of few government officials (executives) in collabora-
tion with donors (IMf and world Bank) to propagate the adoption of 
strategies from north in poverty reduction. while few executives of 
the federal government remain at the policy centre of poverty reduc-
tion, other state actors such as the parliament or parliamentarians 
that represent(s) the entire citizens are excluded at this important 
aspect poverty reduction policy process. similarly other non-state ac-
tors as labour and civil society organisations are equally debarred 
from making direct input in poverty reduction policy process at the 
national level.
at the regional level (state governments), the ownership status 
of the poverty reduction strategy merely reflects concern on conso-
lidating what is obtainable at national level. the state government is 
expected to facilitate the implementation by existing as a coordinating 
unit headed by state Coordinator. It has its highest decision making 
organ, state Poverty eradication Council (sPeC) with the governor 
as the chairman. Like the national, the members of the sPeC include 
the relevant commissioners responsible for state poverty eradication 
programmes and the state coordinator of naPeP. the body is expec-
ted to submit quarterly report to the naPeC to update naPeC of the 
activities.
at local government base, what exists as the structure for the na-
tional poverty eradication reduction programme is the Local gover-
nment Monitoring Committee. the responsibility of the committee is 
to facilitate effective implementation of naPeP intervention initiati-
ves. while these efforts and structures are put in place, it is observed 
that it is devoid of the essential ownership principles that could drive 
the fight against abject poverty. the local government structure for 
poverty reduction strategy rather does not recognize the observation 
of the naPeP blueprint that the failure of previous pro-poor strategy 
is a function of lack of proper targeting and input of beneficiaries. In 
as much as this is acknowledged, it is not reflected in its formulation 
and implementation.  the naPeP action plan only recognizes execu-
tive state actors at federal and state level and the special interest of the 
IfI to the exclusion of Local government and non-state actors in the 
entire poverty reduction policy process.
this therefore explains that poverty reduction strategy as initia-
ted and implemented in nigeria   disconnects the hard core, those at 
verging of drifting into abject poverty and civil society organisations 
including other non-state actors from taking active part in the entire 
pro-poor policy process. on the other hand, the programme rather re-
flects a design from north that is the interest of world Bank and IMf. 
this design it concerns Poverty reduction strategy Papers (PrsP) is 
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characterised by; financial and trade liberalization, privatization of 
public enterprises, public sector reform and maintenance of current 
account and fiscal balance consistent with lower debt levels. also as-
sociated with this is the heavy involvement of international donor in 
preparing documents and conditionalities in release donor fund. the 
internal sIgs who have captured nigerian state, further contribute 
in alienating the citizens especially the poor from benefiting from the 
available opportunities offered by the pro-poor policy. this they do by 
diverting the opportunities provided by PrsP to their kingsmen and 
allies as political patronage. all these reveal that naPeP rather than 
allowing the national interest to propel in the fight against poverty 
acts the script of the IfI. the implication of these reflects on human 
Poverty Index (hPI) examined in three basic dimensions of human 
development on percentages between 0 and 100%. the human poverty 
index (hPI) of 1999-2007 is shown in table below
taken for granted that the prerequisite for reducing poverty in any 
country is to ensure that the process of poverty reduction strategy 
is people-driven, with broad-based participation of civil society and 
other relevant stakeholders, naPeP ought to be owned by three main 
actors; the state, Civil society (including traditional civil society groups 
and social movements beyond the ngo phenomenon like labour, stu-
dents’ organizations, rural and community based groups),and market 
(the private sector).
this takes us to the participation concern that determines a pro-
cess through which stakeholders’, that is state-actors and non-state 
Human Development Report. Human poverty index (HPI) (1999-2007)
Human  
Development
Reports (HDR) 
(YEAR)
Human Poverty 
Index (HPI)
Population of people 
not expected to 
survive at  age of 40
(Longevity) %
Population without 
Adult literacy
(Knowledge) %
Population without 
access
To water, health & 
sanitation %Rank Value %
1999 63 38.2 33.4 40.5 51
2000 62 37.6 33.3 38.9 51
2001 59 36.1 33.7 37.4 43
2002 58 34.9 33.7 36.1 43
2003 54 34 34.9 34.6 38
2004 57 35.1 34.9 34.6 38
2005 75 38.8 46.6 33.2 40
2006 76 40.6 46 NA 52
2007 80 37.3 39 30.9 52
Source: United Nations Human Development Reports on Human Poverty Index 2007.
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actors, shape and share control over poverty reduction initiatives. 
these stakeholders are vital ingredient that promotes national owner-
ship in the process of reducing poverty. Considering this, it is desired 
to note that the level of participation and agreement of the executives, 
civil society, political parties and Parliaments in the governing process 
of poverty reduction in nigeria does not reflect the true dimension 
of national ownership. the implication is increase in the number of 
people living in poverty in irrespective of several efforts. above all, the 
introduction as well as implementation of post military poverty reduc-
tion strategy (naPeP) which has capacity of reducing poverty in nige-
ria unfortunately failed to stem the rising population in poverty over 
years because of inputs from the south, the target citizens and state.
however, to buttress that ownership challenge remains a clog in 
fighting poverty in nigeria, the poverty situation in nigeria shows that 
poverty has increasingly worsened from 1980 to 1996 (federal office 
of statistics of nigeria (fos, 1999) and has not improved. the inci-
dence of poverty rose from 28.1% in 1980 to 46.3% in 1985, but dro-
pped to 42.2% in 1992 from where it rose sharply to 65.6% in 1996.
this continued to raise to 70% in 2001 Canagarajah, ngwafon, and 
thomas (2002). similarly, the data from national Bureau of statistics, 
2005 puts poverty incidence at 54.4% at estimated population of 126.3 
million and 68.70 millions living in poverty. the trend indicates that 
there is a drop in the incidence but the population in poverty (68.7 
millons) shows that more nigerians are living below poverty line. the 
details of poverty profile in nigeria are shown in the table below.
Table 1
Poverty trends in Nigeria (1980-2004)
Year Poverty Incidence % Estimated Population (Million) Population in Poverty (Million)
1980 28.1 65m 17.7m
1985 46.1 75m 34.7m
1992 42.7 91.5m 39.2m
1996 65.6 102.3m 67.1m
2004 54.4 126.3m 68.70m
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2005). 
 
while the trend of poverty as explained in the above table reflects the 
general poverty spread over years, the study identifies two levels of po-
verty in nigeria; core poor and moderate poor. Considering the period, 
1980-2004, the proportion of the core poor increased from 6.2% in 1980 
to 29.3% in 1996, and then came down to 21.8% in 2004. for the mo-
derately poor the picture is quite different as the proportion recorded 
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increased between 1980-1985 from 21.0% to 34.2%; and for 1992-1996 
from 28.9% to 36.5%; but decreased during the periods 1985-1992 from 
34.2% to 28.9%; and in 1996-2004 from 36.3% to 32.4 %.
Besides, the unDP (2003) estimate puts the percentage of the poor 
in nigeria between 66 and 70%; it is based on the estimate incidence 
increase of 10% every three years. this confirms the consensus that, 
poverty and people entering poverty status is on the increase. (world 
Bank, 1990; fields, 2000). In the same vein, Kirk Leigh (2007: 9) reports 
that, nigeria is now considered “one of the 20 poorest countries in the 
world. over 70% of the population is classified as poor, with 35% living 
in absolute (core) poverty”. going by the statistics and by the 1991 po-
pulation figure of 120 million, those living below the poverty line were 
84 millions. If the country’s population has grown to 140 millions accor-
ding to the new 2007 figures then, by analogous reasoning, the number 
of people living on less than one dollar in a day must have risen up to 
98 millions. this means that another 14 millions impoverished people 
have been unleashed in the country, nigerian Business Day (June 7, 
2007: 52). a greater majority of the poor classified in this category are 
rural dwellers that depend on agriculture for food and income. the ta-
ble below illustrates the distribution of poverty by sector. 
Table 2
Distribution of the Population in Poverty (Using three Boundaries)
Year Core Poor % Moderately Poor % Non-Poor %
1980 6.2 21 72.8
1985 12.1 34.2 53.7
1992 13.9 28.9 57.3
1996 29.3 36.3 34.4
2004 22 32.4 43.3
Source: National Bureau of statistics (2005).
Table 3 
Relative Poverty Incidence by Sector (1980-2004)
Year Urban % Rural %
1980 17.2 28.3
1985 37.8 51.4
1992 37.5 46
1996 58.2 69.3
2004 43.2 63.3
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2005).
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It can be seen, that for each year, poverty incidence has predominated 
in the rural areas. as  nigerian national Bureau of statistics (nBs 
2007: 25) records, “the population of nigeria is increasingly beco-
ming one of the poorest in the world with income per capita less than 
us$500. In addition one of every five nigerian children dies before his 
or her fifth birthday, while one of every three child is malnourished. 
the child mortality rate among children living in the poorest 20% of 
the population is three times as high as the rate among children of 
the wealthiest 20%.” this no doubt has put many nigerians in the jeo-
pardy of impoverishment and of course the need to fight the scourge 
becomes of essence. 
the situation of poverty, besides, the preponderance of poverty 
amidst anti-poverty strategy in nigeria further attributes the result 
to the cut off of the people from the pro-poor policy. accordingly, 
ajakaiye (2002: 25) adds that nigeria government established naPeP 
to address “the problem of ineffective targeting of the poor, lack of 
involvement of beneficiaries, social partners and other stakeholders 
in planning and evaluation and top bottom approach in programme 
planning and implementation”. however, the key lesson that emerges 
from this is the incontrovertible fact that the poverty reduction stra-
tegy of nigerian state is not targeted at poor considering that naPeP 
policies and programmes have no input from the people. this follows 
that national ownership which guarantees a deep appreciation and 
commitment to the policies as well as their better understanding is 
not available in naPeP. 
The Importance of Ownership to NAPEP
the absence of ownership is a critical missing link. for the reason 
that when policies are owned and managed by concerned people, an 
enabling prospect that improves the chances of success through an 
injection of historically derived practical realities in the policies and 
programmes are assured. accordingly, Dahl (1971: 8) adds that “what 
determines public policy is actually the net effect of the pressures of 
interest groups, which are usually so many and balanced that no sin-
gle one wields excessive power”. In addition, policy ownership recog-
nizes that participation of citizens especially those targeted by pro-
poor policy increases the propensity of the programme to succeed. 
this centres on the premise that poverty reduction strategy begins 
with the citizens, especially the poor  contributing  in shaping the 
policy .this is not limited to the targeted beneficiaries alone  because 
based on the principle of Common agency, a world of interest groups, 
together with parties, the government, donors and others, come toge-
ther for talking, negotiating and forging a consensus. essentially, this 
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synergy allows interested parties to get involved as they share in the 
vision of the programme which invariably enhances their willingness 
and understanding of Poverty reduction strategy. 
as earlier noted naPeP by scope and content has the capacity of 
eradicating extreme poverty but bedevilled by absence of vision, com-
mitment and understanding which has constrained the programme 
from realising its objectives. all these could be addressed if there is 
policy ownership. essentially resolve the various incongruities that 
exist within the citizens and lack of understanding by policymakers. 
to this end, the fundamental burden of poverty reduction strategy of 
nigerian state is  caused by overwhelming influence of donor inter-
ests becomes controlled once poverty reduction enjoys the status of 
national ownership. also the primary challenge to the prevailing lack 
of government and citizen commitment to reduction of extreme po-
verty will be resolved by policy ownership. 
ownership promotes governance structure that facilitates bottom 
driven poverty alleviation strategy. for instance, the development of 
naPeP as requirement for accessing resources under the world Bank’s 
poverty reduction and growth facility (Prgf) should have reflected 
peoples view especially the targeted poor as a way of accessing their 
commitment and understanding of the PrsP cared for them. this is 
captured in the review of the PrsP approach by united nations Con-
ference on trade and Development where it notes that “the new fo-
cus on poverty and social problems does not replace the development 
strategies implemented under structural adjustment programmes but 
complements them. this is because; the underlying premise of the 
PrsP remains liberalization, greater openness and rapid and close 
integration into the world economy as the key to growth. the PrsP 
continue to reflect the saP emphasis on ‘belt-tightening’ economic 
frameworks, liberalization, and privatization”. (unCtaD 2002: 58). 
unCtaD further cautioned that the approach is unlikely to succeed 
if it is simply a matter of integrating pro-poor public expenditure pat-
terns with deeper and broader structural reforms and the macroeco-
nomic policies of the eighties and nineties. agreed that nigeria’s po-
verty reduction strategy (naPeP) is an adoption from PrsP, it falls 
short of national ownership resulting from lack of popular partici-
pation and initiatives required of stakeholders. the policy ownership 
if introduced could check the concurred ambivalence of top political 
leaders and resistance by other senior politicians and government bu-
reaucrats that embrace naPeP.
It is therefore, noted that if the poverty reduction strategy is 
shrouded with principles of ownership nigerian government will not 
be implementing ideas that emanate from north (IfI) and other de-
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velopmental partners without critical input that serve their interest 
and need.. the conditionality has constrained such freedom thereby 
preventing the country from taking the lead in pro-poor policy as well 
as undermined her ability to advance human well being. this view is 
shared by Commission on human security which notes that, “human 
security starts from the recognition that people are the most active 
participants in determining their well-being” (Chs, 2003: 68). It is the-
refore obvious that interventions aimed at reducing poverty are bound 
to meet with limited success if the poor themselves are not given a 
prominent voice in selecting, designing and implementing poverty 
reduction programmes and projects. the reasons are obvious: “Poor 
women and men have detailed knowledge and have context specific 
criteria about who is poor and not poor” narayan (2000: 274).there-
fore, the participation of organized social and political groups is a key 
strategy for promoting national ownership and domestic accountabi-
lity. at this point, it is noteworthy, to examine how ownership can be 
brought into poverty reduction strategy of nigerian government.
Challenges to introducing Ownership in NAPEP
Besides the imperatives that ownership will make naPeP work for 
nigerians, it is limited by its dynamic nature and conflicts. this is 
not limited to nigeria alone; most other african countries suffer the 
same. “for too long, governments in developing countries and major 
donor agencies started with top-down approaches with well-meaning 
experts telling local communities what to do”. (Johnson, 2008: 5) she 
further notes that this approach is still common today and leads to a 
range of problems which includes; first, the diagnosis of the problem 
is often incorrect. second, even if the diagnosis is correct, without 
local participation the design of the intervention may be flawed. and 
third, and perhaps most important, if local people don’t participate 
in the process of decision-making, they don’t own the project. they 
will watch from the sidelines, wondering why certain decisions were 
made, and assuming that if the whole thing breaks down someone 
else will come and fix it. Instead, what we need is for people to own 
the decisions, and be deeply involved in determining the success or 
failure of the outcome. this played out in the structural adjustment 
programmes (saP) of the past where the aid conditionality of donors 
restricted the initiatives and ability of nigerian state and later caused 
civil protest of 1986. By this circumstance, nigeria state lacks visible 
progress towards developing country-driven strategies, due to two as-
pects of the PrsP process: (i) the international donor community is 
too heavily involved in preparing documents and organizing consul-
tation processes; (ii) donor funds are released with implicit conditio-
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nality. this will remain so until nigerian state grows out of debt and 
aid dependency. 
adding to this is the strong desire of development partners to still 
prefer to have development programs they can identify as their own. 
In this regards the nature and manner donors often come to recipient 
countries with their own priorities and projects, in a hurry to meet 
targets and disburse money has led to inadequate consultation and 
understanding that are pillars for achieving policy ownership. the 
consequence is hasty actions which limit inputs from the potential 
pro-poor beneficiaries. 
accordingly, this attitude has made nigeria government to mould 
proposals to what the donors “want to hear”; so as to attract the world 
Bank contribution to its financing. this drives the inability nigerian 
government to essentially reflect broad based participation of civil 
society, marginalized groups (the poor), private sector, and non-go-
vernment organization in programme. this is equally evident in the 
composition of the policy actors that make up naPeP Council and 
responsible for lack of coordination at three levels of governments, 
thereby contributing to set backs that hinder the objectives of wiping 
out absolute poverty. the foregoing is a prominent challenge that what 
thwarts true ownership in anti-poverty programmes and development 
policies in nigeria.
Politics and policy making in nigeria is characterized by rent see-
king behaviour and patron-client relations. these kinds of political 
systems offer little coordination of policies, low inputs from the people 
and poor delivery of services. these imperfections open opportunities 
for the government to pursue its own interests and for special inter-
est groups (sIg) to influence their own way. as a result of these in-
fluences, these organizations become transformed by their managers 
into “rent-generating machines”, diverting resources from producers 
or consumers for the exclusive benefit of small groups of politically 
connected people. “ominously, these special interests –including tho-
se controlling oil, natural resources and other wealth– sometimes turn 
against reforms even if they are pro-market in general, when they fear 
that their privileged positions and capacity to earn rents are under 
threat”. (Dalmazzo et al., 2001: 12). these bring to the fore the issues 
and problems associated with political culture and the politicisation 
of programmes and projects. however, the nigerian reality, point to 
the fact that, political differences, are decisive factors in the accentua-
tion of poverty in different location in nigeria. this arises when rele-
vant schemes and programmes are resisted in some regions/zones or 
states simply because of the perceived advantages the implementation 
could confer on some political parties.
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above all, ownership helps in achieving good management nee-
ded to fight poverty. nigeria has challenge here, not due to lack of 
resources but inability to make their economy work for the citizens. 
this has consistently led to beggarly manner in which nigerian sta-
te relate with Bretton woods Institutions. therefore there is need to 
ensure that macro economic targets that will translate to structural, 
physical and human development targets are at reasonable balance. 
for all intents and purposes, this will reduce the dependence of nige-
rian governments on aid as alternative to increase their budgets and 
deliver goods and services or other political promises made to citizens 
to the risk taking policy actions that could undermine their political 
support and or cost them the next election.
Strategies for Enhancing National Ownership in NAPEP
 that lack of ownership in naPeP is causing increasingly unabated rate 
of poverty in nigeria is already established but lessons emerging from 
it suggests ways ownership can be brought in, to make it work for the 
people, especially the extreme poor. It is therefore imperative that na-
PeP pays more attention to including the poor and other stakeholders 
in the quest for the achievement of human advancement in nigeria. 
In this regards, there is need to embrace shared-governance in poverty 
reduction process. shared-governance is the process where by gover-
nment, the multiple partners and interest groups actively participate 
in formulating and implementing pro-poor programme. essentially, 
ajakaiye (2002: 27) adds that “considerable resources can be mobi-
lized if the private sector organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions and community based organizations are invited to make specific 
contributions. their substantive involvement in terms of pledges of 
resources will promote the transparency, accountability and bottom 
up approach to diagnosis, analysis; strategizing and implementing po-
verty eradication programme in nigeria. above all it will make for sus-
tainability of programmes, because changes in leadership and other 
actors are unlikely to happen simultaneously in government, private 
sector, ngo and CBo”.
 the import of these remark is an emphasis on collective respon-
sibility achieved by joint effort of concerned stakeholders that seek 
to address the challenge of policy inconsistency and exclusion in a 
pro-poor policy that characterize nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy. 
the exclusion of non-state actors does not only affect the legitimacy 
of the formulated policy but participation and accountability. there-
fore, “empowering the poor requires the removal of all institutional 
barriers that limit their choices and prevent them from taking action 
to improve their well-being. More particularly, empowering the poor 
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includes strengthening the basic principles of good governance by en-
hancing popular participation, improving efficiency in pro-poor deve-
lopment and promoting democratic accountability and transparency” 
(Bonfigiloli, 2003: 67).
Concurring to these submissions, it is emphasized that, “there 
should be sufficient participation of the grassroots people in the iden-
tification and implementation of projects affecting their lives based 
on broad consensus. this will not only increase their commitment to 
such  programmes but will also de-emphasize the erstwhile percep-
tion of such programmes as conduit pipes for national cake sharing, 
which they feel is responsible for their poverty” (obadan, 2002: 24). 
to make amends, the pro-poor policies should involve the formation 
of a “contract” between (actors) the state, citizens and donors (where 
applicable). the configuration of donor partners, state and non-state 
actors in public policy arena forms the “iron triangle” of public policy. 
the notion of an “iron triangle” promotes policy actors relation “with 
one another –of alliance, disregard overt competition– constitute the 
social relations of governance through which struggles over influence 
and outcomes are played out”. (ojanen and gould, 2003: 48).at this 
juncture, the following strategies are considered in order to attain the 
benefits of bringing ownership in naPeP.
Consultation
specifically, enhancing ownership of naPeP can start with techni-
cal committee to prepare guidelines for an interactive consultation 
process with government officials, ngo, women’s associations, trade 
unions, religious associations, traditional authorities, research insti-
tutions, media, farmers’ associations and development partners at lo-
cal ,state and national levels. the technical committee should propose 
the terms of references, the time line, the structure and process for 
participation of the various groups.
the consultation process should  begin with the grassroots, from 
Local governments through the state to the national levels .In essen-
ce ,the justification for these reflects concern on the fact that greater 
number of the poor dwell at rural areas. therefore getting the local go-
vernment official, internal partners (community based organizations, 
women’s association, trade unions, religious associations, traditional 
authorities and farmers) and external partners to participate and con-
tribute their views and interests will no doubt lay a foundation for 
sustainable policy ownership for poverty reduction in nigeria.  at the 
state and national levels, government officials, internal and external 
should meet and brain storm in order to contribute their views in de-
signing national poverty reduction strategy. however  at the end of 
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various group consultative meeting  on  the  four themes of naPeP, 
there shall be a joint national consultative forum where each entity 
should  send  two delegates  to harmonise their propositions with the 
technical committee. It is expected that the consultation will allow for 
production of   qualitative and quantitative data from   perception of 
poverty surveys both from the rural and urban. this will be achieved 
through a combined method small group discussions, interviews and 
direct observation on poverty and its solution.
Implementation
the outcome of the consultation process will guide the restructuring of 
naPeP to reflect principles of ownership at the level of implementation. 
the implementation structure should take into consideration previous 
marginalized groups as local government, parliament and civil society 
organisations. the Legislative assembly should be adequately involved 
in implementing naPeP. the parliamentarians as the representative of 
the citizen have lots to do in ensuring that principles of national owner-
ship are promoted. the parliamentarians should engage in oversight 
functions such as monitoring the various activities geared towards im-
plementing naPeP, especially in budget monitoring and public finan-
ce management. this is essential given that legislative assembly have 
people from various backgrounds; geographical locations and political 
parties that allow for effective debate and inputs.
Local government officials should be involved in the formulation 
and implementation process just as suggested at the consultation level. 
the role of the local level is most essential because this is where the 
greater population of the poor find themselves and their direct partici-
pation in deciding, identifying and managing the process that lift them 
from poverty will get desired result. More so owning the implementa-
tion process of naPeP from the local level bridges the gap that had 
caused the insufficient transfer of resources to the local level by na-
PeP. this can be achieved through decentralization of responsibilities 
which had been much centred around national and to a little extent at 
state level. therefore strengthening the capacity of local governments 
to elaborate and implement local development plans, effectively and 
transparently manage and account for budgeted expenditures and their 
knowledge on monitoring and evaluation, is needed to ensure that an 
effective and timely implementation of naPeP is achieved.
also, the governments at all  level  is  encouraged  to engage  civil 
society groups to monitor and evaluate the implementation of naPeP 
through the establishment of an observatory for naPeP monitoring 
and evaluation. the institutional set-up of the observatory, its specific 
responsibilities and its relationship to the government’s central, state 
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and local steering committees and monitoring and evaluation units 
are very essential in two significant ways. one, the civil society obser-
vatory checks the parochial and politicization of identifying target be-
neficiaries of naPeP. secondly it stands in gap between government 
official and citizens to ensure financial and process accountability as 
well as measure the impact of naPeP in fighting poverty in nigeria.
the role of development partners that is, the IfI in implementing 
naPeP is very critical since the manner and nature of their involve-
ment is attributed to major cause of lack of ownership in naPeP. to 
reverse this role, government should play the leading role in the na-
PeP consultations and implementation; development partners could 
provide financing for various stages of the process and also partici-
pated in thematic groups, alongside other stakeholders. however the 
government and civil society groups should drive the entire inputs 
required in fighting poverty without adopting their documents. this if 
achieved will avoid the repeats of saP and other related developmen-
tal initiatives of the north that are driven by liberalization policies of 
IMf and world Bank. on the other hand, an advice to IfI is that they 
should recognize that domestic factors do matter and it is crucial to 
identify entry points for effective assistance in order to promote the 
integration of aids into nigerian governments’ development agenda.
Focused Political Agenda
ownership in naPeP can not be achieved if there is no effective lea-
dership. nigerian state is quite unlucky in this area as it has very uns-
table political focus. apart from long years of military regime that has 
created a psyche of parochialism and rent seeking among leaders and 
by extension to some nigerians ,it has remained  very challenging to 
conduct a free and fair election for the past ten years of the present 
democratic regime. It is an evidence of state without focused political 
agenda as well as lack of fundamental for political correctness. essen-
tially ownership starts with power of vote which invariably is absent 
in nigeria. therefore for naPeP to acquire an ownership standing 
that can enable it fight poverty, the citizens must be empowered to 
have ballot box relevance .It at this stage that a leader who can stand 
firm and negotiate without blinking before IfI can guarantee pover-
ty alleviation and human advancement because such person has the 
mandate of the citizens. 
Conclusion
against the background of this study, its revelations have shown that 
there is lack of ownership in naPeP. to arrive at this, it first shed light 
on the concept of ownership and discussed from three perspectives of 
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origin of vision, conceptualization and active participation which cul-
minate to establish national ownership. It also examined its theoretical 
background in relation to naPeP using Common agency model. all the 
same, the significance that comes into view clearly from theoretical fra-
mework of analysis examined in this study is that successful fight against 
poverty depends on national ownership and ownership depends on suc-
cessful processes in which domestic participants effectively involved.
subsequently, the origin of naPeP, poverty profile, importance of 
ownership in poverty reduction and strategies for enhancing owners-
hip in naPeP are systematically examined. the result is that engaging 
a wide range of officials, market participants and civil society organi-
zations in naPeP must be given prominence. nigerian government 
should as a matter of sincerity of purpose change the perception of 
regarding PrsP as a document prepared solely as a means of securing 
financial assistance or fund raising tool from the world Bank, IMf 
and other development partners, but rather a blueprint of northern 
nations aimed at accentuating  imperialism in the countries of the 
south. therefore fighting and eliminating extreme poverty can not be 
achieved for nigerians by IfI. essentially what nigerian governments 
and leaders need at this time is to insist on their convinced ideas and 
change of mind-set by government official to reposition naPeP in the 
context of national ownership and reduce the incidence of poverty.
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3.1. Structural Adjustment and 
the Neglect of Intergenerational 
Poverty in the Caribbean
Introduction
In this paper the case is made that much of the prescriptions relating 
to the reduction of poverty and improvement in the quality of life of 
the people of the southern hemisphere that emerged during the pe-
riod of structural adjustment is informed by a neglect of the historical 
traditions that shaped the character of poverty in these places. the 
weight of history or the historical endowment of exploitation, depri-
vation and neglect that are features of historical Caribbean political 
economy continues to exercise undue influence on the poverty lands-
cape of the region. this manifests itself in the form of social inequality 
and in circumstances and characteristics at the household level that 
conduce to the reproduction of poverty across the generations.  this 
historical endowment is hardly considered in the analyses of the local 
context by the institutions responsible for the oversight of structural 
adjustment programmes in the countries of the south. the paper su-
ggests that the positivist-empiricism of the Living standard Measure-
ment surveys employed by these institutions obfuscates the structu-
ral inequality that sustains poverty. In-depth interviews conducted in 
 * Ph.D. in social sciences. senior Lecturer, Dept of Behavavioural sciences, univer-
sity of the west Indies, st. augustine Campus.
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poor households in the territories of the eastern Caribbean are used 
to substantiate the argument.  the paper closes by offering solutions. 
Structural Adjustment in the Caribbean
as policy, structural adjustment gives expression to mainstream eco-
nomics’ trumpeting of the power of market forces as the most efficient 
allocator of resources in an economy. this position is in turn based 
on a philosophy  that suggests that human beings achieve the grea-
test satisfaction and potential for self fulfillment when they are free 
to pursue their interests unfettered;  hindered only by the prohibition 
against inflicting harm on others and the logic of the forces of su-
pply and demand that constitute the market. the freedom from want 
that is central to communitarian approaches to social organization 
is replaced in this doctrine by the freedom to pursue those activities 
that allow individuals to fulfill themselves. this includes providing for 
themselves and their families. according to economic neoliberalism 
those in a position of want and deprivation at the end of the day are 
those who have not come to terms with their moral responsibility of 
exercising their freedom to engage in productive activities that lead to 
the satisfaction of some need in society. 
from this position it follows that virtually any intrusion of the 
state into the production, marketing and distribution of goods and 
services in the economy is anathema. where economic, downturn, 
stagnancy or crisis exists it is due to the hindrance of the free workings 
of market forces by the state. the solution to these problems is said 
to lie in institutionalization of the free market and making the private 
sector the main engine of growth in the economy. there is no recog-
nition of the endowments to the contemporary character of poverty 
bequeathed by hundreds of years of colonial relationships. such con-
siderations had been recognized in those quarters from which Develo-
pment economics had emerged in the late forties through proponents 
such as a.w. Lewis, P. rosenstein-rodan and r. nurske1. this branch 
of economics acknowledged the importance of colonialism in shaping 
some of the contemporary economic and social contours of the newly 
emerging countries in the south and argued that the universalist prin-
ciples of mainstream economics did not apply to them. It also recogni-
zed the limitations of sole reliance on market forces in the process of 
social development on which the new nations were about to embark. 
even so, the prescriptions it put forward were solely macroeconomic 
1  see Meier, gerald 1984 “the formative Period” in Meier, gerald and seers, 
Dudley (eds.) Pioneers in Development (new York: world Bank/oxford university 
Press).
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ones, oblivious to occurrences at the level of the community and the 
household.  thus, while recognizing the limitations of market forces 
as a means of developing the economies of the new nations, Develop-
ment economics struggled with, but never successfully incorporated, 
the sociological categories produced by the region’s history2.
structural adjustment (sa) was first introduced into the Ca-
ribbean in Jamaica in the latter years of the decade of the seventies. 
Its advent in the region was associated with the economic crisis that 
followed on the massive increases in the price of oil associated with 
the cartelization of that product by its main producers in the Middle 
east. this escalation in the price of fuel would have been bad enough 
in itself except that it took place at the same time as a decline on the 
world market in the prices of the primary exports of the poorer coun-
tries of the world.   By the time the countries of the southern hemis-
phere turned to the International Monetary fund and the world Bank 
for monies to bail them out of the crisis that faced them, the conside-
rations of special circumstances in these countries that had informed 
Development economics had been superseded in international policy 
circles by notions relating to the universalism of free market econo-
mics. It was argued by the International financial Institutions (IfI) 
that these countries were poor and in crisis not because of the hun-
dreds of years of asymmetrical relationships between themselves and 
the north atlantic countries, or because of structural features of the 
global economy. rather, they were in crisis because of the inefficien-
cies and corruption associated with the state’s involvement in their 
economies3.
the results of the implementation of this policy in the countries of 
what was then known as the third world were mixed.  the institutio-
nal reform and rationalization of the public sector associated with the 
world Bank and the monetary and fiscal prescriptions associated with 
the International Monetary fund led to the stream lining of what was, 
in many instances, an unwieldy public sector staffed on the basis of 
patronage rather than functionality. fiscal imbalances were also redu-
ced and eliminated as new canons on government’s role and function 
in the era of market centeredness came into play. unfortunately, many 
of the cushions that had been provided for the poor by government’s 
involvement in the economy in the form of subsidies and tariffs were 
removed. also detrimental, but less immediately obvious in its effects, 
2  wisman, Jon D. 1986 “the Methodology of arthur Lewis, Development econo-
mics: economics as Pedagogy” in World Development, Vol. 14, n° 1.
3  Lal, Deepak 1983 The Poverty of Development Economics (London: London Insti-
tute of economic affairs). 
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was the reduction of state involvement in sectors such as health, edu-
cation and welfare. 
In the most recent scenario, the proponents of economic neoli-
beralism have now, in the face of overwhelming evidence, acknowled-
ged that the economic downturn and dampening of demand faced 
by countries in the south are attributable to global economic crisis 
initiated by the bad management of mortgage in the north atlantic. 
In general terms, they have now bought into the Keynesian type res-
ponse of countercyclical fiscal policy, in the short term, as a means of 
countering the downturn. this clearly runs counter to the substance 
of the approach advocated by economic neoliberalism since it calls 
for massive state intervention in the economy. this, they argue, is all 
the more necessary since the private financial system is now in crisis 
as well. they argue, though, that the general rule of state sponsored 
intervention to stimulate local demand is not available to countries 
such as some Caribbean territories that are faced with “greater vul-
nerabilities” and where debt repayment sustainability is a problem. 
their recommendation: more loans from multilateral partners to su-
pport fiscal reform. they also stand ready to assist such countries no 
doubt through another round of structural adjustment. the IMf in 
particular still has no vision of the much touted economic stimulus 
package for the economies of the north extending to the development 
of social infrastructure in the south4. 
Monitoring the Outcome: LSMS and
Anti-Poverty Policy
the International financial Institutions (IfI) as did the governments 
of the region recognized that, in the short run, the proposed ad-
justments to the macroeconomic structures would lead to social fall-
outs. as a consequence technical and financial support were provided 
to some countries to establish policy analysis units to monitor the 
living conditions of the people as a means of mitigating the negative 
impact of this fall out. In the Caribbean, living standard measurement 
surveys were instituted in Jamaica, guyana and trinidad and tobago5. 
In addition, in Jamaica a social policy development unit charged with 
4  this means that in the latest round of economic crisis the households that are 
most in need to these types of resources to off set historically shaped capacity limi-
tations and constraints will be left to fend for themselves on the open, but weakened 
market.  see speech of IMf boss Dominique strauss-Kahn in Jamaica, reported in 
the Sunday Gleaner, December 14, 2008.
5  these surveys were later introduced in the countries of the eastern Caribbean. 
In this instance, though, they were funded and supervised by the Caribbean Develo-
pment Bank.
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the responsibility of administering the Jamaica survey of living condi-
tions was established in the Planning ministry. these surveys canvas-
sed information on consumption, education, demography, health and 
welfare and were conducted under the technical auspices of the world 
Bank with funding from the Dutch government. the surveys in Jamai-
ca were run on an annual basis and provided valuable information on 
the immediate circumstances faced by the people of the country in the 
light of the changes associated with structural adjustment.
Living standard measurement surveys measure consumption and 
provide the basis for the derivation of a poverty line6. this is based 
on the cost of a minimum nutritional requirement as established by 
international health organizations such as Paho7. Changes over time 
in the levels of poverty as measured by this instrument provided an 
important tool with which to monitor the effect of macroeconomic 
policies on the social well being of the population. this instrument 
provided a definition of poverty that was a point in time measurement 
of persons falling below the line. the survey data allowed for the po-
pulation to be differentiated on the basis of age, gender, geographic 
location, health, welfare and educational status. on the basis of this 
understanding poverty eradication policies were formulated and ins-
titutionalized8.
there are a number of grounds on which this approach to the era-
dication of poverty can be critiqued. the two that will be highlighted 
here are as follows: it failed, certainly in the initial stages, to address 
the dynamic nature of poverty. at any two points in time the house-
holds falling under the poverty line will be different since over this 
period some will move into poverty and some will move out. for pur-
poses of this discussion this is important since even as some house-
holds will move into and out of poverty, some households will remain 
under the line for extended periods if not indefinitely. this takes us to 
the second critique which is the failure to link the existence of some 
forms of poverty in the contemporary period to the historical deve-
lopment of the society. world Bank methodology acknowledges the 
existence of chronic, or long term poverty (defined as lasting up to 
6  ravallion, Martin 1992 Poverty Comparisons: A Guide to Concepts and Measures 
Living Standard Measurement Study (washington: world Bank), working Paper 88.
7  gordon, Derek 1989 “Identifying the Poor: Developing a Poverty Line for Jamai-
ca” (PIoJ, Jamaica Poverty Line Project) working Paper n° 3. 
8  see government of Jamaica “Jamaica’s Policy towards Poverty eradication and 
the national Poverty eradication Programme” (Kingston: government of Jamaica), 
Ministry Paper, n° 13.
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8 years), but nowhere mentions intergenerational9. In recent times 
some analysts have linked data sets from the annual surveys and in so 
doing captured the movement of households into and out of poverty 
over time over the period that the surveys have been in existence10. 
however, the ahistorical nature of the poverty analysis conducted in 
these institutional and policy circles leaves us in the darkness as to 
what factors have produced those households that give exemplifica-
tion to Beckford’s notion of ‘persistent poverty11. 
the antipoverty policies/measures derived on the basis of this analysis 
have had only limited effect due to historically based structural inequalities 
and the tenacity of certain expressions of poverty associated with them. In 
the case of Jamaica, the country with the longest running involvement with 
the IfI in the region, at the height of the impact that structural adjustment 
was to have on the society in the early nineties, the percentage of the po-
pulation living below the poverty line spiked to 44.512. this was after two 
decades of economic privatization. the policy makers and technocrats of 
the Jamaican government and the world Bank were faced with the ques-
tion why were significant proportions of the people not able to share in the 
fruits of this privatization13. the answer the world Bank provided was eco-
nomic growth. It described the problem as follows: “three problems stand 
out in Jamaica’s experience with growth since independence. first, growth 
has been too slow on average and too often negative. second, it was achie-
ved very inefficiently. [...] third, growth has only recently started to break 
down the economic dualism that Jamaica shares with many other develo-
ping countries. Growth in the enclaves and formal sector still does not draw 
enough labour and material inputs from the informal sector (world Bank 
1994; emphasis added14)15”. In this analysis, although allusion to structural 
9  ravillion (p.70). 
10  handa sudhanshu 2008 “Moving on up: the Dynamics of Poverty in Jamaica 
1995-2005” Paper presented at Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions Twentieth Anni-
versary Conference, Kingston, november.
11  Beckford, george 1972 Persistent Poverty (oxford: oxford university Press).  
12  up from 30.5% in 1989. the line is derived using the methodology developed 
by foster, greer and thorbecke and utilized extensively by the world Bank in con-
junction with data from its Living standard Measurement surveys (LsMs). see fos-
ter, J.; greer, J. & thorbecke, e. 1984 “a Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures” in 
Econometrica Vol. 56: 173-177. see also, Planning Institute of Jamaica 2000 “report 
on the survey of Living Conditions” (Kingston: PIoJ).
13  see “Jamaica Country economic Memorandum”.
14  world Bank 1994 “a strategy for growth and Poverty reduction. Country eco-
nomic Memorandum” World Bank (Jamaica), april.
15  the deep structural and historical nature of this problem is evidenced by the fact 
that nearly fifty years before this nobel Laureate a.w. Lewis defined it as the chief 
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inequality in the form of economic dualism is made, nothing is said of the 
mal-distribution of resources and the social effects that are associated with 
it. these not only manifest themselves currently at the household level in 
the form of lack of education, unemployment, inadequacy of housing and 
so on, but are also evident in the form of historically conditioned respon-
ses that find expression in areas such as gender relations, and mating and 
family formation patterns.
some of the more recent measures of poverty in Jamaica have recor-
ded levels of 17%16. apart from the question of the basis and sustainabi-
lity of this reduction, two recent manipulations of LsMs data have poin-
ted to the existence of a hardcore of poverty that persists and reproduces 
itself in spite of the efforts of the policy makers. the first has already been 
alluded to. It is a longitudinal analysis of annual LsMs data17. the second 
is the use of this data to create a poverty map for Jamaica. In the first ins-
tance the data reveal a set of households that remain under the poverty 
line even while others move into and out of poverty. In the second instan-
ce, the map reveals that the poorest households in the country are located 
in the hilly rural areas of the country to which the ex-slaves retreated at 
the time of manumission. In the context of the historical development of 
the Jamaican economy these should be seen as markers of the existence 
not just of long term poverty, but poverty that is intergenerational. this 
pattern is repeated throughout the Caribbean. 
what is the nature of the organic linkages between these types of 
households and the ways in which the region’s economy and society 
have developed over historical time? what special features has this 
experience endowed these households with and therefore what are the 
best means of addressing these and therefore of formulating policies 
that speak to their inability to provide for their members? analyses of 
point-in-time statistical data from the LsMs do not answer this ques-
tion. Indeed, they tell us as much as they do not about the character 
of the social whole and its malformations within which poverty exists 
and is sustained.  Poverty reduction strategies based on these data 
that isolate demographic categories within households and provide 
them with welfare do not appear to have effectively redressed poverty 
rooted in long term structural inequalities18.
constraint to socioeconomic development among regions such as the Caribbean. see 
Lewis, a. w. 1954 “economic Development with unlimited supplies of Labour” Man-
chester School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 22.
16  Planning Institute of Jamaica (2000).
17  handa (Ibid).
18  anderson, Patricia 2001 “Poverty in Jamaica: social target or social Crisis” in 
Souls, Vol. 3, n° 4: 39-55.
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the answers to the questions raised above lie in the historical 
political economy of the region and its effect on the socioeconomic 
landscape in the contemporary period, including its pattern of human 
resource development. It is in the labour market that the household 
is either able, or not able to garner enough resources to ensure ade-
quacy for its members. It is not enough though to understand this 
relationship between the household and this market solely in narrow, 
short-term, economistic terminology19. Issues of historically based 
structural inequalities that have been reproduced in the contempo-
rary period are also central to this discussion as well. these have been 
accompanied by a legacy of neglect of the development of the human 
resources of the region. this ensures that a disproportionate number 
of its poor have inherited their condition from their immediate fore-
parents. furthermore, there is a synergism of self reinforcing social 
mechanisms at work that underlie this process. this has tended to 
be neglected in the analyses conducted by the international financial 
institutions. the mechanisms are unemployment and a historically 
based mating and fertility pattern that conduces to unstable family 
life. Both of these factors are in turn associated with poor educational 
performance and a consequent failure to properly equip individuals 
for effective participation in the labour market. the other dimension 
of the social totality that affects poverty and its persistence that is 
missed by point in time statistical analysis is social stigma, exclusion 
and differentiation, aspects of social inequality that have their bases 
in class and racial differences. these issues are brought to the fore in 
the life narratives presented in this paper.
the “one size fits all” approach  to the analysis of economy and its 
social spin offs that has been one of the signal features of economic 
neoliberalism and its policy prescription structural adjustment has 
tended to be associated with  an ignoring, if  not abuse, of the histori-
cal traditions of actual places. More than this however, it has provided 
the basis for misinformed, social policies that proved to be less than 
effective mechanisms for the eradication of poverty. Drawing on C.Y. 
thomas’ typology of Caribbean poverty, arguments are advanced in 
support of the salience of chronic or intergenerational poverty in the 
region20. It is argued that the Caribbean’s historical political economy 
has endowed it with a legacy of exploitation and neglect of its human 
resources and social infrastructure that is associated with a prepon-
19  anderson (2001).
20  thomas, C.Y. 1997 “the interrelationship between economic and social deve-
lopment” in girvan, n. (ed.) Poverty, Empowerment and Social Development in the 
Caribbean (Mona: Canoe Press/uwI), pp. 20-49. 
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derance of the category of the poor that can trace its impoverishment 
over a number of generations. this stands in contrast to the structural 
poor, or those persons that have been made poor by some of the chan-
ges to the macroeconomy associated with structural adjustment and 
the seasonal poor whose poverty is related to seasonal variation in the 
availability of resources.
Conceptually, recognition of the differentiated character of po-
verty in the region is important. although in the Caribbean, with its 
historically recent experience of plantation slavery, most persons have 
a relatively recent immediate forebear that was poor, a distinction has 
to be made between this type of person (even if he or she has been 
made poor by immediate changes in the structure of the economy) 
and one that remains in a situation of need and deprivation and can 
identify that condition in at least two generations of immediate fore-
bears. In this paper it is argued that understanding intergeneratio-
nal poverty is fundamental to any attempt to eradicate poverty, given 
the region’s historical legacy. furthermore, the study of poverty using 
quantitative, Positivist-empiricist, point in time survey data, has not 
carried policy makers nearly far enough in this understanding.
the feature of Caribbean poverty alluded to would be evident from 
any holistic consideration of the circumstances and conditions of the 
region’s poor and especially those of the poorest households in the 
region. Instead, the measures and conceptualizations of poverty that 
have emerged under the technical direction of the institutions respon-
sible for the implementation of economic neoliberalism, in the form 
of structural adjustment in the Caribbean do two things. firstly, they 
obfuscate the structural inequality that sustains poverty across the ge-
nerations since the positivism that underlies them, finds expression in 
the statistical analysis of individual differences. this deflects attention 
away from the character of the socio-economic formation within which 
these differences occur. secondly, there is a consequent conflation of 
the various categories of poor people and a prescription of corrective 
measures that are oblivious to their representation in the national so-
cioeconomic landscape as well as the differences that attend each of 
them21. the argument for the undue significance of intergenerational 
poverty is demonstrated through an examination of the historical poli-
tical economy of the region. this analysis is then linked to qualitative 
household level data collected during the course of recent national po-
verty assessments conducted by the author and a team of researchers 
21  see ravallion, Martin 1992 “Poverty Comparisons: a guide to Concepts and Mea-
sures Living standard Measurement study” (washington DC: world Bank), working 
Paper 88.
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on behalf of the governments of the oeCs and the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank in the countries of the eastern Caribbean22.
the quantitative data gleaned by the formal survey and household 
questionnaires and the data gleaned from the in-depth household in-
terviews are of course based on different approaches to the measure-
ment of social reality. It is important though that the complementary 
nature of the two types of data be understood. their combination can 
lend much to enhancing our understanding of the causes and sustai-
ners of poverty as well as some of the corrective measures that can be 
employed in the area of policy. this can happen in two ways. firstly, 
qualitative data in the form of extended discussion on a topic can alert 
us to measurable issues that are of significance that have been over-
looked. secondly, qualitative data can enable us to understand me-
anings attributed to experiences that simply cannot be measured or 
quantified and yet are important for social outcomes.
The historical political economy of the Caribbean
the Caribbean region is unique in world historical terms. the re-
gion is composed of tabula rasa societies established to create wealth 
primarily for persons beyond its shores. the wealth was generated 
through primary agricultural activity. this external orientation held 
negative implications not only for the organizational structure of the 
economy, but also the development of its human resources and social 
institutional framework. economic growth has been episodic rather 
than continuous. this has tended to be concentrated in specific sec-
tors and has therefore been accompanied by high levels of un and 
under-employment23.
22  the households with which these interviews were done belong to communities 
that were selected as a part of a Participatory Poverty assessment (PPa) component 
of the Country Poverty assessments (CPa). these have been carried out in the coun-
tries of the oeCs since the mid nineties. the CPa comprises an institutional analysis, 
a national household survey and the PPa. the PPa was conducted after the institu-
tional analysis and the national household survey. the selection of the communities 
and the households in the PPa were done in a non-random fashion. this involved 
the use of census data as well as on a more subjective level the opinion of communi-
ty development specialists. the communities are among the poorest in the country. 
the households were selected on the basis of discussions with field officers of social 
agencies working within them as well as on the basis of discussions with community 
members. they represent an instance of purposive sampling since the households 
are selected on the basis of the fact that they face challenges in surviving. these 
households generally represent the poorest to be found in the poorest communities 
in the respective countries. 
23  the exception to this general rule would be in cases where the colony became one 
of settlement as opposed to the usual status as colony of exploitation. such would be 
the case of Barbados in the english-speaking Caribbean and Costa rica in Central 
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In practical terms, this means that the range of opportunities for 
people to develop their capabilities has been limited.  the absence of 
organic linkages between the primary exporting sector and the rest of 
the economy means that the high external capital inflow that initiates 
the growth process is complemented by an equally heavy outflow once 
the demand for the product declines. the local private sector that is an 
integral part of the economic growth contributes to the hemorrhage 
of money and capital by their proclivity for consumption, their prefe-
rence for speculation over production as well as their tendency to hold 
major portions of their resources abroad24.
arthur Lewis attributes Jamaica’s failure to take off economi-
cally in the nineteenth Century, for example, to a number of factors 
having to do with the marginalization of the needs of the population. 
these include the underdevelopment of infrastructure which he as-
sociates with the lack of development of the small farm sector as well 
as a failure to develop secondary education25. In historical terms the 
process of wealth accumulation in the Jamaican economy can be 
said to have been characterized by four features that are related to 
the existence of local deprivation. firstly, it depended on the availa-
bility of abundant supplies of cheap labour. secondly, it has mostly 
been in the hands of foreign individuals and corporations whose 
chief concern has been the promotion of the export of primary pro-
duce. thirdly, it has been insufficient to utilize the available physical 
resources and has therefore been attended by high levels of under 
and unemployment. finally, the rate of accumulation has fluctuated 
over time due to three factors. the first of these is the changing levels 
of demand and prices for the country’s primary produce. the se-
cond factor is the attendant political instabilities and uncertainties. 
the third factor is the unevenness in the rate of investment that has 
taken place in the economy26.
america. In these places, because the colonists effectively created a home away from 
home they reinvested some of the surpluses generated into the infrastructural and 
institutional framework needed for the development of a broader spectrum of its 
people. see Levitt, Kari 2000 The George Beckford Papers (Mona: Canoe Press/uwI)
24  harris, Donald J. 1992 “the Jamaican economy in the twenty-first Century: 
Challenges to Development and requirements of a response”. Paper presented at the 
Jamaica Thirtieth Anniversary Symposium on Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, 
Kingston, p. 10.
25  Lewis, a. w. “foreword” in eisner, gloria 1961 Jamaica 1830-1930: A Study in 
Economic Growth (Manchester: Manchester university Press).
26  witter, M. 1991 “rethinking Development: the role of the state in third world 
Development” in wedderburn, J. (ed.) Rethinking Development: Consortium Graduate 
School (Mona: uwI).
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a less than equitable history is also evident in the case of st. Vincent. 
this country has a long tradition of economic stagnation and underdeve-
lopment. the sources of this underdevelopment are primarily economic, 
political and social. however, environmental factors have also weighed in 
against its full development in the contemporary period.  In terms of its 
political economy, this territory’s transformation from the un-development 
that characterizes existence in a state of nature was delayed by some 300 
years of resistance to european domination and rule by the indigenous 
amerindian population, until their defeat in 1797. this variation on the 
haitian experience means that the country was incorporated relatively late 
into the global capitalist economy centered in industrial western europe. 
this “late” start was probably associated with the relative underdevelop-
ment of its main economic sectors in the historical period. this in turn 
contributed to marked neglect of critical social sectors such as health and 
education. to make matters worse, changes in the international sugar mar-
ket in the last third of the nineteenth Century associated with the emergen-
ce of beet as a competitor to cane undermined the viability of the industry 
in a number of Caribbean territories27. the high levels of crime and exter-
nal migration noted in the historical records of this country are natural 
corollaries of such neglect. as if these problems by themselves were not 
enough, st. Vincent’s socio-economic development has also been impeded 
by a litany of natural disasters. these include, in the historical period, the 
hurricane of 1898 and the volcano of 1902.
a similar kind of pattern is evident in the historical development 
of grenada. Like st. Vincent it opted out of sugar cane production 
from as early as the late nineteenth Century (1891).  this was replaced 
by nutmeg and cocoa28. according to one official report, “the colony 
is entirely dependent upon its agricultural resources and the leading 
exports are cocoa, spices and cotton. the first mentioned contributes 
about 85% of the exports and the second about 10%” (grenada annual 
Colonial report, 1905). not that this changed its essential character 
as a plantation society. what it seemed to have done, rather, was to 
retard the development of the society’s class structure and social re-
lations in a way that exacerbated the negative influences of the histo-
rical pattern of development that has been described.  Data on land 
holdings and the relative share of land in the production of export and 
domestic crops bear out the plantation pattern29.
27  Beachey, g. w. 1957. The British West India Sugar Industry in the Late Nineteenth 
Century (oxford: oxford university Press).
28  Ibid.
29  Brown, Dennis a. 2000 The Political Economy of Fertility in the British West Indies 
1891-1921 (Kingston: Canoe/uwI), p. 64.
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one corollary of this kind of use of resources, and one that 
has implications for the thesis of intergenerational poverty, would 
be the existence of large numbers of under-skilled and underpaid 
workers. the grenadian censuses of 1891 and 1921 tell us that 
of total populations of 53,209 and 66,302 respectively low level 
skilled workers comprised 38.6 and 36.2% of the labour force for 
those two census years. Presumably, if the type of economic arran-
gement that gave rise to the kind of human resource utilization 
that is reflected in the occupational profile outlined here persisted, 
as is argued by the proponents of Plantation theory, then so would 
the occupational structure and conditions of deprivation. “By the 
twentieth Century grenada had become a marginal colonial pos-
session of Britain. there were therefore no British investments in 
mining, manufacturing and agriculture and only limited commer-
cial investment. furthermore, the siphoning of the wealth of the 
country continued. Meeks quotes Brizan as estimating that in 1976 
only 8.3% of the final value earned from nutmeg was actually retai-
ned in the economy. the rest we are told accrued to foreign com-
panies involved in the processing and marketing of the product” 
(Meeks, 1988)30.
even though insular variations exist, this pattern of wealth ac-
cumulation and the implications it holds for patterns of impoveris-
hment lends distinction to the historical political economy of the 
Caribbean region. the variations have to do with a set of factors that 
range from accidents of history and geography to the nature and ex-
tent of the colonizing effort in any given territory. they all occurred, 
though, within a framework of control by external forces over the 
primary resources for the production of a monocrop through the use 
of cheap low level skilled labour power. furthermore, to the extent 
that this type of political economy, or significant aspects of it, has 
persisted then there will also be some continuity in the patterns of 
impoverishment that obtain.
the problem with cross sectional LsMs as promoted by the 
world Bank as monitors of the social fall-out of impoverishment 
from structural adjustment is that they tend to miss the forest for 
the trees. arguments about effects of structural adjustment on the 
quality of life of the people of the south have tended to highlight 
the causal relationship between the intrinsic features of this set of 
policies and poverty while ignoring the particularities of the societal 
30   Meeks, Brian 1988 Social Formation and People’s Revolution: A Grenadian Study, 
PhD thesis, uwI, Mona Campus.
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context, including its historical dimensions31. Manifestations of im-
poverishment in the region in the contemporary period ought to be 
understood as being the product of a field prepared by the plough of 
history. It is only by understanding the background and continuities 
(institutionalization) of these contemporary manifestations of poverty 
that they can be effectively addressed through social policy interven-
tions. Positivist, cross sectional survey data and a knowledge-set that 
has its basis in the north atlantic academy produce a ‘blind spot’ in 
the study of poverty in regions such as the Caribbean that tends to 
conflate historically distinct types of poor people32.
the case study material on poverty that follows is located in the 
general theoretical category of Phenomenology.  It is based on re-
cognition that in order to understand and change people’s circums-
tances one has to understand how the world in which they operate 
is understood by them. this is done through the use of narrati-
ve analysis. this is a hermeneutical inspired approach that places 
emphasis on interpretation and context33. the interviews centered 
on a narration of their life experiences and how these have been 
affected by circumstances of deprivation by the respondents. the 
individual, it is held, operates within two overlapping levels of in-
terpretation. first, there is the understanding of the world that is 
common to all those belonging to a particular culture and societal 
heritage (that which impels, but does not compel) and secondly, the-
re is the individual interpretation and response to these circumstan-
ces34. these are reflected in the choices and decisions made by the 
individual.  epistemologically, the kind of approach to understan-
ding poverty in the contemporary Caribbean that has been outlined 
here departs from the way of knowing that characterizes neoclassi-
31  see, for example, glewwe, P. and Detray, D. 1988 “the Poor during adjustment” 
(washington: world Bank), LsMs working Paper 48; stewart, f 1997 Adjustment 
and Poverty (London/new York: routledge). see also Chossudovsky, M. 1997 The Glo-
balization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms (new York: zed/third 
world network). 
32  given the Caribbean’s relatively recent history of bondage most families would 
have some fairly recent ancestoral poverty. In this paper intergenerational or chronic 
poverty refers to those families that have always been poor. In the Caribbean, it is 
argued, the historical legacy has bequeathed a disproportionate number of such fa-
milies. the seasonal poor and the structural poor are distinguished from the chronic 
poor by the fact that at some recent point in time they have been non-poor.
33  Patton, M. Q. 2002 Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (London: 
sage). 
34  the distinction made by Crotty between construction-ism and constructivism 
is pertinent here. see Crotty, Michael 1998 The Foundations of Social Research: Me-
anings and Perspectives in the Research Process (London: sage).
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cal mainstream economics that is the prism through which the IfI 
understand the world35.
The nature of poverty: chronic poverty and 
its institutionalization  
one useful way in which the extensive theorizing about the nature of 
poverty can be categorized is to understand these accounts as lying 
along a spectrum framed by structuralist accounts at one end and 
individualist accounts at the other36. the individualist explanations 
attribute poverty to weaknesses based in genetics or personality. the 
first category of explanation deems poverty to be the outcome of social 
arrangements that the individual has no control over. these are arran-
gements of classes, groups, agencies and institutions as they exist wi-
thin a given socioeconomic framework that makes up any individual 
society. In the middle of this spectrum lies another category of expla-
nation that locates poverty in the workings of mid-level institutions 
such as family and community. Proponents of this approach point to 
the existence of cycles of deprivation in which poor quality parenting 
deprived communities and low levels of aspirations and expectations 
become internalized and accepted as a normal part of the social mi-
lieu. adults internalize these norms and values and in turn pass them 
on to their children who live their lives accordingly37.
for purposes of this discussion, the focus on some of the cultu-
ral and individual level mechanisms that contribute to the perpetua-
tion of poverty represents an advance on the accustomed approach in 
social policy making circles in regions such as the Caribbean where 
these considerations tend not to enter the picture. even so, the issue 
would seem to be a little more complex.  Is it reasonable to conceive 
of social interactions based on a view of human beings as so entirely 
passive? how far does such a functionalist type approach to the stu-
dy of society take us in our understanding of and ability to modify 
human society? these theories also ignore the broader structural con-
text and fail to account for how these individuals became poor in the 
first place38. of course, the other question that arises here is how do 
35  for an excellent critique of this approach see rist, gilbert 1997 The History of 
Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London/new York: zed).
36  alcock, P. 1993 understanding Poverty (London: Macmillan Press). see also 
ryan, s. et al. (eds.) 1997 Behind the Bridge: Poverty, Politics and Patronage in La-
ventile (trinidad: Iser/uwI, st. augustine).
37  see for example Lewis, oscar 1966 “the Culture of Poverty” Scientific American, 
Vol. 215, n° 4: 9-25.
38  alcock (1993).
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they escape from the cycle of poverty described by the intermediate 
level theories? In this regard, studies on the cycle of deprivation thesis 
conducted in the uK found that the children of those who were poor 
tended not to end up in poverty themselves, while those persons that 
ended up in poverty themselves did not come from poor households39. 
studies of poverty in the appalachians of north america point to the 
well entrenched pattern of intergenerational poverty there and indica-
te some of the sociological mechanisms that contribute to this pheno-
menon40. Is there, therefore, a relationship between the nature of the 
broader societal and macroeconomic context and the extent to which 
poverty persists within families across the generations? 
the main components of the problematic that arises from this 
discussion are therefore as follows: how best do we understand pover-
ty in the context of societies such as the Caribbean with an enduring 
structural asymmetry in its relationship to the north atlantic econo-
mies41; what is the best way to conceptualize the relationship between 
the varying analytical levels that have emerged as a part of the study 
of  poverty as a phenomenon rooted in and informed by historical 
experience; how much weight should be attached to human volition 
as opposed to structural constraint in the study of poverty over time; 
what are the mechanisms of transmission that lend continuity to the 
historical experiences and with what epistemic framework should we 
try to understand them; and finally what are the policy implications 
that follow from these considerations? 
Data from three case studies are analyzed in this paper. one of 
the respondents is from grenada. she is Marie, a 49 year old unem-
ployed mother of 10 children for three different men, living in semi-
urban grenada. the other two are from the island state of st. Vincent 
and the grenadines. one of these is a woman, sylvia, unemployed 
mother of 5 for three different fathers. the second respondent is a 
man, ska, 44 year old, small scale cultivator and father of five with 
three different women. at the time of the interview, ska resided on 
a small plot of land in the hills of rural st. Vincent with three of his 
children. their stories tell of the lived experiences of poverty in the 
region and its connection to the historically based structural inequa-
lities that sustain intergenerational poverty. they also point to the 
mechanisms of transmission or continuity at the household level, 
39  Brown, M. and Madge, n. 1982 Despite the Welfare State (London: heinemann).
40  Duncan, C. M. 1999 Worlds Apart: Why Poverty Persists in Rural America (new 
haven: Yale university Press).
41  of which the experience of structural adjustment would be one of the most re-
cent expressions.
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the interface between human agency and structure as well as the 
mechanisms of escape.
Experiencing Poverty
In this paper poverty is understood to be a multifaceted phenome-
non having as its chief characteristic an inability to afford a minimal 
standard of living defined either in terms of some basic need such as 
nutrition, or in respect of some standard commonly held by members 
of the society. furthermore, its severest manifestations are intergene-
rational. the psychic dimensions of poverty not captured in formal 
questionnaire methodology also come out in their stories.
Marie says, “sometimes when I get up at morning time or in the 
evening or whatsoever and look and see I don’t have anything to give 
my children [to eat] it does disturb me. I does feel real hurt.  But still, 
I does read my bible and I pray. I have faith and I say, is ok man the 
Creator won’t make us sleep hungry. even if I sleep hungry the Creator 
won’t make my children sleep hungry. sometimes even if is a hand of 
fig (green bananas) I does come upon, I will just cook it. and they will 
eat it. the children eating it”.  
Marie was born in 1961 to parents who were labourers involved 
in the processing of the main export agricultural crop nutmeg. In 1968 
when she was seven her parents separated and she went to live with 
her grandmother. according to Marie, “It was hard, because I had to 
do things like bring load (carry produce packed in baskets to be taken 
to the market for sale). at that stage I not suppose to do that (she was 
too young she feels to be doing that heavy work)”. her grandmother 
Marie tells us used to be a market vendor. she continues, “and then 
she used to sell ice cream. I used to have to carry the (ice making ma-
chinery) for a long distance. that was on a sunday. then on saturdays 
I used to be in town selling.  I went to aC primary school. I never went 
to secondary”. Marie says she never went to school on a regular basis, 
“because of my grandmother’s (economic) needs”. Marie says she was 
the youngest of the other children that her grand mother was respon-
sible for. she had a partner,”but after a while he died. I don’t think I 
could even remember him because he died when I was young”. Marie 
says she did not have enough food to eat growing up with her grand-
mother. even in carrying the little that she had to school there was a 
problem since she had no proper container in which to do so.
“I didn’t use to have no books. and I remember one time I get 
into a fight because my friend was carrying the bag I used to put my 
whatever”. she got into a fight and the person she was fighting with 
tear down my bag. “so I end up fighting with (that person)”. she con-
tinues, “then, and maybe this is why I did’nt end up in secondary 
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school, I used to have a grand aunt and she used to have pigs and we 
had to go all the way up to tallville to carry food that people use and 
they don’t want (leftovers) they use to store it up for my grand aunt 
and we used to go for it. and I had to carry it on my head and children 
used to tease us”.
the nature of deprivation and how it is experienced by the poo-
rest individuals in these societies is also evident in the case of sylvia, 
30 something year old mother of five from the island of st. Vincent.
“sometimes me does talk to them (her children) and mek them 
to know sey, if me no got, meh no got (if I don’t have anything, I don’t 
have anything). them have to understand when me get. sometime 
they bawl ‘mummy, mi hungry, mummy mi hungry. sometime me 
have to leave the the home and come out on the road. sometime me 
go up so, sometime round so, just scrunting for a dollar, scrunting for 
a dollar, scrunting for a dollar, much less 50c. sometimes I say, ‘some-
body can’t pass and give me something, boy? sometimes I sit down 
and I see a good partner (friend) pass. he will say, sylvia, what you 
doing there? I say, man me just deh ya ah relax, man. Dem children at 
home bawling for hungry and me nuh have nothing. that is the worst 
thing to hear that children hungry. they will say, come. some people 
carry me down to the supermarket, some to the restaurant. ‘pick up’ 
what you want. Call for what you want”.
sylvia also inherited her poverty. her mother, she tells us, “didn’t 
work; she made her living by ‘picking up’ a boyfriend, a man […] she 
would supplement this activity by going in the bush to plant food.” 
sylvia says she knew her father when she was small but “since I 
become big I don’t know him.  he go and leave my mother when I 
was six years old because my mother go and have another baby that 
is not his, so he did not like the situation and he go and leave her 
[…] he used to go in the bush and plant marijuana and so”.  sylvia 
says that her family suffered great hardships. she was eventually 
given to her uncle’s daughter to be raised.  at first she was treated 
good, but this changed and sylvia says “[…] they started to treat 
me bad.”  this caused her to run away and go back to her mother. 
after a while she says, “a lady take me and bring me down here (the 
grenadines)”.
Mechanisms of Transmission (Continuity)
Intergenerational poverty is sustained by social and economic exclu-
sion. all of the respondents can point to the inheritance of circum-
stances that condemned them to a life of poverty. the narrative of his 
life and those of his forebears provided by ska, though, is particularly 
stark in its representation of this mechanism. according to ska, 
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“[…] well, me nuh know (I don’t know), my old people (parents, gran-
dparents) grow up a kind of way [certain] in life, eh? and if my old 
people and them did have land [things would have been different] me 
never have no land, man! Me never own nothing. My elders and them 
never own nothing. Me nuh come meet nothing [I had no inheritan-
ce]. everything that you see me grow up with, is what I struggle for. 
nothing me no meet easy in life”.  
the case studies provide classic examples of the relationship between 
intergenerational poverty, and a synergism of factors that act as major 
mechanisms of transmission: inadequate schooling, under prepara-
tion for the labour market and the mating and fertility practices that 
obtain among Caribbean folk. the mating system among the folk in 
the Caribbean is a complex one that derives from the experiences of 
Plantation slavery, african retentions and social ecological factors42. 
at any given time most mothers are involved in a relationship with a 
man that has social, but not legal sanction. the relationship in which 
the partners do not cohabit is known as a visiting relationship. the 
male partner may be involved in more than one visiting union, or 
might even be married or in cohabitation with another woman.  for 
the woman such a relationship may continue indefinitely, it may be 
dissolved and another one entered into, or not. It might, as well, be 
followed by common law cohabitation or formal marriage. although 
not practiced by the majority of persons in the lower socioeconomic 
stratum, marriage is seen as the ideal union type. In many instances 
it is entered into after years of visiting or common law cohabitation 
between a man and a woman and represents an embellishment rather 
than an initiation of the relationship. 
these mechanisms of transmission are evident in the lives of the 
respondents. all of the respondents have suffered for being products 
of this pattern of family formation. ska tells us that his mother wor-
ked as a labourer at a distribution centre. “My daddy? Me never did 
know him. him did leave and go Barbados when I was about 7 years 
old. I never knew anything about him”. ska says he grew up with three 
brothers. he has two sisters, he says, but he did not grow up with 
them. “Me mother have five of us, four boys and one girl. that include 
me sister, but me sister never live around with us”.  his mother had his 
siblings for one man, but had him with a second man.  ska describes 
his life growing up as “tough”. he continues, “at one time they used 
to call me ‘mind meself’”; indicating that he was virtually responsible 
42  see Patterson, o. 1982 “Persistence, continuity and change in the Jamaican wor-
king class family” Journal of Family History, n° 7: 135-161, summer. 
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for himself growing up. “I had to look after my little brother after me 
two of us use to go school. every recess I used to have to come and 
look after him. when me mummy cook in the morning this food for 
our lunch, because she cooks in the morning for our lunch. evening 
time we used to be by our granny until she come [home]. sometime 
granny gave us a little snack until she come [for us]. otherwise I tur-
ned around and did a little thing, if is roast two potato or roast two 
banana. those time we snack until mummy come. and we grew up 
that way until we finished school”. ska says he left school at 14 years 
old. “Me could’nt go through (continue school). It was tough, man. 
hardship made me have to stop school. when I stopped school, the 
first thing I ever tried to do was to go and look a trade [skill]. But it 
was such a great struggle within trade life […]”
In similar vein sylvia locates her unfortunate situation in life at 
present in her childhood.  sylvia’s childhood in the grenadines, she 
says, was an arduous one.  she was not sent to school regularly, she 
says, and hunger was a problem. she coped by going to the house of 
neighbours and begging for food and drink. she says, “I would sit and 
cry because I was hungry.  sometimes I would go on the beach, break 
coconut and eat out the inside and go to school.  sometimes I have to 
stay home because [I have] nothing.  I can’t help myself because I have 
nobody by my side to cook and give me something to eat. sometimes I 
would get something, but sometimes is long tears from my eye; suffe-
ring. that is why I did not get the education I was supposed to get like 
everybody. sometimes I does study [think about it] education; if I did 
have somebody good by my side to teach me and show me wrong from 
right. sometimes I does study back all those things […] I do whatever 
I could do just to get something to eat”. 
the respondents have, in turn, created families along lines that 
conduce to the replication of poverty from parent to child. Marie’s 
experiences are illustrative,
“[I left school] when I was 17 and when I was 18 I got pregnant 
with my first son.  I left school because my time did reach to leave. I 
did the school leaving [exam] and I still didn’t pass. so when I did that 
I had was to leave. then I end up going to learn to cook and bake and 
thing at a place they call the Centre.” Marie says that when she met 
the father of her first child she was not working and she was living at 
her grandmother’s home. “after when I get pregnant she get vex with 
me and I had to leave. I came to (present community) and I was living 
with an aunt of mine. and when I was 19 the child was born and then 
I just having them like one after the other, because I have 10”.
Marie says the father of her first child was 2 years older than 
her.  “he used to be working in the park, taking care of the park, the 
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grounds, but he still didn’t use to come up as he should [providing 
support for her and the child]. when the first child was one year I was 
three months pregnant already.  and it was just like that. the only one 
I did not make fast was the last girl for him. [...] I went and live with 
him after, when I had my second child for him; I went and live with 
him. the reason why I [eventually] broke up with him is because he 
didn’t used to treat me right. he used to like hit me and leave me off 
like on weekend and go behind the sound system [disco]. sometime 
[not] till Monday morning I might see him.  I used to make coconut 
oil, you know I wasn’t lazy too, I used to like to do something and I 
used to be making my coconut oil and thing.  I had these two small 
children to look after, I still unto the coconut. I had to cook. I had to 
wash and everything. I used to be crying all the time. and then I still 
end up getting these two girls after [last two children for the first part-
ner] and then I start checking myself, because I starting to learn. and I 
decide ah [I] going [to] leave him off [end the relationship] and [after] 
ah leave him off again ah go and take up a nex one[next man], [this 
time] I get five [children]. Is 10 I have, you know?” when asked why 
she was having so many children Marie replies,” I wasn’t conscious. 
I wasn’t conscious, because when I have the four and then I met this 
one and get this other one [fifth child] I start getting conscious. and 
then I say well I cant go down so making children, but it still happen 
to me, you know. and is just because of I aint working, you know and 
is still needs [she still has needs] and this one [man] come around and 
he says he still going to help. and it wasn’t no help”.
  
Mating, Family and the Labour Market
the labour market component of the dynamic suggests itself in the 
life circumstances faced by Marie. for cultural reasons, the primary 
labour market in the Caribbean favours the participation of men over 
women. nonetheless, it is still a primary labour market with all of the 
insecurities of tenure, low level skill requirements, low pay and so on. 
Men, therefore, although favoured by this market (as Marie puts it, “If 
I could get [a job] he could get too. he is man!”), are still subject to 
its deficiencies. so, they are more likely than women to get work and 
therefore be in a position to make offers to the disadvantaged woman, 
but the nature of the work does not provide the level and stability of 
income to enable the man to make a sustained contribution to the 
upkeep of a family. Because of this many poor men become migratory 
labourers, either within their own country, moving in search of uncer-
tain work, or overseas.
Because of the transitory nature of their stay movers are even 
less encumbered by what in many instances are already loose social 
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sanctions pertaining to the initiation of sexual relationships between 
men and women.  the poorest women in these locales are open to the 
overtures of men who, at least temporarily, have a source of income. 
the presence of women made readily available because of their vul-
nerable socioeconomic position is the basis on which these types of 
unstable relationships rest.
for those men that choose not to move around in search of work, 
being in this labour market can mean that employment is, at best, 
intermittent. therefore, even with the best will in the world and the 
greatest love for their children, such men fall short in the provision 
of support for their families. even where income might be relatively 
steady and sustained, the greater likelihood of the woman’s inability 
to effectively participate in the labour market places her at a severe di-
sadvantage and effectively increases the available pool of women from 
whom the man may obtain sexual favours.  this lends an element of 
instability to the existing unions and often leads to the man overex-
tending himself in terms of families of procreation and their support 
within his community.
It is therefore held that the manifestation of this absolute pover-
ty at the level of the individual and the household is attributable to 
the institutionalization of economic, psychological and sociological 
factors that conduce to its reproduction43. furthermore, these outco-
mes should be understood to be the result of the interplay between 
global economic forces, and their expression at the regional and local 
levels, and a historically shaped capacity, manifest at the household 
level, to respond to these circumstances. an understanding of histori-
cal circumstances at the broader structural level and how these have 
become manifest at the levels of the household and the community is 
central to an understanding of poverty in the present day. Conceptua-
lizations that point to historically shaped capacities to respond to an 
enduringly skewed and unjust opportunity structure that is a feature 
of Caribbean society help us to understand the salience of intergene-
rational poverty in the socioeconomic landscape of the region.
Mechanisms of Escape (Discontinuity)
even so, such conceptualizations still leave room for understanding 
change and how some households escape from the cycle of poverty sin-
ce it is argued that there is a creative interplay between structure and 
agency in which individuals are impelled, but not compelled in their res-
43  Miller, s. 1996 “the great Chain of Poverty explanation” in oyen, e.; Miller, s. 
& syed, abdus samad (eds.) Poverty a Global Review: Handbook on International 
Poverty Research (oslo: scandinavian university Press/unesCo).
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ponses to the circumstances of life44. Marie, for example, shows signs 
of a well developed spiritually that has allowed her to spurn overtures 
from men even when her household was without food. she tells us, “I 
came out with a lady who went to church with me too. I didn’t tell her 
nothing [about not having any food in the house]. But when I reach 
here and I read, I went back to she. I say, I aint going and ask somebody 
who aint going to church and thing to reproach me. I went to she and 
then she treat me good that night [was generous to her], you know? 
so sometimes I does say is just god, you know?  and that night I was 
tempted, because you have [there is] a mister, as I reach out to go to the 
lady he come and he tamp [touch] me on my bottom, you know? Yeah, 
and want to hold a conversation with me. But I wasn’t up to that I was 
thinking about my business. so, I even say, that is the work of the Devil 
too, you know? […] But I didn’t give up, I still go and I get through. I 
could [have] just turn back and ask he. But I didn’t choose to [structure 
and agency, impelled, but not compelled]. so, I think the word of god 
keeping me a lot too. I don’t think I so righteous, but I trust him […]”.
ska, after fathering 5 children with three different women has 
now dedicated himself to providing a stable home for the three youn-
gest ones even while their mother lives and works in a north atlantic 
country. escape is also provided by changes in the structural arrange-
ments that exclude the poor from resources such as education. within 
the life time of the respondents there has been a significant broade-
ning of educational opportunity for the poor. Both Marie and ska’s 
children have done better at school than their parents. this is, in part, 
the result of the parent’s recognition of the importance of education 
and their determination for their children to obtain it. this factor was 
absent in their own upbringing. It is quite uncertain though whether 
sylvia’s children, given the levels of destitution that they face, will be 
able to take full advantage of these historically recent opportunities. 
a lot will turn on her will and determination and the proclivities that 
her children display.
ska remarks that he never had the opportunities for education that 
his children now enjoy. he continues, “that’s why me ah tell them, you 
can’t ramp [joke] you have to go to it. Because, me no get them privilege 
deh. free school! them [his children] want new shoes and thing to wear 
44  this conceptualization is a variation on the theme of creative interplay between 
structure and agency that has emerged in recent social science discourse on this in 
response to some of the more static, one sided conceptualizations that characterize 
Classical and functionalist sociology. see giddens, anthony 1986 The Construction 
of Society Outline of the Theory of Structuration (w/p: university of Claifornia Press); 
hay, Colin 1995 “structure and agency” in Marsh, David and stocker, gerry Theory 
and Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
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to school. Me? when me was now going to school is a half of exercise 
book me carry. half! Me never even write on exercise book when I star-
ted to go to school. It was slate [that I used]. Me write my name on slate 
before me come to meet book. slate! that is the first thing I write my 
name on before me change to copy book […]. that is what me start on, 
until me start to carry exercise book [and] is half an exercise book, until 
it come to one. then it come to three, then it come to six. six is when I 
completed Jr. 5, Common entrance class [last class prior to high school]. 
that is the time I could carry six books. Before Jr 5 is 3 books I was ca-
rrying. Maths in one, english and Comprehension and grammar inna 
one and me little writing book. now, [they] getting computer in school. 
I cant even turn on a computer. [repeats]. But if me go trade and learn 
to do it, I will do it. But me cant […] a dem [the youth] now have to go 
do it. Much less to go and say I am logging on [to the Internet] [laughs]”.
Qualitative life narratives provide a wealth of insight into the cha-
racter of the society in which the individual lives. In the case of the 
poor, case studies tell of the nature of the social relations and social 
network of the individual; how they have lived their lives; the decisions 
they have made and continue to make on a daily basis and how societal 
circumstances have changed over time. In sum, the interviews tell us of 
the circumstances that led to persons finding themselves in situations 
of insufficiency and how they cope, adapt and adjust to such situations.
Life narratives tell us of the larger context within which poverty 
is created and continues to exist. this, it has been argued, is charac-
terized by structural inequalities manifest in the access, or lack the-
reof, to the material and social resources of the society. they will also 
be manifest in the gender and familial relationships existing at the 
household level. here, the human agent still has the responsibility of 
creative interpretation of the pre-existing social and economic arran-
gements. some of the choices that are made will translate into poverty 
for the next generation. some will lead to a break in the cycle. these 
life stories therefore provide us with a view of the interface between 
institutional setting and individual response that is absent from the 
quantitative studies. the case studies provide us with insight into the 
relationship between structure and agency in this process of social 
reproduction. they point to some of the mechanisms of continuity as 
well as discontinuity. furthermore, they tell us how these experiences 
are rationalized by the persons living them.
Answers:  Policy Implications. Conclusion
the analysis suggests the existence of a social dynamic rooted in the 
region’s historical political economy that lends itself to the transmis-
sion of poverty across the generations. the dynamic consists of an 
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amalgam of a set of conditioned responses, mediated by gender, to 
systems of inequality and exclusion that are historically based, but 
which continue to find sustenance in a global economic situation cha-
racterized by marked asymmetry. while it would be incorrect to un-
derstate the personal responsibility that each individual has for the 
outcomes that affect their lives, the data seem to suggest the existence 
of structural constraints in the form of cultural, economic and social 
endowments that impel individuals to make the choices that tend to 
the reinforcement of the circumstances of deprivation into which they 
are born45. Point in time LsMs statistical data associated with the 
IfI and structural adjustment, while providing information for the 
important function of counting, miss the depth and the tenacity of 
the problem that confronts regions such as the Caribbean. there is 
therefore a need for a research methodology that is heterodox in its 
approach to the study of social conditions in the region in order to 
ensure a better informed anti-poverty policy.
structural change has to overcome power asymmetries and the-
refore tends to take place in a piece meal kind of way over time. some 
of the case study material that has been examined point to structural 
changes in Caribbean society that have improved the circumstances 
of the region’s poor. there is no question that some of the children 
in the case studies will enjoy better circumstances of life than their 
parents were able to due to the provision of social support systems in 
the educational system and the expansion of secondary education for 
the region’s children. however, the retarding influences of historically 
based social and economic inequalities have to be acknowledged, un-
derstood and addressed in poverty eradication policies if this change 
is to be sustained and effective.
the study of poverty as well as plans for its eradication in regions 
such as the Caribbean have to move beyond the epistemic and cul-
tural bounds of Positivist empiricism. the holistic  approach to the 
study of poverty in Caribbean society is in accord with the new ways 
of understanding society that have emerged out of the rethink of deve-
lopment studies and the role of the social sciences in managing social 
and institutional changes in the Postcolonial world. It includes calls 
for a new interpretive-critical dialogue that would represent a shift 
from the first world offering technical expertise to the third based 
on the positivist mis-analysis of society and economy associated with 
neo-classical economics to one that enables an elucidatory interchan-
ge between both areas of an increasingly interconnected globe. this 
45  here a good parallel to cite would be the constraining influence of grammar on 
language construction.
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should be based on an understanding of social scientific enquiry de-
void of argument by analogy between the natural and social sciences. 
In its place would be put one that draws more on hermeneutic ap-
proaches to further understandings of local perceptions and interpre-
tations of what is deemed to a much more complex process of social 
change than was previously thought46.
the analysis of poverty in the region done in the paper points 
to the importance of multidisciplinarity and the use of research me-
thodology that is more naturalistic and phenomenological in charac-
ter. the approach to poverty eradication at the household and com-
munity level has to be holistic and inclusive. It has to recognize that a 
situation obtains in which the parents of today’s children and sizable 
proportions of  young people were not able to take advantage of the 
broadening of the opportunity structures that might have taken place 
within their life time. In a sense these people have ‘missed the boat’ 
of structural change that has occurred in these societies. or, perhaps 
more accurately, have been prevented from taking the boat by the so-
cial dynamic that the paper has identified. the case studies point to 
the significance in the reproduction of poverty of intangibles such as 
social exclusion and the historically and culturally conditioned res-
ponses that individuals make to them.  
understanding the intergenerational character of poverty in the 
region means broadening the approach to poverty eradication. It calls 
for an assemblage of intervention strategies that address the mecha-
nisms of continuity, some of which have been identified here. the po-
licy should have administrative loci in all of the social line ministries 
(including planning and finance), be administered by a committee of 
bureaucrats, and representatives from the state, a broad spectrum of 
international donor agencies, ngo and CBo organizations.
The Pragmatic Dimension: Elements of 
Poverty Eradication Strategy
a poverty eradication programme that is community based and en-
courages active participation through the development of the capacities 
of its members and the provision of support systems (e.g. provide the 
facilities and teach ska to use the computer and the Internet). speci-
fic areas of  intervention: international debt relief with monies being 
used in poverty eradication programmes; the provision of international 
grants for countercyclical fiscal support geared to employment creation 
through the development of social infrastructure at the community le-
46  Preston, Peter w. 1996 Development Theory: An Introduction (w/p: Blackwell 
Pub).
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vel; skills training and employment that cater to out of school adoles-
cents as well as adults; school feeding, uniforms, book rental and other 
support systems to the children of households that have inherited their 
poverty and have a particular mating and fertility profile; adolescent 
counseling targeted at both sexes, but especially at young girls from 
households with a particular mating and fertility profile; comm unity le-
vel interventions aimed at fostering social inclusiveness (e.g. discussion 
of community problems, solutions and planned implementations with 
community members by technocrats; the development of community 
based homework centres) as one antidote to social exclusion, one of the 
main bucklers of intergenerational poverty; provision of resources such 
as land, technical support and irrigation in the rural areas and small 
business loans to households in the urban/semiurban areas); improved 
targeting in the distribution of resources to the needy and the use of 
both quantitative and qualitative indices in this exercise.
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3.2. Poverty Reduction in Ghana
Alternative Solutions by the State
Abstract
In ghana, as in many other parts of africa, poverty continues to have 
an indelible mark on a vast section of the population mainly due to in-
adequate access to education and health. the cost-recovery solutions 
dictated by the market logic under the structural adjustment programs 
(saP) have not been effective in dealing with core poverty issues as 
it relates to public access to education and health care provisioning. 
while still situated within the neoliberal domain that privileges mar-
ket solutions, the ghanaian state in the recent past, has strategically 
been shrugging off the recoil order that had been placed on it. the 
effort at engineering alternative poverty reduction solutions so as to 
tone down the bare marketism is the seminal concern of this paper. 
two of such social programs the ghana educational trust fund (ge-
tfund) and the national health Insurance scheme (nhIs) form the 
locus of attention in this discussion 
Introduction
the minimalist state agenda that was pursued under the neoliberal 
structural adjustment programs (saP) demanded of the ghanaian 
 * Lecturer in Political science, faculty of Integrated Development studies, univer-
sity for Development studies, tamale.
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state to disengage itself from the provisioning of social services at 
non-economic rates. the logical execution of the saP led to the 
wrecking of the original social contract that was established on 
the state’s responsibility of provisioning of social services; either at 
subsidized rates or for gratis (Bangura, 1992). the praxis of exten-
sionism that the ghanaian state had assumed prior to the infusion 
of the neoliberal order in the eighties placed a veritable burden on 
the economy. Indeed, the ability of the state to provide social servi-
ces depended very much on the fortunes of the primary commodity 
market. and as these fortunes dwindled in the seventies the state’s 
capacity to keep to the tenets of social provisioning collapsed (nu-
gent, 1995).
the financial injection by the International Monetary fund (IMf) 
and the world Bank substantially resuscitated the capacities of the 
various social service providers, as was for instance the case for health 
care provisioning and education. however, the philosophy for service 
provisioning had changed to one that considered social services as any 
other commodity on the market whose production cost must be borne 
by its consumers. the social policies that were rolled out to address 
poverty issues were underpinned by the market rationality. In conse-
quence, access to such critical services as education and health care 
for the poor became difficult. within the authoritarian realm that the 
neoliberal policies were initiated, it was not too difficult for the state 
managers to waggle through. But with the reintroduction of democra-
cy in 1993 a dilemmatic situation arose for the managers of the state. 
this, on one hand, took the form of internal push for the restoration 
of the social benefits of the past; and on the other hand the difficulty 
of a dependent economy disengaging from the overwhelming unipolar 
neoliberal ideology. to retain the legitimacy of democratic governance 
there emerged some outbox reengineering that allowed the state to 
collectivize the financing of education and health care to allow greater 
public access. these collectivized solutions were adopted to reduce 
poverty as it relates to non-access to basic social services as health 
care and education. as these efforts are meant to tone down the ru-
gged commercialization of these services, this paper focuses atten-
tion on the subtle return of the ghanaian state to provide alternative 
solutions to poverty reduction strategies. these alternative solutions 
are discussed against the backdrop of the unhelpfulness of the bare 
market poverty reduction solutions of cash-and-carry system that had 
been imposed by the international financial institutions (IfI). the 
primary attention for the alternative solutions is on the ghana edu-
cational trust fund (getfund) and the national health Insurance 
scheme (nhIs).
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Theoretical Understanding of Poverty
the ubiquity of poverty and the variegated forms it manifests in ghana, 
and in other parts of the world, renders a concise definition of the con-
cept rather problematic. Poverty is usually conceived in absolute or in 
relative terms; but more importantly it is essentially  an existential issue 
that touches on the conditions of life that a section of society experien-
ces, as they meet the challenges of life (Bilton et al., 1987). those who 
view issues of poverty in absolute terms are usually concerned with cer-
tain minimum subsistence requirements that an individual needs for a 
healthy living in a given social setting; and within a specific temporal 
frame. the poor in this regard, are those who are materially deprived 
in meeting those minimum requirements for subsistence. Poverty is 
also regarded as a relative concept that utilizes the metrics of econo-
mic disparities as the basis for demarcating the poor from the better-off 
(galbraith, 1958). the relative notion of poverty is normally based on 
a measurement criterion that adopts a formula that equates poverty to 
some fraction of the median income or below (townsend, 1979). 
the underdeveloped world is characterized by both forms of po-
verty; as not an insignificant segment of their populations have in-
terminable struggles with subsistence. hunger, malnutrition, filth, ill-
health, illiteracy and similar melancholic existence tend to be their 
lot. the underdeveloped areas are also characterized by massive eco-
nomic differentials that emanate from skewed access to the means of 
economic appropriation, and social surplus allocation. the resource 
limitations that confront the underdeveloped state, severely limits its 
capability of raising the general living standards of its people (adesi-
na, 2007). In the absence of social safety nets, the poor especially in 
africa are particularly vulnerable as they are faced with the agonizing 
effects of material deprivation, and social exclusion that places them 
at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their social superiors. the conditions and 
circumstances of the poor are captured as follows: “poor people suffer 
physical pain that comes with too little food and long hours of work; 
emotional pain stemming from the daily humiliation of dependency 
and lack of power; and the moral pain for being forced to make choi-
ces –such as whether to use limited funds to save the life of an ill 
family member or to use those funds to feed the children” (narayan 
et al., 2000: 3).
the quote largely encapsulates the daily experiences of the poor 
as they encounter the limitations that material deprivation placed on 
them. this easily translates into emotional torments, as the poor are 
faced with uncomfortable opportunity costs. 
however, the occurrence of poverty over the millennia does not 
bring unanimity in the theoretical explanations of its causations. this 
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is primarily due to the social dynamics that continually mutate the 
form, and the outward manifestations of poverty over the years. un-
like the mediaeval past when superstition and religiosity held sway, 
contemporary conceptualizations of poverty are no longer tied to a 
belief in a supernatural predetermined fate, which holds that pover-
ty is the result of god’s visitation of misery on an accursed group of 
people; for sins either directly committed by the victims themselves or 
by familial agnates (gilpin, 1987: 265). the movement away from the 
Karma-determined causational paradigm has, however, not settled 
the theoretical explications around a single issue. 
In Victorian Britain, theories on the causes of poverty were 
mainly couched in secularized tones; but they were equally simplistic 
as their mediaeval antecedents. they held the poor directly responsi-
ble for their plight. Individuals were poor because they were unable 
or unwilling to provide adequately for their own well-being. this point 
of view not only placed the burden on the poor themselves, but also 
exonerated society or social groups for being responsible for its cau-
sation. for instance, herbert spencer conceived of the poor as being 
‘good for nothing vagrants’ that find themselves in their situation due 
to their ‘dissolute living’1. this theoretical paradigm lost considera-
ble explanatory strength for the most part of the twentieth Century 
principally due to the socioeconomic transformations associated with 
industrialization and urbanization. the transformations associated 
with industrial urbanization eroded the communal security that the 
rural environment had provided previously. the nauseating poverty 
that followed the trail of such developments fostered a rethinking of 
the causes of poverty. the rethinking was again catalyzed by the secu-
larization of society and thought that the atomized urban settings had 
fostered. the crystallization of the capitalist industrial society brought 
home the recognition that there were inevitable “winners and losers” 
in the new social construct. this perspective acknowledged the role of 
society in the creation of poverty; and hence held society responsible 
for ameliorative engineering. the post world war II social recons-
truction philosophy was greatly informed by societal responsibility 
for rescuing the poor. fabianist social benevolence was no longer con-
sidered adequate for meeting the needs of the swarming poor that the 
modern state was producing.
the answer to addressing the emerging issues in the post world 
war II era was largely based on the views of Maynard Keynes that 
came to dominate socioeconomic constructs until the late seventies 
1  see offer, John 1993 Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought: Political 
Workings- Spencer (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press), pp.  xxiii-xxiv.
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(Keynes, 1973). Keynesianism demanded of the state to be economi-
cally active and to embark on policies geared towards full employ-
ment. subsequently, the thrust of governance in the period was an-
chored around a social welfarist pact; which the state-managers and 
the general population must adhere to, and deliver on. the underlying 
assumption of this pact was that the individual elements in a capitalist 
system do not have equal access and control over the productive for-
ces. the reward system in terms of economic appropriation and pro-
prietary entitlements in a competitive environment also follows the 
logic that underlines competition; such that it ends up incarcerating a 
section of society in poverty.
whereas, such inequalities may be justified by pure capitalist eco-
nomism, the insecurity that such systems portend is a well known 
phenomenon in sociology. the welfare state based on dirigisme was, 
therefore, crafted to insulate the weak in society from the inequalities 
of an unbridled capitalist drive. this social reconstruction produced 
stupendous rise in living standards, to the point of almost elimina-
ting absolute poverty in the post world war II industrialized societies 
(hettne, 1995). the provisioning of social safety-nets, as employment, 
health insurance, education, unemployment benefits and shelter lar-
gely came to replace philanthropic and charity gestures to the poor, 
with a well-thought-out state welfare policies for poverty reduction. 
the social pact was, therefore, meant to redefine the raison d’ être of 
governance as it established a new relationship between the governors 
and the governed. In this regard, the leaders came to understand that 
their legitimacy hinged on their ability to deliver on the tenets of the 
package; while the citizenry also knew that their responsibility in the 
social equation included their contributions for its sustainability. It 
was this mutual role expectations and performances that underpin-
ned the thriving of the welfare system until the late seventies. 
however, as the western world went through the normal capi-
talist “boom-bust” cycle with a bust in the seventies, the statist and 
welfarist policies that had served so well to uplift the living conditions 
of the many was picked by the neoliberal ideologues, as the culprit for 
the economic meltdown. the state, thence suffered severe demoni-
zation for being an unnecessary deadweight on the vibrant, efficient, 
and effective market system (harvey, 2005). the calls were, therefore, 
for the state’s recoil as a way of restoring the efficacy of the market 
system; and through that pave the way for the restoration of economic 
growth (Mkandawire, 2000). the stage was thus prepared for the pro-
motion of the hegemony of the neoliberal order in a hayekian state 
and to return to laissez faire economics (hayek. 1960). It was also to 
re-invoke the spencerian notions that understood social interventions 
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against poverty, as a sort of ‘social cannibalism’ as it undercuts the 
essence of his ‘survival of the fittest’ logic. the proper role of the state 
in the emerging order was an umpiring one, in an unrestrained mar-
ket system. the market or its more innocuous euphemism ‘the private 
sector’ was now considered as the “engine of growth”; and profit ma-
king as the primary criterion for the measure of its performance. 
By the beginning of the eighties the neoliberal order had congea-
led enough, in the west, to become an export commodity to the rest of 
the world. the legitimacy of neoliberalism was further catalyzed by the 
crumble of the soviet empire that had hitherto provided an ideological 
alternative. the triumph of marketism in the emergent unipolar world 
was to have far-reaching consequences on the poorest continent: africa. 
the dependence of african countries on western bilateral and multi-
lateral donor community is proverbial; and this exposed them to the 
market imperatives that had taken roots in the west. the main conduits 
for bringing these ideas to the african continent were the Bretton wo-
ods financial institutions: the International Monetary fund (IMf) and 
the world Bank. In this vein, financial assistance and all sorts of donor 
support were now predicated on conditionalities meant to delegitimize 
the state, and thereby roll it back from intrusive economic activities. 
the effort was particularly targeted at suffusing adjusting economies 
with the market logic and rationality so as to move them away from 
their prior command systems. the neoliberal order, therefore, deman-
ded the removal of subsidies and the cost-free social interventions as 
they were considered as market distortions (Mkandawire, 2006). the 
rejection of the state as a vital economic actor began to produce proble-
matic and crippling effects for africa as it had depended very much on 
state-led approaches for development management.  
State Welfarism
Largely, africa emerged out of colonial rule with very thin and dimi-
nutive capitalist class that could not be relied on to braze capitalist de-
velopment (onimode, 1988). according to Claude ake (1981) colonial 
rule in africa, was not meant to produce an independent indigenous 
bourgeoisie and hence stultified their development. thus at indepen-
dence, there was a writ large evidence that the development path for 
africa was going to be a very long one. to combat the near-universal 
pauperized conditions that colonial underdevelopment had brought 
into being, various shades of statist development approaches became 
the african norm. 
In fact, the nationalist mobilization against the colonialists only 
made sense to the general populace when the object of the struggle 
was cast in bifurcated Manichean terms (nzongola-ntalaja, 1997). In 
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this sense, the defining characteristics of poverty –deprivation, illitera-
cy, misery and social marginalization– were to be transcended on the 
attainment of independence, by material abundance and prosperity. 
In ghana, this was aptly captured in the aphorism ‘seek yee first the 
political kingdom and all other things would be added unto you’ (ro-
oney, 1988). for the teeming unemployed youth and the marginalized 
colonial subjects, the independence struggle was quintessentially also 
a struggle against poverty. 
In the manner in which the nationalist struggle was cast, it was 
clear the nationalist leaders knew what their mission was going to be 
(austin, 1964). But as the ghanaian situation was also a reflection 
of the general african malaise of paucity of an enterprising capitalist 
class that could act as the engine of growth and development, the path 
chosen for socioeconomic progression was statism. the provisioning 
of social services as education, health care, public utilities were taken 
up by the state; and provided either by subsidization or for gratis. the-
se services and similar responsibilities of the state to provide public 
formal jobs and utilities were measures meant to alleviate poverty. 
the stage was prepared for massive state involvement in the economy 
and for the state to wrestle with the big task of underdevelopment. 
the state, thereon, became the pivot around which the development 
management revolved (Killick, 1978). It was not too difficult for the 
ghanaian state to carry out its assigned role once the commercial re-
turns from its major export –cocoa– was doing reasonably well on 
the international market. the continuity of the colonial appropria-
tion system of the surplus generated by the cocoa farmer via the state 
monopsony, the Cocoa Marketing Board (CoCoBoD) made it possi-
ble for easy funding of the welfare contract. the beneficiaries of the 
social provisioning came to regard it as their entitlement and hence 
resisted efforts at tinkering with it. But the performance of ghana’s 
economy had always been tied to the vicissitudes of the global cocoa 
market. when the cocoa market began to experience downturns in the 
mid-sixties, the state began to feel the burden of the extended respon-
sibilities due to diminished capacity to meet its obligations (Killick, 
1978). notwithstanding the emerging economic difficulties, Kwame 
nkrumah’s government was tenacious in pursuing the collectivist 
approach to meeting the demands of the social contract. 
the effort by Kofi Busia’s right wing government to alter the wel-
farist contract was resisted by such beneficiary constituents as uni-
versity students, civil servants and the military2. In fact, it was due to 
2  Kofi Busia, the Prime Minister during ghana’s second republic (1969-72) was an 
ardent ideological opponent of Kwame nkrumah’s socialist leanings, who attempted 
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resistance to the removal of social amenities that the state had always 
provided that led to the military coup in 1972 (Danso-Boafo, 1996). 
such efforts were interpreted as attempts to calcify class lines in the 
country. successive governments, therefore, shied away from tam-
pering with the welfarist contract and thereby maintained the statist 
approach at dealing with social reconstruction.
the economy of ghana went through massive dislocation in the 
seventies such that by the beginning of the eighties the economy was 
veritably in a state of comatose (shillington, 1992). with Busia’s fa-
ilure to recompose the governance pact, the state continued to be the 
locus of attention in addressing issues of development and policies 
meant for poverty mitigation. But the vitiation of the capability of the 
state to deliver was clear as the economy could hardly support the 
extensionism that it had adopted.
It was in the wake of these developments that the new mili-
tary-based government of the Provisional national Defense Council 
(PnDC) approached the IMf and the world Bank for a financial bai-
lout in 1983. the dealings with the Bretton woods institutions were 
to remarkably change the economic and social discourse in ghana, 
through the adjustment programs 
The Structural Adjustment Programs
and Issues of Poverty
the re-launch of economic growth in ghana under the various phases 
of the saP created the platform for the touting of the country as a ‘suc-
cess story’ for all adjusting economies in africa (hutchful, 2002: 1). 
admittedly, the economy had been lifted from an abyss of unfathoma-
ble regression to growth rates that persistently were above 5% in the 
adjusting years (national Development Planning Commission, 2003). 
It needs to be said with the same vigor that growth was restored by a 
rigorous application of neoliberal conditionalities. the primary goal 
of the conditionalities was to delegitimize the state and to retrench it 
as an active player in economic activities. the market was to occupy 
the void that the state’s departure was to create. the abandonment of 
the original social pact went with social dislocations and vulnerabili-
ties that gained new intensity with the application of the market ra-
tionality (adesina, 2007). this emanated from the basic contradiction 
between the fundamentals of the saP and the prior statist regime.
In the years preceding the saP, health and education expenditure 
fell in both relative and absolute terms. the share of education in the 
rolling out liberal economic policies to replace the leftist programs that had been 
instituted at independence.
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budget declined from 20.7% in 1972 to 20.2% in 1982 and health from 
7.8% to 6.1% in the same period. Perhaps, one of the most dramatic 
developments in the social sector in the early stages of the adjustment 
was the significant increase in the real spending on the sector. expen-
ditures on health, education and school welfare together increased 
from 31.5% of total recurrent expenditure in 1983 to 49% in 1989. 
During the same period the education share of total budget rose from 
21.3% to 27.9%. the corresponding increases for health and social 
welfare were 4.3% to 11% and for 4.3% to 9.6% respectively (world 
Bank, 1991: 104).
without totally abdicating its social welfare responsibilities the 
ghanaian state struggled to deliver, so as to keep the contract. But the 
enfeeblement the state had suffered as a result of the abysmal perfor-
mance of the economy was very much in evidence; as educational and 
public health care institutions were left to rot. It, therefore, became a 
prime target of the government to rehabilitate these service provider 
institutions with donors’ funds. access and utilization of these ser-
vices were, however, meant to be in line with the principles of cost 
recovery. thus, right from the inception of the saP in 1983, user-fees 
were imposed at the public health centers. the introduction of user-
fee payment at health centers became full-blown in 1992 when the 
“cash-and-carry” system became institutionalized (hutchful, 2002).
the implementation of the user-fee policy was, however, associa-
ted with an ignominious situation in which improved conditions at 
the hospitals did not march with the public utilization of services (Ma-
cLean, 1999). It is important to note that modern public health care 
was meant to encourage access to health care that was based on scien-
tific diagnostics and treatment. Indeed, health care system in ghana 
has always been a dualistic one in that the modern competes with the 
traditional (twumasi, 1975). the earlier efforts at making health care 
free were modernization endeavors, as well. as the fees at the health 
care centers got out of reach of the poor, there arose a diminished 
capacity to utilize the modern health care services that the state really 
wanted for the people. a paradox situation thus emerged in the pre-
vailing circumstances in which the enhanced health delivery facilities 
failed to attract patients (ziken International, 1993: 14-15).  
similar situation was played out in the educational sector. In 
1987 the educational sector adjustment Program was launched with 
the world Bank support to address the problems. the adjustment pro-
gram was to be comprehensive in examining issues at all levels of 
ghana’s educational structure; that is from the basic to the tertiary. 
the most visible feature of the educational sector was under-funding 
and the associated low morale among the professionals in the field. In 
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the immediate years prior to the launch of the adjustment program, 
the government behaved as though the educational sector was of no 
priority and a needless burden on the state. as under-funding and low 
salaries became unbearable, teachers voted out of the system with 
their feet to neighboring countries leaving the classrooms empty and 
students were left stranded (gyimah-Boadi, 1992)
given this situation, the rehabilitation of the educational sector 
gained immediacy for progress to be made. the world Bank suppor-
ted program was, therefore, meant to be comprehensive in addressing 
the problems of the past; and thereby bring in efficiency and cost-
effectiveness at all levels. to realize this, it became the objective of the 
restructuring effort to cut down expenditure on education through 
rationalization of the system that would reduce the length of study at 
the pre-tertiary level. Consequently, the previous length of pre-tertiary 
education was found to be too long, and as such was pruned down 
from 17 years to 12 years (hutchful, 2002). the restructuring effort 
was based on the conviction that primary level education had more 
social returns than at the higher levels; and hence priority was placed 
on pre-university education for skill acquisition. to improve access 
the government in 1996, introduced the free Compulsory and uni-
versal Basic education (fCuBe). the efforts at reducing the length 
of basic education and the implementation of the fCuBe greatly in-
creased student enrolments. this produced new challenges that the 
implementers had not adequately catered for. the skills acquisition 
focus of the educational reform demanded the construction of labora-
tories and workshops but it was soon revealed that student numbers 
overwhelmed the facilities that were available. the swarming num-
bers that pre-tertiary institutions were confronted with were soon to 
become problems for the downstream institutions. 
university education in ghana had always been state sponsored 
and cost-free since the colonial period. higher level education had 
been seen as the necessary institutions that would develop the requisi-
te human capacities for national development and hence the premium 
it received; for its social returns. higher level education also produced 
socioeconomic side effects as it was the surest way of vertical mobili-
ty for the under-privileged. It is exactly for these reasons that earlier 
efforts at removing the welfare package created lots of social tension, 
as it was perceived as a negation of the social contract. the educatio-
nal sector adjustment Program was, however, meant to interrogate 
some of the underlying assumptions for tertiary education, and to rea-
lign it to fit into the emerging market rationality. to realize this, the 
university rationalization Committee (urC) was appointed in 1986 
to report on the possible reform in this sector. 
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Based mainly on the recommendations of the urC, the gover-
nment ‘white Paper on reforms to the tertiary education system’ 
was issued in 1990. In consonance with the recommendations the 
white Paper focused on the mode of funding tertiary education. the 
new proposal for funding tertiary education was in the form of cost-
sharing between government, students and the private sector. the 
arrangement under this new system was for government to provide 
for staff recurrent, capital funding and equipment grants for tertiary 
institutions. the students were to wholly bear the costs for lodging 
and incidental expenses. In this regard, the institutions were to be 
non-residential and cafeteria services were to be commercialized. 
the introduction of user-fees for students was meant to undercut 
the old assumption that university education was of a critical social 
benefit; and pivotal for national development, which the state needed 
to provide full scholarships. the emergent thinking was that univer-
sity education was like any other market commodity that the consu-
mers must pay for, on the basis of the individualized utility derivation. 
the rationale for the imposition of fee payment on university students 
were captured by the urC as follows: 
“Because higher education is free –with free tuition and heavily 
subsidized on-campus and off-campus boarding and lodging– and sin-
ce neither students nor their parents bear any significant proportion 
of the total cost of the education of the children, except the oppor-
tunity cost of the student undertaking tertiary education, it can be 
imputed that there is (sic) therefore no pressure for cost containment 
or to enforce higher efficiency, from these quarters” (university ratio-
nalization Committee, 1988: 111).
for students whose needs could out-rightly not be met by their 
parents, a students’ Loans scheme was instituted in 1992. Protesta-
tions by the students’ umbrella organization, national union of gha-
na students (nugs) against fee payments failed to make any dent 
on the implementation of the policy; except the reduction of the loan 
interest from 19.5 % to 3 %. the other restructuring fundamentals 
remained in place as the old contract that guided the provisioning of 
tertiary education suffered corrosion, apace.
though the cost of tertiary education was now shared between 
the state and the beneficiaries, the state continued to be lackadaisical 
in its funding. the upstream restructuring efforts that reduced the 
number of years spent in pre-tertiary education and the fCuBe began 
to turn out large numbers of secondary school leavers that required 
tertiary education. Consequently, tertiary student numbers burgeoned 
without corresponding adjustments in spaces for classrooms, lectu-
re halls, laboratories and libraries. In the prevailing circumstances 
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quality began to suffer as the student-lecturer ratio became awful for 
faculty members. 
Indeed, as the cost-recovery logic and rationality penetrated 
the thinking of state-managers, poor students became mere objects 
that joined the ranks of the wretched. this social category not only 
suffers the harassment of fee-demanding authorities, but they also 
found themselves domiciling in unforgiving slums. the telling ps-
ychological effects of the economistic tertiary educational policies 
on the poor student have become phenomenal. to be certain, the 
implementers of the neoliberal saP policies were not oblivious to 
the social costs of their policies. on the contrary, within few years of 
the implementation of the saP the government began to respond to 
the social needs of the vulnerable elements and groups in the society. 
But these were done in ways that would not depart from the neolibe-
ral paradigmatic domain.
Intra-Paradigmatic Responses to Poverty
It had been recognized right from the inception of the implementa-
tion of the saP that the paradigmatic shift was bringing forth high 
social dislocations and poverty; and hence the placement of necessary 
policies to respond to them. the policies that were implemented to 
address the issues, it must be said again, were not to wreck the mar-
ket principles of growth and the faith in trickle-down effect. In other 
words, the paternalism of the state in the provisioning of services for 
gratis was no longer an option in the intra-paradigm poverty reduction 
policies that were lined up to respond to the emerging situations. 
with the shock therapy that the adjustment was meant to em-
brace, it was soon realized that the effects of the program had crea-
ted widespread social dislocation and poverty (ghana statistical 
service 1989; 2000). this subsequently produced social restiveness 
as people had difficulty understanding the new reality. the military 
based implementing PnDC government, found itself estranged from 
the population as its legitimacy wore thin (ninsin, 1998). the go-
vernment struggled with the ghana trades union Congress (gtuC), 
the national union of ghana students (nugs) and other significant 
socioeconomic formations aligned to the left for abandoning the 
welfarist contract. In order not to jettison the adjustment program, 
and to keep itself in power, the PnDC government in 1987 sponsored 
the Program of actions to Mitigate the social Costs of adjustment 
(PaMsCaD) as a response to mitigating the emerging costs associa-
ted with the program. the dual objectives of political survival and to 
keep the adjustment program rolling underscored the implementa-
tion of the PaMsCaD. 
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In the existing circumstances the PaMsCaD, therefore, sought to 
“enhance the sustainability and acceptability of the [saP]” (ghana, 
1987: 8) by offering assistance to those groups most adversely affected 
by the adjustment in order to avoid the conditions of such groups be-
ing used to create resistance to the program. for implementation pur-
poses, the PaMsCaD identified four target groups: (a) small farmers 
and hired labor; (b) households with limited access to basic social 
services such as education, health, water, sanitation etc; (c) the unem-
ployed and those with meager earnings especially the urban youth; 
(d) households in the northern regions. the problems of these groups 
were to be tackled by five types of projects, which consisted of (1) 
community initiative projects; (2) employment generation projects; 
(3) provision of basic needs and services; (4) education infrastructure 
and (5) redeployment (ghana, 1987: 8-9)
the program implementation, however, encountered difficulties 
as it was meant to be a balancing act that would not undermine the 
adjustment process. as the government managed to contain the oppo-
nents to the saP through the employment of repressive machinery, 
the commitment of government itself to the program waned. Delays 
characterized the implementation of projects due to ad hocism of ins-
titutions that were put in charge of the exercise. the provisioning of 
community projects were to be done with commitment counterpart 
funds borne by community members, but this idea was foreign to the 
poor folks that were to be helped. (hutchful, 2002)  the PaMsCaD by 
its mode of planning and implementation failed to address core issues 
that people were confronted with. In northern ghana that was par-
ticularly identified for intervention the program effect was minimal 
resulting in the persistence of hunger and pervasive poverty3. notwi-
thstanding, the ineffectual nature of the PaMsCaD the government, 
in the adjustment years, was quite particular in ascertaining the sta-
tistical measure of the living standards of the people. this became the 
responsibility of the ghana statistical service (gss) that had been 
commissioned to carry out a series of ghana Living standards sur-
veys (gLss). 
evidence from ghana statistical service surveys on living stan-
dards revealed various aspects of poverty that are associated with 
occupation, gender and regional dimensions. In this regard, post-
PaMsCaD policies were mostly targeted at addressing poverty issues. 
In fact, what has characterized the governance system has been the 
3  all the surveys conducted by the ghana statistical survey that produced the gha-
na Living standards surveys (gLss: 1-4) have all identified the three administrative 
regions of northern ghana as the poorest in the country.
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multitudinous nature of poverty reduction strategies. the national 
Development Planning Commission (nDPC) was established to focus 
and coordinate on poverty related issues. It, therefore, became ins-
trumental in drawing such poverty-focused policy documents as the 
ghana Vision 2020, the ghana Poverty reduction strategy I (gPrs I), 
2003-2005 and the growth and Poverty reduction strategy II, (gPrs 
II) 2006-2009.
these documents targeted poverty reduction in medium and 
long term perspectives. the ghana Vision 2020, for instance, was a 
25 year development program that focused on catapulting ghana into 
an upper middle-income country by 2020. this was to be realized by 
a series of 5-year development programs that were to enhance growth 
and thereby reduce poverty for the realization of the vision. however, 
the implementation of the Vision 2020 was beset with macroeconomic 
instability, as the basic economic indicators were thrown out of gear; 
due to volatilities in the international commodity market. the nose-
diving of ghana’s main export commodities –cocoa and gold– throug-
hout 2000 undercut the government’s ability to meet targeted expen-
ditures. while the country’s major export commodity prices were on 
downhill slide, crude oil price was skyrocketing; and donor budge-
tary support drying up. the result was a stupendous rise in inflation 
reaching 42%, and lending rates at the banks peaking 52% (Institute 
of statistical social and economic research, 2001). the circumstan-
ces enfeebled the private sector as the cost of doing business became 
intolerable. the reliance on the private sector to create jobs for the 
reduction of poverty, therefore, became a forlorn one (national Deve-
lopment Planning Commission, 2003). 
the ghana Vision 2020 program was abandoned with a change 
in government in January 2001. the gloom that characterized ghana’s 
economy in 2000 made the new government to opt for the highly In-
debted Poor Country (hIPC) initiative as a way of getting some re-
prieve from debt overhang. the hIPC initiative was granted with the 
classical conditionalities (hutchful, 2002: 247) plus the production of 
Poverty reduction strategy Paper (PrsP). the PrsP was required 
for committing hIPC savings to poverty reduction efforts. thus hIPC 
became another channel for the implementation of policies directed 
at poverty reduction. 
with the completion of the hIPC initiative programs, the gover-
nment followed it with a more comprehensive ghana Poverty reduc-
tion strategy (gPrs I) 2003-2006. Indeed, the production of PrsP was 
the occasion for the production of the gPrs I and subsequent econo-
mic arrangements that fitted into the national development policy. the 
document’s subtitle An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity was a précis 
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of the policy intent. Just as the poverty reduction programs that prece-
ded the gPrs I were to be driven by the private sector, so was this. the 
state’s role in the context was to create an enabling environment for this 
to happen. Macroeconomic management, therefore, became the preoc-
cupation of the state managers’ for growth to happen. this focus took a 
privilege position because it was seen as the sine qua non for poverty re-
duction that would happen through eventual trickle-down effects. the 
government rigorously applied the requisite economic instruments that 
reduced the volatility, which characterized the economy prior to the 
implementation of the gPrs I. the fall of commodity prices that had 
earlier afflicted the country’s major export commodities began to expe-
rience an upturn. Donor support in terms of debt forgiveness under the 
hIPC initiative and the resumption of donor budgetary support were 
also critical in the restoration of macroeconomic stability. the econo-
mic growth rates for the period averaged 5%. 
It was with a renewed confidence in macroeconomic indicators 
that the growth and Poverty reduction strategy (gPrs II) 2006-2009 
was launched. the objective was for the maximization of the economic 
growth opportunities for poverty reduction. Poverty reduction under 
gPrs II was to be realized through wealth creation. the market was 
the avenue for the wealth creation and hence the ultimate need for all 
to be linked to the cash nexus that the market system provides4.
the capitalist vigor that the gPrs I and II programs were imple-
mented overlooked the emblematic features of the population and the 
economy. It was, for instance, assumed wrongly that the population 
had become absolute converts of the weberian protestant ethic, and 
would as such respond to the market forces once the environment was 
created. But the rural traditional ghana continues to exhibit economic 
dualism, namely affective economy and an embryonic market system. 
the traditional economy, which is an affective one, places premium 
on social returns as a measure of success. It is also distributionist and 
as such contradicts the individualistic accumulative drive of the capi-
talist system (gasu, 2008). It is the non-reckoning of this basic social 
factor that throws the overly optimism of the programs associated 
with poverty reduction out of alignment. 
the growth for poverty reduction focus which underscored the 
inauguration of the gPrs II did not play well out in practice. the 
4  It is erroneous to think that everybody within the country is adequately linked to 
the market cash economy. a ghana Broadcasting news Item, carried on gtV at 7 pm 
on May 13, 2009, reported on how parents of students in second Cycle institutions in 
Kwahu north District assembly in the eastern region of the country pay the fees of 
their wards yams, maize and cassava (mandioc).  
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ghana state has not transcended the character of its colonial economy 
as it continues to be a primary commodity exporter. the fluctuations 
in the primary commodity market, therefore, tell on the fortunes of 
the poverty reduction programs. while the government continued to 
be prudent in its macroeconomic management that was expected to 
create the environment for the private sector, the economy in general 
came under stress from the middle of 2007. the crisis emanating from 
the global food prices, the rise of crude oil prices to unprecedented 
levels5, and the meltdown of the global economy due to credit crunch 
came to impact negatively on the country. even though the country 
continued to experience economic growth during this period the po-
verty-reduction turnaround that was expected did not happen much. 
table 1 shows the poverty levels in the country in the period 
1998/1999-2003 using welfare indicators.  
It is evident from the table 1 that not much has changed in terms 
of welfare indicators of the people in the period 1998-2003. In some 
cases the poverty situation, as measured by unavailability of core wel-
fare indicators, actually deteriorated as shown by rural folk’s access to 
health facilities where the percentage that had access dropped from 
61% to 57.4%.  
notwithstanding the plethoric poverty reduction programs that 
have been implemented in the past two-odd decades, the welfare indi-
cators pertaining to access to health care services and education has 
not changed much in the period under review. this has consequently 
evoked rethinking of the inbox programs that were meant to address 
poverty issues. the effort has been geared towards bringing back new 
forms of collectivized programs at addressing poverty. these outbox 
programs for poverty reduction is examined hereunder. 
5  Crude petroleum price peaked to us$147 in July, 2007.
Table 1
Core Welfare Indicators (1998/1999-2003)
Population Defined as poor (Using Welfare Indicators) 1998/99 2003
Males who never attended school 21% 25.9%
 Females who never attended school 41% 37.4%
Nearest Health Facility is at least 30 minutes away Urban 20% 21.4%
Nearest Health Facility is least 30 minutes away  Rural 61% 57.4%
Supervised delivering assistance (doctor, nurse, midwife) Urban 79% 83.4%
Supervised delivering assistance (doctor, nurse, midwife) Rural  33% 34.7%
Source: Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005.
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Bringing Back the State for Poverty Reduction
the neoliberal poverty reduction policies have not significantly atte-
nuated the situation of the poor in accessing tertiary education and 
health-care services. the return of the country to liberal democracy in 
1993 began a new era, of people asking the fundamental question of 
the essence of governance and the basis for which legitimacy would 
be granted the state. as the response of neoliberal orthodoxy is found 
inadequate in this respect, the political class in their competition for 
state control began to seek new answers. But the circumstances of the 
immediate post-independence years were totally different from what 
obtains today; and as such rendering outright leftist options unavaila-
ble. the unipolar ideological world limits the choices at the disposal 
of the political class; but the reality within the ghanaian political con-
text points to two contradictory directions: the first of such directions 
is that the hands-off approach by the state for social welfare provisio-
ning was unpopular; and the other was the reality that the external 
donor community has not relinquished the neoliberal agenda for the 
country.
given these contradictory directions the state-managers became 
more innovative in meeting the demands from the opposite directions. 
while not abandoning the overall neoliberal domain, the managers 
devised subtleties of bringing back the state to champion the collecti-
ve good that would enhance the legitimacy of the state. since the re-
placement of state sponsorship of health care and education under the 
saP with cost-recovery, the poor have had difficulty accessing such 
services. the shared responsibilities between the state, the consumer 
and the private sector also failed to gel. while the average consumer 
was financially constrained to meet the “cash-and-carry” order for the 
provisioning of the services, the state itself was erratic in funding the 
institutions that provided these critical services. 
It is within this context that thinking outside the box became 
necessary to address the emerging issues. two of such state-led en-
deavors –ghana educational trust fund (getfund) and, national 
health Insurance scheme (nhIs)– are discussed as they contribute to 
the reduction of poverty on national scale.
Ghana Educational Trust Fund
the government’s acceptance of the recommendations of the university 
rationalization Committee’s report; and the subsequent issuance of the 
“white Paper on reforms to the funding of tertiary education system” 
that instituted cost-sharing arrangement at the tertiary level, created a di-
lemma rather than a solution for the stakeholders. the average student, 
who is the consumer of the services, provided by the universities lack the 
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resources to meet the costs demanded of him/her. even the government 
found itself in a sort of quandary as the protests from students’ organi-
zations, quaked the foundations of its legitimacy. But the cost-recovery 
programs were introduced with the benefit of authoritarian control. this 
allowed the state to employ repressive tools to manage the protests. the 
dilemmatic situation continued to exist as to how to fund education 
without upsetting the existing socioeconomic orthodoxy. 
as indicated earlier, the change from authoritarianism to liberal 
democracy called for a new thinking and management of social needs. 
In response to persistent calls from civil society and stakeholders for 
a more sustainable educational funding the ghana educational trust 
fund (getfund) was established under an act of Parliament (act 
561) in august 2000 and came into operational in the middle of 2001 
to supplement state funding of education. the fund was meant to 
provide finance to supplement the provision of education at all levels, 
by the government. the funding for the getfund was to be derived 
from the following sources: an amount of money equivalent of 2.5% 
of out the prevailing Value added tax paid to the state’s Vat service, 
which is responsible for the collection of the value added taxes, other 
such moneys allotted by Parliament for the fund, money that accrue 
from the investment made by the Board of trustees, and any other 
moneys or property that may in any manner become lawfully payable 
to and vested in the Board of trustees of the fund (<www.getfund.
com/stories/200807211363html>, accessed on May 13, 2009). 
the coverage of the getfund in assisting education in ghana is 
quite extensive. the getfund has been the main source of funding 
for infrastructural development in the public tertiary institutions. the 
fund has also been used for faculty development, with the awards 
of scholarships and bursaries for human resource development. the 
tertiary institutions have also benefited from getfund for research 
activities that academic staff undertakes.
the getfund have also financed the building of hostels for stu-
dents to ease students hassle for accommodation in non-conducive 
academic environments. and for students that are classified as indi-
gents the getfund’s scholarship scheme caters for their fees.
to cater for the increasing demands for classrooms, laboratories, 
hostels and vehicles, the getfund has been instrumental in under-
taking projects for such purposes. the getfund has also been spon-
soring science-based television programs for secondary school stu-
dents as a contribution towards the realization of the objectives of the 
new education program.
the contribution of getfund in relieving the educational burden 
of parents is quite phenomenal as it touches every aspect of the system 
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in ghana. It is in realization of this fact that the executive secretary 
of the national Council for tertiary education (nCte), Paul effah, in 
addressing the university of Cape Coast branch of the graduate stu-
dents’ association of ghana (grasag) captured the contribution of 
the getfund as follows:  
“getfund is one of the landmark discoveries in the history of 
education in ghana and if not for the existence of it, most educational 
institutions in the country would have died out or collapsed” (effah, 
2006) 
the getfund has thus become a poverty reduction strategy that 
is founded through a value added tax regime that benefits the whole 
society in one form or the other. the contribution of the getfund 
in addressing poverty emboldened the state-managers to embark on 
another collective funding process meant for the collective good in 
health-care service delivery. this is what the national health Insuran-
ce scheme (nhIs) came into existence to achieve.
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
the national health Insurance scheme (nhIs) was introduced in 
2003 by the national health Insurance scheme act, 2003 (act 650). 
with the view of providing health care access for all residents in 
ghana, especially the poor and the vulnerable to quality basic health 
care services. the national health Insurance scheme act provided 
for three main types of scheme that could operate in the country, 
namely: the District Mutual health Insurance scheme; Private Com-
mercial health Insurance scheme and Private Mutual health Insu-
rance scheme6. 
to operate as a District health Insurance scheme, the scheme 
must first be registered under the Company Code (act 179) as a com-
pany limited by guarantee or shares. thereafter the health insuran-
ce scheme has to apply to the national health Insurance authority 
(nhIa) for registration and licensing. the nhIa acts in supervisory 
capacity and has the responsibility for the implementation of the 
schemes. It also has the responsibility for regulating all the scheme 
operators; and to manage the national health Insurance funds.
funding for the nhIs is manly from two sources –two and half 
% tax on goods and services that are captured by the Vat service; and 
annual premium paid by non-exempt members. the nhIs has a long 
list of exempts that all are registered and issued cards to access health 
care services without payment of premium. this exempt group inclu-
6  the District Mutual health Insurance scheme is the most subscribed scheme in 
the country. 
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des: contributors and pensioners on the social security and national 
Insurance trust (ssnIt); people aged 70 years and above; children 
under 18 years; indigents and pregnant women (since July 1, 2008). It 
needs to be added that the bulk of the funds for the nhIs is sourced 
from the two and half % value added tax7. the exempted category 
does not pay the yearly premiums. the premiums that are paid by 
those who are eligible are scaled to meet the range of income levels. 
the lowest is 7.20 ghana Cedis per year to the highest of 48.00 ghana 
Cedis8.
the nhIs was founded as a critical pillar of the gPrs II and the 
expectation at the time of the inauguration of the scheme targeted 
40% subscription. the subscription to the scheme by the close of De-
cember 2008 was about 62%, thus indicating a high level of access to 
health care services. 
as indicated by table 2 above, 12, 568,560 people of the population 
registered for the nhIs9. those who are exempted from premium 
payment but benefit from the nhIs constitute the following percen-
tages in relation to the total number of registered members: juveniles 
(under 18 years) constitute 50%, pregnant women, 3.5% aged (over 
70 years) constitute 6.9% and indigents 2.4%. this opens health care 
access to many a ghanaian who otherwise could not have afforded 
it. the operation of the nhIs so far covers 95% of all disease con-
7  agricultural produce within the country are exceptuated from the two and half % 
value added tax meant for national health Insurance scheme. 
8  the range premium in terms of american Dollars is from us$5 to us$30.
9  according to the statistics derived from the african health economics and Policy 
association the registered nhIs members constitute about 61.3% of the population. 
Table 2
Coverage of National Health Insurance Scheme (December 2008)
Schemes in Operation 145 Percentage %
Total Registered 12, 568, 560 100%
Informal Adult 3, 727,454 29%
70 years and above 866, 956 6.9%
SSNIT contributors 811, 567 6.5%
Under 18 years 6, 305, 729 50.4%
Pregnant Women 435, 728 3.5%
Indigents 302, 929 2.4%
Source: African Health Economics and Policy Association (AfHEA) Conference March, 2009. 
239
John Gasu
ditions that afflict residents in ghana. the benefit of services covers 
inpatients; outpatients; deliveries during complications; diagnostics; 
medicines (generics) and all emergencies. the extensive coverage of 
the benefits and the high subscriptions has resulted in high patient 
attendance at health centers throughout the country (Daily graphic, 
february 22, 2009). this has appreciably impacted positively on the 
poor as the pressure of committing meager resources to health ser-
vices is much more reduced. In effect the poor, for instance, is better 
placed to feed the family than previously.  
Challenges of the Poverty Reduction Strategies
even though governments in ghana have been addressing themsel-
ves to poverty issues since the mid-eighties there are still grounds to 
cover in uplifting the living standards of people. the shift to neoli-
beral paradigm has not resonated well with a significant section of 
the population that understands the essence of government as one in 
which the state leads in the provisioning of jobs, education and health 
care among others. It remains a challenge for state managers to take 
this section of the population along to understand the workings of the 
neoliberal order. the effort is critical for the sustenance of the demo-
cratic process or else the state and its managers can easily lose their 
legitimacy. 
the strategies for poverty reduction have always depended on 
extensive donor support and on the fortunes of the primary commo-
dity market. Instability in the primary commodity market has always 
produced ripples in the ghanaian economy that affects the meeting 
of the objectives of the poverty reduction policies. the Vision 2020 
was greatly affected by the downward trend in ghana major export 
commodity prices in 2000 (Institute of statistical social and econo-
mic research, 2001).
the two collectivized programs for poverty reduction have also 
been faced with some challenges. this is mainly due to the extent to 
which the managers’ of the program push it. the getfund, for ins-
tance, have become the solve-all program for educational funding in 
ghana. this overextension of the getfund has resulted in projects 
being delayed because contractors are not paid to allow timely execu-
tion of their tasks.
similarly the nhIs has been plagued with a number of challenges 
that needed to be addressed to enhance its performance and accessi-
bility. the nhIs as it operates now is limited in terms of portability. a 
subscriber to a particular district scheme is limited in accessing health 
care without payment if he/she is outside the district of registration. 
the non-portability of the subscriptions is mainly due non-networking 
Strategies against Poverty
240
between the various administrative units. the lack of networking has 
also resulted in delays in claim payments to the service providers.
Conclusion
the neoliberal marketism produced social dislocations that the va-
rious poverty reduction strategies have been struggling to deal with, 
since the eighties. the paradigmatic shift that occurred with the appli-
cation of the market rationality to all social interventions made the ba-
sis for the poverty reduction strategies to be principally located within 
the neoliberal realm. the focus has been on growth as a strategy for 
development; for which the premium should be on macroeconomic 
stability. the cost-sharing approach which defined social services like 
education and health care as commodities for which the individual 
consumer must pay for, did not help matters. such inbox thinking, 
and policies, only denied people services that could produce good so-
cial returns. as indicated by richard Joseph 
“[…] the economic weakness of african states and the hegemony 
of multilateral and bilateral agencies and the unobstructed workings 
of the market economy will accompany whatever political reforms 
that are introduced” (Joseph, 1997).   
as ghana continues to depend on the multilateral and bilateral donor 
community for the management of its economy the neoliberal conditio-
nalities would apply to its receipt of financial assistance. this circumstan-
ce limits the radical option of a total disentanglement from the neoliberal 
web. what the ghanaian state has, however, done is to employ a collective 
tax imposition regime to deal with pertinent social issues which rugged 
marketism could not adequately deal with; so as to enhance the legitima-
cy of the state. the two programs examined in the paper have indicated 
that innovative thinking is needed to enhance access to basic social ser-
vices that would accelerate poverty reduction. If the challenges that the 
programs face are properly managed, then access to health care services 
and education would be enhanced for national development.   
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3.3. Fighting the “Poverty War”
Non-Governmental Organisations and the 
Challenge of Poverty Eradication in Nigeria
Abstract
nigeria is globally known to be rich due to its large human and na-
tural resources endowment. It is however among the poorest globally 
with over 70% of its people in poverty1. since poverty is undesirable, 
1  this is measured against the proportions of nigerians living on less than us$2 
per day.
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at least to the sufferers, successive governments have attempted to 
reduce or eradicate it.  the challenge however is that poverty is increa-
sing rather than reducing. It has been argued that in its present form, 
“nigerian poverty” is largely a creation of market driven economics as 
exacerbated by contemporary globalization intricacies. there is thus 
a relationship between private sector economics as prescribed by the 
north and accepted by government in the south in the dynamics of 
poverty creation and eradication. In nigeria, a third sector compri-
sing ngo have emerged as partners in the fight against poverty. the 
snag however is that the contemporary and popular concept, princi-
ples and operations of ngo are western. their evolution and deve-
lopment are from the north while their survival is dependent upon 
foreign (mainly western) donors who determine their areas and mode 
of interventions, efficacy and sustenance. this paper adopted moder-
nization and dependency theories to interrogate the ngo and poverty 
eradication interface and raise pertinent issues on the problematique. 
the methodology was largely normative. secondary data was used 
with deep and comprehensive primary insights into the operations of 
Key ngo in nigeria to sufficiently address potential efficacy and like-
lihood of failures of ngo as the possible hope in winning the “poverty 
war” in nigeria and identical societies. the dynamics of sustainable 
alternatives were also explored.  It was largely discovered that while 
ngo are key players in poverty eradication efforts in nigeria, solu-
tions to poverty in nigeria can never be from abroad. It is also not in 
sentimental funding for building facilities or imperialistic law chan-
ging but local dynamics prioritization.
Introduction
Poverty is a serious challenge in nigeria. It has become so intractable 
that citizens now accuse the government of lack of commitment. the 
citizens’ position is that the government prospers from poverty creation 
rather than from its eradication. given the negative socioeconomic and 
political consequences of poverty, it has now been recognized as a dan-
ger for the nation and particularly the sufferers who are in the majority. 
Poverty poses serious danger to the nation as it impinges on institutiona-
lization of democratic processes, good governance and development.  as 
poor peoples’ interface, poverty manifests in capacity deprivation and in-
come deficit in a manner that prevents the poor from having the ability to 
build potentials and enjoy quality livelihood.  aside the two basic levels of 
poverty matrix in creation (government and private) the third exists –the 
global.  the global community participates both in poverty creation and 
its “redress”.  global socioeconomic and political intricacies share in po-
verty creation through exploitation of the periphery and individual “de-
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veloped” ations and united nations (un) contribute to campaign against 
poverty.  nigeria is therefore not faced with a phenomenon that is created 
and fought at a single/national level but nearly an intractable one that is 
created and fought at national and global levels.
as, sometimes, coordinated and huge the investments in poverty 
eradication efforts in terms of time, expertise, manpower investments 
and financial resources commitment, are poverty in nigeria is endemic 
and has shown no sign of rescinding.  the situation has thus necessita-
ted the emergence and popularity of another level of intervention-non-
governmental organizations (ngo hereinafter) with origin from the 
global scape of united nations (un)2. ngo in nigeria have their clien-
tele, directly or indirectly, as the poor whose welfare and generalized 
existence they work to improve.  the poor in nigeria are individuals 
and groups whose capacities to improve income earning capacities and 
care sufficiently for selves and significant others have been compromised. 
these individuals and groups have largely dropped out of the attention 
span of both the government and organized private sector (Mabogunje, 
2008). while market forces plunder livelihood for profit-maximization 
irrespective of poverty level, current happenings suggest that the go-
vernment also prospers itself through social forces that disregard po-
verty level. such social forces that share common characteristics with 
market forces and other contours of capitalism are indiscriminate tax 
regimes, human rights violation, lack of accountability, electoral fraud 
and regulations that marginalize the people, infrastructural decay and 
embezzlement of funds, even those meant for social utilities provision 
and poverty eradication. It is against this backdrop that multi sectoral 
approach is being adopted to fight the scourge of poverty in nigeria. a 
recent and popular sector in nigerian poverty eradication marketplace 
is ngo. this paper is therefore essentially situated within the modernist 
and dependency orientations which construct and deconstruct ngo as 
viable engines in poverty eradication. 
The Nigerian Poverty Scenario within
Theoretical Considerations
Modernization theory
Modernization theory is the oldest of all attempts at bringing about de-
velopment in the third world Countries (olutayo and Bankole, 2002). 
the central thesis of the theory is that there are two societies and they 
are two extremes of a continuum. this is basically a distinction between 
2  the relationships between ngo and united nations (un) in terms of origin and 
operation are explained later in this paper.
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two types of societies –the traditional and the modern.  Modernization 
theory argues that the transition from the limited economic relations 
of traditional societies to the innovative and complex economic asso-
ciations of modern societies depended on a change of values, attitudes 
and norms of people (Kambhampati, 2004).  Put differently, develop-
ment depended on “primitive” values being replaced by modern ones; 
modernization could therefore be seen as the increasing significance of 
economic as opposed to social, cultural, racial or religious distinctions 
(Kambhampati, 2004). 
within this orthodoxy, “primitive” “traditional” and “primor-
dial” values like extended filial relationships, kin groupings and 
communal socioeconomic and political associations are antithetical 
to development and affluence. “traditional” and “primordial” va-
lues like those aforelisted therefore should be jettisoned for modern 
ideals like competitiveness, rationality, acceptance of economic and 
technological aids to accomplish development objectives.  since mo-
dernization theory is problem solving and pragmatic, its recommen-
dations are expected to lead to wider social, cultural and political 
changes in developing countries. that is, a comprehensive social and 
economics change of all processes and structural changes required 
to transform non-industrial societies into industrial societies (Kam-
bhampati, 2004).
the notion of ngo for advocacy and programmes as given from the 
west through the united nations is based on the principles of assisting 
developing nations to develop in terms of aids.  aids are central to the 
modernization thesis.  Policies as aids and materials as aids were origi-
nally conceived by the west to keep developing countries non-communist 
(Kambhampati, 2004).  the push by ngo, as already argued elsewhe-
re in this paper, is with western philanthropic mindset that pigeonholes 
local values and norms to construct and solve problems. ngo largely 
emerged and gained ascendancy as aftermath of structural adjustment 
Programme (saP) era in the mid-eighties. this period incidentally coin-
cided with whole sale incorporation of nigeria to global economic and 
policy environment by the then Military government of general Ibrahim 
Badamosi Babangida. the outcome of such incorporation was/is large 
scale austere measures and poverty. Interestingly, the trend of poverty in 
nigeria is increasing due to continuous and unequal incorporations of 
the nation to global environments with northern dominations. Conse-
quences of such unequal incorporation in observable in recent inflation 
of basic commodities’ prices without national buffer. the rise in global 
food prices as very much driven by the demand side of global agricultural 
system (Braun, 2008) has serious adverse effects on the nation’s poor. the 
global financial crisis is another case for concern in terms of poverty exa-
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cerbation in the country. Mass retrenchment of workers due to various 
reforms of government with insignificant or outright lack of compensa-
tions which is dragging more to the base of the economic pyramid (BoP) 
is another case. Below are tabular representations of poverty trends and 
patterns in nigeria.
Poverty as defined within ngo spectrum is as defined in wes-
tern model and approach at solution with slight modifications of the 
pre-welfarist Victorian Britain. ngo unilaterally and teleologically 
design, fund and implement their policies and programmes with 
western elitism that pays little attention to underlying belief, deep 
socioeconomic and cultural elements that will ultimately determine 
programme efficacy.  every society has its own inbuilt mechanisms 
for defining problems like poverty and has sociocultural and econo-
mic infrastructures in place to combat challenges. Before modernist 
orientations, traditional societies guided quality livelihood through 
structures like kin systems and occupations that resonate expec-
ted quality of lives. the gap within haves and have nots was clearly 
defined and managed to the extent that quality livelihoods are not 
compromised. even those these mechanisms are not codified in law, 
they are known and generally subscribed to. It is therefore possible 
to wonder if ngo have the right operating theory, sufficient con-
textual understanding and sincerity of purpose in their operations. 
also, it is possible to wonder whether ngo understand the politi-
cal and economic undercurrents of their activities. or, whether the 
problem is underestimation of local practices and structures in the 
face of “global” impositions of frameworks in relation to poverty 
eradication.
although modernization theory has been variously criticized for 
being parochial, teleological, unilateral and full of gaps in develop-
ment processes understanding, it still saliently guide policies across 
the world. the fundamental shortcomings of the modernization theory 
were mostly revealed by dependency theory of Paul Baran (1957) in 
Latin america.  It is to this theory we now turn.
Dependency theory
there are as many variants of dependency theory as one may want 
to consider. this is due to nearly unprecedented popularity and 
practical usefulness the theory enjoyed upon publication.  the nu-
merous variants of the theory have consequently led to multiplicity 
of terminologies and concepts credited to dependency theory over-
time.  however, the central exposition of the theory is still intact 
even in the variants. this chapter in using dependency theory pays 
close attention to the original version propounded by Paul Baran 
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(1957) “the political economy of growth” in his examination of 
Latin america’s development trajectories.  Basically, dependency 
theory, in whatever variant, traces the underdevelopment in deve-
loping countries to the enthronement of world capitalists system 
which is predicated upon unequal exchange in international social 
and commodity relations.
hence, within this theoretical orientation, the unequal incorpo-
ration of the developing nations to the global capitalist expansionist 
agenda is responsible for the current underdevelopment as manifes-
ted in widespread poverty. In terms of commodities relations, de-
pendency theory posits that advanced economies benefit by obtai-
ning cheaper raw materials, and extract surpluses expropriated by 
foreign capital from the developing nations.  a metropolis-satellite, 
centre-periphery interactions are thus created and the interaction is 
facilitated by local classes and foreign elites (Kambhampati, 2004). 
as capital is expropriated, they are partly squandered on local elites 
(Comprador elites) who benefit from the public plundering for self 
aggrandizement. 
the central arguments of dependency theory can be synthesi-
zed into six.  Cheaper raw materials from the south to the north 
for Industrial development and continuous pauperization of the 
south; subsistence output and low wages for the south as they pro-
duce products that are undervalued in international market and 
consequently experience poverty; continuous dependence on im-
ported products from the developed economies as they are made 
to develop taste for foreign products and further enrich the north 
through foreign exchange; increasing balance of payment deficit as 
they consume more than they earn and continuously be in debt; 
foreign Investment as multinational corporations (MnC) invest in 
poor economies and repatriate funds to developed economics the-
reby perpetuating the circle of underdevelopment; the circle of un-
derdevelopment can not be broken through regional integration ex-
cept through overthrow and severance of unequal relationships that 
exist between the north and the south. as the interests of metropo-
litan north are linked together therefore, underdeveloped countries 
require mental and political struggle within the satellite to bring 
about arrangements that sustain common good in the south (oluta-
yo, olutayo and omobowale, 2008).  
Major strength of dependency theory was its radical departu-
re from hitherto existing orthodoxy.  also, dependency theory paid 
considerable attention to national dynamics that hold prospects for 
behaviours, consequences and development. rather than look for 
panacea to development from without, dependency theory consi-
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ders solutions from within.  Dependency theory as deployed in this 
chapter therefore acknowledges that even though poverty has been 
created with wrong modernist mindset, solution should, again, not 
be sought with such mindset that depends on outside but inside me-
chanisms. thus, while modernization theory led the way for socio-
cultural and institutional colonization of nigeria, dependency theory 
paved the way for economic and policy decolonization.  against this 
background, while ngo may be useful in some respects in contri-
buting to national development, it is expedient to begin a rethink 
and re-tooling of their contemporary policy environments and ope-
rations in terms of poverty eradication in nigeria if they are to be 
sustainable and objectively impactful.
the population of nigeria is 140 million and it is the most po-
pulous country in africa (federal government of nigeria, 2007). 
the population pyramid of nigeria is bottom heavy meaning more 
nigerians are young and youthful (federal Ministry of women 
affairs and social Development, 2007). while the country is one of 
the richest in terms of natural and human resources, it is parado-
xically one of the poorest in the world. at least 70% of nigerians 
currently live in poverty (federal Ministry of women affairs and 
social Development, 2007) and urban poverty particularly is rising 
(national Bureau of statistics, 2005). nigeria has spent 32 years of 
its 48 years of independence under repressive military regimes. the 
implication is that during the military dictatorship, corruption and 
unaccountable leadership was installed; human rights were viola-
ted with impunity while unemployment, corruption, poverty and 
civil rebellions became the norm. In general terms, social values, 
human dignity, respect for constituted authourity, and national 
image were undermined. 
against this backdrop, progress and national developments were 
put in the reverse gear as national psychic was militarized and beclo-
uded. with the return to democracy in 1999 till date, there is yet to 
be much positive effects as poverty level in the country stands at 70% 
and is certain to be rising (federal Ministry of women affairs &social 
Development, 2007 emphasis added). unemployment rate is 11.9% 
(national Bureau of statistics, 2006) and gross national Income 
(gnI) per capita stands at $560 as against uK $37,600 (Department 
for International Development, 2006). according to Yumkella (2008), 
nigeria is currently off-track on meeting the Millennium Develop-
ment goals (MDg), especially worse on health and poverty and “[t]
here are very strong institutional challenges facing the country in 
meeting the MDg”. 
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as the heading suggests, table 1 is basically to demonstrate the trends of 
poverty in nigeria. this is to give clearer picture of the nation’s poverty 
environment.  within the demonstration years, incidence of poverty in-
creases between 1980 and 1985 and between 1992 and 1996.  Between 
1985-1992 and between1996-2004, poverty decreases in rates.  It is howe-
ver important to note that the total population in poverty consistently 
maintain steady increase from 18.26 million in 1980 to 68.7million in 
2004.  It is also very crucial to note that when subjective and self-assessed 
level of poverty techniques were used, the survey gave a poverty figure of 
75.5% in the nation (national Bureau of statistics 2005).  although these 
methods are rarely used, we consider them the best approach since they 
are client centered even though experts/researchers claim people do not 
give their true poverty levels within this approach.
urban-rural disaggregation has always been found useful in poverty 
discourse. thus, we present such figure in the foregoing analysis. 
table 2 depicts poverty by urban-rural socio-economic spaces. It is 
obvious from the table that poverty predominated in the rural areas 
across the years. there has been rise and fall of poverty incidence in 
both the two sectors in 1980-2004. while poverty decline in urban 
Table 2
Relative poverty incidence by sector (1980-2004)
Year Urban Rural
1980 17.2 28.3
1985 37.8 51.4
1992 37.5 46.0
1996 58.2 69.0
2004 43.2 63.3
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2005).
Table 1
Trends in Poverty Levels (1980-2004)
Year Poverty incidence Estimated Total Population Population Poverty
1980 28.1 65m 18.26m
1985 46.3 75m 34.73m
1992 42.7 91.5m 39.07m
1996 65.6 102.3m 67.11m
2004 54.4 126.3m 68.70m
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2005).
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areas between 1985-1992 was not appreciable (37.8% and 37.3%), 
poverty decline was quite significant for the rural areas (51.4% and 
46% during the same periods due to investment in agriculture to 
combat negative outcomes of saP. Poverty however picked subs-
tantially the following period due to lack of sustained efforts and 
corruption.
It is observable from table 1 and table 2 that poverty is a reality 
and a consistently high occurrence in nigeria. when it is sometimes 
said that poverty declines in nigeria, it is usually not substantial decli-
ne. also, when such declines are reported, it is better to check the sou-
rce of the claim and the measure against the general public quality of 
life, poverty atmosphere and the voice of the poor themselves.  the fact 
therefore is that poverty is consistently high in nigeria and neither the 
government, private sector nor the international community has been 
able to stem the tide. 1960-1980 was a critical period for nigeria. since 
independence in 1960 and becoming a republic in 1963, the attendant 
high hopes that development would be realized with independence and 
indigenous governance was compromised due to political instability 
and corruption. this began with high level of political instability that 
emerged with the first military coup in January 15, 1966. this was fo-
llowed by counter coups that climaxed with the Biafra3 civil war from 
1967 to 1970. In the pre-independence era, nigeria was predominantly 
agrarian. agriculture accounted for over 60% of the gross Domestic 
Product (gDP) and at independence, agriculture accounted for 65% of 
gDP and 70% of total exports (federal Ministry of education, 2005). 
oil was discovered in nigeria in 1956 and actual commercial export 
began in 1958. this affected the fortune of agriculture as all atten-
tions were shifted to “easy” and “elaborate” fortunes of oil. It was a 
negative trade-off of agriculture regardless of its social and economic 
sustainability. agriculture was neglected and was allowed to dwindle 
in fortune. although agriculture engaged 80% of the nigerian popula-
tion hitherto for both subsistence and cash crops exports, continuous 
popularity of petroleum from the sixties till early seventies, destroyed 
agriculture and industrial productions in the country (federal Ministry 
of education, 2005). 
an historical excursion might be in order, by 1982, agriculture 
contributed only 17% of gDP, while oil accounted for 40% of gDP, 
75% of total government revenue and 95% of the foreign exchange 
earnings (federal Ministry of education, 2005). In the late seventies 
3  the Biafra civil was a secessionist revolt by the Igbo ethnic group in south eas-
tern part of the country against the federal government of nigeria. the Igbos were 
led by odumegwu ojukwu.
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however, the fortune of oil diminished due to global economic envi-
ronment that affected demands and pricing of oil. this negative oil 
revenue era has come to be known as the Oil glut era in nigerian con-
temporary economic history. this introduced hardship in the country 
and reduced quality of life as it affected foreign exchange earnings 
of government and led to austere measures for the country and its 
citizens that were just coming from the euphoria of oil boom of the 
early seventies.  this period was however short-lived. today, oil is the 
mainstay of nigerian economy. oil still contributes at least 76.5% of 
nigeria’s total revenue though without positive impacts on quality of 
live of nigerians due to governance gaps, weak professional capacities 
and compromised infrastructures.
The Nigerian Political Economy:
Precursory considerations
this section locates the issues of ngo and poverty within important 
political economic environments that defined them. this is important 
for pragmatic and analytical reasons because it is within the political 
economy that every situation subsists. whether a social reality is posi-
tive or negative in effects depends on the political economy base upon 
which the reality subsists.  thus, nothing exists that is not created by 
the interface of politics as authoritative allocation of value and eco-
nomy superstructure.  
The pre-colonial and colonial era
Colonialism marked the beginning of official incorporation of nigeria 
into international political economy with its attendant consequences. 
Prior to colonial era, nigerian communities operated as independent 
groups defining their existence and managing effects in a manner 
understood and accommodated within their environments. norms, 
customs and values were constructed to deal and ensure the welfare 
of every member of the societies without sentiments like class, race, 
gender and disability.  economic and political rights were placed 
within the family institutions that ensured universal survival of all 
members by ensuring ultimate production for communal use (olu-
tayo and omobowale, 2005). societies made necessary remittances 
that ensured survival of the kin-group thereby making provisions 
for the sick, the elderly, the young, the handicapped and others who 
could not work on land for any acceptable reason (olutayo and omo-
bowale, 2005). the political system sustained the communal survival 
mechanisms. although monarchs and warlords enjoyed considerable 
powers, in reality african democracy was infused with checks and ba-
lances that prevented abuse of political powers. Kings did not control 
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the means of survival and popular participation was the hallmark of 
those societies. while rulers were allowed to maintain some expanse 
of land for production from the surplus, they were not allowed to be 
excessively economically wealthy.  
In all, a theme that runs through the analysis of pre-colonial 
political economy is the centrality of kin groupings and communal 
arrangements as against individualism that reigns in contemporary 
societies.  If viewed from contemporary pedestal, the kin group is to 
the african individual what the western state is to the european indi-
vidual (ekeh, 1989: 6). right from the economy to political, kin group 
considerations were manifest in their business exchanges, produc-
tions and adoption of new technologies. Individuals and groups did 
not monopolize economic activities to the detriment of the majority. 
Importantly too, quality of life was not only measured in income and 
financial terms. this is because productive activities were not essentia-
lly quantified monetarily for there were other exchange practices like 
reciprocity, barter system, subsistence productions and non-financial 
social cultural and psychological considerations that define construc-
tions of existential qualities. 
Productive activities, transactions and quality of life were woven 
around families, extended kinship and communal networks. Colonia-
lism however forcefully regrouped the hitherto independent and sus-
tainable communities by regulating and managing the state in terms 
of production, distribution and governance within rational choice 
and neoliberal constrains. Colonialism consequently created poly cul-
tural entities in terms of ethnic and political groups and class tainted 
with suspicion, confusion, anxiety and capital accumulation induced 
by individualism and greed. subsistence agriculture and catch/food 
cropping were substituted with cash cropping for export, in form of 
cocoa and cotton into europe in the wake of Industrial revolution. 
this changed the practices of agriculture and generalized productive 
activities. Indices of quality of life measurement became redefined 
as agriculture was no longer mainly for subsistence but amended for 
global economic needs and monetarised. although since it is impor-
tant for this paper to go colonial and use modernization approach, 
it is possible to think about “welfarist” programs introduced in the 
colonies by the British after the world war II and which particularly 
focused on women and under YwCa. the reality however, is that 
those “welfarist” programmes were mere palliatives and could not 
significantly redress the fundamental complications already created 
by colonialism. In sum, this historical excursion creates an avenue 
through which current happenings in nigerian political economy be-
come appreciable.
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The post colonial era
with independence in 1960, nigeria did not sufficiently deviate 
from the given institutions and behaviour pattern.  this was par-
ticularly the case because emergent rulers were themselves colo-
nial trainees.  Most of them schooled in western world and imbibed 
western worldviews even though they promised to be different and 
protect their people.  Immediate post colonial era was not diffe-
rent from the colonial aside the nationality of the rulers.  the same 
can be said of today’s political economy.  the only difference lies in 
some level of sincerity and dedication exhibited by the immedia-
te post-colonial rulers while current ones lack any. their points of 
convergence are however more than those of departure.  one of the 
most important and relevant areas of convergence is the rhetoric of 
the need and desire to free nigerians from ignorance, diseases and 
poverty. 48 year after independence, the rhetoric remains and the 
problems have not rescinded. If anything, the problems have increa-
sed irrespective of investments. nigeria has only increased in “age” 
and population 30 million in 1952 to 140 million in 2007 (federal 
government of nigeria, 2007) without corresponding increase in 
quality of livelihood. 
although popular explanation from demographers is that popu-
lation increase is largely responsible for poverty and underdevelop-
ment, experiences of China and India now call for rejection of such 
positions.  thus, four fold increases in nigeria’s population within a 
period of 50 years does not necessarily hold negative developmental 
implications for nigeria. More deep seated problems like corruption, 
capitalism, globalization and poor governance are mainly responsi-
ble. By implications, out of the 48 years of Independence, nigeria 
has experienced at least 32 years of socio economic retrogressions, 
flagrant abuse of rights, assassinations and infrastructural neglects. 
these were particularly the case during general Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida’s and general sani abacha’s regimes. the military gover-
nments built patrimonial states, deepened ethno-regional political 
cleavages and politicized the military (Vaughan, 2005). Local com-
munities were ravaged by exploitation, poverty, social dislocation, 
prohibitive inflation, unemployment rates, infrastructure disrepair 
and crushing debt burden amounting to $10 billion in the early ni-
neties (Vaughan, 2005). while the track records of military regimes 
were less than enviable, civilian governments have not faired any 
better.  although right violations with impunity have reduced, other 
relevant socioeconomic indicators have not substantially improved. 
Democratic institutions are subverted and unpopular candidates im-
posed on the people through flawed primaries and general elections 
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rigging (omobowale, 2008; akanle, 2009). Public infrastructures like 
health care delivery system, roads and education are not really diffe-
rent from those of past regimes.  Political assassinations, thuggery 
and corruption are on the prowl. at 10 years of redemocratization 
process, discouraging quality of life index in nigeria have forced cri-
tical analysts to ask “what manner of democracy”. there is no gain-
saying the fact that governance quality in nigeria and its effects on 
peoples’ lives are largely negative, as at now, judging by the high and 
increasing level of poverty.
from government policy angle, since nigeria’s wholesale adop-
tion of saP in 1986 by the general Babangida’s administration, the 
country has not departed from that policy course.  even though the 
policy has been abandoned since the scandalous world wide accep-
tance of its failure in developing countries; its variants are still being 
implemented under the free market economy system and reforms. In 
fact, Mabogunje (2008: 7) observed that “one of the most important 
strategies of the new civilian administration in dealing with the cha-
llenges posed by the socioeconomic conditions of the country was 
to begin the process of deepening the role of the free market in the 
economy of the country”. the free market economy in this context is 
a flip side of globalization as policy aspects of capitalism.  It is pri-
vatization, rolling back the state and commercialization public uti-
lities. It is therefore strange that nations believe that policies hinged 
on capitalism have the capacity to solve socioeconomic problems 
created by it.  this is regardless of the fact that it popular knowled-
ge in critical scholarship that capitalism is nothing but exploitation 
of man by man, individualism and selfish capital accumulation for 
personal benefits.   
globalization presupposes that nations while relating with other 
nations will take advantage of global relationships to develop their 
countries (olutayo and akanle, 2008).  this however is not the case 
as globalization also presents powerful nations with opportunities 
to exploit others for parochial interests.  this has been made possi-
ble in three unique ways. one, while globalization has tremendous 
wealth creation potentialities it is powered by Information Commu-
nications technology (ICt). nations that are not endowed with this 
level of technological sophistication will definitely not be able to take 
advantage of the wealth creation potentialities. even when nations 
can afford the technology transfer when commoditized, like the 
case of nigeria, maintenance and frequent changes pose a threat to 
optimizations. hence, the influence of transnational Corporations 
(tnC) headquartered in developed world poses peculiar challenge as 
they undermine national sovereignty and influence state policies to 
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their advantages.  some compromise their operating environments 
and perpetrate capital flight as is the case in the nigerian telecommu-
nications and oil sectors. another major way is aiding and abetting 
corruption. once government officials and other private individuals 
exploit the system through capital accumulation and corruption, for-
ces of globalization like dual citizenship, interconnected financial 
systems and compression of time and space enable then to starch 
the ill gotten wealth in foreign banks (akanle, 2009b). this created 
an avenue through which resources meant for public welfare are em-
bezzled and successfully kept abroad.  
the last major way globalization systematically plunders poor 
nations and further enriches rich ones is through international trade. 
through globalization forces, countries trade with one another based 
on the principle of comparative advantage for mutual benefits. that 
is country can trade based on products not available at home (or not 
cost effective if produced) but mostly needed and available elsewhere 
at reasonable cost.  a problem however is that commodity pricing 
and valuations are guided by deeper extra-economic trajectories than 
market forces or trade liberalization as made believe by the world tra-
de organization (wto). arguments are that since developing nations 
joined the wto most has become poorer than before. this is because 
they actually lack the ability to maximally operate at global market 
based on primary commodity pricing dynamics and “under the table 
international politics”. 
nigeria like other developing nations concentrates on trade in 
primary products like crude oil and unprocessed agricultural pro-
ducts like cocoa and cassava.  these are only useful as raw materials 
without much value until values are added in the contemporary so-
phisticated production processes. the raw materials are consequently 
under priced as if they are ultimately useless in the processes of pro-
ductions.  to legitimize and sustain globalization shenanigans, deve-
loping countries are made to sign economic Partnership agreements 
(ePa) with the developed ones through which trade activities beco-
me legally binding.  generally, experiences have shown that there are 
not many gains for developing countries in ePa as they only further 
create poverty and make them more vulnerable.  Poverty and vulne-
rability were actually the results of uruguay round for africa and the 
same trend is being observed in the current Doha round (olutayo and 
akanle, 2008). It is in line with this that tankeu, (2008) concluded 
that current negotiations under the economic Partnership agreement 
(ePa) of world trade organization (wto) fall below expectation 
from an african Perspective.
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Poverty eradication efforts in Nigeria:
The government front
since poverty is not new in nigeria and is only increasing, its eradica-
tion attempts are also not new. Various strategies have been adopted 
with little or no success. Common strategies already adopted with signi-
ficant overlap and short life spans include the economic growth strate-
gy; basic needs approach, rural development strategy, reliance on local 
self-governing institutions (obadan and odusola, 2004) and national 
orientation approach. to drive these strategies, specialized agencies 
and frameworks were established with huge financial, manpower and 
technical commitments. the agencies, some of which are defunct, in-
clude agricultural Development Projects (aDP); nigerian agricultural 
Cooperative Bank (defunct); national agricultural Insurance scheme 
(defunct), national Directorate of employment (nDe); federal agri-
cultural Coordinating unit (now projects coordinating unit); national 
Primary health Care agency; Population activities fund agency: Peo-
ple Bank of nigeria (Defunct): federal urban Mass transit; national 
agricultural Land Development agency; Directorate for foods, roads 
and rural Infrastructure (defunct); national Boards of Commodity 
Banks (defunct); Better Life Programmes (defunct); family economic 
advancement Programmes (defunct);  Mass Mobilization for social 
and economic recovery (defunct), national economic reconstruction 
fund, national Commission for Mass Literacy and Poverty alleviation 
Programme (defunct) (obadan and odusola, 2004).
More recently, the immediate past President of nigeria, Chief 
olusegun obasanjo demonstrated its own commitment to poverty 
eradication in the country by establishing the national Poverty era-
dication Programme (naPeP) in 2001 (federal Ministry of Informa-
tion and national orientation). the programme is charged with the 
responsibility of coordinating and monitoring all poverty eradication 
efforts at all levels in the country. the programme is to also embark 
on intervention efforts that address the needs of the poor particularly 
at the grassroots.  nePeP is to be multi sectoral in approach by part-
nering ministries and private sector in resources generations, mobi-
lization and intervention so as to make it more effective.  By design, 
naPeP is to target unemployed youths and women allocating 60% 
available funds for them to participate in projects (federal Ministry of 
Information and national orientation). 
hence, naPeP empowerment programmes focus on three ca-
tegories of people; women, youths and farmers (federal Ministry of 
Information and national orientation, w/d).  although naPeP still 
exists as it is retained by the current president umaru Yar’adua to dri-
ve his poverty eradication plan, like other previous poverty eradication 
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programmes, naPeP has failed to achieve its objective. Major factors 
responsible for this failure are embezzlement, hijacking of program-
mes by the elites and non-poor, elitist programming, institutional du-
plications, improper coordination of beneficiary, executing ministries 
and agencies, non-involvement of beneficiaries, non-payment of loans 
by beneficiaries and poor funding. from personal and professional 
observations, the complex intermingling of these factors and outco-
mes suggest that naPeP is already going the way of its predecessors 
especially as poverty is on the increase regardless of its existence.  It 
is therefore obvious that nigerian governments down the ages have 
not successfully stemmed the tide of poverty but have only created 
recreated and aggravated it. It is against this background that we now 
turn to considerations of the ngo front in the war against poverty 
in nigeria.
Povety eradication efforts in Nigeria: 
The NGO front
since the government and the private sector have failed to solve the 
nigerian poverty problem, this has given legitimacy to engagement 
ngo as “the third party”. this ngo ‘legitimacy’ however does not 
mean efficacy in tackling poverty but as officially acceptable partners 
in the fight against poverty in the country. ngo emerged in nigeria 
with legal basis from article 71 of chapter 10 of the united nations 
(un) charter which sought a consultative role for organisations which 
are neither governments nor member states (Mobogunje, 2008). ope-
rations of ngo are basically prized as they are expected to be deta-
ched from governments and are able to fill the vacuum created by 
either government ineptitude or budget strain. they are legally cons-
tructed to be necessarily complementary. since nigeria is a member 
of the un, operations of ngo are therefore acceptable within that 
limit once they are legally established, subjected to national regu-
lations and with no participation or representation of government. 
ngo in nigeria do have justifications to exist in the nation especially 
as the government have lose the pragmatic capacities to eradicate 
poverty and organized private sector continues to operate optimally 
regardless of poverty level. 
Interestingly, it observable that private sector even appears to be-
nefit from ‘nigerian poverty’ through innovative product developments 
for profit making.  Cases abound but the common ones are observable 
in the nigerian banking industry and manufacturing sector just as is 
the case in tanzania, India, azerbaijan, Mexico and Bangladesh (Pe-
tkoski, et al., 2008; sharma, 2008; Barcelo, 2008; Defta Partners group 
et al., 2008). 
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the notion and practice of ngo are however not totally new 
worldwide. such activities actually date back to when people reali-
zed the need to help their groups independent of political systems 
at various stages. such organizations in the mid-nineteenth Century 
promoted anti-slavery movements before the struggle was taken over 
by British and european governments (Mabogunje, 2008). such or-
ganizations were also responsible for agitations for women suffra-
ge until women in many developed countries were given the rights 
to vote (Mabogunje, 2008).  In traditional pre-colonial and colonial 
nigeria, associations identical to ngo include community develop-
ment associations, self help associations, age grades, farmers’ labour 
rotation Oya, voluntary associations, home town associations and 
other non-state collectivities that attempt interventions and mutual 
assistance for common good. By modern considerations as provided 
for by article 71 of chapter 10 of the united nations Charter howe-
ver, they are new in nigeria and have foreign origins and operations. 
although a few existed at independence, the then governments in 
search of legitimacy took over some of their activities through com-
petitive party affiliations amongst members. Currently, there are 
proliferations of ngo in the country as they have emerged all over 
the nation depending on focus and problem areas.  according to 
Mabogunje (2008) and ouma (2007) ngo dot the nigerian welfare 
scapes as they move and mobilize into areas of social welfare that 
the state could or would not go. Consequently, aside the home town 
voluntary associations and religious organizations, the numbers of 
ngo in the country have grown substantially in the last two decades 
(Mabogunje, 2008).  
factors responsible for the upsurge in the numbers and activities 
of ngo in nigeria are traceable to high government ineptitude, rights 
violations and extreme poverty. the mid-eighties after the introduction 
of saP and austerity measures created and exacerbated unique forms 
of acute poverty in the nation.  Inflation and unemployment rates and 
resultant poverty were abysmal. this was the era of public neglect and 
elaborates corruption. extending to the abacha regime, government 
policy was best described as impossible as the government developed 
paranoia for public demands but continue to aggravate poverty. while 
poverty was 28.1% in 1980, it grew to 46.3% in mid-eighties and 65.6% 
in 1996 (national Bureau of statistics, 2005). these figures although 
high should be higher providing for doctored official recording and 
reporting as are usually the case.  It is against this background that, 
although there were only seven ngo in nigeria in 1940, the numbers 
has increased to at least 5000 with at least 60 ngo working in Cross 
river state alone for instance (angha, et al; 2008; Mabogunje, 2008; 
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ngeri-nwagha, 1995). the peak of the above elements in the eighties 
and nineties coincided with the upsurge in ngo activities.  this has 
continued to be the case since the return to democracy in 1999.  ac-
cording to ford foundation (2008), “since the return of democracy to 
nigeria in 1999 there has been growing interest in non-governmental 
organizations (ngo) and their role as development partners”.  this is 
because democratic governments appreciate the magnitude of poverty 
and the need to tackle it for political legitimation.  hence, democratic 
institutions are less critical of “development partners” and ideas espe-
cially when they are from the west and “advanced democracies”. 
In performing their roles, ngo basically adopt two different but 
overlapping approaches.  these are advocacy and programmes’ im-
plementation (intervention and operations). advocacy is government 
policies interfacing.  It is primarily to influence policy towards achie-
ving a course.  It may be in changing laws, establishing agencies and 
other institutional manipulations.  this is often achieved through 
campaigns, awareness creation, lobbying and activism to defend or 
promote specific course. according to Mabogunje (2008), operational 
ngo design and implement projects as a form of direct intervention 
in government incapacities.  this could be cases of building public 
toilets, construction of schools or micro credit financing.  
operational ngo can also be further subdivided into “relief orien-
ted” or development-oriented organizations, community-based, natio-
nal or international depending on scope of work (Mabogunje, 2008). 
It is important however to note that the above classifications are not 
hard and fast and only useful for analytical purpose because nearly all 
ngo in nigeria undertake both advocacy and operations and the two 
classifications are mostly not separated in practice. In other words, 
nearly all ngo participate in both advocacy and project implementa-
tion only the level of involvements may vary. this point is particularly 
important as ngo are dynamic in focus and techniques. they evolve 
into postures depending on problems at hand and adopt strategies 
accordingly.  for instance, during the military regimes due to flagrant 
human rights abuses, the most prominent activities were centered on 
human rights defense and international pressure mounting to safe de-
tained journalists and activists.  since the return democracy however, 
focus has shifted mostly to programming and intervention. the niger 
Delta environmental degradation and conflicts have led to the emer-
gence of environmental ngo and those focused on peace and conflict. 
also, urbanization and associated waste generation and pollution 
have further increased ascendancy of environmental ngo. the same 
could be said of the era of hIV/aID combating in the nation. thus, in 
achieving their goals, ngo dovetail in focus and approach.  no classi-
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fication is therefore rigid. focus, strategies and dynamism only largely 
depend on organizational contacts, financial sources and availability 
and manpower capacities.
It is in order at this juncture to re-emphasise that to a large ex-
tent, contemporary ngo are heirs and direct offshoots of ‘old’ charita-
ble organisations rooted in western philanthropic tradition revolving 
around the notion of the “deserving poor” (nieuwenhuys, 2001). they 
have deep seated preconceived notion and beliefs about the causes 
and nature of poverty and how it should be addressed (nieuwenhuys, 
2001) in the order of sameness in development processes of nations. 
In other words, today’s ngo (premised on western philanthropy cons-
tructs) approach poverty in ways identical to those used in Britain’s 
response to labour conditions created by late Victorian industrializa-
tions that virulently rejected almsgiving and advocated the need for 
reformation of morals and customs, to provide sufficient labourers for 
the labour market at minimum public expenditure (Mabogunje, 2008; 
nieuwenhuys, 2001).  
this reveals important historical and cultural elements that are 
bound to hold strategic implications for operations and efficiency. 
from the foregoing and based on our experiences, origin, princi-
ples, operations and financing of ngo in nigeria are largely western. 
their evolution, sustenance and development are from the north.  In 
analyzing poverty eradication attempts in nigeria with a focus on 
ngo, one thus discovers unsatisfactory efficacy.  this is particularly 
the case considered in relation with the disjuncture between globali-
zing narratives and local problems when problematisation, financing 
and solutions are given from without. ngo are expected to curtail su-
ffering and let people enjoy their existence to the full through advoca-
cy and programming that fill government-created vacuum.  they are 
to lead efforts in building inclusive communities, curb government 
waste and corruption in programming and create intervention models 
that public institutions can model. Persistent and increasing poverty 
in the nation however justify the need for ngo framework scrutiny 
and call reconsideration in nigeria.
NGO and Poverty Eradication in Nigeria: 
the Challenge
obviously, ngo are forces to reckon with in nigeria.  they are many, 
established and their structures are visible in the urban areas especially 
at the capitals. operations and interventions are designed and financed 
from abroad through international donor agencies. although poverty is 
accepted to be endemic in nigeria, philanthropic orientation is still very 
underdeveloped among wealthy citizens who keep their wealth to them-
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selves and families. ford, rockefeller and Bill and Melinda gates public 
support spirits are obviously absent from nigerian rich class.  ngo are 
therefore forced by operational funding and survival to rely on foreign 
granting agencies who decide which areas they are determined to fund 
even though with little understanding of the local problems. this is part 
of the reason why ngo chamelionate their activities to suit internatio-
nal funding environments. a foremost academic and ngo practitioner 
in nigeria puts the challenge thus:“Most ngo in nigeria have tended 
to depend for their funding on international ngo foreign foundations 
and to a lesser extent, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. to the 
extent that these funding organizations have their own agenda which 
may not always fall on all fours with our national priorities, there is a 
weakness in the role of ngo as strategic partners for national develop-
ment” (Mabogunje, 2008: 15).
the fact is that every funding agency has core funding areas in-
terested in no matter the national priorities.  and some of those core 
funding priorities may not necessary reflect national needs. this is a 
major risk factor in ngo environment that depends on foreign insti-
tutions. regrettably, international funding is actually on the decrease 
due to global economic crunch and as more ngo now get “tie offs” 
and donors concentrate on less stable nations.  the decrease has been 
compounded by the current global economic melt down.  as interna-
tional funding reduces and local donors are seriously undeveloped, 
the few available funding at public and private domains are disquiet 
about ngo relevance, professionalism, ethics and development im-
pact in nigeria (ford foundation, 2008).  In fact, the most widely held 
view is that most ngo are dubious and poise to defraud the donors of 
their funds (ford foundation 2008). this perception gap has largely 
affected the efficiency of ngo operations and the available resources. 
existing international donor agencies demand stringent measures 
that make operations very cumbersome in the name of international 
best practices. on the private angle, while there has been an increa-
se of interest in Corporate social responsibility (Csr), private com-
panies establish in-house foundations to perform ngo roles thereby 
reducing operating resources and spaces of ngo.  this multiplicity 
of organizations further pluralized the already uncoordinated opera-
tions, fragment resources and reduces impact.
Poverty eradication needs serious coordination, capacities and 
monitoring and evaluation. Lots of ngo are only conduit pipes to si-
phon fund as already observed by ford foundation above.  Most either 
employ unqualified staff or employ qualify ones and underpay them 
thereby leading to high labour turnover of qualified staff with impli-
cations for programmes. some use their directors’ contacts at donor 
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agencies to get funds which they lack ethics and capacity to utilise. 
some international donors are aware of this capacity and ethical gaps 
but decided to turn blind eyes once records show their sponsorship 
and northern political commitments to assisting the third world. ngo 
have consequently become political machineries through which do-
nors agencies and develop countries maintain orthodoxy. hence, there 
is high level connivance to enrich selves through project funds. ngo 
from this position become business enterprises moving into a sector 
where financial success is guaranteed by illicit enrichment which is the 
rule (abe, 2005). this trend has been observed across africa in Burki-
na faso, Cote d’Ivoire, ghana, senegal, angola and Cameroon where 
operators of ngo have become gang of white-collar bandits posing 
as intermediaries in order to collect funds that never reach the people 
(abe, 2005). the interaction of these snags is responsible for the poor 
efficiency and relevance of ngo in nigerian poverty eradication sche-
mes.  ngo terrain in nigeria is therefore not enviable considering the 
interlock of their political economy, corruption, perception and capa-
city gaps. 
Towards a Sustainable Alternative:
Concluding Remarks 
the best pedestal to begin this section is to acknowledge the fact po-
verty is undesirable to the individual, nation and the globe.  this is 
due to its debilitating effects on all. not only the sufferer(s). It is sur-
prising however that popular poverty construction and eradication 
strategies are from the north and never homegrown.  In part, this is 
due to the belief that best problem diagnosis and solution options are 
from the north.  Indigenous scholars are often considered incapable. 
hence, northern designs that have proved useful, or otherwise, in sol-
ving problems in northern communities are transfused into southern 
environments with very little or no modifications. such strategies also 
appeal to donors and international communities given their origins 
and “track records”.  this, particularly, is the case with ngo as pover-
ty eradication strategy in nigeria. 
as war is being waged against poverty in the country it is stra-
tegic to consider local alternatives which have been underestimated 
and disregarded thus far. sustainable alternatives must consider his-
torical peculiarities of local environments, greed of capitalism and 
external politicking.  external politicking must be well focused and 
checkmated as it has overarching influence on all would be policy al-
ternatives.  In the age of globalization and international power play, 
powerful nations have the capacity to reject local policy options they 
have not originated thereby making efforts meaningless.  this was the 
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case for the african alternative to structural adjustment Program 
for socio-economic recovery (aaf/saP, 1989), african Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development and transformation, and Lagos 
Plan of action, of 1980 (olutayo et al., 2008). as important as those 
blueprints were, they were never implemented or seriously considered 
due to international dishonor for them.  International governmental 
and non-governmental influences must therefore be appreciated and 
tackled ab initio.
solution to poverty in nigeria can never be from abroad. It is 
also not in sentimental funding for building facilities or imperialistic 
law changing. they only eventually create corruption, classes within 
class, avarice and greed among the local people.  for instance, ba-
sed on experience, it is beginning to be difficult to intervene through 
policy and research in nigeria.  Local people have come to conceive 
ngo and researches as money making ventures with plenty of dollars 
from the Oyinbos (local parlance for europeans and foreign donors). 
It is common to see people demand money before they participate in 
researches as respondents since they believe ngo have already used 
their problems to receive plenty of money from foreign donors.  
this is an emerging and familiar occurrence in nigeria. Cases 
abound but niger Delta is an example of such settings. researches 
as well as project interventions that do not factor this into designs 
and strategies may run into problem. It is then necessary to allow 
local scholars who know the intricacies of their environments con-
duct necessary studies and develop blue prints that are not teleguided 
from without. It is about time recognition and values are given local 
contents.  hence, the principles of popular participation, family and 
community levels involvement and bottom-top approaches are called 
for.  to know the poor, the poor must say so but not defined for them. 
while poverty is rife in nigeria, not all the poor people wish to be seen 
and addressed as poor because it has socio-cultural implications. this 
is particularly important in rural areas where most of the poor people 
are believed to be domicile. also, because of financial and material 
benefits that come with interventions, non-poor share or completely 
hijack benefits of projects with the poor thereby compromising pro-
ject impacts.  
Most of what is necessary is responsible leadership that is not 
neck deep in corruption. that is, accountable leadership that can pro-
vide the necessary infrastructures to make life easy and potentials 
annexable. with a little independence, self definitions, sense of worth 
and communal values reinforcements, most of the problems would 
be addressed.  a good fit between indigenous survival techniques and 
modern capacities acquisition and utilization should be the focus. 
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government should include the Ministry of Information and natio-
nal orientation’s Programmes for broadcast on the media but mostly 
on radio. for the young populations and the owners of tomorrow, 
this message should be included in their curriculum so that they can 
imbibe the principles of self definition, self worth, hard work and 
local appreciation and exploitation while annexing the outside early 
in life.
 for external partners who may wish to contribute objectively to 
the poverty eradication war, best practices must be their major con-
cern. they should focus more on mobilization of local stakeholders 
and facilitation of participatory processes that can successfully win 
the war against poverty. efforts should be made to coordinate and 
encourage organized private sectors, philanthropic individuals, well 
meaning ngo, labour unions, hometown and community develop-
ment associations (CDa) and the poor themselves. there are cultural 
practices that sustain the poor in nigeria, to some extent. aside the 
CDa, there are esusu (rotational collective indigenous banking or con-
tributions) among the Yorubas. through this process, a group of peo-
ple may come together to assist members to meet needs after which 
another batch is contributed to help another. there is also Oya (ro-
tational labour). In this case, people rotationally help with labour in 
productive activities, mostly on the farm. this process cancels expen-
ses on labour. Important sociocultural capital is however needed to 
sustain these processes. a sense of unity, oneness and belongingness 
in societies are needed to productively annex these processes. Impor-
tant considerations here however is that there are many of indigenous 
practices that could be investigated and annexed for sustainable po-
verty eradication rather than those reified and imposed by contempo-
rary global intricacies. these have not worked because they were not 
developed and have been relegated to the background as a thing of the 
past and the villages.
the above background dynamics demonstrate the need for 
sufficient prioritization of the structure and agency interface in po-
verty constructions and eradication attempts. research, policy and 
programming questions could then be: how do the society and the 
poor construct their existences? how do they live? are there lived 
experiences in their sociocultural environments that could be explo-
red, annexed and built upon to eradicate poverty? these would then 
mean attempts from below as distinct from top-bottom dimensions 
to poverty constructions, programming and interventions. alternati-
ve solutions to poverty would ultimately not necessarily be to cons-
truct another global binary of history between the global north and 
global south but, to look at manufacture and existence of poverty 
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with structure-agency binoculars that are critically pragmatic with 
particular historical and sociocultural specificities. this is strategic 
because poverty, affluence and overall development are not on a con-
tinuum but states of mind that must be galvanized in the poor them-
selves. hence, there must be sustained and increased partnerships 
amongst countries of the global south who are socioeconomically 
and historically identical on poverty and development to cross-breed 
in intellectual poverty policy designs and implementations. this is 
important if war against poverty is to be won.
Interested global north partners should humbly ensure suffi-
cient understanding of local circumstances and structural intricacies 
in order to liberate the traditionally marginalized group (the poor 
people) in national economic and political systems. emphasis should 
therefore be reduced on exporting frameworks and generalized aids. 
Prominence should be given to increased technical partnerships with 
local systems in terms of research and capacity building to appro-
priate local and global resource advantages. also important are mo-
nitoring and evaluation to galvanize sustainable activities that get 
people thinking about how to assess and take advantage of their near 
and far environments within indigenous worldview that has the ca-
pacity to sustainably improve approach to life and quality of life. this 
could be literally translated as “thinking globally and acting locally” 
or “acting locally and thinking globally”. the “thinking globally and 
acting locally” or “acting locally and thinking globally” componets 
are important but are yet to be valued. the approach still being adop-
ted is thinking globally and acting globally largely. for instance, the 
best the government is doing to make ngo responsible at the mo-
ment is to make sure they are registered with the corporate affairs 
commission as incorporated with Board Members. this is nothing 
but acting the global templates of International Best Practices in 
ngo operations. International f recommended this and good Book, 
audited accounting systems and general operational transparency. 
these are operation issues. what this chapter advocates is the value 
attachment to local problem solving templates. this is ngo activities 
that would research local ways of wealth creations and orientations. 
this local orientations and wealth creations and maintenance could 
then be formalized in ways acceptable to the people by the ngo in a 
partner-in-progress process. 
generally however, one can never end this chapter without mentio-
ning the fact that ngo as a group is a major force in nigerian poverty 
eradication terrain. they can therefore not be wished away. what we 
have done mainly is to show that relying on a framework that excessively 
esteem ngo ahead of other local imperatives and life pattern is faul-
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ty. a multisectoral approach is therefore to be prioritized. although the 
governments, individuals and private sectors now have interventionist 
agendas, these agendas are largely piece meal and uncoordinated. the 
national poverty eradication Programme (naPeP) is still on, ngo still 
have momentum, private companies now have foundations for poverty 
eradication; Presidents and governors’ wives have pet projects, while in-
dividuals have philanthropic programmes. a gulf however still exists in 
their orientations and operations while poverty in still on the rise.
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3.4. Rethinking World Bank Driven 
Land Tenure Reforms in Kenya
Abstract
this paper examines the Kenyan experience with world Bank dri-
ven land tenure reforms and how the government has attempted to 
ameliorate its impacts on the vulnerable groups such as women and 
orphans. the paper also examines the current thinking about land te-
nure reforms as illustrated in the draft land policy 2008. the main ar-
guments in this paper are that world Bank driven land tenure reforms 
have had several negative consequences among the vulnerable groups 
in Kenya, and these vulnerable groups have been at the forefront in 
resisting these reforms and have forced the government to bring in 
not only alternative land administrative mechanisms but also the de-
velop draft land policy whose originality and effectiveness are at the 
moment being debated by the public.  
the paper relies on rigorous corroboration of available secondary 
data together with primary data which were collected between 2004 
and 2006 in Kombewa division of western Kenya involving about 
156 informants. the informants were identified using purposive and 
 * Ph.D. in economic history. Lecturer at Maseno university, department of history 
and archaeology, Kenya.  P. o. Box 333-40105, Maseno-Kenya; <okuroh@yahoo.
com>.
Strategies against Poverty
274
snowballing sampling techniques. the finding show that world Bank 
assisted land tenure reforms has been responsible for landlessness, 
land disputes, and increased poverty among vulnerable groups. the 
findings also show that the poor have resisted these reforms and have 
forced the government to initiate land boards and land tribunals who-
se primary purpose are to assist the poor access land rights. these 
resistances have climaxed with the development of the currently de-
bated draft land policy, which is not a radical departure from the past. 
the paper is divided into three parts. the first part looks at the 
history and theoretical underpinning of land tenure reforms in Kenya. 
the second part analyses the consequences of land tenure reforms. 
the third part looks at the resistance and the new players in land tenu-
re reforms and how these have been incorporated in alternative draft 
land policy. the conclusion looks at the challenges facing land tenure 
reforms in Kenya. 
Genesis of land tenure reforms 
generally, a stable, flexible and negotiable structure of land access and 
control existed in Kenya until the establishment of the protectorate in 
the early 1890 and the colonial state at the beginning of the century 
(okoth-ogendo, 1981, 1991). the period of the British colonialism in 
Kenya was characterized by three main events i.e., alienation of land, 
imposition of english Property Law and transformation of customary 
land law and tenure (wanjala, 2000: 27).  the first step, from which 
others followed, was alienation and acquisition of land by the protec-
torate as a prelude to the establishment of a colonial state.  the sequel 
to this was imposition of english Property Law and acclamation of tit-
les and private property rights.  this, together with other legislations, 
provided a juridical context for the appropriation of land that had 
already taken place and the land tenure reform that was to follow. 
although the British protectorate did not carry with it any title 
to land, the colonial administration imported a series of legislative 
regulations to guide future appropriations and to give previous ones 
the necessary judicial support. the introduction of these measures 
were based on an assumption that the relations of local communities 
to the land did not carry the notion of individual title, and that their 
rights were constricted only to occupation, cultivation and grazing. 
thus, unoccupied land reverted back to the territorial sovereign.  as a 
result, several regulations were issued to facilitate land appropriation 
and making of land grants to settlers (sorrenson, 1965).
such legislative regulations included, Land regulation of 1897 
that authorized the protectorate to issue certificates for a short-term 
occupancy of 21 years renewable for similar period.  there was also 
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the Council of 1901 later incorporated into the east african (Land) 
order which empowered the administration to dispose of or lease 
unoccupied land in the protectorate.  the Crown Lands ordinance of 
1902 permitted the sale of land by settlers, but did not confer titles to 
land (okuro, 2008: 52) 
however, one of the most important early measures was the intro-
duction of Crown Lands ordinance of 1915 (wanjala, 2000: 28).  this 
ordinance declared all “waste and unoccupied” land in the protecto-
rate “crown land” and subject to the governors’ powers of alienation. 
It created the reserves for “natives” and located them away from areas 
scheduled for european settlement.  these developments witnessed 
the creation of what Mamdani refers to as “citizen” (settlers) and “sub-
ject” (africans) –and dual system of land tenure and land adminis-
tration to consolidate the colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996).  however, 
customary land tenure continued to govern africans’ relationship to 
land and was enforced by chiefs who were appointed by the colonial 
state to help in colonial administration.  By contrast, an individuali-
zed tenure regime, which was attached comparatively high level of 
rights, obtained for settlers.  the ordinance took away all the africans 
land rights and rested them in the crown.  the result was, as okoth-
ogendo puts it, that african occupants became ‘tenants of the crown’ 
(okoth-ogendo, 1991).
Despite all these legislative advantages, the settlers further clamo-
red for a security of tenure obtaining in england with regard to land ow-
nership.  they also advocated for a system of property law, with regard 
to transfers, mortgages, covenants, leases etc., the content of which was 
english.  these settler claims resulted in the official institutionalization 
of the transfer of property act of India as the applicable law to land held 
by the settlers under the Crown Lands ordinance.  Besides, to cater for 
the security of tenure, there was enacted the registration of titles ordi-
nance whose effect was to declare the title of the registered proprietor 
of land as conclusive and indefeasible (okuro, 2008: 53).
the creation of the reserves in areas deemed unsuitable for eu-
ropean settlement had far-reaching implications both for the natives 
and the colonial administration.  underlying them was a policy of ex-
ploitations and oppression against the colonized people accentuated 
by land alienation, forced male labour mobilization, overcrowding, 
insecurity, stagnation in african agricultural production, massive lan-
dlessness and rapid land deterioration due to fragmentation, overstoc-
king and soil erosion.  
In the long term, the problems in the reserves led to unrest and 
eventually to a political uprising –the Mau Mau resistance movement 
that organized around the issue of land (harbeson, 1971: 232).  the 
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colonial state’s answer to the unrest was to initiate an ambitious pro-
ject of land tenure reform in the reserves that would serve as a bulwark 
against rural radicalism. the colonial agronomists argued that the 
basic problem was neither over-population nor the need for better 
farming methods but the indigenous tenure arrangement, which they 
saw as a major constraint to agricultural development.  this argument 
was to lead to a grandiose tenure reform program relentlessly pursued 
by the colonial government throughout the period of colonization.  
the colonial agronomist’s thought about the individualization of 
land tenure was first contained in the less well-known J. h Ingham re-
port published in 1950 (okuro, 2008). however, the blueprint that was 
to destroy the indigenous/communal access to land was formulated by 
r. J. M. swynnerton in what was to be known as the swynnerton Plan 
(swynnerton, 1954). the architect of this plan argued persuasively in 
support of individualization of tenure in Kenya as a pre-condition for 
enhanced agricultural production.  
the process of tenure reforms took three main phases: adjudica-
tion, consolidation and registration.  the first phase entailed the as-
certainment of rights or interest in land amounting to “ownership” in 
support of individual claimants, while the second was a process where-
by individual holding were to be aggregated into what was considered 
“economic units”.  the final phase was the entry of the rights shown in 
the adjudication register into a Land register and issue of title deeds. 
registration of an individual as a proprietor of land conferred upon 
him absolute and indefeasible title to the land (wanjala, 2000: 30). 
the publication of the swynnerton Plan and the activities that 
followed marked the beginning of an evolution in Kenya’s land tenure 
reform system with shift from communal/traditional to individual ow-
nership (Place & Migot-adholla, 1998: 360).  In the whole of western 
Kenya, areas of the present day Kombewa division became a pilot 
scheme for land consolidation, which began onMay 8, 1956 (okuro 
2002, 2005).  In the words of the then the District Commissioner Cen-
tral nyanza e.h. risley “Kombewa was chosen as a pilot scheme since 
it contained examples of almost every type of soil formation as well as 
having considerable element of progressive minded people” (okuro, 
2005: 181). the individualization of land tenure has expanded rapidly 
since independence from high agricultural potential zones to semi-
arid agro-pastoral areas. 
World Bank and land tenure reforms
the world Bank has produced a series of influential reports on land 
matters since the seventies and has been a key actor in setting the policy 
agenda on issues of land tenure. this has been pointed out by a number 
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of key commentators. toulmin & Quan, for example have argued that 
much of africa remains heavily dependent on development assistance. 
as a consequence, african governments have been particularly subject 
to the ebb and flow of donor thinking about the importance of the land 
question and how it should be addressed (toulmin & Quan, 2000). wi-
lliams has also pointed out that for more than a decade and a half, the 
world Bank’s land policy greatly influenced the kind of development ac-
tivity that was financed and supported throughout the world by donor 
and international financial institutions (williams, 2002).
as to be expected, the world Bank continues to take a lead in set-
ting the land policy agenda not only in Kenya but also in other african 
countries (toulmin & Quan, 2000: 1-29). the changes in the world 
Bank’s thinking between 1975 to date about land reform are well do-
cumented by their own land and agricultural specialists (whitehead & 
tsikata, 2003: 67-112). this paper will borrow from two world Bank 
policy documents on land and agricultural production. these are the 
Land reform Policy Paper (1975) and world Bank report on sub-
saharan africa: from Crisis to sustainable growth (1989). these two 
reports captured the Bank’s thinking on a range of issues such as land 
reforms, land administration, land rights, customary tenure, land 
markets among others particularly in developing countries.
In the Land reform Policy Paper of 1975, the world bank un-
derscored the importance of land issues in fostering economic growth 
and reducing poverty and recommended that “formal land titling as 
a precondition of modern development; the abandonment of com-
munal tenure systems in favour of freehold title and sub-division of 
the commons; widespread promotion of land markets to bring about 
efficiency-enhancing land transfer; and that support for land redistri-
bution on both efficiency and equity grounds” (Quan 2000: 38). tenu-
re reform was seen as central to promoting agricultural growth, with 
private freehold tenure as an essential step to a modernised agricul-
ture, promoting investment and providing incentives to adopt new te-
chnologies (whitehead & tsikata, 2003:11). these assumptions were 
seen as primarily relevant to Latin america and asia on the wides-
pread understanding that the sub-saharan africa was land abundant 
continent characterised by extensive agriculture (Platteau, 1992: 5-6). 
however, by the eighties, all these assumptions changed. the change 
was attributed to the experiences that were gathered from the coun-
tries that had experimented with privatisation of tenure. for example 
it was becoming evident that some communal tenure arrangements 
were able to increase tenure security and provide a (limited) basis for 
land transactions in ways that are more cost effective than the free-
hold titles (Deininger & Binswanger, 1999:248).  
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In africa, the widespread food crises and famines in the eighties 
led to the renewed focus on agricultural productivity and the condi-
tions for agricultural growth. as early as 1982, a highly authoritative 
report on agricultural development in sub-saharan africa pointed to 
land as a growing constraint and recommended greater attention to 
land use and land tenure issues (eicher & Baker, 1982). an equally 
influential account emphasised the growth of land sales and the impe-
diments affordable to a free market in land by the post-colonial states. 
these developments created a shift in the world Bank thinking on 
land reform particularly in africa. 
this shift became apparent in the 1989 document sub-saharan 
africa: from Crisis to sustainable growth. In this document, world 
Bank followed a widely rehearsed logic concerning the inability of 
“traditional” systems of land tenure to adapt to changing conditions 
(william, 1994). the document emphasised that increased agricultu-
ral productivity required new technologies and the incentives to adopt 
them, to be provided by tenure security through land titling. It further 
posited that land rights secured by titles would also help rural mar-
kets in credit and land to develop. Customary systems were seen to 
be responsible for the lack of incentives, did not stimulate land and 
credit markets and prevented the distribution of land to most efficient 
users. 
In the early nineties, the world Bank funded a series of studies 
on the link between the security of the freehold tenure and agricul-
tural productivity (Bruce & Migot-adholla, 1994). Kenya was among 
the countries studied, and the findings confirmed earlier research. no 
difference in the productivity and investment of land held in freehold 
title compared with those held in customary tenure were found (Mi-
got-adholla, et al. 1994). the conclusion that emerged was that the 
customary tenure systems appeared to offer sufficient security of te-
nure for farmers to invest in land, although the lack of the title meant 
they had no automatic rights of disposal. and that there was no com-
pelling economic justification for replacing customary land law with 
state guaranteed titles. 
By the year 2000, the world Bank adopted a more cautionary mea-
sure to land tenure reforms in africa. at one moment, the bank seem 
to have followed a incremental approach to land policy, i.e., adapting 
and not replacing existing land management practices, with the role 
of the state to provide the legal and administrative environment that 
will support and promote evolutionary change.   at another moment, 
the bank became keen towards promoting land reforms that will eli-
minate conflicts between parallel sets of rights and is setting up pilot 
programs to register and adjudicate customary rights, to provide titles 
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on a community basis and to redistribute land through negotiation 
and the market (Quan, 2000). 
however, the recent policy declarations emanating from the world 
Bank, shows its commitments towards formalisation of land relations 
as a necessary precondition to modernisation and economic develop-
ment. that the bank continues to hold to the idea that formalisation 
and titling of land rights is the most desirable goal and continues to 
offer substantial support to governments establishing land tenure re-
forms with individual registered titles (Quan, 2000:38). In its latest 
policy research report entitled Policy research report: Land Policies 
for growth and Poverty reduction, the bank persuasively argued that 
policies that make it possible to use land as a means to access credit 
turn it from a dead asset into an economically viable resource with 
major equity benefits (Manji, 2006: 58).  
as a consequence of this history, since independence, land titling 
programs have been implemented with great vigour, particularly in 
the areas of settled agriculture (Coldham, 1979: 616). In addition, land 
titling has remained the official policy of the ministry of land within 
the department of land adjudication and settlement. the department 
is governed by three acts of parliament namely: Land Consolidation 
act (Cap. 283), Land adjudication act (Cap. 284), group representa-
tives act (Cap. 287), with an express mandate of ascertaining rights 
and interests on land in trust land areas and transforming of owner-
ship from customary tenure to individual ownership through demar-
cation, survey and registration. Despite the purposeful penetration 
by non-customary tenure ideology and legal provision, unregistered, 
customary tenure not only persists but also is still by far the major 
form of tenure in most regions in Kenya.  In contemporary Kombewa 
division customary and statutory systems co-exist and operate within 
somewhat distinct domains (adams & turner, 2006; okuro, 2005).  
The consequences of land tenure reforms
since the swynnerton Plan, numerous empirical studies have emer-
ged which specifically examine the impact of land tenure reforms in 
Kenya (okoth-ogendo, 1986; green, 1987; shipton, 1988; haugerud, 
1989; Bruce et al,. 1994; Place & Migot-adholla, 1998; okuro, 2005). 
evidence from these and many other studies, has shown that land tit-
ling has not delivered on the key envisaged areas namely: that titling 
has failed to achieve the expected increase in agricultural investment 
and productivity even among small holders, did not facilitate the use 
of land as collateral for small holder farmers, and encouraged land 
speculation by outsiders. the titling programs were also responsible 
for the increased land conflicts as it ignored the overlapping and mul-
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tiple rights and uses of land at the local levels hence reinforcing un-
equal access to land based on gender, age, ethnicity, and class. 
the empirical weakness of these studies, however, emanates from 
their regional bias. these studies were mostly done in agriculturally 
rich regions of rift Valley, Central and eastern regions of Kenya. we 
are yet to ascertain the impact of land titling on farmers practicing 
subsistence agriculture particularly in sections of western and even 
the Coastal regions of Kenya.  this exists despite the fact that the 
government and even the world Bank have continued to support land 
registration as official policy when it comes to dealing with land re-
forms. extensive land registration and titling has been going on in 
Kombewa division of western Kenya for a long time. the evidence 
we have today concerning the extent of land registration in this area 
confirm that it is almost complete (okuro, 2008). what is however 
astonishing is that the villagers have continued to petition the local 
administration for support to enable them to obtain titles. 
the integration of Kombewa into colonial capitalist economy 
and later into emerging regional political economy in post-colonial 
Kenya significantly restructured and modified the way the people of 
Kombewa thought of themselves and the properties they owned. for 
example, the colonial requirement that households pay taxes in cash 
and renewed cash demands by and large necessitated rampant sale of 
livestock and remarkable demand for wage labour. In the end, even 
bridewealth exchange, which was accomplished using livestock, as-
sumed monetary terms. Prospective husbands who found rates of bri-
dewealth exchange unreasonable either exchanged less or migrated 
to look for wage labour. some even eloped with girls without exchan-
ging anything (okuro, 2006). thus in Kombewa, the three decades 
after 1920 were marked by increased demand for cash-to pay taxes, 
to acquire bridewealth, to buy clothes and to meet other necessary 
domestic requirements. Indeed, the adoption of western forms of clo-
thing, quarrels over quality and amount of clothing provided to co-
wives, had become one of the principal items of conflict within the 
homesteads in Kombewa (hay, 1989). 
therefore, the three decades after 1920 stand out as decades of 
fluidity and experimentation with a number of economic possibilities, 
including the growing of cotton and other cash crops, long distance 
trade and a regular occupation, and wage labour outside Kombewa 
to look for cash. the leaders of this process were often the first Chris-
tians in the area, the sons of lineage leaders who dominated the Kom-
bewa politics around the turn of the century and their wives and mo-
thers together with migrant laborers (hay, 1989). these fluidities and 
experimentation indeed became the guiding principles upon which 
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the people of Kombewa came to terms with the land tenure reforms. 
It was and continues to be a reflection of their overarching demand 
to come to terms with the difficult economic options they have faced 
since the establishment of colonialism and after (okuro, 2008). 
when land tenure reforms reached Kombewa as from May 8, 1956, 
it did not by and large realise the theoretical expectations, instead it 
created greater uncertainty and conflicts. those on whose names land 
was registered as principal landholders-men, assumed exclusive indi-
vidual rights in given pieces of land at the expense of women, widows 
and juniors whose rights to land remained either secondary or usu-
fruct. eventually, and as it did happen in Kombewa, principal land 
holders imagined and indeed started to use land as any other property 
they had once held and used during the colonial period. 
thus immediately after independence, it was land acquisition 
and not the number of livestock or women that became a significant 
measure of wealth. the attention was from livestock to access to land. 
those who benefited most after land registration were the ones who 
had access to cash. these included government civil servants, wage 
labourers and those who secured limited or no land during the pro-
cess of registration. they used their status and cash to purchase land 
from willing sellers who desperately needed cash to meet day-to-day 
household demand. as such, land tenure reform in Kombewa has so 
far resulted into land sales, land disputes, and the denial of land rights 
particularly for vulnerable groups. these have been significantly exa-
cerbated by the high prevalence of hIV/aIDs resulting into the rela-
tive increased in numbers of orphans and young widows with limited 
knowledge about land rights (okuro, 2007; 2008). 
In Kombewa disposing of land as a gift became the precursor for 
land sales. usually, the person receiving land as a gift held some infor-
mal or formal relationship with the principal landholder. for example, 
such a person was either given birth to as a result of leviratic marriage 
or offered some financial assistance to the principal landholder. It was 
these gifts that eventually initiated the land sales witnessed in Kom-
bewa division today and particularly in the era of hIV/aIDs. as from 
seventies evidence continued to accumulate in which individual male, 
usually, principal landholders sold their land to either kin members or 
migrant labourers at relatively lower prices. similarly, others who had 
not accumulated enough livestock used land to increase their herds. 
here, the principal landholder offered for sale a section of his land in 
exchanged for livestock.
today the people who live in Kombewa espouse various and at 
times conflicting explanations for selling land. a survey of these rea-
sons include: to rescue a relative fined in a court of law; to buy a 
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coffin or just to meet funeral expenses; to pay school fees for children; 
to exchange bridewealth; to pay hospital bills; to buy food: to build 
iron roofed house; to cultivate land; to avoid land dispute; to esta-
blish a home, to pay debt, and others- including buying a bicycle or 
to repair a boat, or just inability to give birth to male children, among 
others. while the rampant land sales in Kombewa may be attributed 
to the intensifying rural poverty, nuance analyses reveal the extent 
to which some of these sales are directly or indirectly related to the 
ravages of hIV/aIDs at individual, community and household level 
(okuro, 2007).
while land tenure reforms were premised on increased agricultu-
ral activity particularly for smallholder farmers, out of all interviewed 
in Kombewa, a limited number preferred to sell their land to increase 
their acreage under food cultivation. the land sell seem to have been 
motivated by prestige and speculative purposes rather than increased 
economic benefits from land cultivation. these land sales were geared 
towards acquiring household needs, however, with long-term detri-
mental effects on those whose livelihoods depended directly on land 
and on intergenerational land inheritance. It needs to be emphasised 
that this rather vibrant land market thrives albeit secretively or infor-
mally and not with a view of raising land use efficiency. 
In the unfolding scenario, those with cash have continued to ac-
cumulate more land at the expense of the poor. for example, in Kom-
bewa, land sales pitted “wealthy individuals” including urban elites, 
teachers, and other government civil servants living and working 
within Kombewa division against poor households who ordinarily 
should be deriving their livelihood from land. usually, these “wealthy 
individuals” are the first to be consulted should there be a person 
willing to dispose off his or her land, and given their monopoly over 
land purchase, they often quoted lower prices so as to pay less and 
buy more. 
In Kombewa, these “wealthy individuals” are the ones who have 
processed their land title deeds, while a majority of the people parti-
cularly those from poor household (and mostly the ones selling their 
land parcels) do not even know their parcels numbers and have not 
bothered to process their title deeds. this process has led to impo-
verishment, disempowerment and curtailment of livelihoods for the 
poor rural households in Kombewa. Indeed, the skewed distribution 
of land during adjudication in Kombewa enhanced and reinforced 
class and wealth differentiation, especially when looked at in terms of 
the inability of the poor to defend their claims to land.
It is not only land sales that has characterised the last two deca-
des in Kombewa. these land sales have been characterised by inces-
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sant land disputes. the reasons for these are multiple, and essentially 
linked to the increased scarcity of land caused by demographic pres-
sures and to a higher extent by rights conferred to landholders under 
land registration and titling. for instance, where land has traditio-
nally been the object of multiple rights and uses, the weakening of 
the customary institutions that were able in the past to balance these 
different interests as well as the attempt to renegotiate the arrange-
ments established in the past have not only fostered tensions but also 
land disputes. furthermore, many people are today seeking land to 
settle and farm. this has been compounded by frustrations with off-
farm economic opportunities.
the characterisation of land disputes in Kombewa varies and 
includes; disputes related to the issue of land transfer; disputes in-
volving absent landowner; disputes concerning land sharing and loa-
ning; disputes of land purchases and payment by instalment; disputes 
arising from land exchanges i.e., when two or more registered land 
owners exchange land among themselves to ease cultivation or to hold 
continuous plots; disputes involving land tenants; disputes regarding 
succession or inheritance of land rights; land boundary disputes; and 
lastly are land disputes involving “contents” in purchased parcels. 
In the intervening years, two competing interpretations have 
emerged to explain the impact of land tenure reforms on women and 
other minors. on the one hand is the admission that land titling has 
disadvantaged women and children. these interpretations have played 
out and have led to the conclusion that land registration has effected 
hardening on men’s land rights into absolute legal ownership, to the 
exclusion of women and children, meaning not only that it introduced 
the bias in favour of men’s rights, but that it also reinforced the bias 
that existed already and, arguably made it more resistant to forces of 
change that might otherwise have addressed the imbalance. on the 
other hand, some studies have posited that land registration indeed 
strengthened some women’s land rights. as a consequence, some wo-
men gained from registration while others lost. for example, widows 
sometimes registered land in their names instead of returning it to 
the dead husband’s family under customary law (shipton, 1988: 119). 
other women and widows have been able to purchase land-but this 
must be understood from a background of affordability and risk of 
harassment.
these two competing arguments are tenable in Kombewa. as al-
ready discussed, land in Kombewa was registered in the name of males, 
thereby, in effect, alienating women’s access rights to land.  Prior, to 
this, such access rights depended upon the fact that individual males 
were not able to alienate land, even though as members of the land 
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holding patrilineage they had the right to allocate land.  Moreover, an-
ticipated cash needs –taxes, school fees, sickness, among others, forced 
those with land to lose it all together. In effect, land titling that came 
with colonial land tenure reform and continued in the intervening years 
gave individual males the theoretical and, in practice, legal right to dis-
pose of the land through sale or any other means without necessary 
recourse to the elders of the patrilineage, who would ordinarily have the 
power of veto in matters of alienation of land by individuals. these have 
been experienced despite the fact that all transfers of adjudicated land 
should be approved by the District Land Board, taking into account the 
needs of the transferor’s dependents. this requirement has no enforcea-
ble sanctions to ensure that transfers via sale are reported to the board. 
the reform transferred to an almost exclusively male, individualized 
–tenure system, which left no provision concerning not only women 
but also widows and orphans. In Kombewa, those who lost out inclu-
ded widows, particularly those with no male children, and divorced and 
separated women who were widely regarded at the time of adjudication 
as having no entitlement to land allocation. 
In addition, land privatization significantly interfered with the so-
cial embedded-ness that characterized the numerous ways into which 
secondary holders of land rights accessed land. Beneath it existed flexi-
ble, negotiable, overlapping, and location specific rights to land. the 
customary systems provided a wide array of arrangements by which 
people could gain access to land and other resources, even though 
they were not landowners. these included, sharecropping, borrowing 
of land, tenancy, pledges, and access for a particular purpose, such as 
grazing on crop residues. all these provided access to land for use wi-
thout undermining the flow of land through inheritance.  these arran-
gements were important because they provided flexibility within rural 
Kombewa economies and enabled land to be made available to tho-
se with surplus labour on negotiable terms (cf. whitehead & tsikata, 
2003), particularly for those groups who received little or no land at 
adjudication. It also provided a means by which poor groups without 
land of their own could nevertheless gain access to land resources. 
thus in a village one could claim grazing rights over a parcel of land 
that was subject to hunting rights of another, transit rights of a third 
and cultivation rights of a fourth group.  each of these categories ca-
rried with it varying degrees of control exercised at different levels of 
social organization.  these arrangements ensured an equitable distri-
bution of land rights among all community members (okoth-ogendo, 
1976; 1991). 
as land registration progressed, these different or bundle of land 
rights became avenues of contestations. for example, grazing rights 
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tended to polarize younger and older generations of men. elders felt 
their lineage interests, as well as their “category interests” as elders, 
were threatened by the eminent restriction of grazing grounds and 
the likelihood of having to reduce their herds. for example, before 
the advent of land tenure reforms there was an area referred to as 
alara in Kombewa division. alara was a big unoccupied parcel of land 
(unoccupied as far as the establishment of homesteads is concerned). 
the area was used by the villagers for a variety of purposes including: 
grazing animals, cutting grass, collecting medicinal plants, and even 
the children played in the area as they grazed animals. It was only in 
alara that animals could access drinking water and lick the naturally 
available salts. however, access to alara was curtailed as individual 
exclusive rights provided under the new tenure arrangement overrode 
these overlapping land rights. things even got worse with population 
pressure as people either rushed to establish home to the vicinity of 
alara or started to cultivate their individual parcels. grass for that-
ching houses that people could acquire for free assumed monetary 
terms. today, accesses to alara resources are only limited to alara 
individual landholders. those who used to graze their herds within 
alara have really found it difficult. In fact they are faced with only 
one option to reduce their herd to manageable number. therefore, 
what seems to be emerging from the above debate is that the predicted 
outcomes of land privatization have not occurred and where they have 
occurred, this has not always been for the predicted reasons. nonethe-
less, it remains. In the following pages, I debate the extent to which 
the government and other players have been enjoined to remedy the 
unfortunate impacts of land tenure reforms particularly with exam-
ples from Kombewa division in western Kenya.
Addressing the disastrous effects of land titling
almost five years after independence, the government seems to have 
realised some of the disastrous impact of land tenure reforms (oku-
ro, 2008: 235). this is what witnessed the enactment of Land Control 
act (Cap. 302) and Land Control Boards (LCB) in 1967, for the pur-
pose of restricting and controlling the right to freely alienate land in 
agricultural areas by creating a local committee to vet all transfers. It 
stemmed from the desire to protect citizens from the potential threats 
of the system of formal land registration introduced by the colonial 
government (okoth-ogendo, 1976; Coldham, 1978). It was also felt 
that formal legal rules should not be the only determinant of how the 
land market should operate. the LCB was expected to continue to 
uphold customary norms and regulations relating to land ownership 
(ngugi, 2004). the customary land law and the received land law were 
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thus juxtaposed (adams and turner, 2005). the LCB exercised their 
discretion to deny approval for land transaction in, (a) where family 
members have not approved the sale or subdivision; and (b) where the 
vendor cannot adequately demonstrate that the family has adequate 
alternative means of subsistence in the event of the transaction (oku-
ro, 2008: 236).
similarly, as from 1981, the government introduced a series of 
administrative measures designed to take the resolution of land dis-
putes, in the rural areas, out of formal courts into the hands of panel 
of elders and administration members. this also witnessed the en-
actment of the Magistrates Jurisdiction amendment act (MJaa) of 
1981, which established the elders’ courts or the panel of elders and 
vested in them the power to hear and decide on certain land disputes. 
these included beneficial ownership of land, the sub-division and de-
termination of land boundaries claims to occupy and work on land 
and other land related disputes (okuro, 2005: 185). the overriding 
argument was that the elders panel could unlock the potential for the 
quick and cheap resolution to land disputes since the membership 
were more conversant with the problems on the ground and because 
they were near the people. Moreover, the act made it easy for people 
to present cases, by writing to the District officer (Do), using the spe-
cial knowledge of elders in matters that were considered awkward for 
the formal courts to process in an appropriate manner. the decisions 
were to be formally recorded in a magistrate’s court, if the court did 
not issue instructions to investigate the matter further. however, the 
ability to appeal such decisions was unclear (africa right, 1996).
the panel of elders as dictated to by the act comprised the District 
Commissioner (DC), as the chairman, or any other person appointed 
by him, and two to four elders agreed upon by the parties involved 
in the dispute. the judgement of the panel was then passed on to the 
resident magistrates’ court entrusted with making the final decision. 
appeals could be made, in which case, a fresh panel was to be cons-
tituted. the act defined elders as persons in the country or commu-
nities to which the parties in dispute belong, and who are recognised 
by the customs in the community or communities as being, by virtue 
of age, experience, or otherwise, competent to resolve issues between 
parties. where there was no such elder, the law defined an elder as 
meaning such a person as the DC appoints (wanjala, 1990).
the act as it was established experience several limitations in its 
application. the act contemplated an elder in the old style, who is 
presumed to be incorruptible, impartial and respected by the society. 
such an elder is fast disappearing as the society changes. In deed, the 
elders found in these panels tended to be those persons appointed by 
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the DC as allowed for in the second part of the definition. the Do was 
presumed the chief elder tended to be a relatively young person. while 
the process was intended to be simple, cheap fair and democratic, in 
reality it faced several limitations including: limited jurisdiction of the 
elders’ panel, corruption among panel members, unclear legal provi-
sions, and peoples’ lack of knowledge regarding the working of the 
panel (okuro, 2008).
rather than solving the huge number of existing land cases, the 
act ended up increasing the backlog of land cases in courts (africa 
rights, 1996; okuro, 2005). this was because people could challenge 
the decision of the elders in courts under existing laws, but the judges 
would put them aside. according to smokin wanjala, an expert on 
land law “many of the cases were being referred to court, and kept on 
going back to courts, even though the president was saying that the 
elders rather than the law courts should be handling land cases. the 
courts were in dilemma. so when land case file came up, the judge 
would deliberately adjourn it-indefinitely. Land became completely 
tied up in disputes […] at that stage we might have thought it was for 
genuine reasons, to give the poor more access to justice. But I am now 
more inclined to think that it was politically motivated, because of 
the way it developed. It seems that it pitted the disadvantaged against 
increasingly emerging propertied elite. the government preferred to 
take the battle out of sight, and so out of the courts […]” (Quoted in 
africa rights, 1996: 75). 
as it became apparent that the panel of elders was creating more 
chaos in land dispute resolution, the act was amended in 1987 to bar 
the elder from arbitrating cases involving registered land. But still 
things did not improve. no one was satisfied; even those who had ma-
naged to obtain private land saw the elders as ultimately resisting the 
pre-eminence of individual title deeds. Moreover, the individual titles 
did not recognise the bundle land rights that people held on registe-
red land. the new amendment attempted to relegate the traditional 
authorities to the periphery in land matters. for an act which goes to 
great length to integrate customary with statutory tenure, shoots itself 
down when it fails not only to utilise existing traditional institutions, 
but also the taboos and customs that continue to apply even after land 
has been registered. 
In response to the further crisis, in 1990, the government was 
forced to re-examine the issue of the rising land disputes (okuro 2005: 
188). the “solution” was found in the creation of the Land Dispute tri-
bunal act n° 18, 1991. the act gained presidential assent on January 
14, 1991. this act heralded the creation of land tribunals in every pro-
vince in Kenya. however, the act did not mark a significant departure 
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from the previous ones.  It maintained the definition of an elder. as 
with other acts creating the previous elders panels, this act limited the 
jurisdiction of magistrates’ courts in certain cases, particularly those 
related to land in rural areas. It required that such land cases be sent 
back to land tribunals for arbitration. 
unlike the previous acts, the new act made provisions for appeals 
by creating the Land Dispute appeal Committee, appointed by the 
Provincial Commissioner (PC) and consisting of a chairman appoin-
ted by the PC and no fewer than five people appointed by the minister. 
the act stated that the minister may make rules prescribing the pro-
cedure of the tribunal in particular; the form in which any decision, 
order or determination of the tribunal shall be given; the evidence that 
may be admitted in the proceeding before a tribunal and the taking of 
such evidence (okuro, 2005: 189). as it was created, the act conside-
rably gave powers to the minister and the provincial administration 
in determining the operations of land tribunals. the appointment and 
the membership of the tribunals became amenable to political mani-
pulation by anyone with local power or vested interest (shipton, 1988: 
115). this is the environment that characterised the creation of Kom-
bewa Division Land tribunal (KDLt) in 1999. 
the operation of KDLt respected the prevailing traditional hie-
rarchy and/or “invented” power structures in Kombewa before and af-
ter colonialism. It developed an elaborate structure of reporting land 
cases to the land tribunal. for example, in instituting a land case in 
KDLt, the elders expected the litigant to exhaust the procedure of first 
reporting the land dispute to the family, the village elders, the sub-lo-
cation elders and lastly to the location elders for arbitration or media-
tion. It is only in the event that the one disputant is dissatisfied should 
the case be forwarded to the tribunal. the dissatisfied party moreover 
had to be issued with a letter to the land tribunal indicating the full 
resume of the land dispute. upon receipt of the introductory letter, the 
dissatisfied party must pay equivalent of $4 as sitting allowance for 
the elders. 
Provision exists in which a person with land dispute can directly 
approach the Do with the dispute. the Do will issue such a party 
with a letter to the tribunal. the tribunal will then write to the chief 
whose jurisdiction falls within the area with the land dispute. In the 
letter, the members of the tribunal normally ask the chief to provide 
them with a complete resume of the land dispute before it is put for 
arbitration. three quarters of the membership constituted a quorum. 
the land tribunal is required to discuss the dispute in presence of all 
the aggrieved parties and may physically visit the land under arbitra-
tion to make certain observations before resolving the dispute. the 
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tribunal’s verdict must always be typed by the Do’s secretary and han-
ded over to all the parties. In the case of a boundary dispute, the tri-
bunal members must implement their verdict by visiting the disputed 
land to redraw the boundary under the watchful eye of the sub-chief 
and the village elders. If the parties are not satisfied with the verdict 
of the tribunal, the dissatisfied person is given a letter (upon payment 
of equivalent of $25) to refer the case to the appeals committee at 
a date and time agreed upon. the appeals committee comprised at 
least three elders from different areas. Its judgement is final. In its full 
working capacity, the tribunal hears (and rarely arrived at verdict), a 
maximum of two cases per day and sits twice a month. as such the 
tribunal has several cases pending (okuro, 2005: 190).
almost decade after their formation, the land dispute tribunal has 
not lived to the intended purpose. Land disputes and appeals con-
tinued to accumulate at the divisional level. the demand for elders 
allowances kept justice system away from the poor and the elders 
themselves continued to be referred to as jodong’ aich [old belly men] 
by those they were to serve. since, the then ruling party Kenya african 
national union (Kanu) had used land for purposes of maintaining 
political patronage and securing party loyalty (Kanyinga, 1998), it was 
not surprising that the tribunals became centres for not only isolating 
party dissent but also to aid the establishment in mobilising support. 
It was Kanu sycophants and retired members of the provincial ad-
ministration who dominated membership to the land tribunals. as it 
were, the tribunals became avenues for corruption, nepotism and all 
forms of favouritism.  the membership lacked adequate knowledge of 
basic law and were constantly under pressure from the legal fraternity 
to justify its existence (okuro, 2008). 
It was not surprising when Civil society organisations joined 
hands in challenging the moral and the legal value of the land tri-
bunals. several gender activists, particularly argued, that customary 
rules and obligation, which formed the hallmark of the tribunal’s ju-
risdiction, had notable weaknesses particularly in the exclusion of wo-
men, the young and the vulnerable not only from land rights but also 
from decision making. they further lamented the extent to which the 
tribunals were dominated by old men with very little participation of 
women-despite the fact that women constituted over 80% of subsis-
tence farmers (Bosworth, 2002: 10), and also significant players ma-
naging resources such as water, grasslands, forest, livestock and even 
wildlife (Verma, 2001). 
the gender view was even clearly captured by one practising 
lawyer who argued “polygamy is very common here. with land dis-
putes, it is normal for the in-laws to claim that the woman is ‘not 
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really married’ under customary law […] they call in witnesses from 
the community to disinherit her […] there are also big problems over 
custody of children. You will typically have a common law wife-which 
is recognised under statutory law-who has children and whose set up 
has all the ingredients of a marriage, but whose in-laws will abuse and 
manipulate everything in court in order to get the land. Courts are 
often very biased over these issues, and rely heavily on the word of 
community elders. It flies in the face of women’s rights, under statu-
tory law”. (africa rights, 1996: 77). 
taking power on a platform of “zero tolerance to corruption”, the 
national rainbow Coalition (narC) dissolved all land boards and tri-
bunals in June 29, 2003 in what was described as a continuation of 
the war on corruption (Imathiu, 2003). the dissolution was meant 
to pave way for the minister to put in place mechanisms to regulate 
their operations with a view to making them more transparent and 
efficient (wachira, 2004). while this dissolution was announced by 
the lands minister at a public rally in Mweru chief’s camp in Imenti, 
it nonetheless marked a deliberate attempt by the new government to 
address the confusion, corruption and inefficiency that characterised 
land transactions particularly in rural areas. It also responded to the 
gender question hitherto lacking. 
In reconstituting the new tribunals, the minister directed that 
three members will have to be women (Imathiu, 2003). In January 
5, 2004, the new land tribunals and land boards were reconstituted 
under the December 11, 2003 Kenya Gazette Notice. the qualifications 
for appointment included honesty, integrity and form for education. 
those with leadership experience in the civil service, churches or pri-
vate organisations were also considered (wachira, 2004). while the 
new requirements and the appointments were welcomed, there was 
however no significant break from the old ways of doing things. for 
instance, the reduction of the role and powers of the provincial ad-
ministration was not visible enough since all the appointments were 
done with their recommendations and at times approval. welcomed, 
however, was the enthusiasm of development partners in providing 
support to newly created LCB/LDt, through training, capacity buil-
ding, monitoring and evaluation.  
The Civil Society and Land Tenure Reforms
In the recent years, the role of the civil society organisations (volun-
tary organisations and non-governmental organisations) in promoting 
social and economic development is increasingly acknowledged parti-
cularly on land issues. this is partly because of the role of subsistence 
agriculture in providing food security and improved living standards 
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for the rural poor and also given the fact that land tenure reforms 
is essentially a political process as it involves interventions in local 
power relations to the benefit of the poor. 
as in other agrarian settings, two forces in civil society have crys-
tallised in the debates around land tenure reforms in Kenya.  on the 
one hand, we have large land owners association, rich merchants, tra-
ders, and agro-industrial groups, which constitute immensely power-
ful group able to influence the state and donor agencies on crucial 
agrarian policies. these groups are usually against rural poor land as-
pirations as well as other broader livelihoods interests and political re-
presentation with direct relevance to the poor. on the other hand, we 
have the poor groups associations, co-operatives, rural trade unions, 
civil rights groups, rural and agricultural ngo, environmental groups 
and professional associations such as lawyers, women’s associations 
attempting to promote the poor land rights and other wider social 
mobilisations. In the next pages, I examine the place of Kenya Land 
alliance (KLa), a civil society organisation conscious of the social ori-
gins of rural poverty and inequality and which conducts activities to 
improve the agrarian relations in Kenya. 
the KLa was formed in 1999 as a net work of non-governmen-
tal organisations and individuals advocating for a fair land distribu-
tion and policy reforms in Kenya. this network has been particularly 
opposed to the world Banks’ promotion of market led land reforms 
arguing that it seeks to make land “just another commodity” to be 
subjected to the whims of market forces, at the expense of millions 
of landless peasants. for this reason, the KLa has been advising the 
bank to appreciate the results of the assessments of the impact of their 
approach to land reforms and to seek consultations with the rural 
poor most affected by its policies. 
while opposing the world Bank driven land tenure reforms, the 
co-ordinator of KLa particularly argued “what we are discovering is 
that the world Bank is sponsoring land reforms but they are actually 
releasing land to the market place, making it even more inaccessible 
for poor landless people […] we can’t reduce poverty if the majority 
of the landless can’t afford to buy land […] such an arrangement is 
impossible with the diminishing labour market in developing coun-
tries, and could only work if the countries already have industries lar-
ge enough to absorb landless people. If we don’t even have jobs people 
have to subsist on land, which the world Bank is now taking away 
from them. even those employed are already being retrenched (Inter 
Press, 2000).
In the Kenyan context, the KLa has been at the forefront in ad-
vocating for formulation and implementation of national Land Policy 
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and review of land laws as applicable in Kenya. this it has done con-
sidering that the policy, legal and institutional frameworks created in 
the fifties was inappropriate because of the many changes in social, 
political, economic and cultural fronts in Kenya. In mobilising the 
poor to agitate for new land law and policy, the KLa has been decoding 
outdated land legislations into simplified terms and in local languages 
using radios, television stations, theatre, newspapers, seminars, con-
ferences, theatre and in the many memorandums to the national land 
and constitutional conferences.  through these and many others, the 
KLa has not only brought to fore the land law issues of concern to the 
poor but has also created land literacy campaigns on land rights. 
as a consequence, in 2007, the government completed the develo-
pment of Draft national Land Policy for debate by the members of the 
public (okuro, 2007). the draft policy sought to address critical issues 
of land administration, access to land, land use planning, restitution of 
historical injustices, environmental degradation, conflict, unplanned 
proliferation of informal urban settlement, outdated legal framework, 
institutional framework and information management. however, the 
major arguments advanced in the draft policy did not have any real 
departure from the past. In fact, the draft land policy still over relies 
on the unfounded belief that land administration problems can best 
be solved through land adjudication procedures, land registration and 
land allocation systems, land market and the establishment of inde-
pendent, accountable and democratic systems and mechanisms inclu-
ding alternative dispute management system (okuro, 2007).
for example, the draft land policy seeks to modify incidents of 
freehold tenure to; permit family ownership of customary land, en-
courage co-ownership of land acquired during marriage, prohibit sub-
division of land held in the family ownership, remove the principle of 
absolute sanctity of the first registration and to regulate the power of 
the primary rights holders to alienate land in order to ensure that such 
alienation take into account all the other legitimate rights or interests 
held or claimed by other persons over the affected land. however, sec-
tions of land adjudication procedures and processes seem to support 
and encourage land registration. the section affirms that the process 
and the procedure of land adjudication, consolidation and registra-
tion have been slow. to hasten it, the draft land policy has persuasively 
argued for the merger and amendment of Land adjudication act (Cap. 
284) and Land Consolidation act (Cap. 283) to increase the pace of 
implementation of the land adjudication and registration process in 
the remaining parts of the country.
the draft policy has however delivered on certain pro-poor is-
sues that were critical to the civil society organisations as espoused 
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in the report of the national Civil society Conference on land re-
forms. on the land tenure issues and particularly on the land tenu-
re principles, the draft land policy recognised the overlapping land 
rights, gender equity, hIV/aIDs and poverty. to address these, the 
draft land policy sought to take into account multiple interests of all 
land users, co-registration, co-ownership of matrimonial property, 
equal access to land, and promotion of items and principles relating 
to international conventions on women’s human rights relevant to 
women’s property rights. 
on gender equity principle, the draft land policy recognised that 
culture and traditions continue to support male inheritance of family 
land. Moreover, women are not adequately represented in the insti-
tutions that deal with land. their rights under communal ownership 
and group ranches are not defined and these allow men to dispose of 
family land without consulting the women. to address the situation, 
the draft policy adhered to the principle of non-discrimination and 
particularly sought to repeal existing laws and outdated regulations, 
customs and practices constituting discrimination against women in 
relation to land. 
on children, the draft land policy sought to enforce Children’s 
act (Cap. 586) and to review, harmonise and consolidate all the laws 
relating to children’s inheritance of family property in order to protect 
and promote rights of orphans. on matrimonial property, the draft 
land policy promised to among other things, review succession, ma-
trimonial property and other related laws to ensure that they conform 
to the principle of equality between men and women and ensure pro-
portionate representation of women in institutions dealing with land 
at all levels. 
Considering land administration issues, the draft land policy re-
cognised the need to ensure access to timely, efficient and affordable 
land dispute resolution mechanism for the purposes of promoting 
land market, tenure security, and investment in land. to address this, 
the draft land policy sought to integrate all possible land conflict reso-
lution options including negotiations, mediation, arbitration and even 
other traditionally acceptable methods of land dispute resolutions to 
reduce the number of cases that end up in the courts. 
while accepting previous research findings (okuro, 2007, 2008), 
the draft land policy underscored the implications of hIV/aIDs on 
land rights and agricultural productivity arguing “the hIV/aIDs pan-
demic has had significant impact on total economic productivity, spe-
cifically on utilisation and production from land based resources. It 
has tended to affect the most productive age bracket. the pandemic 
thus calls for the reorganisation of rural settlement with a view to 
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rationalising agricultural production system. further, this pandemic 
has adversely impacted on the property rights of widows and orphans, 
who are invariably disinherited of their family land whenever male 
household heads succumb to illnesses occasioned by the pandemic. 
the hIV/aIDs pandemic thus underscores the urgent need to reform 
cultural and legal practices that discriminate against women and chil-
dren with respect to access and ownership of property”(goK, 2007: 
43). to address this, the draft policy sought to review, harmonise and 
consolidate all the laws relating to children’s inheritance of family land 
in order to recognise and protect the rights of orphaned children.  
Conclusion
as a way of conclusion I discuss the challenges facing land tenure 
reforms in Kenya. Land reform is a political process. It involves the 
redefinition of property rights. the redefinition of property rights pro-
duces both losers and winners. as is expected the title owners and lan-
downers will definitely frustrate the process of land reforms. In Kenya, 
the land owners constitute a wealthy class with the power and abili-
ty to influence the process of land reform to their advantage. this is 
not only unique of Kenya. even in countries committed to improving 
access and security of tenure, implementation is often slow, delayed 
or manipulated by the power of vested interests and landed classes. 
this group comprises politicians, legislatures, and top civil servants. 
therefore, for the poor and the landless to succeed they will need the 
support and solidarity of the various forms along with the moral au-
thority of credible partners both domestically and internationally.
Currently, there is a window of opportunity. the vast numbers of 
landless or near landless which are being joined by those displaced 
due to processes of land privatisation of common property, the expan-
sion of commercial agriculture and ethnic land conflicts have forced 
resource rights into national agenda. In fact this has seen the recogni-
tion that an agrarian sector reform is a pre-requisite to economic, so-
cial and political stability. Moreover, enlightened decision-makers are 
beginning to understand the interaction between poverty, land rights, 
and economic development.
the second threat to land reform in Kenya is the institutions that 
are supposed to foster the poor to acquire land. these institutions 
including the state are being controlled by the powerful and the non 
poor.  Can the poor and weak use, transform and benefit from those 
institutions, which were initially controlled by the rich and powerful 
and run mainly in their interest? what alternative or countervailing 
institutions need to be established or strengthened to advance and 
protect the access needs of the poor to productive resources and rela-
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ted upstream and downward services? for example, experience from 
Kenya has demonstrated that even if the representation of the weak 
and vulnerable is increased in land related institutions they still have 
to endure the pressure from the powerful and the male colleagues. at 
the rural level, there will be need to change the village political struc-
ture to support the voice of the poor and their participation in local 
resource distribution institutions. 
the paradox between law and practice also continue as a major 
challenge to land reform in Kenya. governments, policy makers and 
legislators have all clearly acknowledged the importance of customary 
land tenure in practice and the need to somehow incorporate it into 
statutory law in order to avoid the continuing persistence of tenure 
dualism. while this tenure dualism is a challenge, of significance is 
the process of crating formal system of land tenure that is more re-
flective of the actual practice on the ground and also sensitive to the 
inconsistencies and contradictions inherent in customary land tenure 
particularly its gender biases. while gender activists seem hostile to 
customary tenure, it is becoming apparent that as long as the cus-
tomary tenure remain the most dominant tenure in the rural areas, 
customary institutions will still have to play a role particularly in en-
forcing certain statutory provisions. 
It also needs to be acknowledged that policies and laws are not the 
only ingredients required to bring in pro-poor land tenure reforms. In 
the Kenyan scenario, the research finding on the impacts of land priva-
tisation needs to be shared at the rural level before its implementation. 
the Kombewa case demonstrates that despite the remarkable eviden-
ce concerning the disastrous consequences of land registration, more 
villagers continue to ask the government to speed up the process to 
enable them own titles. Perhaps the civil society particularly, the Kenya 
Land alliance will have to play more roles in providing information and 
sensitising the poor towards making informed decisions during land 
registration. however, important to note is that civil society must work 
with and through government institutions and civil society organisa-
tions must seek to engage with and even participate in those same insti-
tutions. as the case of Kenya illustrates, the government, legislators and 
the land owners still conceive the civil society actors as trouble makers 
when they campaign for pro-poor land reforms. 
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3.5. The Macroeconomic Limits 
of Income’s Policy 
in a Dependent Country
The Need and Possibilities for Radical 
Reforms in Social Policies in Argentina 
after the Crisis (2001-2008)
Introduction
this article analyzes incomes policies in argentina. In particular, we 
study the role of social and wages policies during the years 2001-2008. 
In this regard we’ll comment on the effectiveness of policies towards 
the reduction of poverty and show how they are strongly conditioned 
by macroeconomic policy objectives and by argentina’s mode of capi-
talist participation in the world’s economy.
our argument is that the peripherical position of argentina’s eco-
nomy and the correlative policy of undervalued real exchange rate and 
public sector’s fiscal surplus, limit the government’s ability to allow for 
a clearly pro-poor income’s policy (including social and wages poli-
cies). the need for “competitiveness” and foreign debt payments puts 
immediate pressure on wages, incomes and labour conditions for the 
working people.
 * PhD in social sciences, universidad de Buenos aires, argentina, PhD in econo-
mics, université de Paris 13/nord, france. Member of the Centro de estudios para 
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from this framework we propose that argentina’s government fa-
ces two radically different alternatives. on the one hand, accepting long-
term poverty while it attempts to structurally improve the economy’s 
competitive stand on a low wages, low labour rights, low productivity 
development path. this implies accepting not only the current unequal 
distributive structure but also systemic and general social unrest linked 
to the unjust distribution of income and the correlative pervasiveness of 
income poverty. as an alternative, the government could transform its 
social security system in a generalized income distributive program of 
the Basic Income type. such a system may not only put an end to long-
term income poverty, also increasing economic democracy and political 
participation, but may also reduce social conflict to allow for sufficient 
levels of investment and socio-technical innovation.
first we present an analysis of social and wages policies in argen-
tina since the crisis of 2001/2002. then we discuss how the internatio-
nal insertion of argentina’s economy limits the ability these policies to 
reach their objectives. afterwards we present an alternative to today’s 
social and wages policies: the basic income. we discuss its main cha-
racteristics in relationship with argentina’s current situation. finally 
we present some conclusions and the bibliographical references.
Social and wages policies in Argentina
since the crisis of 2001-20021
after the crisis of the Convertibility Program in 2001/2 social and wa-
ges policies have changed greatly in argentina. In the nineties, policy 
interventions regarding extreme poverty were reduced to few and li-
mited programs. In particular, the so-called “plan Trabajar” in its diffe-
rent versions was a program of subsidies for unemployed workers in 
exchange for community work. this program included about 300,000 
beneficiaries by the end of the decade and was accompanied by several 
other marginal social programs. regarding the policies for employed 
workers most of the government’s intervention pointed towards the 
flexibilisation of modalities of work and work-contracts. wage policy 
was restricted to establishing a rule that affectively fixed real wages 
for the members of the manufacturing industries. In other branches, 
nominal (and real) wages actually fell during the latter part of the de-
cade in particular since the crisis begun in 1998.
1  In this article we refer to social policies as public programs and actions that ope-
rate a redistribution of income to the poorest sectors of the labour class. In principle, 
their financing through taxes indirectly affects the mass of profits. wage policies 
attempt to affect the incomes of the different sections of the working class through 
a direct redistribution of income at the point of production. In this case the negative 
impact on profits is transparent.
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as a general rule in argentina during the Convertibility social po-
licy followed the residual and individualized patterned favoured by 
the world Bank while labour policies provided an efficient and effec-
tive limit to wage increases and promoted the precarisation of work 
(féliz, 2005)2.
the hecatomb caused by the end of the Convertibility plan pro-
duced the preconditions for a different type of policy intervention. on 
the one hand, the explosion of social conflict during the crisis created 
a real menace to political stability (Bonnet, 2002). Mobilizations by 
unemployed workers and protests of small bank-deposit holders whe-
re generalized. the final days of the Convertibility where accompanied 
by the resignation and appointment of three different presidents in a 
matter of days. within this context the national government took seve-
ral measures that would change altogether the development strategy. 
the abandonment of the Convertibility plan implied the devaluation 
of the currency, the conversion of all dollar-denominated credits and 
deposits to the national currency (peso argentino) and the establish-
ment of a tax on exports, amongst other changes.
the government to promote political and social stability created 
the program “Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados” (JJhD) for unem-
ployed heads of households. this program extended the benefits of 
the previous Trabajar programs to several hundred thousands benefi-
ciaries within few months. while the program included the obligation 
of community work in exchange for the subsidy this duty was me-
rely nominal. since the main objective was to calm down the political 
unrest (golbert, 2004) the government did little to control the actual 
performance of the counterpart activities formally required (neffa et 
al., 2008).
the magnitude of the program put on the agenda the possibility 
of its extension and transformation into a wider income-support pro-
gram. Pérez et al. (2006) have analyzed this possibility and proposed 
to picture it as the embryo of a Basic Income Program. this was cer-
tainly a possibility since the decree that created it (presidential Decree 
565/2002) stated “all unemployed men and women heads of house-
holds will benefit from the family right to social Inclusion”. howe-
ver, the government elected in 2003 (president nestor Kirchner) deci-
ded to progressively discontinue the program turning it into several 
2  the Convertibility plan was an all encompassing neoliberal program (based on 
the washington Consensus but even more radical) that instated a currency board 
fixing the domestic currency (peso) to the united states’ dollar at a 1 to 1 parity, 
forbidding price and wage indexation, completing a reduction on trade tariffs and 
pushing through a generalized process of privatizations and labour market flexibili-
zation.
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programs oriented towards family support (program “plan Familias 
por la Inclusión Social”; families for social Inclusion or plan Familias 
–for short–) and professional education for the unemployed (program 
“Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo”, sCe; Insurance for Professional 
training and employment), amongst other minor programs.
the main social program would be the plan Familias that was 
meant to replace the program JJhD as an income-support scheme. 
while the recipients of the program JJhD would remain receiving 
$150 a month (about us$50 in 2003) in exchange for community 
work, the plan Familias was oriented towards mothers with many 
children and would receive up to $305 a month (us$101 in 2003) 
for sending them to school and guaranteeing their vaccination. all 
other beneficiaries of the JJhD should either find work (salaried or 
in self-employment) or opt for one of the other programs all of which 
actually required them to participate in a work-project or actively 
search for employment. Between May 2003 and June 2008 the JJhD 
lost 1.36 million beneficiaries (secretaría de empleo, 2008) 599,802 
of which found employment. In 2008 the government expected to 
have 700,000 beneficiaries in the plan Familias two-thirds of which 
would be ex-beneficiaries of the program JJhD (subsecretaría de 
Presupuesto, 2008).
the principal limitations of the new programs were two. first, the 
combination of the plan Familias and the Program sCe resulted in the 
reinstatement of a conditioned world Bank-type income support poli-
cy. while the program JJhD was an universalistic program (in theory, 
and somewhat in practice) that gave unconditioned income support 
(cash transfers) to families in need, the plan Familias and the Program 
sCe –together– put families in the obligation of meeting a participa-
tion criterion that forces women back into their homes to take care 
of their children and men to look for work of any kind (precarious at 
best) to remain beneficiaries. second, in contrast with the pervasive-
ness of poverty and unemployment, the new social programs were still 
greatly insufficient. while the JJhD paid $150 to beneficiaries (equi-
valent to 73% of the individual –not the family’s– poverty line in 2002 
and only 47% in 2008), the plan Familias gave families just 97% of the 
individual poverty line. the Program sCe paid $225 a month to each 
beneficiary (us$71 in 2008), equivalent to about 71% of the individual 
poverty line3.
3  In these estimations we consider the poverty line for an “adult-equivalent” (adult, 
male, between 35 and 55 years of age), while in most cases the actual beneficiaries 
of social program are extended families with many children. this line represented 
about us$100 in 2008.
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It is true that public expenditure has grown significantly in the 
last five years. Public outlays on social assistance expenditures, emplo-
yment programs and unemployment benefits have grown 50% in real 
terms between 2002 and 2006. In relationship with the incidence of 
poverty the increase has been somewhat larger: real expenditures (on 
such items) per poor person have grown 155%. however, they remain 
completely insufficient since social assistance expenditure represents 
just about $103 (us$32) a month per person in poverty and emplo-
yment programs plus unemployment benefits equal $259 (us$82) a 
month for each unemployed worker. In any case, total expenditure in 
these programs topped just 1% of gDP.
Parallel to these social policies the government has implemented 
–since 2002– a new wages and employment policy. after the great shock 
of the Convertibility’s bust that greatly reduced real wages and levels 
of employment, government’s policy in this regard allowed for a per-
sistent recuperation. the improvement on labour’s working conditions 
was allowed by the rapid increase in production, investment and con-
sumption that begun during the second quarter of 2002. this process of 
accelerated valorisation of capital –that lasted until 2008– created the 
objective conditions for the change in the dynamics of wages.
the new policy regarding labour included the increase in the mi-
nimum wage, the renegotiation of collective agreements and, in the 
beginning, an active state intervention by decreeing nominal wage 
increases. the minimum wage was increased from $200 in early 2003, 
accumulating a 158% rise by 20074. according to the Ministry of La-
bour the number of collective agreements negotiated jumped from an 
average of 200 a year before 2002 to more than 1,000 in 2007. During 
the years 2002-2005 the government decided several wage increases 
for salaried workers of the private sector with formal (registered) em-
ployment. these unilateral wage increases pushed up real wages sig-
nificantly for these employees. however, for state employees and for 
private sector workers with precarious (un-registered) employment 
the government policy was much less benevolent. the disparity in 
wage distribution widened significantly. In 2007 real wages for the 
formal workers were 6.7% over its level of 2001 while for precarious 
workers real wages were still 22.4% lower and state employees were 
28.4% below its 2001 level.
this type of intervention was not simply the result of the new 
political ideology of the government or the improvement in economic 
conditions but also the response to growing uneasiness within the la-
4  significantly, while the private sector’s minimum wage increased by 1.5 times in 
real terms in the period, the benefit of the program JJhD remained fixed at $150.
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bour movement (féliz and Pérez, 2007). within the working class the-
re was rising turmoil due to mounting grassroots organization. the 
reduction in unemployment and economic expansion was giving pla-
ce for stronger workers’ organization within the working places outsi-
de the direct control of union directions (Prensa de frente, 2005). the 
government interpreted the situation as troublesome since worker’s 
demands for more rapid increases in incomes were, according to bu-
siness representatives, putting pressure on economic competitiveness 
(e.g., profitability). this conflict manifested in an increasing inflation: 
capital’s attempt to maintain its profit rate and keep wages down re-
sulted in the political need for anti-inflationary policy and control over 
wages and labour conflict (féliz, 2007b: 73-74).
In this context the somewhat pro-labour policy lasted only a couple 
of years, since by mid-2005 the government had taken the decision to 
reduce its pro-labour interventions. the response by the government 
in 2006 was to establish tight wage limits. this limits where to be gua-
ranteed in the agreements between the two labour’s national unions 
(Confederación General del Trabajo, Cgt, and Central de los Trabajadores 
Argentinos, Cta) and employers (private and public).5 the government 
proposed a limit to wage increases equal to 19% for that year and 16.5% 
for 2007. while the official inflation rate was 9.8% in 2006 (down from 
the 12.3% of 2005) many observers (including workers within the offi-
cial institute of statistics InDeC) claimed actual inflation to be at least 
twice as much (ate/InDeC, 2008). In 2007, the rapid improvement 
in labour’s incomes reached its limit (féliz, 2008b). the combination 
of successful repression of non-institutionalized conflicts, tight control 
(at times violent) by union leaders of grass-root movements and the 
difficulties for the creating political alternatives constricted the ability 
of workers to claim a larger share of value added. In 2008 labour’s parti-
cipation in value added stagnated. while it had increased steadily since 
2003, it still remained below its 2001 level (Lozano, 2009).
Argentina after 2002: dependent capitalism
and macroeconomic limitations to pro-labour
social and income policies
as we stated in the introduction we understand that the effectiveness 
of poverty reduction policies is strongly conditioned by macroecono-
5  the Cgt is the main labour organization representing most workers, particularly 
within the private sector. Its leadership lies today in the trucker’s union (Camione-
ros), lead by hugo Moyano. the Cta, born in the early nineties, is composed mainly 
by state employees, professors and teachers. Its current leader, hugo Yasky, comes 
from Ctera (the main teacher’s union).
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mic policy objectives and by argentina’s participation in the world’s 
economy. In fact, the aforementioned restrictions and limitations po-
sed by argentina’s government on social and income policies since 
2002 are closely tied to the characteristics of argentina’s economy af-
ter neoliberal restructuration and its effects on economic policy.
within the peripherical position of argentina’s economy the par-
ticular strategy adopted by governments to confront those limits –and 
the economic policy associated to them– can alter its ability to allow 
for a pro-poor, pro-labour income’s policy. governments are never to-
tal constrained by structural restrictions since they may take policy 
choices that solve some of the immediate social and economic pro-
blems while they help create the conditions to progressively displace 
those restrictions.
an orthodox (neoliberal) strategy –that adapts to structural limita-
tions instead of trying to change them– may restrict the government’s 
ability to move towards growing equality in the distribution of life 
chances, income and wealth. on the contrary, a policy choice that 
confronts existing structural restrictions might be able to move those 
limits, making room for more progressive income distribution and 
inclusive policies. since 2002, the macroeconomic policy choice of 
argentina’s government (devalued currency, public sector’s fiscal sur-
plus, the decision to obtain competitiveness by reducing labour costs 
and the strategy of payment of the foreign debt) has put immediate 
pressure on wages and incomes for the working people also limiting 
the policy alternatives and their efficacy.
argentinean economy is deeply integrated in the cycle of capital 
on a global scale. the biggest capitalist firms are strongly transnatio-
nalized in every branch of production (féliz, 2007b). this is manifes-
ted, in part, in the fact that 80% of exports and a third of all imports 
are generated directly by these firms6. Besides, the strong insertion 
of the local cycle of capital in the world’s cycle of capital is expressed 
in that real exports of goods and services represented 12.8% of gDP 
in 2008 (in comparison with only 6.9% in 1993); real imports grew 
from 9.3% of gDP to 10.5% in the same time span. the jump in inter-
national prices allowed for a greater increase in international trade’s 
participation on gDP: exports represented 23.3% and imports 20.7% 
of nominal gDP in 2008 (6.9% and 9.3%, respectively, in 1993).
this intense integration is profoundly asymmetric. In spite of the 
strong advance in labour productivity during the nineties –the period 
of deep regressive restructuration– argentina’s economy is well behind 
6  the 500 largest firms by sales. source: encuesta nacional a grandes empresas 
(enge) of the Instituto nacional de estadísticas y Censos (InDeC).
Strategies against Poverty
308
the technological frontier in most branches of production. the inter-
national trade of the country shows this. on the one hand, exports are 
concentrated in primary products and its manufactures: they repre-
sented 56.8% of total exports in 2007, without great changes from the 
58.1% in 1998. on the other hand, imports are mostly concentrated in 
inputs and capital goods (76.2% of total imports in 2007 in compari-
son with 76.5% in 1998).
secondly, from the point of view of the circulation of value, the 
distributive structure presents a division of final demand with nota-
ble changes in comparison with the nineties (table 1). these changes 
are the result of the structural transformations that argentina has 
gone through. they have consolidated a pattern of valorisation of ca-
pital based on the super-exploitation of labour and an extroverted 
accumulation (or export-led growth) centred in the exploitation of 
natural goods7.
first, we should highlight the fact that the other face of the super-
exploitation of labour is the reduced weight of popular consumption 
(workers) in total consumption and thus in total demand. as we can 
see, less than a quarter of total final demand is sustained by the value 
needed for the reproduction of the labour force. after 10 years from 
the previous production peak (in 1998) workers have not recovered 
7  we prefer to use the concept of natural goods instead of natural resources. In 
fact, natural resources are natural goods (use-values) turned into capital (values) and 
thus subject to the rules of capitalist valorization.
Table 1
Structure of final demand. Percentage of nominal GDP. Argentina (1993-2007)
Year
Workers
consumption
(a)
Capitalist
consumption
(b)
Investment
(c)
Net exports
(d)
Public sector’s 
deficit
(e)
1993 27.7 41.5 19.1 -2.4 -2.4
1998 22.7 46.4 19.9 -2.5 -0.9
2002 19.3 42.6 12.0 15.0 -0.7
2003 18.8 44.4 15.1 11.2 -2.3
2005 22.5 38.8 21.5 5.9 -3.7
2007 22.9 35.7 24.2 4.3 -3.2
Source: Estimation based on data from the INDEC. (a) We take as workers’ consumption the participation of wages on income, 
deducing the part accrued to the richest 10%. (b) Non-workers consumption is calculated as the difference between total consumption 
and workers consumption. This “non-workers” include those whose income is –as an approximation due to the lack of more precise 
data– strongly derived from surplusvalue (c) Gross fixed investment. (d) Trade of goods and services. (e) Total result of the non-
financial national public sector (NFNPS).
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the level of consumption expenses (in proportion to total value-added) 
of the year 19938.
the super-exploitation of labour represents the reduction of the 
price of the labour force (wages) under its value (cost of reproduc-
tion). Marini explains that this is a typical mechanism in peripherical 
capitalist nations (Marini, 1973). International competition in a si-
tuation of wide inequalities in the access and use of technology com-
pels capitals in peripherical countries to look for alternative means 
to warrant its own valorisation. In this situation the economy creates 
a permanent downward pressure on wages while at the same time it 
tends to increase the value of the labour-power in the peripherical 
country. this occurs because to compete, these capitals increase the 
speed-up of labour (raising the intensity of use). In consequence, the 
cost of reproduction of labour increases, while wages tend do not.
the low level of global expenditure in the reproduction of the la-
bour force is explained mainly by the advancement in the super-exploi-
tation of labour. growing internationalisation of argentina’s capital 
increases the pressures for improving competitiveness. since technolo-
gical innovation takes time, effort (high investment) and socio-political 
stability (something strange to argentina’s recent history) local capitals 
opt for the path of lowest resistance: widespread precarisation of labour 
and super-exploitation. this alternative manifests in levels of incomes 
that, for most of the working families, do not cover the standard family 
consumption basket (sfCB) or even the basic consumption basket9. 
nowadays (early 2009) with –official– open unemployment rates under 
8% of total economically active population, over a third of all families 
remain under the poverty line, and about 80% have incomes below the 
sfCB (about $3,500 a month in 2008)10. to complete the picture, take 
into account that the average wages amounted to $1,617 in 2008 (about 
half the sfCB) and the official minimum wage (that applies only to 
formal workers) reached $1,350.
the historical change in the pattern of appropriation of income 
between classes (from workers to non-workers) has also translated –in 
8  Besides, we must highlight that not only does the working class as a whole appro-
priate of a smaller part of value-added for its own reproduction. this reduced appro-
priation is produced in a context where families turn a growing part of their potential 
labour-power into active labor force for capitalists. the sustained and systematic 
increase in the rate of participation in the labour market –especially by young people 
and women– is a clear manifestation of this.
9  In 2008, the poverty line equalled to about $1,400 (us$ 440) a month for a repre-
sentative family (2 adults and 2 children).
10  representing about us$1,100. source: our own estimations based on official 
data.
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recent years– into a modification in the way of utilization of surplus 
value. In the nineties, the biggest part of the surplus value was desti-
ned to unproductive expenses: the consumption of dominant classes 
represented almost half of the value-added and approximately 2/3 of 
total surplus value (table 1). that is, the realization of surplus va-
lue was oriented towards branches that produced sumptuary means 
of consumption. By contrast, in the present stage we’ve witnessed a 
re-orientation in the use of surplus value towards productive accu-
mulation. while the consumption of dominant classes continues to 
represent the most part of non-necessary value, this proportion has 
been reduced in favour of productive investment.
Increased accumulation rate is mainly the result of the greater 
profitability of capital created through devaluation of the currency11. 
the rate of profit for concentrated capital (500 largest firms by sales) 
was 10% on average between 1993 and 1998. In the period 1999-2001 
it dropped to 7%, jumping to 13% (on average in 2002-2004) after the 
crisis of the Convertibility (table 2)12. on the other hand, the relation-
ship between profits and wages (or rate of exploitation) jumped from 
an average 54% (1999-2001) to 166% (2002-2004); during the previous 
peak (1996-1998) it had reached 80%13.
In terms of the realization of profits, following the kaleckian 
equation, these equal the sum of capitalist (luxury) consumption, in-
vestment, net exports, and public sector’s deficit (Kalecki, 1977). as 
we can see in table 1 in this new stage investment has gained weight 
as a motor of profit realization (increasing from 33% to 41% of total 
surplus). another expansive factor has been net exports that turned 
into surplus, representing (in 2007) 7.3% of the mass of profits. on the 
contrary, luxury consumption lost participation (from 73% to 57%).
In conclusion, the present stage of capitalist development in ar-
gentina reproduces low levels of wages (super-exploitation of labour) 
within a process of valorisation of capital based on an export-led stra-
tegy built on extraordinary profits (and rents) from the intensive ex-
ploitation of natural-goods14.
11  Increasing international prices for argentina’s main export commodities also 
helps explain recent growth. however, this affects only a small part of the economy 
while devaluation has “helped” capital across all productive branches.
12  Capital has been estimated as the value of brute production minus net profits. this 
represents a fair approximation of circulating capital. the profit rate has been estima-
ted as the ratio between net profits and circulating capital. source: enge/InDeC.
13  this is the ratio between net profits of the biggest 500 firms to the mass of wages 
in those firms. source: enge/InDeC.
14  wages in argentina are especially low in relationship to the historical standards 
of reproduction of the labour force (standard family consumption basket) in the 
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this type of non-central participation in the cycle of internatio-
nal capital requires that the valorisation of capital in argentina to be 
sustained by a pattern of international competitiveness based on a 
high real exchange rate (rer). this is the economic policy side of the 
tendency for the super-exploitation of labour.
the real exchange rate depends on the contradictory interaction of 
the ratio of labour productivity and real wages between different 
national spaces of value production (féliz, 2008a; shaikh, 1991). If 
productivity does not increase fast enough in a country, the compe-
titiveness of its capitals will tend to fall in relation to other coun-
tries unless its real wages suffer from relative stagnation. In other 
terms, if workers do not pay for greater competitiveness though 
higher labour intensity and/or exploitation, capital demands that 
they “finance” it by giving up a share of their incomes (féliz and 
Chena, 2006).
Labour’s super-exploitation manifests in the political need to keep 
private sector’s wages growing at no more than productivity’s growth 
while simultaneously keeping an important share of working families 
with incomes under the basic consumption basket. In argentina, after 
5 years (2003-2008) of a gDP that has grown more than 50% in real 
country, not in absolute us dollar terms or in relationship to other countries in the 
region.
Table 2
Rate of exploitation and profit rate. Percentage. Big firms. Argentina (1993-2004)
Year Rate of exploitation Profit rate
1993 55 8.6
1994 72 10.7
1995 69 9.9
1996 80 10.7
1997 87 11.2
1998 74 9.5
1999 51 6.8
2000 63 7.9
2001 46 5.9
2002 172 14.0
2003 141 10.4
2004 185 13.6
Source: Encuesta Nacional a Grandes Empresas (ENGE/INDEC).
Strategies against Poverty
312
terms more than a quarter of the population (29.8%) was still poor in 
2008 (Lozano, 2009)15.
real unit labour costs should fall relatively to the rest of the world 
if the government’s high exchange rate policy is to succeed. If real wa-
ges in the private sector increase more than labour productivity, the 
profits of capital will fall. and with it the competitiveness of tradable 
sectors will fall, especially in manufacturing. If the ratio of wages to 
productivity increases more in argentina than in the rest of the world, 
competitiveness tends to fall.
argentina’s recent experience shows that after the jump in com-
petitiveness due to the nominal devaluation –that successfully turned 
into a real devaluation and reduced real wages– the real exchange 
rate has tended to appreciate (figure 1). this has been the result of 
growing relative unit real labour costs since 2003. while real wages in 
argentina are far lower than in 2001, the increase in industrial pro-
ductivity has been well below the productivity growth in the reference 
country (united states).
the fall in competitiveness –due the revaluation of the domestic 
currency– has impacted in net exports. In spite of higher prices for lo-
cal exports the current account surplus has systematically fallen since 
2003. this has been partially compensated by the increase in internal 
relative prices of goods over services, in particular public services with 
high incidence in industrial costs (féliz, 2008a; shaikh, 1991). the in-
dex of implicit prices between goods and services increased until 2007 
by 48.8% in comparison with the year 2001; however, this index has 
fallen 13.5% since its maximum level in 2003.
this tendency towards the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
brings forward another limitation. Dominant fractions of capital will 
try to displace and contain the sustained increase in the different com-
ponents of aggregate demand that might conspire against the reali-
zation of an external surplus. on the one hand, they will try to limit 
growing wages that increase domestic demand for foods and fuels, 
something that may reduce net exports substantially. on the other 
hand, and more importantly quantitatively and qualitatively, the inter-
nationalization of local capital turns it into a strong source of demand 
for imported inputs and capital goods. the relative deterioration of 
net exports is consistent with this evaluation. thus, accumulation 
argentina’s economy confronts another structural limit to the sustai-
ned growth on real wages and improvement in labour conditions. In-
come policies (in particular, regarding wages) soon face the structural 
15  In 1998 –with lower real gDP and lower productivity in manufacturing produc-
tion– poverty incidence was only 18% on average.
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restrictions posed by exchange rate (competitiveness) policy within 
the periphery.
a further restriction of the dependent capitalist reproduction on so-
cial and incomes policies comes from the need to obtain a public sec-
tor surplus big enough to make room for public debt obligations and 
the Central Bank’s strategy of accumulation of international reserves. 
this signals the continuity between the new so-called neo-develop-
mentalist model (2002-2009) and the old neoliberal one (1991-2001). 
the primary fiscal surplus is the reflection of the remaining weight 
of financial capital, which still acts as the general representation of 
capital’s interests (féliz, 2007b).
far from “lip service” by the government to the growing auto-
nomy of the economy vis-à-vis its creditors, the payment in advance 
to the IMf and the Paris Club (in 2005) have only created the illusion 
of autonomy. In fact, together with restructuring most of the foreign 
debt (in 2005) the reconfiguration of the relationship with foreign cre-
ditors just created the necessary conditions for a different division of 
surplus-value between productive and financial capital.
Figure 1
Tendencial (rulc) and measured (rer) real exchange rate. Argentina (2001-2008)
Source: Féliz (2008b). Note: the rer is estimated as the actual nominal exchange rate divided by the producer price index for industry. 
The tendencial rer (rulc) expresses the evolution of relative real unit labour costs between Argentina’s manufacturing industry and the 
United State’s manufacturing industry both corrected by the evolution of the relative prices of goods and services in both countries.
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after the crisis of the Convertibility the continuity of capital’s va-
lorisation required the devaluation of all capital, including fictitious 
capital (e.g. financial debt) created during the nineties and the transi-
tion period (2002-2003). Before the 2005, public debt (mostly foreign, 
in international currency) reached 137% of gDP on average (between 
2002 and 2004). from 2005 onwards, it fell steadily to reach 55% of 
gDP in 2007, a level equivalent to that of 2001. the devaluation of fic-
titious capital of about 33% is approximately the same suffered in the 
international value (in us dollars) of domestically produced commo-
dities (nominal gDP) in the period immediate after to the fall of the 
Convertibility (féliz, 2008a, 2007a)16. the appropriation by internatio-
nal financial capital of more than 10% of gDP in concept of interest 
payments was clearly socially non-viable –in capitalist terms– since it 
represented close to half the surplus-value available for accumulation 
in 2001-2002.
If the capital flight in the late nineties was no more than the res-
ponse of capital to growing difficulties for continual valorisation, the 
positive inflow that begun in 2005 ascertained that the restructuration 
of debt was necessary for financial capital to contribute again to re-
create the fundaments of its own valorisation. this does not mean, 
however, that this form of capital has lost against other forms of (pro-
ductive) capital. In fact, the policy of fiscal surplus registers adequa-
tely the actuality of the power of financial capital.
the origin of such surplus, destined to the accumulation of inter-
national reserves and interest payments, shows its class-fundament. 
It is usually stated that taxes on exports are a key element in today’s 
public sector’s surplus. In fact, in 2007 these rights on exports accoun-
ted for 79.5% of the non-financial national Public sector’s primary 
surplus. however, this surplus is mostly the result of the absolute and 
relative reduction real wages of state’s employees. they have fallen, in 
comparison with 2001, in absolute terms (at least 15%) and relative 
terms (in relationship to real gDP growth).
In the short run the existence of a boom in international prices, 
coupled to the real devaluation of the currency, allowed the govern-
ment to partially contain the contradiction between surplus (finan-
cial capital’s interests) and public employee’s wages. high commodity 
prices let the government obtain extraordinary finance that comes 
from abroad. the existence of extraordinary rents in the branches 
of intensive exploitation of natural goods has reduced the pressure 
16  the dollar price of nominal gDP fell by 41% between 2001 and 2004 (féliz, 
2008a).
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that the growing employee’s demands put on the primary surplus.17 
when these rents fall because of falling international prices (and it’s 
already happening) and demand and/or growing domestic costs, the 
possibility of a renewed adjustment in the public sector will increase 
considerably.
this section shows that argentina’s mode of participation on the 
cycle of global capital affects the level of wages and the conditions of 
labour’s reproduction while at the same time severely restricting the 
room for social and income policies. the main conclusions so far are:
1. argentina’s current economic regime creates a pattern of circu-
lation of value that globally limits the participation of workers 
in total income. within this restriction, the current high-profits/
rents export led model favours investment over sumptuary con-
sumption.
2. surrounded by this global restriction, in argentina peripheral ca-
pitalist competition pushes the reproduction of labour to the edge 
of the precarisation of living conditions. this appears under the 
form of super-exploitation of labour: wages do not keep up with 
the social cost of reproduction of labour, thus the increasing rela-
tive poverty and stagnating absolute poverty levels.
3. argentina’s peripherical insertion on the cycle of global capital 
tends to enhance the contradiction between increasing wage stan-
dards and preserving capital’s competitiveness. this creates infla-
tionary pressures and a tendency for the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.
4. Dependence on global financial capital creates a pressure on 
argentina’s government to maintain a significant primary public 
budget surplus. this contradicts the demands of public employees 
for higher wages and the increasing claims for social expenditu-
res (in particular, in the form of income-support or cash-transfer 
programs).
Alternatives in social policies: from the neo-liberal 
agenda to a pro-labour radical proposal 
within this context we propose that argentina’s government faces two 
main alternatives. on the one hand, the current situation of accepting 
long-term relative (and absolute) poverty while it attempts to structu-
17  It is important to highlight that rents from natural resources are not caused by 
external forces such as high international prices. these generate additional pressures 
to redistribute the already existing rents, which are caused by the monopoly power 
over certain resources.
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rally improve its competitive stand on a low wages, poor labour rights, 
low productivity development path. this implies accepting not only 
the current structure of income distribution but also a systemic and 
general social unrest. the short-run alternative is to transform its so-
cial security system into a generalized income redistribution program 
of the type of a Basic Income. such a system may not only put an end 
to long-term income poverty but may also –as we will discuss– redu-
ce social conflict to allow for greater levels of investment and socio-
technical innovation. Moreover, in our opinion the latter choice could 
create the basic conditions for the further, deeper transformation in 
socio-economic and political structures that bind argentina to the afo-
rementioned peripherical, dependent capitalist development path.
this alternative proposal is not just a theoretical option but also 
the demand of many social and political organizations in argentina. 
since the mid-nineties social movements born from the agitation and 
opposition to neoliberal policies have favoured and fought for chan-
ges in income policies. their opposition to the world Bank’s choice 
(focalized income support or cash transfers for the deserving poor) 
has led them progressively to engage in a political battle to impose on 
the state the alternative of non-conditional, universal income grants 
(cash transfers). amongst these organizations and their proposals we 
may refer to the frente nacional Contra la Pobreza (frenaPo, natio-
nal front against Poverty), the Central de los trabajadores argentinos 
(Cta, argentina’s second largest national trade union confederation) 
and the frente Popular Darío santillán (fPDs, Popular front Darío 
santillán)18. In early December 2001 –a few days before the so-called 
“Battle of Buenos aires” (Dinerstein, 2002) that ousted president De 
la rua and ended Convertibility– the frenaPo carried out a Popular 
Consult to promote a universal income benefit (cash transfer) for each 
children under 18 years of age; about 2 million people voted in favour 
of this proposal in the consult (Página/12, 2001). the Cta –a foun-
ding member of the frenaPo– has carried on with the proposal onto 
the present (Cta, 2005). finally, the fPDs has been proposing for se-
veral years now the implementation a basic income (unconditional 
cash transfer) for all families –including those in unemployment– and 
more recently a universal income equal to the basic consumption bas-
ket (fPDs, 2009). In 2009 there are several parliamentary proposals 
to implement a particular form of these programs, which have recei-
18  the fPDs is a social organization of new type comprising movements of unem-
ployed workers, university students, salaried-workers, peasants and social, cultural 
and political activist and collectives. Born in 2005, the fPDs has more than 2,500 
members in several provinces of argentina.
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ved support –or at least lip service– by most candidates in argentina’s 
most recent national elections.
argentina’s social security (ss) has been since its origin tied to 
the dynamics of the labour market. the financing of social security 
came mainly from the contributions from labour, paid by workers and 
capitalists in different proportions. By the mid-eighties this contri-
butions amounted to more than 35% of the payroll. however, by that 
time it became clear that the system was impossible to finance on its 
original bases. the growing pauperization (first relative, then abso-
lute) of the working class since the late fifties threw the system into 
financial collapse. the first impulse had been to patch the system with 
additional funding from other sources (income taxes, import duties) 
without altering its essence. In the nineties the domination of the neo-
liberal agenda proposed a twist: to privatize the system altogether as a 
way to salvage it. however, the results were horrendous and gave pla-
ce to its re-estatisation in 2008 (CenDa, 2008). the new reforms have 
not backed off –however– from the main structural transformations 
of the old system: increased years of working life and postponement 
of retirement age.
In general, the debate regarding recent changes did not include the 
criticism to the theoretical background of social security reform. Priva-
tization as well as re-estatisation had both been justified on a particular 
way of understanding the production and circulation of value in a ca-
pitalist economy. the basic idea is that value is something that can be 
accumulated and transferred in time. for that reason, it is understood 
that social security is some sort of indirect-wage payment, and labour 
and capital’s taxes for social security simply set aside funds to finance 
future ss payments. according to the standard vision, social security 
contributions have a certain value that  –transferred in time (as if on a 
time machine)– will finance future benefits for today’s contributors.
the standard view is inspired in a pre-marxian comprehension of 
value that sees it as a thing or material substance (friot, 1999). on the 
contrary Marx proposed –and we concur–value is not something that 
can be stored and transferred in time (féliz, 2008c). Value is produced 
and reproduced by today’s labour applied to capitalist production for 
it is, above all, a social relation. this means that all taxes destined to fi-
nance social security are merely a deduction from current surplus va-
lue (for current consumption) and not a means for transferring value 
to the future. this understanding is the basis for the proposal of basic 
income (BI) as an alternative to current social and income polices.
the creation of an unconditional income allowance (cash trans-
fer) or BI has been widely analyzed (for example, Lo Vuolo, 1996; ra-
ventós, 1999; Pérez et al., 2006; elgarte, 2008). the idea is to guaran-
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tee a minimum income to every member of the population regardless 
of their condition of employment, age or gender.
the BI is not just an income support program for the poor. the 
idea is not to locate a particular group of people in need (“the poor”) 
above of the poverty line. the BI implies a radical program of redis-
tribution of income to guarantee a minimum level of access to goods 
and services through unconditional income or cash transfers for each 
and every person in the country.
to us its most important justification is the growing socialization 
of labour and production. since social production is –increasingly– the 
result of socialized labour, it is evident the need to disengage income 
(and thus survival) from direct participation in production processes 
(abstract –value producing– labour) and concrete working activities. 
as society has become really subsumed in capital, even unemploy-
ment and reproduction activities are really part of social labour (ne-
gri, 2001). for that reason, today all labour is part of the production of 
value19. thus maintaining the direct tie of wages and salaried labour 
(as if this were the only necessary labour) contradicts the real process 
of abstraction of labour in modern capitalism20. greater socialization 
of production with the private appropriation of income and use-values 
entails a growing irrationality (since it lacks arguments to support it) 
and contradiction (since it accentuates the opposition between the 
possibilities and the reality of capitalist society)21.
a BI program implies and requires a massive deduction of resour-
ces from current surplus value. In general, the concrete alternatives 
propose to begin with a BI for every child under 18 years of age and 
the elderly over 70 years of age. our own estimations for argentina 
put the gross redistribution at roughly 9.8% of gDP –in 2004– for an 
unrestricted, population-wide BI (Pérez et al., 2006). In this case, the 
income for consumption of the wealthiest would have to be reduced in 
about 23%22. the poorest 20% of the population would see its availa-
19  of course, not all labour directly produces surplus value. however, all social 
labour is necessary for its direct or indirect production and circulation.
20  this process of real abstraction implies that all labour tends to become necessary 
labour. In fact, not only “manufacturing labour” creates value but all labour actually 
becomes really subordinated under capital and thus needed for capital’s reproduc-
tion. for that reason wages can no longer be the only means of paying for surplus-
value producing labour, which now pervades society as a whole.
21  as pointed out by Álvarez Leguizamón (2005), hayek also proposes a similar 
system but on a very different argument. hayek’s idea has more in common with 
friedman’s negative income tax proposal than with the BI proposal.
22  the estimation is a gross estimation of the amount needed to provide for a BI 
equal to the indigence line for all argentinean inhabitants. It does not take into ac-
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ble income increase 3.4 times23. In the case of argentina such redistri-
bution would not imply –in principle– the reduction in the rate of ac-
cumulation. as we’ve seen, dominant classes use a substantial portion 
of surplus value for their luxury, non-necessary consumption. In fact 
this is the other side of sustained income inequality in the country: the 
income of the upper 10% of the population is 28.7 times greater than 
that of the bottom 10% in 2008 (increasing from 22.8 times in 1998) 
(Lozano, 2009). this program could be financed completely from redi-
recting luxury consumption without directly affecting the profit rate.
the BI proposal would significantly reduce inequality by increa-
sing the bottom half of the distributional pyramid. since unequal 
distribution of income is one of the main sources of socio-political 
conflict (figueroa, 1998; rodrik, 1998), socio-political instability 
would be reduced, favouring investment, innovation and thus accu-
mulation. of course, the BI will not eliminate capitalism’s inherent 
social class conflict but improved general living conditions will facili-
tate social changes and innovations that could then be discussed in a 
framework not restricted by the fear of hunger or income poverty. In 
a way, social freedom will be enhanced (Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 
1986; offe, 1995).
furthermore, the reduced compulsion to work for a living will 
makes room for lower direct demands for higher wages. since BI 
would displace immediate needs from debate, workers would be able 
to put on the bargaining table of collective negotiations –with better 
leverage– the duration of labour time and working conditions. Direct 
wage costs would then be contained –in the short run– thus allowing 
for greater competitiveness, paid for not by work precariousness but 
by redistribution of socialized production24.
count the fact that a significant number of them would return this amount in paying 
higher personal income taxes. on the other hand, if the BI were equal to the poverty 
line our estimate put the gross redistribution at roughly 21.5% of gDP in 2004 (Pérez 
et al., 2006). this estimation does not take into account the higher personal income 
taxes paid and the fact that it would cancel itself out with some currently existing 
benefits for employed, salaried people (such as the benefit for child support).
23  argentina’s government has recently (late 2010) extended the benefit for child 
support to the children of the unemployed and a portion of the self-employed. while 
this has provided income support for more than 3 million children under 18 years of 
age, the implementation of the program implied the elimination of several other be-
nefits for poor families (such as the plan Familias), it is not generalized to the whole 
population and it is not unconditional. see Barrera (2009).
24  the implementation of a BI proposal may requiere some reforms in argentina’s 
health and educational system. since after neoliberal reforms both systems have been 
heavily privatised, the proposed redistribution may put pressure on prices in both 
services. the government would have to push forward reforms to decommodifie their 
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the BI proposal will produce other important, although contra-
dictory, effect. By greatly increasing income security the BI will redu-
ce compulsion to work. In capitalism the cost of unemployment is the 
main reason of the employers’ power, the BI will enter in conflict with 
the main means of coercion of the system. reduced fear of unemplo-
yment (actually, of its costs to workers) will improve labour’s bargai-
ning conditions and thus radically change the dynamics of capitalist 
enterprises, reducing the ability of capital to create and appropriate 
surplus-labour (value). thus, even though it might create the condi-
tions for greater economic democracy (by enhancing labour’s ability 
to achieve its political organization) the BI will face the generalized 
resistance of the dominant classes. this is a very important point in 
the discussion. the BI will create objective conditions for more eco-
nomic democracy meaning that it will give workers (the majority of 
the people) greater possibilities to decide –with less compulsion– on 
matters of the social organization of production, working conditions, 
etc. society will be able to move a step forward from the “autocracy 
of capital” in the work place and in society, letting people have more 
freedom to participate on the political organization of social produc-
tion. however, since vertical –non democratic– organization of the 
production process –at the level of the individual enterprise as well 
as at the level of society as a whole– is the basis of capitalist political 
organization, even the faintest possibility of a BI will face significant 
opposition from dominant classes.
In any case, this proposal implies a very different conception of 
social security and will not pass without political dispute. the social 
and political organizations that have proposed it will have to struggle 
against common sense and the ideological and material hegemony of 
the capitalist class.
Conclusions
we analyzed the structural restrictions that social and income poli-
cies in argentina face due to its peripherical position in global capital. 
these restrictions pose serious limitations to the possibilities of tra-
ditional wage and income policies for they contradict the imperative 
of capital’s need for valorisation. while this necessity applies to every 
capitalist economy, in the case of peripherical nations –such as argen-
tina– it creates an insurmountable obstacle unless profound, progres-
sive and pro-labour changes in economic policies are put forth.
provision. this would imply further contradictory political pressure on the upper (do-
minant) classes. I wish to thank an anonymous referee for stressing the need to ak-
nowledge this fact.
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however, even within the peripherical international insertion a di-
fferent kind of social policy intervention can be used with greater suc-
cess: a basic income policy. even though such a policy does not lack res-
trictions and it is not unproblematic –particularly in political terms– it 
could not only attack (and even put an end to) income poverty, it would 
also provide with improved conditions for democratic social transfor-
mations. since the BI proposal could be financed at no direct or imme-
diate cost to accumulation, it could clearly provide with a road allowing 
for higher accumulation, lower political instability, greater economic 
democracy and no income-based social exclusion. this –of course– will 
enter in direct contradiction with the current organization of society 
and create a different sort of political commotion.
By actually eliminating income poverty, this allowance will allow 
working families to dispose of more time for free self-development 
by demanding lower working time. the expansion of disposable time 
would open the path to more ample radical/revolutionary (“pro-poor”, 
“pro-labour”) social changes, as organized active political participa-
tion will also have greater room for action. this alone –in our humble 
opinion– is sufficient motive to struggle for it.
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3.6. State Failure, Poverty 
and Productive Structure
while there is growing literature addressing state failure, in this paper 
we intend to show that there is a strong link between states failing, 
poverty and the productive structure of an economy that has not been 
previously addressed in state-collapse literature. we show that reali-
zing this connection has been an important feature of both nation-
building and development since the renaissance. and last, we argue 
that in order to address both state failure and poverty, academic as 
well as policy discourse should re-focus its attention on industrial po-
licy. we argue that without establishing increasing returns activities 
in failing or failed states, poverty-alleviation programs from foreign 
aid to Millennium Development goals are bound to remain palliative 
in their effect.
Introduction
when german economist Johann Jacob Meyen stated in 1770 that “it 
is known that a primitive people does not improve their customs and 
institutions later to find useful industries, but the other way around”, 
he expressed something which could be considered common sense at 
the time. we find the same idea –that civilization is created by indus-
trialization or, to put it more specifically, by the presence of increa-
sing returns activities– prevailing in the development thinking from 
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renaissance economic writings to the nineteenth Century in thinkers 
across the whole political spectrum from abraham Lincoln to Karl 
Marx. Industrialization “draws all, even the most barbarian nations, 
into civilization” as Marx puts it. what might be called the historical 
development consensus saw, in other words, the aim of development 
in the creation of middle-income economies –with all the accompan-
ying values and culture– that in turn were perceived as highly condu-
cive to further sustained developement. however, as figure 1 shows, 
the creation of middle-income economies has become a true rarity in 
the last three decades.
a closer look at the post world war II development dynamics in de-
veloping countries shows an almost L-shaped growth path (figure 
2). while the decades immediately following the war up to the mid-
seventies can be seen as relatively successful, the subsequent era 
brought significantly lower and flattening-out growth rates. In the two 
thousands, another positive growth trend seems to have started but 
the jury is still out on how much of this was caused by speculative 
bubbles fueled by financial globalization and how much is sustainable 
growth. It seems, however, relatively safe to assume that at least the 
Figure 1
Growth rate of GDP per capita of selected world regions; regional average in selected periods between 1820 and 
2008, in 1990 international dollars
Source: data for 1820-2001 is extracted from Maddison, 2003; and data for 2002-2008 is extracted from The Conference Board and 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, June 2009, <http://www.conference-board.org/economics>.
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positive trends in eastern europe were caused by massive and unsus-
tainable debt-led growth strategies (Kattel, 2010).
Figure 2
Growth rate of GDP per capita of selected world regions; regional average in selected 
periods between 1950 and 2008; in 1990 international dollars
Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, June 2009, 
<http://www.conference-board.org/economics/>.
however, while poverty and states collapsing are not phenomena pe-
culiar to the last decades, it can hardly be a coincidence that the poo-
rest billion on earth live in persistently non-performing states. Foreign 
Policy’s failed states index currently lists up to 60 states as failed or in 
danger of failing1. while there is growing literature addressing state 
failure2, in what follows, we intend to show that there is a strong link 
between states failing, poverty and the productive structure of an eco-
nomy that has not been previously addressed in state-collapse literature. 
we show that realizing this connection has been an important feature 
of both nation-building and development since the renaissance. and 
last, we argue that in order to address both state failure and pover-
1  for 2009 and previous rankings of the failed states, see : <http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index>.
2  for instance, Di John (2008) offers an excellent overview and discussion of state-
failure literature, also of the problems defining state collapse and non-performance; 
see also hesselbein et al. (2006). walle (2001) offers an interesting and useful discus-
sion of the role of foreign aid in state failure.
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ty, academic as well as policy discourse should re-focus its attention 
on how to “find useful industries” for development. we argue that 
without establishing increasing returns activities in failing or failed 
states, poverty-alleviation programs from foreign aid to Millennium 
Development goals are bound to remain palliative in their effect. (see 
easterly, 2008 for an opposing view).
In what follows, we do not attempt to define precisely what is 
state failure or collapse; instead, we utilize di John’s continuum of 
fragile, crisis and failed states: “a ‘fragile state’ is a state significantly 
susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems. […] a crisis 
state is a state under acute stress, where reigning institutions face se-
rious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and 
shocks. […] we define a ‘failed state’ as a condition of ‘state collapse’, 
e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and develo-
pment functions and that has no effective control over its territory 
and borders” (2008). we use the abbreviation fff (failing, fragile and 
failed) states to denote this continuum. we argue that along this con-
tinuum, the existing literature on state failure and fragility has missed 
perhaps the key element in the equation: the link between governance, 
poverty and productive structure.
Lost Theoretical Insights from US Secretary
of State George Marshall
More than sixty years ago, on June 5, 1947, us secretary of state geor-
ge Marshall gave a speech at harvard university announcing what was 
to be called the Marshall Plan3. the Marshall Plan was probably the 
most successful development plan in human history, re-industrializing 
and industrializing countries from norway and sweden in the north to 
greece and turkey in the south-east. at about the same time, a similar 
process based on the same principles re-industrialized and industria-
lized east asia, spreading from Japan in the north-east towards the 
south-west. In this way, a cordon sanitaire of wealthy countries was 
created around the communist world, stemming the communist tide 
that was rising at the time of Marshall’s speech. one country to benefit 
from the Marshall-type ideology was south Korea, a country that in 
1950 was poorer (gDP per capita estimated at us$770) than somalia 
(gDP per capita estimated at us$1,057 according to Maddisson, 2003), 
which today is an example of a failed state (see figure 3 below).
although sometimes it is misunderstood as a scheme for giving 
away huge sums of money rather than a re-industrialization scheme, 
3  a transcript of the speech is available on oeCD website: <http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html> .
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the Marshall Plan is well-known. what is less known is that the relati-
vely short speech contained three key theoretical insights, with strong 
relevance in today’s situation.
the first insight is the link between a certain type of productive 
structure and what george Marshall calls “modern civilization”, what 
in a more politically correct and neutral language today could be ca-
lled “development and democracy” (emphasis added):
“there is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and 
serious. the farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange 
with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of la-
bor is the basis of modern civilization. at the present time it is threate-
ned with breakdown. the town and city industries are not producing 
adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer”.
Figure 3
Korea-Somalia, GDP per capita, 1950-2008, in 1990 international dollars
Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, June 2009, 
<http://www.conference-board.org/economics>.
During the formation of the european nation-states, it was common 
knowledge that democracies and “civilization” were both products of 
certain economic structures associated with “city activities” (reinert, 
2009a). It was not lost on enlightenment europe that the first demo-
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cracies –Venice and the Dutch republic– were also the states where 
artisans and manufacturing were the dominant professions. agricul-
tural states meant feudalism and lack of political freedom. already in 
1613, Italian economist antonio serra identified the “glue” that crea-
tes the common weal of cities and nations as being a large division of 
labor in activities that are all subject to increasing returns (i.e. falling 
costs as volume of production goes up, which excludes agriculture) 
(serra, 1613; reinert and reinert, 2003). this phenomenon could be 
observed as city-states grew first into dynamic urban agglomerations, 
then into nation-states.
Marshall’s second insight regards the vicious circles that are crea-
ted in societies without manufacturing activities (emphasis added):
“the remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the 
confidence of the european people in the economic future of their 
own countries and of europe as a whole. the manufacturer and the 
farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange 
their product for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open 
to question”.
It is notable that Marshall used the term “vicious circle”, which 
became fashionable only later – in the fifties and sixties – with develo-
pment economists like gunnar Myrdal.
Marshall’s third insight is that development assistance must provi-
de a cure rather than a mere palliative:
“such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal 
basis as various crises develop. any assistance that this government 
may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere pa-
lliative. any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery 
will find full cooperation”.
Marshall’s speech points to the fundamental feature of capitalism: 
change. this change is only poorly reflected in standard economics. 
financial crises are just one of the many things that happen in real 
life, but cannot happen in standard textbook economics. from the 
standpoint of Joseph alois schumpeter (1883-1950) –austrian eco-
nomist and harvard economics professor who spent much time at 
harvard Business school–, “equilibrium” is the opposite of economic 
development. equilibrium theory therefore fails to reflect many of the 
mechanisms of industrial and economic dynamics that create econo-
mic welfare.
what from a long-term perspective may look as relatively smoo-
th curves of economic development are in reality the result of explo-
sive productivity changes in a small number of industries. figure 4 
shows an early example of such a “productivity explosion” from a 
breakthrough innovation: that of cotton-spinning in the late eighte-
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enth Century when annual labor productivity rose by more than 25% 
annually for a brief period.
Figure 4
An early productivity explosion: the mechanization of cotton spinning
Source: Reinert (2009c).
at the time, the common sense of economics was for nations to at-
tempt to get industries behaving like this inside their borders. Produc-
tivity explosions create a system of triple rents: profits are high, wages 
rise, and the government tax-base grows. In its essence, colonialism 
was a system that prohibited such production activities –industry in 
general– from being carried out in the colonies. at the time of this 
early productivity explosion, this prohibition of manufacturing was a 
main motive for the united states’ Independence in 1776.
today we experience a similar productivity explosion in the com-
puter industry. Moore’s Law tells us that, since the late seventies, the 
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capacity of the computer chips doubles roughly every 18 months, 
creating an upward curve like the one of the cotton industry in the 
eighteenth Century.
also the activities –even technologically pedestrian ones– that are 
near the productivity explosion may achieve triple rents. the task of 
cutting and preparing cables to the computer industry grew up geo-
graphically close to the computer industry itself when the volume was 
low and prices not a big issue. Based on the growing demand, howe-
ver, even low-tech industries may achieve economies of scale and run 
down the learning curve (see figure 5).
figure 5 attempts to make a fluid classification system for econo-
mic activities sorted according to their abilities to create triple rents 
(high profits, high wages, large tax base). Black, at the top, marks 
a situation of temporary monopoly from a new innovation. white, 
at the bottom, marks a situation of “perfect competition” which is 
the “ideal” situation in neo-classical economics with “normal” or no 
profit. the problem is that economic theory only defines pure black 
(monopoly) and pure white (perfect competition) well, while very 
Figure 5
Learning curve of best-practice productivity in medium-grade men’s shoes, United States (1850-1936)
Source: Reinert (1980).
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few activities stay long in any of these positions. Industrial dynamics 
take place in the various shades of gray areas where theory has little 
precise to say.
the gravity in the system (from black to white) is produced by 
imitators of the original idea and general productivity developments, 
and under some circumstances –as when a patent expires– the fall 
can be very fast (the price of a medicine may suddenly drop by 90%). 
some innovations, like the container, are born towards the white end, 
but the container was important to other industries because transpor-
tation costs were reduced.
the various factors that create gravity and gravity resistance are 
listed in figure 6. the position of a nation’s export activities –at what 
level (at what shade of gray)– in figure 6 will be highly determinant 
for the real wages of that nation. Baseballs for the us national sport 
have not experienced innovation in the final assembly operations for 
a century.
this is still 100% manual work. the world’s most efficient baseball 
producers are in haiti and honduras, where their wages are between 
us$0.50 and us$1 an hour. the wages in the national service sector, 
the librarians or the firemen of haiti, will have wages in line with the 
producers in the export sector. the world’s most efficient producers 
of golf balls, on the other hand, are in new Bedford, Massachusetts, 
where the average industrial wage is us$14 per hour. Baseballs are a 
high-tech product that needs to be located near the engineers.
when haiti exports baseballs to the united states and imports 
golf balls, the country exchanges 28 hours of labor (at 50 cents an 
hour) for one hour of labour in the united states (at us$14 an hour). 
these mechanisms are not captured in international trade theory, sin-
ce this theory operates on the basis of bartering labor hours –all of the 
same quality– alone.
If we wish to explain the difference in gDP per capita between 
somalia and Korea – where somalia was a richer country than Korea 
until the fifties (figure 2 above)–, the main explanatory variables are 
found in these same forces. In this paper, we argue that the root cau-
ses of poverty lie in a certain type of economic structure which fails to 
produce the virtuous circles of economic growth that need increasing 
returns and sufficient diversity and diffusion of economic activities 
in order to become self-sustainable. Increasing returns produce ba-
rriers to entry into an economic activity, which again allow a degree of 
imperfect competition that produces capital accumulation. we argue 
that economic development requires dynamic imperfect competition 
under increasing returns, rather than the standard assumptions of 
perfect competition and diminishing returns.
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Figure 6
The quality index of economic activities
Source: Reinert, 2007.
Innovations
new technologies
Dynamic imperfect competition
(high-quality activity)
Shoes (1850-1900)
Golf balls
Automotive paint
House paint
Shoes (2000)
Baseballs
Perfect competition
(low quality activity)
Characteristics of high-quality
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 • new knowledge with high market value
 • steep learning curves
 • high growth in output
 • rapid technological progress
 • necessitates and generates learning-by-doing
 • imperfect information
 • investments come in large chunks/are divisible (drugs)
 • imperfect, but dynamic, competition
 • high wage level
 • possibilities for important economies of scale and 
scope
 • high industry concentration
 • high stakes: high barriers to entry and exit
 • brandes product
 • produce linkages and synergies
 • product innovations
 • standard neoclassical assumptions irrelevant
Characteristics of low-quality activities
 • old knowledge with low market value
 • flat learning curves
 • low growth in output
 • little personal or institutional learning required
 • perfect information
 • divisible investment (tools for a baseball factory)
 • perfect competition
 • low wage level
 • little or no economic of scale/risk of diminishing returns
 • fragmented industry
 • low stakes: low barriers to entry and exit
 • commodity
 • produce few linkages and synergies
 • process innovations, if any
 • neoclassical assumptions are reasonsable proxy
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During the decades following world war II, world development fo-
llowed the strategic outline of the 1947 Marshall Plan, the principles 
of which also were at the core of the 1948 havana Charter, signed by 
all members of the united nations at the time. these principles were 
abandoned in the eighties, however, and at the end of a sequence of 
unsuccessful “Development Decades” the Millennium Development 
goals were launched. these are –in the view of the authors– heavily 
biased towards palliative economics, treating the symptoms of pover-
ty rather than addressing its root causes.
Ibn-Khaldun: Pre-Industrial Rent-Seeking
as a Zero-Sum-Game
Muslim historian and philosopher Ibn-Khaldun (1332-1406) described 
society’s development from the nomadic tribes of the desert, organi-
zed in clans originating in blood relationships, to agriculturalists and 
ultimately into town dwellers. the town dwellers decay into luxury; 
as their wants increase, the city must resort to constantly increasing 
taxation. resenting the claims of their clansmen to equality, they rely 
for aid on foreign supporters, who become necessary because of the 
decline of clansmen as warriors. thus the state grows decrepit and 
over time becomes the prey of a fresh group of nomads, who undergo 
the same experience. In Ibn-Khaldun’s pre-industrial setting, history 
logically becomes a cyclical sequence of tribal wars –with foreign su-
pporters– fighting over the static and non-productive rents that accrue 
to the nation’s or region’s capital.
Pre-increasing returns and pre-common-weal productive sys-
tems specialized in raw materials create a type of feudal political 
structure. But even where there is no real feudalism involved, as in 
some african agriculture today, the state seems to continue the ex-
traction of economic surplus characteristic of colonialism, giving 
very little back. sharing economic growth becomes a fundamental 
issue in the identification of responses to poverty alleviation. un-
der such conditions pre-capitalist production structures and politi-
cal structures are very durable, and probably for some good reasons 
(see also north et al., 2008). the absence of an increasing returns 
sector creates zero-sum-game societies of static rent-seeking4. these 
4  It is, however, important to note that increasing returns can today easily characte-
rize knowledge-intensive services as well. In manufacturing industry today outsourced 
low-end activities are often subject to constant or negative returns to scale and have 
a very limited scope for learning. what used to be a simple system where manufactu-
ring activities are always “good” has developed into something more complex, but the 
key characteristics of “good” activities remain the same: increasing returns, imperfect 
competition and a large scope for learning and technical change (reinert, 2007).
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nations are prime candidates for developing into failing, failed and 
fragile (fff) states.
Indeed, as gregory Clark argues in his A Farewell to Alms (2007), 
the world before the industrial revolution and that of today’s failed 
states is characterized by what he calls a Malthusian trap: higher stan-
dards of living bring increasing population growth that without sig-
nificant productivity increases lowers the standards of living back to 
subsistence level. In many ways, today’s poorest countries are worse off 
than ever before in history. as Clark argues, “the subsistence wage, at 
which population growth would cease, is many times lower in the mo-
dern world than in the preindustrial period. […] given the continued 
heavy dependence of many sub-saharan african countries on farming, 
and a fixed supply of agricultural land, health care improvements are 
not an unmitigated blessing, but exact a cost in terms of lower material 
incomes” (2007: 45). there are essentially two options to escape the 
Malthusian trap: decreasing population or significant and continuous 
productivity increases (through diversification into increasing returns 
activities). we have argued that the genocide in rwanda cannot be un-
derstood except from this perspective (reinert, 2007).
It is increasingly clear that there is a strong connection between 
economic growth and states failing or not failing. as Paul Collier ar-
gues, “civil war is much more likely to break out in low-income coun-
tries: halve the starting income of the country and you double the 
risk of civil war” (2007: 19). however, in the same book, Collier goes 
on to argue that “globally, we now know what produces productivity 
growth in manufacturing: it is competition” (2007: 160). this repre-
sents a startlingly simplistic view from someone who repeatedly has 
admired east asian economies, those that have escaped the bottom 
billion of poorest people on earth in the last century. Clearly, produc-
tivity increases alone do not solve the problem of poverty; the fruits 
of productivity increases may easily disappear as lowered prices to 
foreign customers (singer, 1950; reinert, 2007). In order to remain in 
the producing country, productivity increases must take place inside 
the synergies of a finely woven web of diversified economic activities, 
all subject to increasing returns (a “national Innovation system”). a 
lack of competition and growth does not explain state failure. It is ra-
ther, as we argue, the lack of the specific composition of the economic 
structure that characterizes all rich and middle-class nations. failed, 
failing and fragile states exhibit decidedly different economic structu-
res compared to developed countries5. the fff states have common 
5  another important aspect in state failure and fragility is the fast pace of urba-
nization in many poor regions of the world (Davis, 2006; unhsP, 2003). these are 
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economic factors that distinguish them from e.g. Canada, finland, 
norway, germany or singapore.
we have argued that economic retrogression –a development pro-
cess in reverse– is a common phenomenon that requires much more 
attention than it actually gets (reinert, 2007). the former soviet repu-
blics in Central asia, as well as Moldova and Mongolia offer examples 
of how ill-guided liberalization (premature exposure to global free tra-
de) can reverse the long-term processes of building productive forces 
in few years. with the breakdown of the soviet union and following 
rapid liberalization of trade and economy in general, most Central 
asian countries transformed within few years from relatively deve-
loped countries to fragile and poor states that by now often exhibit 
feudal patterns of political and socio-economic behavior (see reinert 
et al., 2009 for further discussion and data).
It is also exceedingly important to understand the qualitative di-
fference between developed states and fff states when it comes to ab-
sorbing “wealth shocks” from oil, mining and other natural resources 
into the economy. Developed countries normally manage to integrate 
these activities into their innovation systems, while the same type of 
activities in fff states tends to create economic enclaves that are iso-
lated from the rest of the economy.
historically the forces that broke the Ibn-Khaldunian circle of 
rent-seeking tribal violence were the simultaneous development of a 
large division of labor and the growth of increasing returns industries. 
with these activities, the national capital became an asset to the coun-
tryside and viceversa: the nation-state was no longer a zero-sum-game. 
nations displaying these types of characteristics became the first de-
mocracies (Italian and Dutch City states).
three main periods could be identified for increasing divergence 
between fff states and industrialized countries:
•	 the divergence among regions was marginal during the first pe-
riod, i.e. from 1000 to 1870, ending with the geographical seg-
urban agglomerations where increasing returns are few and limited in scale and sco-
pe. the rise of such slums in poor countries indicates an interesting phenomenon: 
state failure and fragility are often preceded, or at least accompanied, by failure and 
fragility of cities. In fact, such failed cities often survive on resource-based activities 
from the country-side (large-scale agriculture, natural resources such as minerals, 
mining, etc.) and petty commerce (often selling imported goods). state and city 
failures reverse the development logic (the city does not support surrounding areas 
but vice versa) and thus create huge dependencies and vicious circles. In these hu-
man settlements, many survive in illegal activities and lodgings that enforce the 
vicious circles.
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mentation of the colonial world among former colonial powers 
(see also Clark, 2007: 303-370).
•	 During the second period, between 1870 and 1950, developing 
regions such as africa, Latin america and asia (excluding Ja-
pan) were unable to boost their gDP per capita on a sustainable 
basis. an important explanation for this is colonialism, which 
at its very core has been a technology policy prohibiting ma-
nufacturing in the colonies (reinert, 2007). asymmetry among 
those regions is mainly due to the fact that the developing re-
gions which managed to become economically independent or 
directly integrated in the productive structure of the regional 
economic locomotive (such as Japan for asia) could gradua-
lly re-appropriate their economic wealth using friedrich List’s 
theory of “productive powers” (List, 1856: 394). whenever vi-
sionary leaders succeeded in promoting industrialization and 
public goods for their respective populations, the country or 
the region experienced a convergence with industrialized coun-
tries in terms of gDP per capita, share of manufacturing value 
added (MVa) in gDP and growth of MVa per capita (see reinert 
et al., 2009). Bad governance –a phenomenon accompanying de-
industrialization or lack of industrialization– usually leads to 
a convergence among fff states that represents a race to the 
bottom (see also Collier, 2007: 53-63).
•	 Between 1950 and 2001, economies with the optimal productive 
structures in place benefit from the gradual acceleration of the 
globalization process. the globalization shock that started in the 
eighties accelerated the divergence between poor fff economies 
and rich industrialized countries: nations that had achieved a 
dynamic increasing returns economy above a certain threshold 
prospered (forging ahead), while those below that threshold 
were made poorer by globalization (falling behind). In parallel, 
middle-income economies, even though sometimes considered 
fragile –are gradually experiencing a convergence with the world 
average.
In sum, the gap between the poorest and the richest countries in the 
world has grown from a 4:1 ratio in 1800 to more than 50:1 today. 
(Clark, 2007: 319-320).
The Need for a Holistic View of Economic
and Political Structures
six main differences distinguish today’s approach to economic develo-
pment –as represented by the washington Institutions– from previous 
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theories of development process (renaissance to Marshall Plan). 
today’s theories fail:
1. to approach economic development from a multidisciplinary 
standpoint, as was done in the german tradition of Staatswis-
senschaft;
2. to study and tailor-make policy-recommendations to the specific 
context in which a nation finds itself (insisting that “one size fits 
all”);
3. to observe and classify qualitative differences between economic 
activities (e.g. increasing or diminishing returns, perfect or im-
perfect competition, etc.);
4. to investigate differences between the productive structures of 
nations;
5. to conceive of development as a dynamic synergetic phenome-
non propelled by self-reinforcing mechanisms (e.g. Collier’s static 
development “traps” compared to the dynamic virtuous and vi-
cious circles of classical development economics);
6. to understand the role of the state in economic growth from any 
standpoint other than “market failure”.
these weaknesses are all reflected in the standard methodology of 
economics today (see also Clark, 2007: 145-147). In particular the last 
assumption leads to a highly simplistic juxtaposition of free market 
vs. government intervention. such a dichotomy fails completely in its 
understanding of how real markets work: markets are often bundles 
of rules, institutions, regulations, enforcements (or lack thereof), and 
thus represent highly intricate webs of transaction costs and externa-
lities that create context-specific motivators for particular economic 
behavior. the failure to understand this, in turn, leads to an overly 
simplistic understanding of the role of state and particularly of pu-
blic administration in development (see further below). this leads to 
policy solutions and advice (“get the institutions right”) that are often 
completely alien to the country they are meant to help (Doornbos, 
2002; fukuyama, 2004; rodrik, 2007).
the important trend of divergence between fff states and in-
dustrialized countries today appears to be a major source of global 
concern, and this should not simply be reduced to security-related 
issues. In 1950, singapore was poorer (gDP per capita estimated at 
$2,219) than Peru (gDP per capita estimated at $2,263, see figure 7 
below). a clear indication of a non-failed state is its ability to perform 
productive activities within a system rewarding institutions suppor-
ting growing value-added achieved through industrial diversification 
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under increasing returns. our contention is that any policy aiming at 
preventing nation-states from failing should –in order to avoid trea-
ting mere symptoms rather than causes– include an analysis of how to 
make the productive structure of such states resemble the structure of 
developed ones. the overall approach of the Millennium Development 
goals should be revised to include productive structure as the core 
variable (reinert, 2007: 239-270). Poor countries ought to emulate the 
productive structure of rich countries, not their economic policies.
Common economic characteristics of failing states are, among others, 
very few if any urban increasing returns industries, very little division 
of labor (i.e. monoculture), no urban middle class bringing political 
stability, no important artisan class that is economically independent 
engaged in commodity competition (perfect competition) in their ex-
port activities, a comparative advantage in supplying cheap labor to 
the world markets, and a low demand for educated labor combined 
Figure 7
Peru-Singapore, GDP per capita, 1950-2008, in 1990 international dollars
Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, June 2009, <http://www.
conference-board.org/economics/>.
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with a very low level of education. this complex of symptoms can-
not be cured by attacking isolated symptoms: a focus on education 
will tend to increase the brain drain rather than improving the eco-
nomic structure, as the local demand for jobs requiring education is 
so low. all symptoms must be attacked simultaneously through the 
only solution that has proved historically viable: that of changing the 
underlying economic structure.
It can be observed that a productive system specialized in raw 
materials sometimes creates a type of feudal political structure. But 
even where there is no real feudalism involved, as in some african 
agriculture, the state seems to continue the extraction of economic 
surplus, characteristic of colonialism and post-colonialism (walle, 
2001). these states based on static rent-seeking can only give very litt-
le back to the community at large: instead of being the hub of increa-
sing returns and value creation, the capital city becomes a parasite 
on the rest of the nation. under such conditions, pre-capitalist pro-
duction structures are very durable, and probably for good reasons 
(Collier, 2007: 34). such neo-feudal structures easily produce fff sta-
tes because of their inability to upgrade the production structure: the 
industrial policy tools of the Marshall Plan and the havana Charter 
have in effect become outlawed, and the artisan/industrial class is too 
weak to induce a change in this direction. enlightenment economics 
of the eighteenth Century clearly distinguished between “parasitic” 
administrative capital cities, surrounded by inefficient agriculture, 
and “synergy-creating” industrial capitals surrounded by efficient 
agriculture. spain’s Madrid was the classical example of the former 
kind of capital and Lombardy’s Milan of the latter. as george Marshall 
stated “the synergy between city and countryside forms the core of 
economic development”. and we must not forget that in order for this 
system to work, the countryside’s city customers must be part of the 
same labor market as the farmers themselves. farmers’ customers in 
faraway countries cannot trigger these mechanisms.
the positive-sum game between city and countryside referred to 
by george Marshall can only be created through a large division of 
labor and increasing returns. only then the “common weal” that was 
the goal of Italian renaissance City states can be observed, and only 
then the state ceases to be a parasite that takes away in taxes more 
than it brings back. this synergy-based understanding of successful 
states is found already in florentine state theory, with Brunetto Latini, 
in the thirteenth Century. In order to escape pre-capitalist zero-sum- 
games –negative-sum-games from the point of view of the subsistence 
sector–, the nation-state must operate under synergic increasing re-
turns. the argument of increasing returns was, according to schum-
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peter, also a key argument in eighteenth Century national economic 
policy promoting industrialization.
we suggest going back to the literature at the time when early 
viable states with some kind of democracy were created. In giovanni 
Botero (1588), and in the tradition of “ragion di stato” (Staatsraison 
or Reason of State) created by him, there are clear links between eco-
nomic structure and the viability of states. Botero’s Ragion di Stato 
and Sulle grandezze delle Cittá (“on the greatness of Cities”) are, after 
all, parts of the same work. this tradition was continued by eighteen-
th Century social scientists, including Montesquieu. as one german 
author said at the time “it is not so that a primitive people becomes 
civilized, and then founds industries, it is the other way around!” frie-
drich List brings this eighteenth Century argument into the nineteen-
th Century, linking manufacturing and “civilization” directly. already 
in early german social science, Veit Ludwig von seckendorff (1626-
1692) found that germany did not have the economic basis to create 
a society like the one observed and so admired in the Dutch republic. 
seckendorff’s approach to making the state function better was inti-
mately tied to changing the economic basis of the state itself, its mix 
of professions and industries and their geographical relocation within 
the realm. In the tradition started by seckendorff, the Fürsten (Prin-
ces) were turned into modernizers by arguing that their Recht (right) 
to govern was accompanied by a Pflicht (duty) to modernize and, in 
effect, in the long term create the conditions where the Fürsten in the 
end would be obsolete and the conditions needed for a functioning 
democracy would have been created. a successful Principality carried 
with it the seeds of its own destruction and the birth of democracy.
the first wealthy states with some kind of republican rule were 
often islands, like Venice and the Dutch republic. the absence of ara-
ble land both led to an absence of a feudal structure and contributed 
to the creation of a diversified economic structure including activities 
subject to increasing returns. this makes florence, with power also 
by landowners, so interesting. there the corporazioni (guilds) and the 
burghers fought for power among themselves, but very early (twelf-
th-thirteenth Century), they had banned the families that owned the 
land around the city from participating in politics (these continued to 
trouble florence for centuries through alliances with other cities).
there is, then, a long history of trying to move the vested interests 
of the ruling class from land into manufacturing. the rulers, who had 
a manufacturing strategy, also tend to have a policy against the lan-
ded nobility, starting with henry VII in england in 1485. the goal of 
converting the “useless” landed nobility into a useful one was an im-
portant reason for Johann heinrich gottlob von Justi’s appointment 
343
Erik S. Reinert, Rainer Kattel and Yves Ekoué Amaïzo
in Vienna in 1752, and for the establishment of the Theresianum the-
re. sometimes, however, the urban non-feudal modernizers lost, as in 
the War of the Comuneros in spain in 1520-1521. this kind of strife 
between landed upper classes –with their economic interests vested 
in diminishing return activities and the generally urban classes pro-
moting artisans and manufacturing– has been very common over the 
last 500 years. the politics of economic development evolve around 
these crises. the us Civil war was one such conflict of interests when 
the manufacturing north defeated the raw-material producing south. 
In many ways, the history of Latin america is the history of nations 
where the “south” has won the civil wars, and where the military, at 
times, have sided with a weak industrial bourgeoisie and contributed 
to creating development.
Palliative Industrialization: from Primitivization
to “de-industrialization”
De-industrialization as an accident, or alternatively as a planned pro-
cess of colonialism, should always be considered to be an integral part 
of our understanding of fff states. the international community’s 
focus on palliative economics –on “development aid”– rather than 
on wealth creation may push economically fragile states towards the 
failed-states group. Particularly in africa, top-down policies aimed at 
“fixing” developing countries’ problems, have produced poor results 
and many failures. (see e.g. easterly, 2001; Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009). 
at the core of the problem of these washington-Institution policies is 
the failure to perceive the activity-specific nature of economic develo-
pment: it does not take off in the absence of increasing returns and the 
synergies created around them. there is an urgent need to reverse the 
counterproductive policies that the washington Consensus establis-
hed in many weakly industrialized countries.
Based on a continuous policy of industrialization starting in the 
late forties, China and India have stubbornly improved their industrial 
structure and productive capacities and capabilities, based on an eco-
nomic policy diverging from the one advised by the so-called washing-
ton Consensus. the present relative success of these nations cannot be 
understood without taking into account more 50 years of industrial po-
licy in both India and China. without a re-definition that puts industrial 
policy at its core, the Millennium Development goals will fail, being 
overly palliative rather than constructive. when the g8 group of coun-
tries calls for “an improvement of global investment climate as well as 
taking the social dimension of globalization into account”, they must go 
one step further and re-introduce the building of productive structure 
in fff states as a means both to create profitable investment oppor-
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tunities anD to improve the social conditions in these states. only a 
changed economic structure will start a process leading them to beco-
me middle-income countries. after all, it is the fragile countries that are 
suffering the most from the globalization process (see e.g. Collier, 2007: 
79-96). approaching the problem exclusively by attempting to alleviate 
the collateral effects of poverty implies failing to address the root of the 
problem. attacking the symptoms of poverty and conflict rather than 
its causes prevents security- and peace-building processes and increa-
ses the cost of building trust in fff states. this “palliative economics” 
in effect produces a new type of colonialism, which we have dubbed 
“welfare colonialism” (reinert, 2006). while the world-Bank models 
normally assume full employment, employment is what africa needs 
most of all. In order to create employment, the vicious circle of “no pur-
chasing power” and “no productive power” must be broken. studying 
500 years of the history of economic thought, we argue that the only 
way to escape this type of vicious circle has been through heavy doses 
of industrial policy (reinert, 2009b).
Just as in eighteenth Century Latin america, africa achieved de-
colonization but not real independence. Keeping africa deindustriali-
zed also carries a huge price tag, both in terms of human suffering and 
in monetary terms. according to the International Crisis group, “civil 
war in a low-income country costs that country and its neighbours on 
average 42 Billion euro in direct and indirect costs. that is for a single 
conflict. to put that in perspective, the worldwide aid budget in 2004 
was 60 Billion euro”.
Conclusion
the policies of the washington Consensus precipitated a process of 
de-industrialization in many poor countries, from Mongolia via afri-
ca to Latin america (reinert, 2004; 2007). this process, strengthened 
by the many “conditionalities” imposed on these countries, weakened 
their productive agglomerations, making them more fragile. Contem-
poraneously with an effort to build peace and security in fff states, 
the process of deindustrialization produced exactly the opposite effect 
to the one desired: the creation of a system of vicious circles of re-
ducing wealth, employment and the middle class. the centuries-old 
understanding of the relationship between the “urban sector” and “de-
mocracy”, so well explained by george Marshall, was lost: the divi-
sion of labor between the farmer and the city dweller (agriculture and 
manufacturing) “is the basis of modern civilization”.
In post world war II europe, the Marshall Plan followed the 
Morgenthau Plan, a plan to de-industrialize germany. reinert (2004) 
argues that the free trade shocks promoted by the washington Insti-
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tutions in practice created a Morgenthau Plan, a de-industrialization 
plan, for the world periphery, starting in the late seventies. now is 
the time to start a real Marshall Plan for the de-industrialized third 
world, but recognizing that probably the most important element of 
the Marshall Plan –without which the transfer of funds would have 
been much less efficient– was that the Plan was accompanied by tariff 
autonomy. heavy industrial policy interventions, including prohibiti-
ve tariffs and import prohibitions, were key elements in the recons-
truction of europe after world war II. africa, starting from a much 
weaker base than europe did, will probably need an even stronger 
tonic of policies. Pan-african economic integration must be incorpo-
rated into any such long-term policy.
the virtual absence of a manufacturing sector seems to explain 
the lack of convergence between the fff least industrialized coun-
tries and industrialized countries. Improving industrialization and 
knowledge creation needs an enabling governance system with a 
strong policy capacity. trade in diminishing returns activities without 
knowledge production is not sustainable, and the economics of failed, 
failing and fragile states must be re-engineered with a performing pro-
ductive structure.
at the core of fragile, failing and failed states (fff) is a producti-
ve system where the glue that creates national unity in a positive-sum 
game is missing: a large increasing returns sector with a large division 
of labor (i.e. many different professions and manufacturing activities). 
the relation between economic structure and political stability and 
peace –or instability and armed strife– was well understood during the 
enlightenment (reinert, 2007, 2009a). as long as this key relationship 
is not recognized, long-term peace building and poverty alleviation 
will fail. 500 years of historical record is crystal clear.
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